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For Lanfranco and Giulia, my grandparents, 
who still exist 
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Existence is mysterious. It is rich and complex as shown by its laws;  
it is what in the end the whole of what thinking and acting is about. 
Yet, it seems redundant and empty 
H.-N. CASTAÑEDA 1974 (1989): 247 
 
 
I am afraid that, to those who are unacquainted with the doctrine of philosophers  
upon this subject, I shall appear in a very ridiculous light, for insisting upon a point so evident, 
as that men may barely conceive things that never existed. 
They will hardly believe, that any man in his wits ever doubted of it. 
Indeed, I know no truth more evident  
to the common sense and to the experience of mankind 
T. REID 1785 (1969): 405 
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Introduction 
How do Obama, Socrates, my merely possible twin and Sherlock Holmes differ from one 
another? One could easily answer that there are some strong qualitative differences between 
them: Obama is the current President of  the United States, he has a wife named Michelle and he 
is now dealing with difficult political and economical problems. On the other hand, Socrates was 
an important philosopher, he was Plato's teacher, he died in 399 B.C. after an unfair trial and he is 
now remembered as one of  the most important "philosophical heroes". My merely possible twin 
perhaps resembles me in several physical respects, even if  he (or she?) is perhaps my evil twin – 
or maybe I am his (or her?) evil twin. Finally, Sherlock Holmes is a famous detective: he has a 
friend named Watson, he lives in London, he once died after a fight at the Reichenbach Falls with 
his brilliant enemy Moriarty, even though he resurrected (or he never died?) and resumed his 
battle against the crime. 
 But wait... is this everything we can say about their being different entities? Furthermore, 
are they entities at all? Do they truly have all those features that I have ascribed to them? Well, it 
is difficult to deny that Obama is an entity: even if  I have never met him, I cannot doubt that he 
performs many activities during the day, that he has great powers as the President of  the United 
States and that he can influence the course of  the world. I strongly believe that Socrates existed 
too, even though I cannot now talk with him (I would really like to!): unfortunately, he is now 
dead, he does not exist anymore – or perhaps he does not exist anymore in this world. Does he 
now have the property of  being a philosopher? Yes and no: we all claim that Socrates is a great 
philosopher, even though he is not doing philosophy now. My merely possible twin could have 
existed. Yet, s/he does not actually exist: I am an only child. It is true that s/he could have been 
similar to me, even though it seems that s/he is not actually similar to me. Finally, what about 
Sherlock Holmes? He never existed, he does not exist now and, according to many ontologists, 
he cannot exist at all: he was created by an English writer, Arthur Conan Doyle, as a fictional 
character, he does many things in many stories and I greatly admire him for his intelligence. Yet, 
if  there were a murder in Macerata, I had better not suggest that the Italian police should ask for 
his help.  
 Yet, if  it is acceptable to claim that Socrates does not exist anymore, that my merely 
possible twin does not actually exist and that Sherlock Holmes does not exist at all (and that 
perhaps he  cannot exist), is it true that they have some features? Is it legitimate to assert that 
there are objects that once were philosophers, that are now greatly admired, that are fictional 
characters, and that nevertheless do not exist? Furthermore, what does it make it true that 
Obama (now) exists, that Socrates once existed and that he does not exist anymore, that my 
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merely possible twin does not actually exist, even though s/he could have existed and that 
Sherlock Holmes does not exist at all? In sum, what is it for something to exist or not to exist? 
Are there things that exist and things that do not exist? 
 In this dissertation, I shall try to answer such questions. It seems to me that we have 
conflicting commonsensical views on existence and non-existence. On the one hand, it seems 
that we attribute some sort of  being to everything to which we attribute properties: if  there were 
nothing such as Sherlock Holmes, how could we assert that Sherlock Holmes is such-and-such? 
Yet, on the other hand, it seems nevertheless legitimate to assert that there are things that exist 
and things that do not exist: Sherlock Holmes is something that seems to be different from 
Emma Bovary, even though both Sherlock Holmes and Emma Bovary do not exist. Is the 
conjunction of  these intuitions inconsistent? Are we justified in holding them?  
 This dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part, I have tried to deal with the 
status quaestionis concerning existence and non-existence. In the second part, I have developed a 
theory of  existence and non-existence according to which, roughly, (i) there are both things that 
exist and things that do not exist, (ii) existence is only a first-order, informative property (i.e., only 
a property of  objects that is instantiated by some objects and that is not instantiated by other 
objects) and (iii) it is legitimate to attribute (in some peculiar way) many properties to many 
things that do not exist.  
 In the first chapter of  the first part (I.1. Prologue in Heaven: the Ontological Argument) I shall 
deal with many of  the aforementioned problems by examining the problem of  the validity of  the 
ontological argument for the existence of  God. I shall examine four versions of  the argument 
(two versions provided by Anselm and the ones provided by Descartes and Gödel) and several 
classical and contemporary objections. It seems that Anselm assumes that there are objects that 
merely exist in the mind and that do not really exist. Yet, God cannot be one of  such objects, 
since it would be contradictory to assert that God is the greatest conceivable being and that He 
does not really exist. Descartes justifies this conclusion by asserting that existence (or real 
existence) is a perfection, i.e., a first-order property. It seems that there are things that do not 
exist or that do not really exist, so that they do not have this perfection, but God cannot be one 
of  such things, since He has every perfection. Gödel remarks that only necessary existence is a 
positive property of  objects, i.e., a perfection, so that God necessarily exists. 
 Yet, Kant famously argued that existence adds nothing to the whole concept of  
something: it merely "posits" that thing with all its predicates. Thus, existence cannot be 
considered a first-order property, such as the property of  being a man or of  being someone's 
brother: perhaps it cannot be considered a property at all. Yet, if  existence is not a property that 
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objects can possess or lack, what is it that makes some negative existential statements (e.g., 
"Sherlock Holmes does not exist") true? Furthermore, is there any kind of  mental existence that 
merely mental objects have and that is different from real existence? More generally: are there 
kinds of  existence at all? Are there things that necessarily exist? What is it for something to 
necessarily exist? 
 In the second chapter (I.2. What are we talking of ? Existence and Reference) I shall deal with 
some problems that typically arise when one considers the relationship between the reference of  
terms and existence. In general, it seems that we can assert something true about non-existents. 
Yet, what do terms such as "Sherlock Holmes", "Emma Bovary", "Bilbo Baggins" refer to, 
provided that it seems also true that Sherlock Holmes, Emma Bovary and Bilbo Baggins do not 
exist? Furthermore, given that there are true positive and negative existential statements (such as 
"Obama exists" and "Sherlock Holmes does not exist"), what does make them true? If  we accept 
that propositions are primary truthbearers, do we need to assert that these statements do not 
express propositions such as [Obama exists] and [Sherlock Holmes does not exist]1, provided that 
[Obama] and [Sherlock Holmes] must refer to Obama and Sherlock Holmes – who does not 
exist – in order for such propositions to be true? In fact, given the Fregean Principle of  
Compositionality, the reference of  a complex such as a statement or a proposition, i.e., the True 
or the False, is determined by the reference of  their constituents and by the rules used to 
combine them). On the other hand, are we justified in simply asserting that there are true positive 
and negative existential propositions, that are made true by something not involving Obama qua 
object and Sherlock Holmes qua object? Or: are we justified in asserting that, at least in the case 
of  true negative existential propositions, such propositions are made true by something that does 
not involve non-existents qua objects?  
 After having presented some data and some problems (e.g., the problem of  the 
distinction between existence-entailing and non-existence-entailing predicates and properties, the 
ambiguity of  statements such as "Sherlock Holmes is a detective", and so on), I shall examine the 
classical theories defended by Brentano, Frege, Russell, Moore and Meinong. I shall also briefly 
recall some classical objections that have been advanced against them.  
 Later on, I shall discuss two theses: 
 
(actualism) there are no objects (more generally, no items) that do not exist; 
 
(actualism-a) existence is not a first-order and informative property. 
 
 These theses are strictly connected, so that many philosophers accept both (actualism) 
                                                 
1 I shall adopt the convention according to which: (i) propositions are put into square brackets in order to distinguish 
them from the statements that express them; (ii) constituents of propositions are also put into square brackets. 
11 
 
and (actualism-a). On the other hand, other philosophers (e.g., Meinongians) reject (actualism), 
but some of  them accept (actualism-a). Finally, there are philosophers who partly accept 
(actualism) and partly reject (actualism-a), at least given two different interpretations of  the 
predicate "exist".  
 In considering the first group of  philosophers, I shall first deal with Ryle's and Quine's 
theories. More recently, other proposals have been presented by Chakrabarti (who has revived 
some typical Carnapian theses), some Neo-Russellians (Cocchiarella, Landini, Orilia), Kripke and 
van Inwagen, Sommers, Vallicella and Azzouni. I shall not deal with the more general 
metaontological debate about the genuineness of  existential questions in metaphysics, since it 
seems to me that such a debate is too vast and deep to be examined here. By claiming that there 
must be something in the world that makes some positive and negative existential propositions 
true, I shall assume that existential questions in metaphysics are genuine and that they cannot be 
only dealt with from a linguistic and/or a metalinguistic perspective, i.e., by only examining the 
use of  the predicate "exist" within and across different linguistic frameworks. I cannot give here a 
proof  of  the genuineness of  such questions. Yet, it seems to me that those who introduce 
contexts and frameworks in order to leave non-existents out of  their ontologies should deal (at 
least) with the problems of  the identity conditions and of  the ontological status of  such contexts 
and frameworks.  
 I shall try to criticize (actualism) and (actualism-a) by remarking that: if  they are mere 
assumptions, it seems legitimate to assert that they are false or at least questionable, since there 
are some data that seem to conflict with their truth and we do not have any valid reason (except 
for the acceptance of  (actualism) and (actualism-a) themselves) for denying such data; if  they are 
not mere assumptions, they are not adequately justified; there are some internal and (at least 
according to my perspective) insurmountable problems within each actualist strategy. 
 Moreover, I shall present the positions of  those who do not accept (actualism). Following 
Berto (2013a), I shall distinguish three different kinds of  Meinongianism: property-centered, 
instantiation-centered and world-centered Meinongianism. Each kind of  Meinongianism has its 
own internal problems and, in general, it seems to me that Meinongians require too much from 
non-existents. Contrary to what is asserted by many Meinongians, one could perhaps deny that 
non-existent objects are mind-independent and nevertheless admit that they are objects that do 
not exist. In this part of  the chapter, I shall present McGinn's theory too. 
 Finally, I shall examine a "third way" between actualism and non-actualism, that has been 
proposed by Geach and, more recently, by Miller. According to Geach, there is at least one use of  
the predicate "exist" that makes it legitimate to assert that not everything exists – even if  there is 
12 
 
another use of  that predicate according to which everything exists. From Miller's perspective, 
existence is a first-order and really important property, even if  he does not actually believe that 
there are objects that do not exist.  
 In the third chapter (I.3. The Importance of  Being (Non-)Existent), I shall explore in depth the 
problem of  true fictional statements, i.e., of  true statements that seem to be about fictional non-
existent objects. Our data will comprehend several kinds of  such statements and I shall examine 
four different kinds of  theories that try to deal with them: Meinongian theories, make-believe 
theories, Thomasson's artifactualism and Voltolini's syncretism. The theory of  fictional objects 
that I shall present in the second part of  this dissertation summarizes several important aspects 
of  these theories and tries to solve some problems that are connected to them.  
 Finally, in the fourth chapter (I.4. The Times and Worlds they are (a-)changin'), I shall first 
present some data concerning seemingly true intuitions about contingent existence and non-
existence and existing objects' substantial change. It seems true that many existents only 
contingently exist and that many non-existents only contingently do not exist. How can we 
interpret such intuitions in order to ground the truth of  true modal existential statements? It 
seems that we should use possible worlds. Yet, what are possible worlds? And how can we accept 
(from an actualist perspective) the fact that possible worlds – that are existing items – seem to be 
identified by referring to non-existent items? Furthermore, if  we accept that there are non-actual 
possible worlds in which non-actually existing objects exist, how can we justify the intuition 
according to which such objects do not only need to exist in other possible worlds, but they need 
to be possibly existent in the actual world too? Is the distinction between de re and de dicto 
possibility with regard to such objects ontologically justified from a non-actualist perspective? 
Does it help to solve the aforementioned problems? 
 With regard to the ontology of  time, I shall consider the problem of  accounting for 
substantial change, i.e., the fact that objects start and stop existing. In general, presentists can deal 
with this problem in a better way than non-presentists, even if  those presentists who accept 
(actualism) have to solve other difficult problems, e.g., the problem of  providing present 
truthmakers for truths about merely past objects. 
 In the second part of  the dissertation, I shall present and defend some theses about 
existence and non-existence. The first chapter (II.1. One and Many: Objects and Properties) 
constitutes an ontological introduction to the rest of  this speculative part of  the dissertation. I 
shall accept a two-category ontology, comprehending both objects (in a wide sense) and 
properties, roughly characterizing the items belonging to the former category as what cannot be 
predicated of  (and instantiated by) anything else and the ones belonging to the latter category as 
13 
 
what can be predicated of  (and instantiated by) something else. Furthermore, I shall defend an 
abundant conception of  properties, according to which it is not legitimate to claim that there are 
some predicates that do not denote any property at all and necessary coextension among 
properties and/or the fact that some properties are more natural than other properties are not 
sufficient reasons to set some items that seem to be properties out of  our ontologies. Finally, I 
shall justify the acceptance of  negative facts and negative properties into my ontology.  
 The second and the third chapters present the core of  my theory. In the second chapter 
(II.2. Existence: about a Genuine Property) I shall defend the following theses: 
 
(a) the predicate "exists" in true positive existential statements, such as "Obama exists", only 
denotes a first-order and informative property, i.e., a property that is only instantiated by objects 
(so that no property properly exists) and such that there are some objects that do not instantiate 
it; 
 
(b) our ordinary quantifiers are not ontologically loaded: it is legitimate to quantify over objects 
(and properties) that do not exist, provided that such objects (and properties) have definite 
identity conditions. In other terms, by quantifying over objects and properties, we are only 
committed to the fact that such items have identity conditions, that there is some criterion 
according to which they are identical with themselves and distinct from any other item (so that, if  
I assert that there is something that is identical with Sherlock Holmes, I am only committed to 
the fact that there is an object that has definite identity conditions, that is identical with itself  and 
that is distinct from any other item, e.g., from the property of  being identical with Sherlock 
Holmes, from Emma Bovary, from Socrates, Obama, and everything else); 
 
(c) necessarily, for every object, that object exists iff  it has at least one disposition to act, i.e., at 
least one disposition to cause something. However, after having dealt with some problems such 
as the paradox of  fiction and the fact that many objects belonging to different kinds seem to 
possess the same dispositions to act, I shall refine such an analysis in order to define a more 
perspicuous account of  existence; 
 
(d) many non-existent objects (in particular, all fictional objects and propositions) simply are 
mental objects, i.e., objects that depend for their identity conditions on the activity of  some 
minded subject(s); 
 
(e) however, not all non-existent items are mental objects: facts, properties, merely past objects, 
and so on, seem not to depend on the activity of  some minded subject(s) for their identity 
conditions. 
 
14 
 
 My defense of  such theses will be dialectical (at least in part). For example, concerning 
(a), I shall argue that, even if  there were a property of  existence instantiated by all items (both 
objects and properties), such a property would be a merely disjunctive one and it could not be 
identified with the property that seems to be involved within the truth-conditions of  [Obama 
exists]. We do not have any valid reason (except for the acceptance of  (actualism), that I shall 
criticize in the first part of  the dissertation) for admitting that to exist simply is to be identical 
with something or to be self-identical, so that everything exists. On the other hand, it does not 
seem to me that fictional objects – and many other non-existent objects – are objects 
independently of  the activity of  minded subjects. In fact, many Meinongians argue that such 
objects are not mental objects, since they have some definite ontological status (e.g., the status of  
being non-existent) independently of  minded subjects' thinking of  them. I do not agree with 
such a view. It seems to me that it is not legitimate to claim that it is true that Sherlock Holmes 
does not exist, if  there is no object such as Sherlock Holmes. In a possible world in which no 
minded subject exists or in which there is no minded subject that defines Sherlock Holmes' 
identity conditions, there are no true propositions such as [Sherlock Holmes does not exist] or 
[Sherlock Holmes is a fictional object] and there is no Sherlock Holmes at all. Thus, I accept that 
there are objects that do not exist, as every Meinongian does, but my theory had better be 
considered a Half-Meinongian or a heretical Meinongian theory of  objects, rather than an 
orthodox one. 
 In the third chapter (II.3. Non-Existence: an Ascriptivistic Theory) I shall present a theory of  
ficta that is grounded on some peculiar relations: ascription relations. Such relations hold (at least) 
between an object (or a property), a property and a minded subject. They could involve fictional 
contexts too, i.e., fictional objects that can be roughly considered worlds of  fiction and that are 
identity-defined by stories. If  the proposition [Sherlock Holmes is a detective] is true, it is made 
true by some ascription relation's holding between Sherlock Holmes, the property of  being a 
detective, some minded subject and some fictional context (e.g., the fictional context defined by 
the story A Study in Scarlet). I shall provide further qualifications for the interpretation of  such 
truth-conditions and I shall analyze all the other seemingly true fictional statements introduced in 
chapter I.3 from the perspective of  this theory, that I shall name ascriptivism. Ascriptivism is a 
general theory of  intentionality. It aims at interpreting many general phenomena connected to 
our thoughts and beliefs, even though I cannot investigate in this work all the implications of  the 
theory. 
 Furthermore, within the ascriptivistic perspective, it is not necessary to introduce fictional 
surrogates of  existing objects that seem to be involved within works of  fiction and it is neither 
15 
 
necessary to admit that there are true contradictions, nor that there are properly inconsistent 
objects. I shall try to show other advantages of  the theory in that chapter. 
 In the fourth chapter of  the second part (II.4. I might have not existed, I shall not exist 
(maybe)), I shall deal with the data concerning the relationship between existence, contingency and 
temporality by briefly sketching two theories. The first theory is grounded on a mentalistic and 
ascriptivistic approach to modality, that takes modal truths as dependent on the activity of  some 
omniscient minded subject. In particular, I shall admit that there are contingently non-existent 
objects and I shall assert that such objects are identity-defined by the activity of  that subject and 
that possible worlds can be thought of  as "completed" fictional contexts (i.e., as a peculiar kind 
of  fictional contexts). I shall also question the widely accepted thesis according to which every 
fictional object is necessarily fictional: it seems to me that there are good reasons for taking some 
fictional objects as only contingently non-existent.  
 Concerning the ontology of  time, I shall present a Meinongian version of  presentism that 
is based on the admission of  tensed properties with regard to times (e.g., the property of  pastly 
being a philosopher with regard to some time) and on the rejection of  (actualism). I shall 
demonstrate that such a version of  presentism can efficiently deal with many problems that 
typically affect presentism.  
 Finally, in the last chapter (II.5. Epilogue in Heaven: the Existence of  God), I shall defend two 
arguments for the existence of  a being that is thought of  as greater than any other being (so that 
I shall give a new interpretation of  Anselm's ontological argument) and for the existence of  an 
omniscient minded subject. 
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I.1. Prologue in Heaven: the Ontological Argument 
In this chapter, I shall analyze the connections between the logical and metaphysical discussions 
on the validity of  the ontological argument for the existence of  God and my inquiry on existence 
and non-existence. I shall not deal with all the several versions of  the ontological argument: I 
shall only consider Anselm's, Descartes' and Gödel's versions and some relevant objections of  
Hume's and Kant's, because it seems to me that these moments of  the discussion are the most 
important and interesting ones with regard to my inquiry. In particular, it seems that there is 
some difference between Anselm's and Descartes' arguments, on the one hand, and Gödel's 
argument, on the other hand. This difference lies in the fact that Anselm and Descartes seem to 
consider existence a first-order property, while Gödel (like Plantinga and other philosophers) 
does not consider it a first-order property. I shall focus on four questions: 
(I) what is the concept of  existence involved in these versions of  the ontological argument? 
(II) What is the relationship between mental and real existence? 
(III) Is existence a first- or a second-order property? Is it a property at all? 
(IV) What is the relationship between subjective conceivability, general conceivability, possibility 
and the ontological status of  mental objects? 
 
I.1.1. Anselm vs. Gaunilo and some "fools". 
In Anselm's Proslogion (1078) there are at least two versions of  the ontological argument. It seems 
that by the first version (in the second chapter of  his work) Anselm aims at directly proving the 
existence of  God, while by the second one (in the third chapter) he aims at proving that it is not 
conceivable that God does not exist. Here is the first version: 
And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to 
understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art 
a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, 
there is no God? (Psalm xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of  this being of  wich I speak – a being 
than which nothing greater can be conceived – understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his 
understanding; although he does not understand it to exist. 
For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a 
painter first conceives of  what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet 
understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his 
understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it. 
Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater 
can be conceived. For, when he hears of  this, he understands it. And whatever his understood, exists in the 
understanding. And assuredly that, then which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding 
alone. For, suppose it exist in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. 
Therefore, if  that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, 
than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which greater can be conceived. But obviously this is 
impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it 
exists both in the understanding and in the reality2. 
I shall assume that: "C1" stands for the dyadic property of  being conceivable that ... has ...; "C2" 
                                                 
2 Anselm, Proslogion, II, in Plantinga (1968): 3-4. 
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stands for the triadic property of  being conceivable that ... is more ... than ...; "C3" stands for the 
triadic property of  ... conceives ... as ...; "U" stands for being understood; "GR" stands for the 
dyadic property of  ... is greater than ...; "G" stands for being the greatest being; "EM" stands for 
having mental existence; "ER" stands for having real existence; "E̅R" stands for not having real 
existence; "f" stands for the fool; "g" stands for God; "P̅" stands for the negative property which 
corresponds to the negation of  a positive property. I accept a second-order logic, according to 
which it is possible to quantify over properties. It seems to me that the proof  goes as follows3: 
 
(a'1)     C1gG A 
(a'2)     ~ x(C1xG & ~(x = g)) A 
(a'3)     ~ x(C1xG & ~(x = g)) ↔ ~ x(C2xGRg & ~(x = g)) A 
(a'4)      x P(C1xP̅→ Ux) A 
(a'5)      x(Ux → EMx) A 
(a'6)     (EMg & ~ERg) →  y(C2yGRg & ~(y = g))) A 
(a'7)      x y P(C3xyP̅ → C1yP̅) A 
(a'8)     C3fgE̅R                                                                                       A 
(a'9)     ~ERg                                                                                         H (~I) 
(a'10)    y P(C3fyP̅ → C1yP̅)                                                                         (a'7) E 
(a'11)    P(C3fgP̅ → C1gP̅)                     (a'10) E 
(a'12)   C3fgE̅R → C1gE̅R                                                                                (a'11) E 
(a'13)   C1gE̅R                                                                                        (a'8),(a'12)→E 
(a'14)    P(C1gP̅ → Ug)                                                                                 (a'4) E 
(a'15)   C1gE̅R → Ug                                                                                      (a'14) E 
(a'16)   Ug                                                                                             (a'13),(a'15)→E 
(a'17)   Ug → EMg                                                                                          (a'5) E 
(a'18)   EMg                                                                                            (a'16),(a'17)→E 
(a'19)   EMg & ~ERg                                                                               (a'9),(a'18)&I 
(a'20)    y(C2yGRg & ~(y = g))                                                                        (a'19),(a'6)→E 
(a'21)   C2aGRg & ~(a = g)                                                                              H( E) 
(a'22)    x(C2xGRg & ~(x= g)) (a'21) I 
(a'23)   ~ x(C1xG & ~(x = g)) → ~ x(C2xGRg & ~(x = g)) (a'3)↔E 
(a'24)   ~~ x(C1xG & ~(x = g)) (a'22),(a'23)MT 
(a'25)    x(C1xG & ~(x = g)) (a'24)~E 
(a'26)    x(C1xG & ~(x = g))                                                                        (a'20),(a'21)-(a'25)( E) 
(a'27)    x(C1xG & ~(x = g)) & ~ x(C1xG & ~(x = g)) (a'26),(a'2) &I 
(a'28)   ERg                                                                                           (a'9)-(a'27) (~I) 
 
                                                 
3 I shall use in this work the system of natural deduction presented in Varzi, Nolt, Rohatyn (2007). For a list of 
symbols, see the Appendix (pp. 281-284). 
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The assumptions state that: it is conceivable that God is the greatest being (a'1); there is 
no greatest being different from God (a'2), so that God is the only greatest being; it is not 
conceivable that there is a greatest being different from God iff  if  it is not conceivable that there 
is a being different from God which is greater than Him (a'3); for any property and any object, if  
it is conceivable that that object has the negative property corresponding to the property 
assumed, then that object is understood (a'4); for every object, if  that object is understood, then 
it has mental existence (a'5); if  God has mental existence but He does not have real existence, 
then there is an object different from God that is conceivable as greater than Him (a'6); for any 
two objects, for any property, if  one of  these objects conceives the other object as having the 
negative property corresponding to the property assumed, then it is conceivable that that object 
has that negative property (a'7); the fool conceives that God has non-real existence (a'8). In order 
to clarify what is for something to be conceivable as the greatest being, using the symbol ι to 
introduce definite descriptions, I assume that 
 
(def.C1G)  x(C1xG ↔ (ιy z(C2yGRz ↔ ~(y = z)) & x = y)) 
 
This is not equivalent to state that there is at least and at most one really existent being 
which is the greatest being. In this latter case, the proof  would be a petitio principii. I only wish to 
assume that it is conceivable that something is the greatest being, i.e., that it is conceivable that 
there is at least and at most one greatest being.  
Furthermore, my use of  the conceivability relations seems to assume that Russell's 
multiple relation theory of  judgment is valid, i.e. that, roughly, judgments directly connect objects 
and properties4. As it will become clearer after having dealt with my theses on non-existent 
objects, I think that attitudes such as judging and conceiving can be truly considered relations. 
This treatment of  conceivability seems to reply to Parsons' objection against Anselm's argument5. 
According to Parsons, Anselm states that the fool imagines (de dicto) that there is an object 
nothing greater than which can be conceived, but then he establishes that there is an object which 
is imagined by the fool (de re) and this seems not to be valid. However, following our notion of  
conceivability, it is legitimate to state that the fool conceives that God does not really exist iff  
there is at least and at most one object (God) that is conceived of  by the fool as not really 
existing. It is not legitimate to turn the de dicto assertion into a de re one only if  one assumes that it 
is not legitimate to quantify over objects of  thought. Yet, I reject this latter assumption. 
Let me now consider some relevant objections against the premises and the form of  the 
argument. 
                                                 
4 See Russell (1992): 105-118. 
5 See Parsons (1980): 214-215. 
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(1vs.a'quantifiers) The quantifiers range over non-existent and existent objects. Yet, if  the 
existential quantifier implies ontological commitment, it is not legitimate to state that there is 
some object that does not exist. This Quinean objection will be examined in the next chapter. 
However, it seems to me that it is necessary to assume a neutral interpretation of  the quantifiers, 
in order to deal with objects that truly do not have real existence, yet instantiate properties. 
(2vs.a'modal) When we use the property of  it is conceivable that ..., we deal with modal 
categories. Thus, it would be better to use modal operators instead of  properties. Yet, the notions 
of  being conceivable that ... and of  being possible are not identical: we can conceive of  objects 
regardless of  their possibility. This Meinongian assumption will be defended after having 
considered some data concerning non-existent objects. Thus, there is no room for Sobel's 
objection, according to which conceivability does not imply logical possibility and logical 
possibility (that is only expressed by the modal operator of  possibility) is required in order for the 
argument to work, so that the ontological argument is not well-grounded6. However, I think that 
God is not an impossible object. If  we have valid reasons for rejecting the objection 
(1vs.a'quantifiers) and if  we can demonstrate that God is a logically possible object, it is legitimate 
to use the property of  being conceivable that… instead of  modal operators. 
(3vs.a'1) If  God is a transcendent being, how could we conceive anything about Him? How could 
we conceive that He is the greatest being? We can state these words ("God is the greatest being"), 
even without understanding what they mean7. Yet, in general, what is for something to be 
conceived of? I think that we have to distinguish three different meanings of  "conceiving": we 
conceive1 that an object has some property even without knowing if  that object truly has that 
property; we conceive2 that an object has some property iff  that object truly has that property; 
we conceive3 that an object has some property when we know why that object has that property. 
I have only assumed that it is conceivable1 that an object (God) has some property, because we 
do not know if  that object truly exists and if  it truly has that property.  
(4vs.a'1) Gaunilo objects that, in order to conceive of  a greatest being, it has to be possible to 
conceive of  different degrees of  being in nature and of  some supreme degree, even though it 
might neither be true that there are real degrees in nature, nor any supreme degree8. Yet, we are 
not considering here real degrees of  being in nature: we are just talking of  an object that is 
conceivable as having the property of  being the greatest being. Is this property a fictional one, 
provided that it might be true that there are no degrees of  being in nature? I do not know. Yet, it 
is conceivable that God has it by definition. 
                                                 
6 See Sobel (2004): 65-66. 
7 See Gaunilo in Plantinga (1968): 10. 
8 See Gaunilo in Plantinga (1968): 12. 
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(5vs.a'2-a'3) I have assumed by definition that God is the greatest conceivable being. Yet, is it 
possible that there are other greatest beings different from Him? Let me assume that there is 
another greatest being different from God: if  this being is greater than God, it is the true God; if  
it is as great as God, it is not the greatest being, because it is not greater than God. Thus, the idea 
that there is a greatest being implies that there is only one greatest being.  
(6vs.a'4) Is it legitimate to assume that there are negative properties? I think that it is. Yet, I shall 
justify this answer after having made some general remarks about properties in the chapter II.1. 
(7vs.a'4) If  it is conceivable that something has some negative property, is that thing understood? 
I think that it is. In fact, it is understood that that object has that negative property. For example, 
if  it is conceivable that I do not live in France, something about me is understood. In general, if  
it is truly conceivable (with regard to all the three meanings of  conceivability) that something has 
some negative property (i.e., if  the antecedent is true), then that thing is understood (i.e., the 
consequent is true)9. 
(8vs.a'5) It does not seem to be true that, if  something is understood, then that thing has mental 
existence, i.e., it exists in some mind. What does this kind of  existence amount to? What is the 
ontological status of  mental objects? I shall clarify this aspect of  the proof  when I shall deal with 
the ontological status of  mental objects. 
(9vs.a'5) Furthermore, it seems that, when I understand something real, that thing does not exist 
in my mind: I only understand that real thing. Yet, there are many objects that do not exist and 
that are objects of  our thoughts: Pegasus, the round square, and so on. Thus, it is possible to 
imagine that every object, when it is thought of  by me, exists in my mind too. Real objects, when 
they are thought of  by me, exist in my mind and in reality, whereas non-existent objects, when 
they are thought of  by me, exist in my mind but they do not exist in reality. However, it is not 
clear what is for something to exist in one's mind and how mental existence is exactly correlated 
with real existence (e.g., are they two different kinds of  existence?).  
(10vs.a'5) If  I think of  God and if  God exists, do I think of  a mental object different from the 
real existing God? In other words: is mental existence only exemplified by some mental object 
that is somehow different from the real corresponding object? I think that it is not. Mental 
existence and real existence are exemplified by the same really existing object (God) and this 
seems to make the proof  valid. 
(11vs.a'5) However, if  I think of  God and you do not think of  Him, God has and does not have 
                                                 
9 This line of defense is assumed by Anselm too: "whoever, then, denies the existence of a being than which a greater 
cannot be conceived, at least understands and conceives of the denial which he makes. But this denial he cannot 
understand or conceive of without its component terms; and a term of this statement is a being than which a greater 
cannot be conceived. Whoever, then, makes this denial, understands and conceives of that than which nothing 
greater is inconceivable" (Anselm, Proslogion, II, in Plantinga (1968): 26). 
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mental existence. Thus, it seems that mental existence is mind-dependent: it seems to be a 
relation between one object and one mind, rather than a monadic property of  some objects. I 
shall deal with these issues in the second part of  this work. 
(12vs.a'6) Is real existence a property of  objects? In other words: is existence a first-order 
property? As we will see, Kant objects against this thesis, that grounds the validity of  the 
argument. 
(13vs.a'6) Alston10 accepts that existence is a special first-order property, because the instantiation 
of  that property is presupposed by every true predication. According to him, there are many 
ways of  existing, which seem to be context-dependent: real existence, fictional existence, mental 
existence, and so on. On the one hand, when we deal with non-really existing objects, we have to 
think that there is a real existing correlate that somehow corresponds to them: if  I think of  God, 
there is some thought that is the really existing correlate of  Him. On the other hand, if  we think 
of  non-existent objects, their ways of  existing limit their predications: if  God is a non-existing 
object, we cannot state that God really exists, because it is not legitimate to attribute real 
existence to non-existing objects. In fact, these objects are limited by the fact that their non-real 
kind of  existence implies the real existence of  their real correlates but it does not imply their real 
existence. Yet, developing an objection of  Plantinga's11, let me consider this statement: 
 
(1) God is more famous than Obama. 
 
What is the kind of  existence that limits the instantiation of  the relation of  being more famous 
than, if  God is considered a mentally existing object, while Obama is a really existing object? It 
seems plausible that mentally existing objects bear real relations to really existing objects, so that 
mental existence does not limit by itself  the instantiation of  real properties and relations. 
According to Plantinga, this implies, contra Alston, that mentally existing objects really exist too. 
Yet, as we will notice in the next chapter by examining existence-entailing properties, this 
conclusion is not so obvious.  
(14vs.a'6) What is the relationship between real existence and the property of  being greater than? 
Is existence a perfection (i.e., something that expresses the greatness of  an object) and/or a 
great-making property? This point needs to be developed. In fact, it seems that, for example, an 
existing evil is less perfect than a non-existing one.  
(15vs.a'28) Gaunilo's perfect island’s example is one of  the most well-known objections against 
the validity of  Anselm's ontological argument. According to Gaunilo, following Anselm’s 
premises, it would be possible to defend an ontological argument for the existence of  some 
                                                 
10 See Alston (1960), in Plantinga (1968): 86-110. 
11 See Plantinga (1967): 53. 
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perfect island. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be a good objection: in God’s case, in fact, we 
are talking of  the greatest being, while, in the perfect island’s case, we are simply talking of  the 
greatest being within one category of  beings (the islands). There is something greater than the 
perfect island. Yet, there is nothing greater than God. 
The second Anselmian version of  the ontological argument aims at proving that it is not 
conceivable that God does not exist. It could be interpreted as a supplement to the first version 
and it seems to be less remarkable than the former version, because it can conclude that God 
exists only by introducing one further premise, according to which what cannot be conceived as 
non-existent does exist (perhaps by necessity), and because it does not concede that the fool can 
think that God does not exist. However, here is Anselm's text: 
And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of  a being 
which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if  
that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing 
greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which 
nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O 
Lord, our God12. 
I shall assume that: "C1" stands for the dyadic property of  being conceivable that ... has 
...; "GR" stands for the dyadic property of  ... is greater than ...; "ER" stands for having real 
existence; "E̅R" stands for not having real existence; "g" stands for God. It seems to me that the 
proof  goes as follows: 
 
(a''1)      x~C1xE̅R A 
(a''2)      x y((~C1xE̅R & C1yE̅R) → GRxy)                  A 
(a''3)     ~ xGRxg                                                        A 
(a''4)      x(~C1xE̅R → ERx) A 
(a''5)     C1gE̅R                                                             H(~I) 
(a''6)     ~C1aE̅R                                                          H( E) 
(a''7)       y((~C1aE̅R & C1yE̅R) → GRay)                     (a''2) E 
(a''8)      (~C1aE̅R & C1gE̅R) → GRag                           (a''7) E 
(a''9)       x~GRxg                                                      (a''3)QE 
(a''10)    ~GRag                                                           (a''9) E 
(a''11)    ~(~C1aE̅R & C1gE̅R)                                      (a''8),(a''10)MT 
(a''12)    C1aE̅R V ~C1gE̅R                                           (a''11)DM 
(a''13)    ~C1gE̅R                                                         (a''6),(a''12)DS 
(a''14)    ~C1gE̅R                    (a''1),(a''6)-(a''13)( E) 
(a''15)    C1gE̅R & ~C1gE̅R                                           (a''5),(a''14)&I 
(a''16)    ~C1gE̅R                                                         (a''5)-(a''15)(~I) 
                                                 
12 Anselm, Proslogion, III, in Plantinga (1968): 5. 
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(a''17)    ~C1gE̅r → ERg                                               (a''4) E 
(a''18)    ERg                                                          (a''16),(a''17)→E 
 
The assumptions state that: there is something for which it is not conceivable that it does 
not exist (a''1); for any two objects, if  one of  them is not conceivable as not having real existence 
and the other is conceivable as not having real existence, then the former is greater than the latter 
(a''2); there is nothing greater than God (a''3); for any object, if  that object is not conceivable as 
not having real existence, then it has real existence (a''4). 
It seems that objections (1vs.a’quantifiers), (2vs.a'modal), (15vs.a'7), (3vs.a'1), (4vs.a'1), 
(5vs.a'2-a'3), (12vs.a'6), (14vs.a'6) hold for this version too. However, it is possible to introduce 
further relevant objections.  
(1vs.a''1) Every existential statement seems to be contingent. Thus, it seems that there is no 
object for which it is not conceivable that it does not exist. This objection is formulated by Hume 
and I shall analyze it in the third section of  this chapter. 
(2vs.a''1) The first assumption states part of  what has to be proved, i.e., that there is an object 
that is not conceivable as not having real existence. Thus, the proof  only demonstrates that this 
object is God and that He really exists. I think that this objection, as well as (1vs.a''1), is well-
grounded and decisive.  
(3vs.a''2) It is not justified why something that is not conceivable as not having real existence is 
greater than something that is conceivable as not having it.  
(4vs.a''4) The last assumption seems very questionable, because it seems that a nosse ad esse non valet 
consequentia: if  it is not conceivable that some object does not have real existence, then it does not 
follow that that object really exists. This assumption can be only defended by the conclusions of  
the first version of  Anselm's ontological argument. 
In sum, it seems to me that the first version fairs better than the second one because it 
seems to have more reasonable assumptions, because it concedes that the fool can conceive that 
God does not exist and because it proves something that is only assumed in the second version. 
 
I.1.2. Descartes and the Perfection of Existing. 
René Descartes formulates his version of  the ontological argument in his Meditations on First 
Philosophy (1641-1642). The French philosopher tries to give some reason for the fact that an 
existent being is more perfect than a non-existent one and tries to describe what is for something 
to be conceived of  by someone. Here is Descartes' text: 
If  just because I can draw the idea of  something from my thought, it follows that all which I know clearly and 
distinctly as pertaining to this object does really belong to it, may I not derive from this an argument demonstrating 
the existence of  God? It is certain that I no less find the idea of  God, that is to say, the idea of  a supremely perfect 
Being, in me, than that of  any figure or number whatever it is; and I do not know any less clearly and distinctly that 
an actual and eternal existence pertains to this nature than I know that all that which I am able to demonstrate of  
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some figure or number truly pertains to the nature of  this figure or number, and therefore, although all that I 
concluded in the preceding Meditations were found to be false, the existence of  God would pass with me as at least 
as certain as I have ever held the truths of  mathematics to be. 
This indeed is not at first manifested, since it would seem to present some appearance of  being a sophism. For being 
accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself  that the 
existence can be separated from the essence of  God, and that we can thus conceive God as not actually existing. But, 
nevertheless, when I think of  it with more attention, I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the 
essence of  God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of  a 
rectilinear figure, or the idea of  a mountain from the idea of  a valley; and so there is not any less repugnance to our 
conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain 
perfection is lacking), than to conceive of  a mountain which has no valley. 
But although I cannot really conceive of  a God without existence any more than a mountain without a valley, still 
from the fact that I conceive of  a mountain with a valley, it does not follow that there is such a mountain in the 
world; similarly, although I conceive of  God as possessing existence, it would seem that it does not follow that there 
is a God which exists; for my thought does not impose any necessity upon things, and just as I may imagine a winged 
horse, although no horse with wings exists, so I could perhaps attribute existence to God, although no God existed. 
But a sophism is concealed in this objection; for from the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it 
does not follow that there is any mountain or any valley in existence, but only that the mountain and the valley, 
whether they exist or do not exist, cannot in any way be separated one from the other. While from the fact that I 
cannot conceive God without existence, it follows that existence is inseparable from Him, and hence that He really 
exists; not that my thought can bring this to pass, or impose any necessity on things, but, on the contrary, because 
the necessity which lies in the thing itself, i.e. the necessity of  the existence of  God determines me to think in this 
way. For it is not within my power to think of  God without existence (that is of  a supremely perfect Being devoid of  
a supreme perfection) though it is in my power to imagine a horse either with wings or without wings. 
(...) Whenever it happens that I think of  a first and a sovereign Being, and, so to speak, derive the idea of  Him from 
the storehouse of  my mind, it is necessary that I should attribute to Him every sort of  perfection, although I do not 
get so far as to enumerate them all, or to apply my mind to each one in particular. And this necessity suffices to make 
me conclude (after having recognized that existence is a perfection) that this first and sovereign Being really exists13. 
I shall assume that: "C1" stands for the dyadic property of  being clearly and distinctly 
conceivable that ... has ...; "C2" stands for the triadic property ... clearly and distinctly conceives 
that ... has ...; "PE" stands for the second-order property of  being a perfection; "PS" stands for the 
property of  being the most perfect being; "N" stands for the dyadic property of  being necessary 
that ... has ...; "ER" stands for having real existence; "g" stands for God; "i" stands for me (since 
the first-person speaker in the text could be anyone); "P̅" stands for the negative property that 
corresponds to the negation of  a positive property. It seems to me that the proof  goes on as 
follows: 
 
(d'1)     x y P(C2xyP → C1yP) A 
(d'2)     x P(NxP ↔ (C1xP & ~C1xP̅)) A 
(d'3)    ~C1gP̅S A 
(d'4)    C2igPS   A 
(d'5)     x(PSx ↔  P(PEP → Px)) A 
(d'6)    PEER A 
(d'7)     x P(NxP → Px) A 
(d'8)     y P(C2iyP → C1yP) (d'1) E 
(d'9)     P(C2igP → C1gP) (d'8) E 
(d'10)   C2igPS → C1gPS (d'9) E 
                                                 
13 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, III, in Plantinga (1968): 31-33. 
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(d'11)   C1gPS (d'4),(d'10)→E 
(d'12)   P(NgP ↔ (C1gP & ~C1gP̅)) (d'2) E 
(d'13)  NgPS ↔ (C1gPS & ~C1gP̅S) (d'12) E 
(d'14)  (C1gPS & ~C1gP̅S) → NgPS (d'13)↔E 
(d'15)  C1gPS & ~C1gP̅S (d'3),(d'11)&I 
(d'16)  NgPS (d'14),(d'15)→E 
(d'17)   P(NgP → Pg) (d'7) E 
(d'18)  NgPS → PSg (d'17) E 
(d'19)  PSg (d'16),(d'18)→E 
(d'20)  PSg ↔  P(PEP → Pg) (d'5) E 
(d'21)  PSg ↔ (PEER → ERg) (d'20) E 
(d'22)  PSg → (PEER → ERg) (d'21)↔E 
(d'23)  PEER → ERg (d'19),(d'22)→E 
(d'24)  ERg (d'6),(d'23)→E 
 
The assumptions state that: for any two objects and any property, if  one of  them clearly 
and distinctly conceives of  the other as having that property, then it is clearly and distinctly 
conceivable that the latter object has that property (d'1); for any object and any property, it is 
necessary that that object has that property iff  it is clearly and distinctly conceivable that it has 
that property and it is not clearly and distinctly conceivable that it has the corresponding negative 
property (d'2); it is not clearly and distinctly conceivable that God is not the most perfect being 
(d'3); I clearly and distinctly conceive that God is the most perfect being (d'4); for any object, that 
object is the most perfect being iff, for any property, if  that property is a perfection, than that 
object instantiates it (d'5); real existence is a perfection (d'6); for any object and any property, if  it 
is necessary that that object has that property, then that object has that property (d'7). 
One could try to prove that God necessarily exists by adding one further assumption, 
according to which it is not conceivable that God does not exist. However, as I have already 
remarked examining Anselm's second version of  the ontological argument, this thesis is quite 
questionable: as a matter of  fact, the fool conceives that God does not exist, so that it is 
conceivable that God does not exist. Thus, I prefer this reading of  Descartes' argument.  
Objections (1vs.a'quantifiers), (2vs.a'modal), (3vs.a'1), (4vs.a'1), (5vs.a'2-a'3), (6vs.a'4), (12 
vs.a'6) seem to hold for this argument too. Furthermore, it is legitimate to make further 
objections against the assumptions. 
(1vs.d'1) What is for something to be clearly and distinctly conceivable? Descartes claims that we 
clearly conceive of  something when we see all the attributes of  that thing (or perhaps the 
relevant ones), so that we do not ignore any aspect of  that thing, and we distinctly conceive of  
something when we know in what respects that thing is different from any other thing. Yet, it 
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does not seem that we can clearly conceive of  God, because we do not know all the attributes 
that belong to Him. However, we can clearly conceive that God has existence, perhaps because 
He is the Supreme Being. Maybe this represents our partial, yet clear knowledge of  God. 
(2vs.d'2) A property that necessarily belongs to an object is a property that is conceived of  as 
being instantiated by that object and whose corresponding negative property is not conceivable 
of  as being instantiated by the same object. However, it seems that we use conceivability in order 
to define the modal category of  necessity. Yet, there are many property that necessarily belongs 
to an object and that are not conceivable (by us) as belonging to that object and/or for which it 
seems also conceivable for us that that object has the corresponding negative property. For 
example, is π necessarily such that its 20.000.000th digit is a zero? Maybe it necessarily is. Yet, even 
though we can conceive of  that property as belonging to π, we cannot state if  it belongs to it. 
Furthermore, it is also conceivable that π does not have that property. However, we could think 
that conceivability is a general concept, that can be applied to any minded subject. Thus, if  there 
were an omniscient minded subject, perhaps it could rightly conceive what properties necessarily 
belong to objects. 
(3vs.d'2) Yet, if  two minded subjects conceive of  two different positive properties as instantiated 
by the same object and these properties are hiddenly contradictory, it turns out that that objects 
seems to be an impossible one, even though it is not impossible. Thus, we have to understand 
how it is possible that conceived objects bear implicit properties (properties implied by the 
properties that they are thought of  as instantiating) and whether it is possible to conceive of  
impossible objects. 
(4vs.d'3) However, the fool can deny that he conceives that God is the most perfect being. Yet, if  
this is a definition of  God (and we have to define God in some way or another, at least in order 
to make it sure that we are all thinking and talking of  the same object), the fool does not conceive 
of  God but maybe of  some other object. It seems plausible to accept that God is by definition 
the most perfect being, so that it is not conceivable that something is God, even without being 
the most perfect being. 
(5vs.d'5) Sobel argues14 that the statement 
 
(2) A supremely perfect being exists 
 
is amphibolous between 
 
(2a) for any object, if  it is a perfect being, then it exists, 
 
and 
                                                 
14 See Sobel (2004): 35-40. 
28 
 
 
(2b) there is at least one object that is a perfect being and that exists. 
 
(2a) expresses an implication, but it does not state that it is true that there is a perfect being, while 
(2b) expresses an existential statement, whose truth-value is contingent. Yet, it seems to me that 
my assumption (d'5), that is a logical equivalence, is not affected by this amphibolous reading: for 
any object, that object is the most perfect being iff  it has all the perfections (existence included).  
(6vs.d'5) Yet, it could be the case that all the perfections are not compossible. Facing this 
problem, Leibniz tried to prove that all the perfections are compossible in his famous 
Supplementum to Descartes' ontological argument15. I do not know how to defend the 
compossibility of  all the perfections. I think that we have to face particular cases in which two 
perfections seem not to be compossible and that we have to assume, given that there are no 
decisive and insurmountable objections against the incompossibility of  some perfections, that all 
the perfections are compossible. 
(7vs.d'6) Developing (14vs.a'6), Malcolm argues that existence is not a perfection, yet necessary 
existence is16. However, why is necessary existence a perfection? Contingent beings could not 
exist and they can die. Yet, a necessarily existent being does not have these features. If  the former 
beings contingently exiss, whereas the latter necessarily exists, why is the latter more perfect than 
the former? I think that we can give an answer to this question only if  we assume that to exist is 
better than not to exist, so that existence is a perfection. In general, this seems to be true. 
However, there seems to be some counterexamples to this thesis: is an existent devil more perfect 
than a non-existent one? 
(8vs.d'6) Gassendi objects that existence is not a perfection, yet it is what is presupposed by the 
instantiation of  any perfection17. However, let me imagine two non-existing men: John and Paul. 
John is a sinner, while Paul is a saint. Is Paul more perfect than John? Yes, it seems that he is. Yet, 
they do not exist, so that existence is not presupposed when we attribute different degrees of  
perfection to them: they are a non-existing saint and a non-existing sinner. Thus, it seems that 
Gassendi had to justify his thesis in some better way. 
(9vs.d'6) Parsons objects that, if  something is perfect, its perfection can entail or not entail its 
existence. If  it does not entail its existence, the proof  is a non sequitur. If  it entails its existence, 
one can only conclude that there is no non-existing perfect being, but maybe because there is no 
perfect being at all18. Yet, I have already established in Descartes’ proof  that perfection is a 
second-order property (it is not a property of  objects), so that Parsons' objection seems not to be 
                                                 
15 See Leibniz’s text in Plantinga (1968): 54-56. 
16 See Malcolm (1960), in Plantinga (1968): 136-159. 
17 See Gassendi’s text in Plantinga (1968): 46. 
18 See Parsons (1980): 213. 
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tenable. Furthermore, in order to deal with the second horn of  his objection, we have to 
introduce Parsons' distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties: nuclear properties 
are properties that can be used in order to characterize objects, while extra-nuclear properties 
cannot be used in this way. Existence is an extra-nuclear property. However, we could 
characterize an object as an existent perfect being by using a "watered-down" version of  
existence. Yet, this does not imply that that object really exists, i.e., that it has extra-nuclear 
existence. In general, I think that Parsons' distinction is very problematic. I shall consider some 
objections against it in the next chapter. Nevertheless, it seems that when we think of  God as 
really existent, we do not attribute to Him the "watered-down" property of  really existing: it 
seems that we use just one property, the property of  really existing, in order to characterize 
objects that really exist.  
In general, Caterus objects that we can conceive of  a being that has necessary existence. 
Yet, anything actual follows from this conception. It only follows that the concept of  existence is 
inseparably connected with the concept of  the most perfect being19. This objection, that seems to 
develop (4vs.a''4), is a very serious one. One could perhaps reply that necessity in our thoughts is 
strictly connected with necessity in reality, so that everything that necessarily is the most perfect 
being in our thoughts is the most perfect being in reality too. Yet, in order to defend this thesis, 
we have to investigate the status of  necessity, possibility and conceivability and their mind-
dependence or mind-independence. 
Oppy argues that Descartes' argument aims at proving that there exists a supremely 
perfect being, but it only proves that there is a supreme perfection20. However, it does not seem 
that me that my reading of  the argument implies this difficulty: a supreme perfection is only a 
property.  
 
I.1.3. Hume, Kant and the "fools' revenge". 
In the IXth Part of  his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Hume argues that it is possible to 
conceive of  any existent being as non-existent, so that it is not possible to demonstrate the 
existence of  anything, because every demonstration implies some kind of  necessity. Thus, it is 
not possible to demonstrate God's existence by means of  any kind of  ontological argument. 
Here is Hume's text, in which Cleanthes, who seems to partly express Hume's point of  view, 
defends this thesis: 
I shall begin with observing that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of  fact, or to 
prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing that 
is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-
existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being 
                                                 
19 See Caterus’ text in Plantinga (1968): 35-37. 
20 See Oppy (1995): 22-23. 
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whose existence is demonstrable21. 
Let me assume that "DEM" stands for the dyadic property of  being demonstrable that ... 
has ...; "ER" stands for the property of  having real existence; "E̅R" stands for not having real 
existence; "C" stands for the dyadic property of  being distinctly conceivable that ... has ...; "g" 
stands for God; "P̅" stands for the negative property that corresponds to the negation of  a 
positive property. Thus, Hume's objection goes as follows: 
 
(h1)     x P(DEMxP ↔ (CxP̅ → (Q & ~Q))) A 
(h2)     x((CERx & CE̅Rx) → ~(Q & ~Q)) A 
(h3)     x(CERx & CE̅Rx) A 
(h4)    CERg & CE̅Rg (h3) E 
(h5)    (CERg & CE̅Rg) → ~(Q & ~Q) (h2) E 
(h6)    ~(Q & ~Q) (h4),(h5)→E 
(h7)    CE̅Rg                                                                        (h4)&E 
(h8)    CE̅Rg & ~(Q & ~Q) (h6),(h7)&I 
(h9)     P(DEMgP ↔ (CgP̅ → (Q & ~Q))) (h1) E 
(h10)  DEMgER ↔ (CgE̅R → (Q & ~Q)) (h9) E 
(h11)  DEMgER → (CgE̅R → (Q & ~Q)) (h10)↔E 
(h12)  ~DEMgER V (CgE̅R → (Q & ~Q)) (h11)MI 
(h13)  ~(CgE̅R → (Q & ~Q))                                              (h8)MI 
(h14)  ~DEMgER                                                               (h12),(h13)DS 
 
The assumptions state that: for any object and any property, it is demonstrable that that 
object has that property iff  if  it is distinctly conceivable that that object has the negative 
corresponding property only if  some contradiction results (h1); for any object, if  it is distinctly 
conceivable that that object has real existence and it is distinctly conceivable that that object does 
not have real existence, then no contradiction results (h2); for any object, it is both distinctly 
conceivable that that object has real existence and that it does not have real existence (h3). 
Setting objection (6vs.a'4) apart, that seems to hold for Hume's argument too, I think that 
we should focus on assumptions (h2) and (h3). 
(1vs.h2) Hume claims that, for any object, it is both distinctly conceivable that that object has real 
existence and that it does not have real existence (i.e., that it has non-real existence). What does 
this property of  being distinctly conceivable correspond to? I have already claimed that it is 
conceivable1 that some object has some property when it is conceivable that that object has that 
property even if  that object does not truly have that property, while it is conceivable2 that some 
object has some property iff  that object truly has that property. If  we assume that Hume's 
                                                 
21 Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, IX. 
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distinct conceivability corresponds to conceivability1, then Hume's argument works against 
Anselm's second version of  the ontological argument, while it does not work against Anselm's 
first version. In fact, Hume demonstrates that it is conceivable1 that God does not have real 
existence, so that it is not demonstrable that He has real existence. Yet, in this case, one could 
argue against (h1): I could conceive1 of  a triangle that does not have three angles, even though 
this would not result in any real contradiction (it would only be a contradiction in my thoughts). I 
shall develop this point in the chapters I.2 and I.3. However, even though Hume's argument fully 
worked against Anselm's second version, it seems that it does not work against Anselm's first 
version. The fool thinks of  God as non-existing. Yet, following Anselm’s first version, a 
contradiction results. Thus, (h2) needs to be revised. If  we accepted that Hume's distinct 
conceivability corresponds to conceivability2 (and this seems to be the most reasonable 
interpretation, given that, in Descartes' terms, if  something is distinctly conceivable, no 
possibility of  error results), then there would be some counterexamples to (h3).  
(2vs.h3) For example, developing an objection of  Plantinga's, let me assume this statement as 
true: 
 
(3) there is (there really exists) a prime number between 18 and 20. 
 
The proposition expressed by (3) seems to be necessarily true, because there is a number (the 
number 19) that is between 18 and 20 and that is prime. Thus, in this case, (h3) seems to be false: 
it is conceivable2 that some prime number between 18 and 20 has real existence, but it is not 
conceivable2 that it does not have real existence. How could Hume reply to this objection? He 
could reply that (a) numbers do not have real existence or (b) that there are things for which it is 
not conceivable2 that they do not have real existence, but God and concrete beings are not such 
things. I shall set (a) aside, even though I could accept that numbers do not have real existence. 
As regards (b), this option is not well justified. In fact, one could state that it is not conceivable2 
that some numbers do not have real existence because there are laws that make their real 
existence necessary. Yet, according to (b), these laws do not hold for God or for other concrete 
beings. However, God's existence seems to be much more similar to numbers' existence, than to 
contingent concrete beings' existence. In fact, if  God exists, God does not only contingently exist 
(as every contingently existing being does), since the proposition expressed by 
 
(4) God exists  
 
is necessarily true or necessarily false. I shall not analyze problems concerning modality in this 
chapter. Yet, I can conclude that Hume's argument fails if  we accept conceivability2, because 
assumption (h3) is not always true (it is not true for every object) and it does not seem to be true 
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for God. Furthermore, if  we accept conceivability1, Hume's argument fails against Anselm's first 
version of  the ontological argument.  
Kant directs his criticisms to Descartes' ontological argument and, in particular, to the 
assumption (d'6) and to the validity of  the conclusion (d'24). I shall not quote here Kant's texts22. 
Yet, it seems to me that Kant aims at defend the following theses: 
(k1) every proposition must be either analytic or synthetic. When a proposition is analytic, it 
expresses a mere tautology, because the predicate is already contained in the concept of  the 
subject. When a proposition is synthetic, on the other hand, it provides some new information 
about the subject, because the concept expressed by the predicate enlarges the concept expressed 
by subject.  
(k2) Thus, if  the proposition expressed by (4) were analytic, it could not be properly proved, 
because the predicate "exists" would be already contained in the subject: this proposition would 
express a mere tautology. 
(k3) On the other hand, if  (4) expressed a synthetic proposition, then the predicate "exist" would 
be informative and it would refer to some property. Yet, according to Kant, this predicate is not a 
real one and it does not determine the concept of  any subject, i.e., it does not add new 
information to this latter concept. To state that something exists is nothing more than to posit 
the subject with all its predicates: when we claim that (4), we only claim that 
 
(4') there is a God, 
 
i.e., that there is something (God) with all its predicates. Thus, "exist" is a logical, rather than a 
real predicate: it seems to be a presupposition of  any true predication. Thus, at least from the 
perspective of  real predicates, the real contains nothing more than the possible: the concept of  
one hundred real tallers and that of  one hundred possible tallers do not differ, because they 
provide the same information about those tallers. 
(k4) Furthermore, when we claim that there is a triangle and that this triangle does not have three 
angles, we claim something contradictory. Yet, when we reject that there is a triangle, we reject all 
its predicates too. Thus, no contradiction will result. When we reject the concept of  God (i.e. 
when we state that there is no God) with all its predicates, we do not claim anything 
contradictory, because we reject God's predicates too. Furthermore, we cannot state anything 
necessary about the concept of  God. In fact, when we consider propositions, every necessity is 
conditional: it is necessarily true that the predicate is borne by the subject only if  the subject is 
posited with all its predicates. Yet, if  the subject is not posited, no necessity and no contradiction 
will result. 
                                                 
22 See Kant’s text in Plantinga (1968): 57-64. 
33 
 
The distinction expressed in (k1) between analytic and synthetic propositions is far from 
being clear and many objections have been raised against it. Yet, I shall not examine here this 
Kantian thesis. Nor will I consider (k2), even though the distinction between analytic 
propositions and a priori synthetic ones is not sufficiently clear. 
At any rate, (k3) and (k4) are the most interesting theses. Here are some plausible 
objections against them. 
(1vs.k3) What does it mean that the real contains nothing more than the possible, at least from 
the perspective of  real predicates? I think that there are two different meanings of  possibility 
implied in this thesis: possibility as such and mere possibility. Something is possible as such iff  it 
is logically possible and it is naturally possible, i.e., it can exist given the actual order of  nature. 
Thus, one hundred tallers are possible as such iff  their concept does not imply any contradiction 
and they can exist, given their actual order of  nature. In this case, is it true that the concept of  
one hundred possible tallers contains nothing more than the concept of  one hundred existing 
tallers? No, it is not. The concept of  one hundred possible tallers contains all the predicates 
borne by one hundred possible tallers and, moreover, this concept is not contradictory (it is 
logically possible) and, given the actual order of  nature, one hundred possible tallers can exist. On 
the other hand, the concept of  one hundred existing tallers contains all the predicates borne by 
one hundred possible tallers and, moreover, this concept is not contradictory and, given the actual 
order of  nature, one hundred existing tallers can exist and they exist. Furthermore, one hundred 
existing tallers can surely exist, given that they exist, whereas one hundred possible tallers can 
exist because nothing within the actual order of  nature makes their existence impossible. Thus, 
there are at least two differences between the concept of  one hundred possible tallers and the 
concept of  one hundred existing tallers: their (natural) possibility is explained in two different 
ways and the concept of  a hundred existing tallers contains their existence, while the former 
concept does not contain it. Thus, if  there are such differences, why cannot we state that 
existence is a real predicate, that is borne by the concept of  one hundred existing tallers and that 
is not borne by the concept of  one hundred possible tallers? 
If  we now consider mere possibility, the concept of  one hundred merely possible tallers 
seems to be identical with the concept of  a hundred existing tallers minus the real predicate of  
existence or it seems to be identical with the concept of  one hundred possible tallers. In the first 
case, existence adds something to the concept of  one hundred tallers, while, in the second case, 
there are the same differences that subsist between the concept of  one hundred existing tallers 
and the concept of  one hundred possible tallers. Thus, in both situations, it seems that we have 
to abstract from existence in order to distinguish two different concepts. Yet, we can abstract 
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from existence only if  existence is a real predicate, i.e., only if  existence adds something to the 
concept of  something. Perhaps "exist" is a special real predicate, because it determines the 
ontological status of  an object. Yet, I do not see any reason to deny that "exist" is a real predicate. 
The Kantian thesis (k3) is acceptable only if  one assumes – without any valid reason – that 
"exist" is not a real predicate. 
(2vs.k4) Thus, when we state that one hundred existing tallers do not exist, we state something 
contradictory, while, when we state that one hundred possible tallers do not exist, we do not state 
anything contradictory (we state something that is made true or false by the fact that these tallers 
exist or that they do not exist) and, when we state that one hundred merely possible tallers do not 
exist, we state something true, if  these merely possible tallers do not exist (if  they are merely 
possible) and assuming, contra Quine23, that such merely possible tallers have clear identity 
conditions provided by all their real predicates. 
(3vs.k2-k3) What about the concept of  God? Following the first version of  Anselm's ontological 
argument, it seems possible to think of  God as not existing. If  Kant's objections aim at proving 
that we can think of  God as not existing, we have already conceded this possibility. Yet, if  they 
aim at proving that we can think of  God as not existing without running into any contradiction 
and if  Anselm's first version's assumptions are true, such objections do not reach any valid result. 
We can hold the concept of  a merely possible God, of  a possible God and of  an existing God. 
In the first case, non-existence is truly predicated of  a merely possible God, yet this true 
predication is not made true by any fact about God: it is made true by an act of  abstraction made 
by subject. In the second case, existence can be truly predicated of  God. In the third case, 
existence must be truly predicated of  God. Anselm's first version considers the second case and it 
shows that, given the definition of  God, existence must be predicated of  Him.  
In sum, it seems to be true that we can conceive of  God as not existing. Yet, in God's 
case, this conception is false: it is not made true by any fact, given the definition of  God, while 
the definition of  God and what follows from this definition make the proposition expressed by 
(4) true.  
 
I.1.4. The Mathematician and the Theologian: Gödel in defense of Anselm (and of God). 
In this section, I shall summarize Gödel's ontological argument for the existence of  God, I shall 
make some remarks about Gödel's ontological assumptions on properties and existence, I shall 
report some objections against Gödel's assumptions and conclusions. Furthermore, I shall 
summarize Anderson's revised version of  Gödel's argument and some objections against this 
                                                 
23 See Quine (1948) and his famous example of the possible fat man in the doorway, that I shall consider in the next 
chapter. 
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latter version. I shall neither report the proofs of  the theorems, nor shall I discuss all the 
objections to in detail. I shall only focus on those assumptions that are relevant for this work on 
the notions of  existence and non-existence. 
First, I shall try to summarize the argument by following Sobel's reading of  Gödel's 
axioms and theorems24. Let me assume S5 in order to deal with modal formulas. The operator 
"◊" means "it is possible that", i.e., "in some possible world it is true that"; the operator "⎕" 
means "it is necessary that", i.e., "in every possible world it is true that". Furthermore, I assume 
that: "x" and "y" are variables ranging over objects; "φ" and "ψ" are variables ranging over first-
order properties; "POS" stands for the second-order property of  being positive; "GOD" stands for 
the first order property of  being God-like; "ENEC" stands for the first-order property of  
necessarily existing; "ESSENCE" stands for the relation of  being an essence of  ... . Furthermore, I 
shall assume that "φ̅" is a variable that stands for complementary properties of  positive 
properties, i.e., for corresponding negative properties.  
 
(gs1) ⎕ φ(POSφ̅ ↔ ~POSφ) (axiom 1) 
(gs2) ⎕ φ ψ(((POSφ & ⎕ x(φx → ψx)) → Pψ) (axiom 2) 
(gs3) ⎕ φ(POSφ → ◊ xφx) (theorem 1) 
(gs4) ⎕ x(GODx ↔  φ(Pφ → φx)) (definition of  being God-like) 
(gs5) POSG (axiom 3) 
(gs6) ⎕ φ(POSφ → ⎕Pφ) (axiom 4) 
(gs7) ⎕ φ x(ESSENCEφx ↔ (φx &  ψ(ψx → ⎕ y(φy → ψy)))) (definition of  being an essence of  ...) 
(gs8) ⎕ x(GODx → ESSENCEGODx) (theorem 2) 
(gs9) ⎕ x(ENECx ↔  φ(ESSENCEφx → ⎕ xφx)) (definition of  necessarily existing) 
(gs10) POSENEC (axiom 5) 
(gs11) ⎕ xGODx (theorem 3) 
(gs12) ⎕ x( y(GODy ↔ y = x) & ENECx) (corollary 1, not present in Gödel's proof) 
 
The assumptions state that: it is necessary that, for any property, the complementary of  
that property is positive iff  that it is not true that that property is positive (gs1 – axiom 1); it is 
necessary, for any two properties, that, if  one of  them is positive and it is necessary that, for any 
object, if  that object exemplifies the former property, then it exemplifies the latter too, then the 
latter property is positive too (gs2 – axiom 2); it is necessary, for any object, that that object is 
God-like iff, for any property, if  that property is positive, then it is exemplified by that object (gs4 
– definition of  being God-like); the property of  being God-like is positive (gs5 – axiom 3); it is 
necessary, for any property, that, if  that property is positive, it is necessarily positive (gs6 – axiom 
4); it is necessary, for any object and any property, that that property is an essence of  that object 
                                                 
24 See Sobel (1987) and Sobel (2004): 117-138. 
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iff, for any property exemplified by that object, it is necessary that the essential property implies it 
(gs7 – definition of  being an essence of  ...); it is necessary, for any object, that that object 
necessarily exists iff, for any property, if  that property is essential to that object, then it is 
necessary that there is an object that instantiates it (in other words, an object is necessarily 
existent iff  its essential properties are necessarily instantiated) (gs9 - definition of  necessarily 
existing); the property of  necessarily existing is positive (gs10 – axiom 5). 
The theorems state that: it is necessary, for any property, that, if  that property is positive, 
then it is possibly instantiated (gs3 – theorem 1); it is necessary, for any object, that, if  it is God-
like, then the property of  being God-like is an essence of  it (gs8 – theorem 2); it is necessary that 
there is something that is God-like (gs11 – theorem 3); it is necessary that there is only one object 
that is God-like and it necessarily exists (gs12 – corollary 1). It has been shown by Sobel, 
Anderson and by some other authors that Gödel's assumptions and conclusions are widely 
questionable. 
(1vs.gs1) What does it mean that some property is positive? Maybe it means that, by instantiating 
that property, something is more perfect than by not instantiating it. Thus, positive properties are 
properties that make things more perfect. It seems that they are properties that imply 
perfection(s). Yet, this is only one plausible possible interpretation of  Gödel's thought. It is far 
from being clear, in this proof, what is for something to be positive.  
(2vs.gs1) Anderson objects that, given axiom 1, for every property, if  that property is not 
positive, it is necessary that its complementary property turns out to be positive. Yet there, are 
many properties that are indifferent with regard to positiveness. For example, if  it is not positive 
that I have brown hair, because this property does not make me more perfect, given axiom 1, the 
property of  not having brown hair turns out to be positive. Yet, it seems that this latter property 
does not make me more perfect, i.e. that it is not a positive property. Thus, there are properties 
for which (gs1) is not true25. 
(3vs.gs1) Are there negative properties? As we have already seen, the answer to this question is far 
from being obvious. 
(4vs.gs2) Given axiom 2, following Sobel, it seems that every trivial property implied by any 
positive property, such as the properties of  being self-identical or of  being red or non-red, turns 
out to be positive. Yet, this is highly counter-intuitive.  
(5vs.gs3-gs4) Given the definition of  being God-like and theorem 1, it seems obvious that it is 
possible that there is a being with all the positive properties. Yet, this fact is not well explained. If  
positive properties were finite in number, in fact, it is possible to demonstrate that they are 
                                                 
25 See Anderson (1990). 
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compossible, so that a being that instantiates all these properties is possible. Yet, Gödel does not 
demonstrate such compossibility, while Leibniz, in his Supplementum, aims at proving this fact. On 
the other hand, if  they were infinite, as Sobel remarks26, how is it possible to demonstrate their 
compossibility?  
(6vs.gs2-gs5) Given both axioms 2 and 3, Sobel remarks that a disjunctive property such as the 
property of  being God-like or being Devil-like would turn out to be positive27. Thus, a Devil-like 
being would have this positive property. I must confess that I do not see any trouble in this fact, 
at least for the sake of  the argument. First, it must be proved that disjunctive properties are 
genuine properties. Secondly, even if  a Devil-like being had the positive property of  being God-
like or being Devil-like and a God-like being had it and even if  these two beings shared all their 
disjunctive properties, that Devil-like being would be different from that God-like being, because 
they would have different positive and non-positive non-disjunctive properties. Thus, given (gs4), 
it is not legitimate to prove that it is necessary that there is a Devil-like being, while it is legitimate 
to prove that it is necessary that there is a God-like being. On the other hand, accepting 
disjunctive properties, it would be possible to prove that it is impossible that there exists a being 
that has no positive property at all. Yet, it is possible to object that it is highly counterintuitive to 
admit that the property of  being God-like or being Devil-like is a positive one. However, this 
objection does not undermine the argument by proving that necessarily a Devil-like being exists. 
(7vs.gs5) Is the property of  being God-like a positive one because it makes any being 
instantiating it more perfect or because God is the most perfect of  all the beings by definition? 
Anselm would have accepted the second thesis and I agree with him. In fact, if  we tried to justify 
the first thesis, we would probably have to assume that God is more perfect than any other being, 
i.e., that He is the most perfect of  all the beings. 
(8vs.gs6) Is every positive property necessarily positive? In other words: is every positive property 
positive in every possible world? We could imagine worlds in which the positive property of  
being omniscient, for example, does not make its bearer more perfect. Thus, this assumption 
should be justified.  
(9vs.gs9) Sobel argues that, given this definition of  necessarily existing, there could be a 
necessarily existing being without any essence. In fact, the conditional  
 
(gs9) ⎕ x(ENECx ↔  φ(ESSENCEφx → ⎕ xφx)) 
 
would be true, even if  Eφx were false. 
(10vs.gs9) If  existence were expressed by the existential quantifier, how could we deal with beings 
                                                 
26 See Sobel (2004): 121-122, 141-143. 
27 See Sobel (2004): 122-123. 
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that do not exist within some possible world but that truly have some properties within that 
world (e.g., fictional beings)? 
(11vs.gs10) Why is necessary existence a positive property? Perhaps because it makes things that 
necessarily exist more perfect than things that contingently or impossibly exist. Moreover, it 
seems that necessary existence is a positive property because existence is positive too. In fact, as 
we have already seen, if  existence were not a positive property or, in general, following Gödel, if  
the fact of  existing were not more positive (or more perfect) than the fact of  not existing, why 
would a being that necessarily exists be more perfect than a being that only contingently exists? 
(12vs.gs) Sobel argues that the God-like being that necessarily exists, following Gödel's proof, is 
not identical with God, i.e., it is not (or it could be not) the worshipful being that we call "God". I 
shall not present Sobel's arguments for this conclusion, because this objection is not strictly 
connected to the topics of  this work28. 
(13vs.gs) There is another relevant objection presented by Sobel that I should mention: given 
further theorems that follow from Gödel's proof, a modal collapse follows from the axioms. In 
fact, every proposition turns out to be necessarily true or (aut) not possibly true and every being 
that has an essence turns out to be necessarily existent. This is another unwelcome result of  
Gödel's ontological argument that I cannot analyze here29. 
However, in order to clarify some aspects of  Gödel's assumptions and to deal with 
Sobel's objections, Anderson tries to modify Gödel's proof30. I shall follow Sobel's reading of  this 
latter Gödel-Anderson's ontological argument. I shall assume all the previous symbols of  (gs) 
with the same meanings (even though Anderson's second-order property of  being positive means 
something different from Gödel's positivity) and all the previous assumptions about S5 and 
quantifiers. I shall only add the symbols "IMPERF", that stands for the first-order property of  being 
imperfect, and "E", that stands for the first-order property of  existing. 
 
(ga1) ⎕ φ(POSφ ↔ (⎕ x(~φx → IMPERFx) & ~⎕ x(φx → IMPERFx))) (definition of  being positive) 
(ga2) ⎕ φ x(ESSENCEφx ↔ ((φx &  ψ(⎕ y(φy → ψy))) ↔ ⎕(Ex → ψx)) (definition of  being an essence of  ...) 
(ga3) ⎕ x(ENECx ↔  φ(ESSENCEφx → ⎕ xφx)) (definition of  necessarily existing) 
(ga4) ⎕ x(GODx ↔  φ(ESSENCEφx &  ψ(⎕ y(φx → ψx) ↔ POSψ)) (definition of  being God-like) 
(ga5) ⎕ φ(POSφ → ~POSφ̅) (axiom 1) 
(ga6) ⎕ φ ψ(POSφ & ⎕ x((φx → ψx) → POSψ)) (axiom 2) 
(ga7) POSGOD (axiom 3) 
(ga8) ⎕ φ(POSφ → ⎕POSφ) (axiom 4) 
(ga9) POSENEC (axiom 5) 
                                                 
28 See Sobel (1987) and Sobel 2004: 128-132. 
29 See Sobel (1987) and Sobel (2004): 132-135. 
30 See Anderson (1990). 
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(ga10) ⎕ φ(POSφ → ◊  xφx) (theorem 1) 
(ga11) ⎕ x(GODx → ESSENCEGODx) (theorem 2) 
(ga12) ⎕ xGODx (theorem 3) 
 
The assumptions that are different from (gs) are in bold text.  
Gödel-Anderson's ontological argument seems to clarify (1vs.gs1) and it seems to avoid 
(2vs.gs1), (6vs.gs2-gs5) and (13vs.gs). However, it is still open to all the other objections. 
Furthermore, there are at least two peculiar objections against this version. 
(1vs.ga3) The definition of  necessarily existing implies that it is necessary that there is a being 
that has some essential property, i.e., that in every possible world there must be something that 
instantiates this property. Yet, it does not guarantee that it is always the same being in every 
possible world31.  
(2vs.ga12) There is no uniqueness condition. Thus, there could be many God-like beings. 
In order to avoid the modal collapse (13vs.gs) and the problem of  disjunctive properties 
(6vs.gs2-gs5), Hájek introduces some emendations that I shall only mention32. In particular, he 
suggests that we should replace (gs1) and (gs2) with 
 
(gh1)  φ ψ(((POSφ & ⎕ x(φx → ψx)) → ~POSψ̅) 
 
and (gs4) with 
 
(gh4)  x(GODx ↔  φ(⎕φx ↔  ψ(⎕ y(ψy → φy) & POSψ))) 
 
I cannot evaluate here Hájek's version, because I cannot discuss the whole problem of  
the modal collapse. It seems that this version, as well as Anderson's one, clarifies (1vs.gs1) and 
avoids (2vs.gs1), (6vs.gs2-gs5) and (13vs.gs). Yet, Hájek does not deal with all the other 
objections. 
 
I.1.5. From God to Existence: some Proto-Conclusive Remarks. 
After having examined these versions of  the ontological argument, it is time to summarize some 
of  the data and of  the problems that we have found out. This discussion have been guided by 
four questions, although I have made further remarks about the validity of  the arguments and the 
truth of  the premises:  
(I) what is the concept of  existence involved in these versions of  the ontological argument? 
(II) What is the relationship between mental and real existence? 
(III) Is existence a first- or a second-order property? Is it a property at all? 
(IV) What is the relationship between subjective conceivability, general conceivability, possibility 
                                                 
31 See Sobel (2004): 143. 
32 See Hájek (2002). I only mention the version of the emendations without variable domains. 
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and the ontological status of  mental objects? 
As regards question (I), it seems that existence is considered a perfection by Descartes, 
while Anselm only thinks that things that really exist are greater (more perfect) than things that 
do not really exist, i.e., that exist only in our thought. It seems to me that it is not necessary to 
justify Anselm's argument by using Descartes' notion of  existence as perfection, even though this 
latter thesis gives some kind of  justification to Anselm's thesis (perhaps not a very good one). 
However, in order to make such versions of  the ontological argument sound, it seems necessary 
to interpret and justify the connection between existence and perfection.  
In both Anselm's and Descartes' arguments, real existence is considered a first-order 
property, i.e., a property of  objects (question III). On the other hand, Gödel thinks of  existence 
as something expressed by quantifiers: things that exist are things that are part of  some domain 
of  quantification. Thus, if  it is possible that there is something that instantiates some property, 
there is at least one possible world in which that thing exists, even though that world needs not to 
be our (actual) world. Necessary existence is considered a positive property, i.e., a property that 
seems to make things instantiating it more perfect. However, necessary existence seems not to be 
a genuine first-order property: to state that something necessarily exists is logically equivalent to 
state that, in every possible world, there is something that instantiates some property (in God's 
case, the property of  being God-like). Yet, what is the difference between genuine first-order 
properties and non-genuine ones? It seems to me that genuine first-order properties are 
properties that are instantiated by objects and that are informative: objects can instantiate them 
or not instantiate them and the instantiation of  such properties gives some information about 
objects. Non-genuine first-order properties are trivial properties: their instantiation by an object is 
simply implied by there being that object (maybe they are analytically contained within the notion 
of  object). Gödel's necessary existence seems to be both trivial and informative: it is trivial, 
because it is simply expressed by the existential quantifier and the necessity operator; it is 
informative, because things that have it are made perfect (or more perfect) by the instantiation of  
this property.  
Kant's objections against the thesis that existence is a first-order property are not 
acceptable, at least according to my perspective. However, many philosophers follow Kant's line 
and try to justify and/or to slightly modify in different ways his theses about existence. In the 
next chapter, I shall consider this latter line of  thought, that seems to be shared by Moore, Broad, 
Russell, Frege, Quine, and many other authors.  
With regard to question (II), in order to make Anselm's arguments sound, it seems 
necessary to reply to objections (8vs.a'5)-(11vs.a'5). Yet, in order to reply to such objections, it 
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seems necessary to develop a theory of  non-existent objects, i.e., of  objects that do not really 
exist but that nevertheless seem to have some properties and/or to which it seems that we 
attribute some properties.  
Finally, with regard to question (IV), it seems necessary to describe and justify the 
connections between conceivability and possibility, even though the notion of  possibility is not 
required by Anselm's first version of  the ontological argument. I have already distinguished 
between three different kinds of  conceivability. Yet, what is the relationship between conceived 
objects and actual objects? Moreover, in order to make Descartes' and Gödel's arguments sound, 
we need to clarify the relationship between existence, necessity and possibility. Finally, is a God-
like being (a being that instantiates every positive property) possible?  
In the last chapter of  this work, I shall try to defend the ontological argument, after 
having developed a general theory of  existence and non-existence that tries to deal with the 
problems, the objections and the requests of  clarification that I have discussed here.  
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I.2. What are we talking of? Existence and Reference 
When we claim something true or false, it seems that we always claim something true or false 
about something. If  I claim, for example, that I do not live in France, I claim something true about 
me. Besides, if  I claim that Obama is not a politician, I state something false about politician. In 
general and only considering true propositions, if  a statement expresses a true proposition that 
has the logical form  
 
Pa  
 
(where "P" is a variable ranging over properties and "a" is an individual constant), then, by the 
rule of  existential generalization, it is also true that 
 
 xPx 
 
 The problem of  the connection between the reference of  terms and the existence of  
objects arises when we try to interpret the existential quantifier. According to actualists, there are 
(i.e., we can successfully refer to, claim something true about) only items that do exist and there is 
no item that does not exist: to claim that something is an item and that it is such-and-such implies 
that that item exists33. On the other hand, according to non-actualists, there are items (in this case, 
objects) that do not exist and we can claim something true about them (we can successfully refer 
to them and truly state that they are such-and-such). Before considering some varieties of  
actualism and non-actualism, I shall introduce and discuss some data that such theories aim at 
explaining. Further data will be introduced in the next sections of  this chapter and in the next 
two chapters. 
 
(datum1) (existential propositions) There are statements that seem to affirm or deny the (tenseless)34 
existence of  objects, such as 
 
(5) lions exist; 
 
(6) unicorns do not exist; 
 
(7) Obama exists; 
 
(8) Sherlock Holmes does not exist; 
 
(9) this exists (e.g., when I point at my laptop); 
 
(10) this does not exist (e.g., when I see a mirage in the desert and I realize that the object of  the 
                                                 
33 Here I use "items" in order to designate all the entities, i.e., objects, properties, and so on, even if my discussion in 
this chapter is restricted to objects. 
34 I shall consider the question of tensed existence in chapter I.4. 
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mirage does not exist); 
 
(11) I exist. 
 
 These statements seem to express true propositions. Yet, what makes such propositions 
true? What are their logical structures? And what are the referents of  their logical subjects?35 
 
(datum2) (ambiguities concerning non-existents) If  we now consider the proposition expressed by 
 
(12) Sherlock Holmes is a detective,   
 
it turns out that there seem to be reasons for considering it true and reasons for considering it 
false. It is true because, according to Conan Doyle's stories, there is a detective who is named 
"Sherlock Holmes" and is such-and-such. Yet, it is false because there is no real detective named 
"Sherlock Holmes" who has all the features of  Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes.  
 
(datum3) (ontological status of  non-existents) It seems that 
 
(13) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character 
 
expresses a true proposition, even though the proposition expressed by (8) seems to be true. 
 Thus, we can see how the paradox of  non-existence arises: if  the proposition expressed 
by (13) is true and if  the rule of  the introduction of  the existential quantifier is valid, then there 
is something that is a fictional character. Yet, if  the proposition expressed by (8) is true and if  
there are only objects that do exist, there is no such thing. Thus, there is and there is not 
something that is a fictional character. In order to deal with this paradox, non-actualists deny that 
there are only objects that do exist, so that the meaning of  "there is" is different from the 
meaning of  "exist". On the other side, actualists deny that, by means of  statements such as (8) 
and (13), we actually refer to objects and try to paraphrase such statements in order to make it 
clear that we do not.  
 
(datum4) (existence-entailing attributes) In order for the proposition expressed by 
 
(14) Obama is a politician 
 
to be true, it must be true that (7). In general, in order for someone to be a politician, s/he has to 
exist. It seems that the truth of  (7) is implied by the truth of  (14): existence is a necessary 
condition for the instantiation of  (at least some) properties by objects. Yet, provided that (8) is 
                                                 
35 I shall set aside here the approach based on gappy propositions, according to which, roughly, propositions with 
empty names such as "Sherlock Holmes" do not express full propositions, but unfilled or gappy ones, that are false, 
following Braun (1993) and (2005), or truthvalue-less, following Adams, Dietrich (2004). For some problems 
concerning this view – in particular with regard to its adherence to commonsensical intuitions – see Reimer (2001a) 
and (2001b). 
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true, how do we justify the truth of  (12) (at least in some respect)? Furthermore: is every 
property an existence-entailing one?  
 
(datum5) (intensional contexts) There are verbs such as "think" or "hope" or "believe" that define 
contexts in which the rule of  the introduction of  the existential quantifier seems to fail. It is true 
that 
 
(15) John thinks of  a hobbit, 
 
even if  it does not follow from (15) that it is true that 
 
(15') there is (=there exists) something that is a hobbit and that is thought of  by John. 
 
 A good theory of  the relationship between existence and reference has to explain and 
justify the truth of  data (datum1)-(datum5). In the first section of  this chapter (I.2.1), I shall 
analyze the theses of  five thinkers who can be considered the fathers of  all the current actualist 
and non-actualist options: Brentano, Frege, Russell, Moore, Meinong. In the remaining sections 
(I.2.2, I.2.3 and I.2.4), I shall illustrate and discuss some varieties of  actualism and non-actualism. 
 
I.2.1. Existence and Reference: the first Arguments and Problems 
I.2.1.1. Brentano's Existential Presuppositions. 
Developing some intuitions of  Kant's, F. Brentano, in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 
argues that existence adds nothing to the concept of  an object. When I affirm (7), I simply affirm 
Obama36. However, if  we try to reconstruct the assumptions of  Brentano's argument to prove 
this thesis, it seems that his proof  does not work: 
 
(brentano 1.1) for every combination of  two things, both things have to be affirmed 
(assumption); 
 
(brentano 1.2) everything is affirmed iff  that thing exists (assumption); 
 
(brentano1.3) it is not true that (7) iff  Obama is affirmed. Yet, it is true that (7) iff  there is a 
combination of  Obama and his existence (hypothesis to deny). 
 
 The first conjunct of  (brentano 1.3) is denied in virtue of  (brentano 1.2). The second 
conjunct is denied in virtue of  the fact that, by (brentano 1.1) and (brentano 1.2), we simply have 
to affirm Obama in order to affirm his existence. Yet, (brentano 1.2) cannot be assumed, because 
it is what Brentano aims at proving! Thus, this argument, if  we assume (brentano 1.2), is 
question-begging and, if  we do not assume it, it is a non sequitur37. 
                                                 
36 See Brentano 1874 (2009): 161-162. 
37 This criticism is partly inspired by Vallicella (2001). 
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 Concerning (8), Brentano argues that, if  (8) were the denial of  the combination of  
existence and Sherlock Holmes, then Sherlock Holmes would not be denied. In fact, when I deny 
some combination of  two things, I do not deny those things, but only their combination. Yet, 
Sherlock Holmes does not exist iff  he is denied. Thus, the denial of  the combination of  
existence and Sherlock Holmes does not imply the denial of  Sherlock Holmes' existence. 
However, it seems to me that this argument works only if  we assume that: Sherlock Holmes does 
not exist iff  he is denied. Yet, this latter thesis exactly is what has to be proved! Thus, Brentano's 
argument concerning (8) is question-begging or it is a non sequitur.  
 Brentano thinks that quantified propositions can be reduced to existential propositions38. 
In order to prove this, Brentano shows that the following logical equivalences are true: 
 
(brentano aff.un.) all men are mortal iff  an immortal man does not exist. 
 
(brentano neg.un.) No stone is living iff  a living stone does not exist. 
. 
(brentano aff.part.) Some man is sick iff  a sick man exists.  
 
(brentano neg.part.) Some man is not learned iff  an unlearned man exists. 
 
 One might try to interpret (5) and (6) by following these equivalences and by using super-
ordinate concepts. In this case, we would have: 
 
(5brentano aff.part.) lions exist (a lion exists) iff  some animal is a lion. 
 
(6brentano neg.un.) Unicorns do not exist iff  no animal is a unicorn. 
 
 As it will be argued by Frege, one could introduce the concept of  being an existent as the 
most super-ordinate concept, whose negation does not admit any positive determination (while 
the negation of  being an animal admits, for example, as one of  its positive determinations, the 
concept of  being a flower) and then replace the term "animal" with the term "existent". Yet, as 
Brentano claims, there is nothing such as the concept of  existing. In order to claim something 
true about something, I always need to affirm some object, i.e., the same thing about which I 
claim something true. Thus, for example, in order to deny that there are immortal men (i.e., in 
order to claim that it is not the case that there are immortal men), I need to presuppose that there 
are men and that all men are mortal. This presupposition of  existence makes some rules of  the 
square of  opposition invalid, at least when we try to use non-referring general terms.  
 For example, the proposition expressed by 
 
(16) all unicorns are winged 
 
                                                 
38 See Brentano 1874 (2009): 165. 
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turns out to be false, because there exists no unicorn. Yet, if  (16) expresses a false proposition, 
according to the square of  opposition, it must be true that 
 
(17) some unicorn is non-winged, 
 
which, according to Brentano, is equivalent to 
 
(17brentano) a non-winged unicorn exists. 
 
 Yet, (17brentano) is false, because it is true that (6). Thus (16) and (17) are both false, 
even though, according to the rules of  the square of  opposition, they are contradictory, i.e. they 
cannot be both true or both false.   
 Elsewhere39, Brentano claims that seemingly true propositions such as the one expressed 
by (13) imply the existence of  poetic fictions and of  characters imaginatively created by authors. 
This theory of  ficta is quite confused and not well developed. Thus, I shall not analyze it. I think 
that Brentano's contribution to our debate lies in his acceptance of  existential presuppositions 
for every true proposition and in his denial of  existence as a property. Yet, I have tried to show 
that his arguments seem not to be sound.  
 
I.2.1.2. First Interlude: the Square of Opposition and some other Actual(ist) Problems. 
As we have seen, Brentano is an actualist. According to actualism,  
 
(actualism) there are no items that do not exist40. 
 
 Thus, we cannot quantify over non-existing objects. Yet, actualists have to deal with some 
problems. For example, since (6) expresses a true proposition, actualists cannot mantain that the 
square of  opposition holds for non-denoting general terms (or, for non-actualists, for general 
terms that seem to denote non-existing objects). Developing some intuitions of  Lambert's41 and 
interpreting the square of  opposition in a non-Brentanian way, it is possible to prove the general 
validity of  this objection. Let me consider the square of  opposition that concerns unicorns’ being 
winged: 
 
(16aff.un.) for everything, if  that thing is a unicorn, then that thing is winged; 
 
(18neg.un.) nothing is a winged unicorn; 
 
(19aff.part.) something is a winged unicorn; 
 
(17neg.part.) something is a unicorn and it is not winged. 
 
                                                 
39 See Brentano 1874 (2009): 169-170. 
40 As we will see in chapter I.4, actualism is something different from modal actualism.   
41 See Lambert (1967). 
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 Given that it is true that (6), (16aff.un.) and (18neg.un.) always express true propositions, 
while (19aff.part.) and (17neg.part) always express false ones. Thus, (16aff.un.) and (18neg.un.) 
cannot  express contrary propositions, because they are both true, while contrary propositions 
cannot be both true. Furthermore, (19aff.part.) and (17neg.part.) cannot express subaltern 
propositions, respectively, of  (16aff.un.) and (18neg.un.), because the superaltern does not have 
the same truth value of  the subaltern. Finally, (19aff.part.) and (17neg.part.) cannot express 
subcontrary propositions, since they both express false propositions, while subcontrary 
propositions cannot be both false. Actualists can reply that we can only construct squares of  
oppositions out of  denoting general terms or that the square of  opposition only holds with 
regard to contradictory propositions. Yet, these seem to be too strong restrictions.  
 Strawson suggests that we should interpret the square of  opposition as follows42: 
 
(16aff.un.strawson) there is nothing that is a unicorn and that is not winged and there is at least 
one thing that is a unicorn and there is at least one thing that is not winged; 
 
(18neg.un.strawson) there is nothing that is a winged unicorn and there is at least one thing that is 
a unicorn and there is at least one thing that is winged; 
 
(19aff.part.strawson) there is at least one winged unicorn or (vel) there are no unicorns or (vel) 
there is nothing that is winged; 
 
(17neg.part.strawson) there is at least one unicorn that is not winged or (vel) there are no unicorns 
or (vel) there is nothing that is not winged. 
 
 Since both (16aff.un.strawson) and (18neg.un.strawson) are false and both 
(19aff.part.strawson) and (17neg.part strawson) are true, Strawson does not preserve the law of  
subalternity, according to which (16aff.un.) and (19aff.part) must have the same truth-value, as 
well as (18neg.un.) and (17neg.part.). Furthermore, the second and the third disjuncts in 
(19aff.part.strawson) and (17neg.part.strawson) seem to be suspiciously ad hoc: nothing implies in 
our square of  opposition that unicorns might not exist, in order to make particular statements 
true.  
 Rescher argues that actualists cannot justify the truth values of  some modal propositions 
and of  existential counterfactuals43. For example, if  we allow that there are things that possibly 
exist and that do not exist, we have to allow that there are things that do not exist.  
                                                 
42 See Strawson (1952): 176-178. 
43 See Rescher (1959): 160-162. I cannot dwell here on the logical definitions of existence provided by free logicians 
and, more generally, by logicians wishing to reveal the tacit existential presuppositions of logical systems. See 
Leonard (1956), Rescher (1957), (1959), Hintikka (1959), Lambert (1958), (1961), (1962), (1963a), (1963b), (1964), 
(1965). See also Lambert (1986) and (1987).  
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 Finally, actualists have to paraphrase statements such as (6), (8), (10), (13), (15), in order to 
maintain that they are true and that they are not about non-existent objects. There is no object 
that does not exist. Thus, there is no non-existent object that has properties. Concerning (6), the 
form of  this paraphrase should be: 
 
(act.par. of  (6)) (6) iff  p 
 
where p expresses some proposition that does not commit us to non-existent objects, while the 
truth of  (6) seems to commit us to them.  
Yet, it seems that such attempts to paraphrase (6) are ambiguous. In fact, from an actualist 
viewpoint, it is legitimate either to claim that the proposition expressed by p has the same logical 
structure as the proposition expressed by (6) – i.e., they express the same proposition that has the 
logical structure expressed by p – and that such a logical structure seems less ambiguous when we 
state p, or that they have two different logical structures, that are nevertheless logically equivalent. 
In the first case, non-actualists can reply that, by stating (6), we simply mean something different 
from what we mean by stating p. In the second case, non-actualists can provide some 
counterexamples to the logical equivalence between the logical structure of  the proposition 
expressed by (6) and the logical structure of  the proposition expressed by p, in order to 
demonstrate that it does not hold. Yet, in the second case, it would be possible to quantify over 
non-existent objects. Thus, many actualists choose the first strategy. On the other hand, with 
regard to (5), (7) and (9), both strategies seem available, as I shall try to demonstrate in what 
follows. These are only general remarks concerning some problems and strategies of  actualism44. 
 
I.2.1.3. Frege's Second-Order Concepts and Designata. 
According to G. Frege, philosophers should distinguish between two different meanings of  the 
predicate "exist": it can mean the same thing which is meant by the predicate "being actual", so 
that existence, following this interpretation, can be considered a property of  objects (a first-order 
property), but "exist" can be used with another meaning too. Since numbers are not actual, but 
they do exist, logicians are primarily interested in this latter meaning45. I shall use the term 
"property" instead of  the Fregean term "concept", provided that Fregean concepts are not 
subjective entities and they are the referents of  predicates.  
 However, in his Foundations of  Arithmetic, Frege argues that there is a parallelism between 
our uses of  the word "one" and of  the predicate "exist" (at least following its second meaning). 
The argument goes as follows: 
 
                                                 
44 See also Parsons (2008). 
45 See Frege 1893 (1964): 24. 
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(frege 1.1) from a logical viewpoint, the word "one" does not stand for a property of  things; 
 
(frege 1.2) from a logical viewpoint, the use of  the word "one" is similar to the use of  the 
predicate "exist"; 
 
(frege 1.3) two words have similar logical uses iff  they have the same logical status; 
 
(frege 1.4) thus, the predicate "exist" does not stand for a property of  things. 
 
 In order to argue for the premise (frege 1.1), Frege points out that: if  "one" referred to a 
property of  things, everything would possess it, so that it would be a non-informative property; 
the word "one" does not admit plural, while genuine first-order predicates admit it; the meaning 
of  "one" is different from the meaning of  "unitary", that can be used as first-order predicate. 
Furthermore, Frege argues that, if  I state that 
 
(20) Venus has 0 moons, 
 
 I do not state anything about some object that is one of  Venus' moons, because such an 
object does not exist46. However, Frege can justify this latter thesis only if  he accepts an actualist 
interpretation of  quantification over objects, according to which we can only quantify over 
existing objects. As I have already shown, it is obviously not legitimate to argue that actualism is 
right (i.e., that there are no items that do not exist) under actualist assumptions. If  we do not 
accept actualism, we can argue that (20) has the same meaning as 
 
(20non-act.) all the objects that are Venus' moons do not exist. 
 
 In this latter case, we claim something true about non-existent objects. 
However, the most relevant premise is the one expressed by (frege 1.2). Frege argues that the 
affirmation of  existence is "nothing but the denial of  number nought"47. Thus, for example, (5) 
means the same as 
 
(5frege) it is not the case that the property of  being a lion has 0 instances, 
 
while (6) means the same as 
 
(6frege) it is the case that the property of  being a unicorn has 0 instances. 
 
 This seems to assume that we are talking of  existent instances of  such properties: Frege's 
thesis is still justified under actualist assumptions. In fact, under non-actualist assumptions, from  
 
(6non-act.) all unicorns do not exist 
 
                                                 
46 See Frege 1884 (1960): 40-59. 
47 See Frege 1884 (1960): 64-65. 
50 
 
it is not legitimate to infer that 
 
(21) there is no unicorn. 
 
 The property of  being a unicorn might have at least one non-existent instance. On the 
other hand, what is expressed by (5) is that the property of  being a lion has at least one existent 
instance. This latter instance, that is a lion, bears the first-order property of  existing. Thus, under 
non-actualist assumptions, the premise (frege 1.2) can turn out to be false. Frege does not 
provide independent reasons for accepting the actualist perspective.  
 However, developing Frege's solution, one might claim that the predicate "exists" stands 
for the property of  having at least one (existent) instance, while its negation stands for the 
property of  having 0 (existent) instances. Such properties are properties of  properties, i.e., 
second-order properties. One difficulty immediately arises: if, according to Frege, the expression 
"the property of  being a unicorn" does not stand for a property, but for a property-correlate (a 
concept-correlate, in Frege's terms)48, and if  property-correlates are objects, existence turns out 
to be a property of  objects. Existence is not a property of  ordinary objects, but of  objects that 
are property-correlates. Yet, it is possible to deal with this objection by accepting a Russellian 
view of  properties, according to which they do not turn out to be objects when they instantiate 
other properties.  
 Furthermore, Frege's thesis seems quite problematic in dealing with 
 
(22) unicorns are mythical entities, hence they do not exist. 
 
 If  (22) expresses a true proposition, the property of  being a unicorn is instantiated by 
something that does not exist and that nevertheless is a mythical entity. According to Frege, 
propositions expressed by sentences containing non-denoting terms do not have any truth-value, 
at least if  we do not use them within intensional contexts. In this latter case, the non-denoting 
terms denote their "primary" senses (the ones they have within extensional contexts). Yet, (22) is 
not implicitly contained within any intensional context: it seems to express something that is 
simply true. Something similar is expressed by (13), that contains one non-denoting singular 
term. Thus, from Frege's actualist perspective, intensional contexts can be introduced with regard 
to (12) and (16) (e.g., if  I claimed that, in Greek mythology, all unicorns are winged), but not with 
regard to (13) and (22). 
 Before dealing with statements containing proper names, I wish to consider one further 
argument of  Frege's, that has already been introduced. In his 1884 Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence, 
Frege claims that the property of  being an existent can be considered the most super-ordinate 
                                                 
48 I shall consider the question of property-correlates in chapter II.1. 
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property, that admits of  no contrary49. This is the most radical expression of  Frege's actualism. A 
non-actualist could accept the logical equivalence between the propositions expressed by (5) and 
by 
 
(5act.frege) something existent is a lion. 
 
 Yet, according to non-actualists, it does not follow from this equivalence that existence is 
the most super-ordinate concept, that admits of  no contrary. One of  the positive determinations 
of  not existing, for example, could be the property of  being fictional.  
 Accepting that existence admits of  no contrary and in order to show that existence 
provides no information about objects, Frege argues that we can replace the property of  existing 
with the property of  being self-identical50. Thus, (5) can be paraphrased by 
 
(5frege self-id.1) some lions are identical with themselves; 
 
(5frege self.id.2) something identical with itself  is a lion. 
 
 Nevertheless, it seems that (5) states something different from such paraphrases. If  we 
accept the actualist thesis of  self-identity of  items according to which 
 
(act. self-id.) everything exists iff  it is self-identical, 
 
and if  we accept that two coextensive predicates stand for the same property, we can agree with 
Frege. However, in this latter case, existence as self-identity turns out to be a first-order property. 
Yet, non-actualists are not forced to accept (act. self-id.). Unicorns are different from hobbits, 
Sherlock Holmes is different from Mr. Pickwick, but unicorns and Sherlock Holmes are identical 
with themselves and they nevertheless do not exist.  
 Finally, we have to consider (7) and (8) from a Fregean view. They seem to claim that 
 
(7frege) the word "Obama" denotes something; 
 
(8frege) the expression "Sherlock Holmes" does not denote anything, it is an empty sound, 
 
and the fact that our words denote something is a presupposition of  their use51. "Sherlock 
Holmes" can denote a sense within some intensional context. Yet, as we have already seen, this 
thesis turns out to be unacceptable with statements such as (13). Furthermore, it can be shown 
that singular existence is not identical with names' having denotations52. Obama could exist, even 
without being thus named. Let me imagine a situation where our Obama is not thus named and 
                                                 
49 See the translated text in Frege (1979): 63-64. 
50 See the translated text in Frege (1979): 62. 
51 See the translated text in Frege (1979): 60. 
52 See, for example, Forgie (1972): 260-261. For the defense of a thesis similar to the one of Frege’s, see Thomasson 
(2008). 
52 
 
where there is no object named "Obama", even if  our Obama exists. Thus, (7frege) turns out to 
be false, even though Obama exists. Frege would concede this point and add that, in this latter 
case, there would be another statement concerning the proper name used to denote that object. 
Yet, since names are used within communities of  speakers, how could it be true that that object 
exists, if  it had no name at all? There could be some statement such as (9). Yet, if  no one saw our 
Obama and Obama did not recognise his own existence by claiming something such as (11), 
would Obama be non-existent? Thus, it seems to me that the existence of  an object is not 
logically equivalent to some linguistic fact concerning the name (or the indexical) that we use to 
designate that object. The statement (7frege) expresses a true proposition iff  it is true that there 
is an existent object that is named "Obama".  
 Furthermore, a non-actualist might reply that the expression "Sherlock Holmes" denotes 
something that does not exist. We can presuppose that proper names (and words in general) 
denote something. Yet, it turns out to be problematic to presuppose that they only denote 
existents. Actualists should demonstrate that non-existent objects are not the legitimate referents 
of  proper names and/or that they are not self-identical and/or that they cannot instantiate 
properties and/or that it is not legitimate to quantify over them53.  
 
I.2.1.4. Russell, On Deleting (non-existents). 
In his 1903 work The Principles of  Mathematics, B. Russell claims that being is different from 
existence54. Being can be predicated of  every object of  thought, of  every countable thing, while 
existence is only predicated of  objects that exist. Thus, Pegasus is, but it does not exist, while 
Obama is and exists. Following Frege, in his article on The existential import of  propositions55, he 
argues that existence can be treated in two different ways: it can be considered equivalent to, for 
example, being spatio-temporally located; from the logical viewpoint, however, it is equivalent to 
some other thing, since, when we state that some class exists, we do not state that it is spatio-
temporally located, but that it has at least one member. In his The Philosophy of  Logical Atomism, 
Russell seems to reject this latter view too56. 
 Concerning Russell's view of  existence, I shall analyze his well-known article On Denoting57 
and some parts of  The Philosophy of  Logical Atomism. In this latter text, Russell states that, if  
existence is considered a first-order property, then the following syllogism turns out to be valid: 
                                                 
53 For further discussions on Frege's view of existence, see Dummett (1993): 277-307. For another interesting 
objection concerning the existence of properties in the Fregean (and Russellian) view of existence, see McGinn 
(2000): 24-26. For a recent defense of the second-order property view of existence against McGinn’s objections, see 
Katzav (2008). 
54 See Russell 1903 (1996): 449-451. 
55 See Russell (1905a) in Russell (2003): 77-80. 
56 See Russell 1918-1919 (2010): 77. 
57 See Russell (1905b) in Russell (1956): 39-56. 
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(ex. syll.) Greeks exist. Socrates is a Greek. Thus: Socrates exists.  
 
 The first premise can be interpreted with an universal quantifier. In this case, the 
syllogism seems to be valid. Yet, according to Russell, it is not valid: I cannot deduce the existence 
of  anything from its attributes. However, I do not see where the invalidity lies. In fact, if  the 
property of  being Greek is an existence-entailing property, we can deduce the existence of  all the 
objects that instantiate it. It is true that there can be Greeks that do not exist. Yet, in this latter 
case, we might state that non-existent Greeks do not instantiate the property of  being Greek and 
that they have some different kind of  relation with this property. If  we interpret the first premise 
with the existential quantifier, this syllogism is as invalid as any other syllogism of  the same 
logical form. For the same reasons, if  I state, for example, that at least one Greek is a painter and 
that Socrates is a Greek, it does not follow that Socrates is a painter. However, there are other 
reasons that ground Russell's denial of  existence as a first-order property. I shall not quote them 
now, because I shall analyze them within the Russell-Meinong debate.  
 While Russell, presupposing the actualist reading of  quantifiers, seems to consider (5) and 
(6) respectively equivalent to 
 
(5russell) there is at least one thing that is a lion, 
 
(6russell) there is nothing that is a unicorn, 
 
the most interesting part of  his proposal is the theory of  definite descriptions, that is used in 
order to deal with (7) and (8). According to Russell, not every grammatical proper name is a 
logical proper name. Logical proper names, in fact, presuppose their designata, while many 
grammatical proper names do not presuppose them. Indexicals, for example, when they name 
actual objects of  senses, are logical proper names58. Yet, "Obama" and "Sherlock Holmes" are 
not logical proper names: they are abbreviations of  definite descriptions, such as "the P", where 
"P" is replaced by a predicate or by a conjunction of  predicates that uniquely defines something. 
In order for a sentence with some definite description to express a true proposition, that definite 
description must satisfy two conditions: the uniqueness and the existence conditions. Thus, when 
we state that 
 
(23) Michelle Obama’s husband in 2013 is American, 
 
we presuppose that there is (there exists) at least and at most one husband of  Michelle Obama’s 
in 2013 and that he is American. Thus, if  "Obama" abbreviates the definite description "Michelle 
Obama’s husband in 2013", by stating (7), we state that 
                                                 
58 See Russell 1918-1919 (2010): 28-30. 
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(7russell) it is the case that there is at least and at most one thing that is Michelle Obama’s 
husband in 2013, 
 
and this seems to express a true proposition. On the other hand, by stating (8) and by accepting 
that "Sherlock Holmes" abbreviates the definite description "the detective who lives in London 
and who is one of  Watson's friends", we state that 
 
(8russell) it is not the case that there is at least and at most one thing that is a detective and that 
lives in London and that is one of  Watson's friends, 
 
and this seems to express a true proposition too. Thus, existence is a property of  propositional 
functions, namely, from an ontological viewpoint, a property of  properties (or of  conjunctions 
of  properties)59.  
 A definite description must individuate one property (or one set of  properties) that is 
uniquely instantiated by one individual, provided that that individual exists. It is worth noticing 
that, by denying a sentence containing a definite description, one might deny the clause of  
existence and/or the clause of  uniqueness. This point will be deepened when I shall examine 
Quine's treatment of  non-existent objects. However, it is difficult to accept that, whenever one 
states that (7), one has in mind a property (or a set of  properties) that uniquely defines Obama 
and that one states something about that property (or that set of  properties). It is difficult to 
affirm that, in natural language, we do not directly talk of  an object. Yet, Russell could reply that 
this is a defect of  natural language and that a logical language can eliminate it. However, there 
might be many definite descriptions for Obama, which satisfy the uniqueness clause. Provided 
that there is only one husband of  Michelle Obama’s in 2013 and that there is only one U.S. 
President in 2013, (7) is legitimately paraphrased by both 
 
(7russell-1) there is at least and at most one husband of  Michelle Obama’s in 2013; 
 
(7russell-2) there is at least and at most one U.S. President in 2013. 
 
 Thus, (7) might be equivalent to (7russell-1) or (vel) (7russell-2). Yet, provided that there 
might be only one man on earth (Obama), so that "the man" would be a valid definite description 
of  Obama’s, (7) would be adequately paraphrased by  
 
(7russell-3) there is at least and at most one man. 
 
 Does (7russell-3) adequately paraphrase (7)? This seems to be highly counterintuitive. In 
order to state that (7) is adequately paraphrased by (7russell), we have to pick out one definite 
                                                 
59 See Russell 1918-1919 (2010): 66. 
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description that is only applicable to Obama in every possible situation. It seems that, when we 
state (7), we do not always have in mind this latter definite description. Finally, Russell seems to 
presuppose the actualist thesis and not to explain what is for something to exist. This latter point 
will be clearer after having analyzed sentences concerning non-existent objects.  
 In fact, (12) turns out to express a false proposition. I accept that there is a sense for 
which this latter remark is true. Yet, I think that there is also a sense for which (12) expresses a 
true proposition. According to Russell, (12) expresses a false proposition because it is adequately 
paraphrased by 
 
(12russell) there is at least and at most one thing that is a detective who lives in London and is 
one of  Watson's friends and that thing is a detective, 
 
and the existence clause is not satisfied. There are some problems with this approach. First, it 
seems that, if  we assume the fact that Sherlock Holmes is a detective as expressed by Sherlock 
Holmes' description, (12) turns out to be an analytic proposition, even though a false one60. Yet, it 
seems that (12) provides new information about Sherlock Holmes: it does not state anything that 
is assumed within the description of  Sherlock Holmes. Secondly, all fictional entities turn out to 
be indistinguishable. In fact, if  every statement about fictional entities is false, it is also false that 
 
(24) Sherlock Holmes is different from Pegasus. 
 
 Thirdly, in order for (13) to express a true proposition, we have to presuppose Sherlock 
Holmes' existence, that seems to be denied by his being a fictional character.  
However, there is a sense for which, according to Russell, (12) and (13) seems to express 
true propositions. In fact, if  there is a secondary occurrence of  the definite description within 
some intensional context, (12) turns out to be adequately paraphrased by 
 
(12russell int.cont.) (in the story a) there is at least and at most one thing that is a detective who 
lives in London and is one of  Watson's friends and that thing is a detective, 
 
and this seems to express a true proposition. I wish to remark that (12russell int.cont.) seems to 
assume that there are fictional contexts, even though Russellian actualists might not accept this 
assumption. If  there were no such contexts, in fact, this solution would seem suspiciously ad hoc. 
 Furthermore, accepting fictional contexts, one might eliminate the story operator and 
state that (12russell int.cont.) can be paraphrased by 
 
(12russell int.cont.') there is at least and at most one thing that is a detective that lives in London 
and is one of  Watson's friends in the story a and that is a detective in the story a. 
                                                 
60 See, for these criticisms, Kripke (1972). 
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 The story operator would turn out to be redundant. In order to deny that (12russell 
int.cont.') adequately paraphrase (12russell int.cont.), one has to deny that there are properties 
such as the property of  being such-and-such in the story a. Thus, one has to assume that every 
property, when it is truly instantiated by something, is an existence-entailing one (while the 
property of  being such-and-such in the story a is not an existence-entailing one). However, if  we 
assumed this latter thesis, how could we deal with (13)? In fact, the property of  being fictional 
seems to be a non-existence-entailing property! Russellians might deny these properties, by 
stating that (13) is adequately paraphrased by 
 
(13russell int.cont.) it is not the case that there is at least and at most one thing that is a detective 
that lives in London and is one of  Watson's friends and, within some intensional context, there is 
at least and at most one thing  that is a detective that lives in London and is one of  Watson's 
friends. 
 
 However, (13russell int.cont.) seems to quantify over intensional contexts, that are 
suspicious entities: do such contexts exist or not? Admittedly, we could replace this latter 
quantification with the intensional operator "in the world of  fiction", that defines one and only 
one intensional context. However, in this way, it would be difficult to provide some uniqueness 
condition for Sherlock Holmes. As we shall see in dealing with C. F. Williams' theory and in the 
next chapter, the world of  fiction is extremely varied, so that there might be no adequate definite 
descriptions for Sherlock Holmes.  
 I add one further, brief  remark about Russell's theory, in order to clarify the relationship 
between logical proper names and the existence of  their designata. Dealing with (9) and (10), 
Russell seems to claim that (9) is always true and (10) is always false when the indexical "this" 
stands for a sense-datum, an actual object of  perception. However, there are other uses of  "this" 
that do not make this latter indexical a logical proper name. When I claim that the object of  this 
sense-datum exists or does not exist, I do not claim anything that is always true or always false. In 
this latter case, following Russell, "this" should be replaced with some definite description.  
 
I.2.1.5. "Moore" Senses of Existence and Imagination. 
Even though G. E. Moore seems to distinguish between the property of  being real and the 
(supposed property) of  existing, he seems to accept that "exists" cannot be considered a 
predicate that stands for an attribute (in our terms, for a property)61. He argues that there are at 
least two differences between existential statements and non-existential ones. First, we should 
consider the following statements: 
                                                 
61 See Moore (1936). 
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(25) tame lions growl; 
 
(26) tame lions exist. 
 
 According to Moore, it is perfectly meaningful to add quantifiers to (25), so that it is 
meaningful to state that all/some/most tame lions growl. On the other hand, it is meaningless to 
add quantifiers to (26), except for the quantifier "some". (26) means that some tame lions exist, 
i.e., that some lions are tame. Following Moore and considering the corresponding negative 
statements, one could state that it is meaningful to assert that all/some/most tame lions do not 
growl, while it is meaningless to assert that all/some/most tame lions do not exist. However, by 
stating that some tame lions do not exist, we could mean that some tame lions are imaginary. Yet, 
this is another sense of  the predicate "exist", that is different from the sense considered in (26) 
and in its corresponding negative statement. I think that a non-actualist can do justice to the fact 
that we can claim that all/most/some tame lions exist/do not exist. Moore's objection holds only 
if  our quantifiers range over existent beings.  
 Moore notices that there is one further difference between (5) and some statement such 
as 
 
(27) lions growl. 
 
 This latter statement can be analyzed as follows: 
 
(27moore) for at least two values of  x, it is true that x is a lion and x growls, 
 
while (5) can be analyzed as 
 
(5moore) for at least two values of  x, it is true that x is a lion. 
 
 Thus, existence can be paraphrased away by our logical analysis of  (5). However, if  we 
admit that there are non-existent lions, existence cannot be paraphrased away. Yet, as I have 
already claimed, this latter criticism has in turn to face at least one problem: in order for 
something to be a lion, it must exist, so that the property of  being a lion seems to be an 
existence-entailing property. I shall deal with this problem in the second part of  this work. 
 With regard to (10) and (11), Moore states that these statements are meaningful and that 
they seem to imply the use of  some logical predicate (i.e., in Moore’s terminology, of  some 
predicate that stands for some attribute). When (10) is used in order to refer to something that is 
represented by my sense-datum, it is equivalent to 
 
(10moore-1) this sense-datum is the sense-datum of  a physical object, 
 
and, since it is true and meaningful that 
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(28) this might not have existed, 
 
the statement (11) is meaningful too, though contingently false. Furthermore, if  we talk of  the 
sense-datum itself, (10) might mean that 
 
(10moore-2) this sense-datum exists. 
 
 Yet, it seems to me that this use of  the predicate "exist" is equivalent to the use of  the 
predicate "is real".  
 However, if  existence in (5) and in (26) is different from the property of  being real, since 
non-existence is different from the property of  being imaginary, we might try to interpret (8), 
(12) and (13) by analyzing what happens when we imagine something to be the case62. Following 
Moore (1933), (8) might mean that 
 
(8moore) Sherlock Holmes is not real 
 
and this, provided that (13) expresses a true proposition and that Conan Doyle is the creator of  
Sherlock Holmes, is equivalent to 
 
(8moore-1) in sentences in which the symbol "Sherlock Holmes" occurs, Conan Doyle wasn't 
telling us about any real man, to whom he was referring by that name. 
 
 Trying to interpret (12) from Moore (1933)’s viewpoint, with regard to Conan Doyle, it is 
legitimate to state that 
 
(12moore-1) the man called "Sherlock Holmes", having such-and-such characteristics, about 
whom I am telling this story, has the characteristic of  being a detective. 
 
 If  we refer to Sherlock Holmes, we can state that 
 
(12moore-2) the man called "Sherlock Holmes", about whom Conan Doyle tells stories and with 
such-and-such characteristics assigned to him by Conan Doyle in those stories, has the 
characteristic of  being a detective assigned to him in those stories. 
 
 I shall not discuss such theses. Yet, I think that Moore's contributions consist in his 
having dealt in detail with the thesis that there are two meanings of  the predicate "exist" and that, 
at least with regard to statements (6) and (8), it seems legitimate to use it as a first-order predicate 
(referring to the property of  being real) in a meaningful way and in his having recognized that 
there might be at least two ways in which something is such-and-such: such-and-such in reality 
and such-and-such in some work of  fiction, in such a way that, in that work, there are some 
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properties that are assigned to it63. 
 
I.2.1.6. Second Interlude: Existence and Contradiction. 
 There is a well-known argument against existence as a first-order property that I should 
mention. This argument is accepted, among others, by Ayer64 and Broad65. Turning to (5), (6), (7), 
(8), it is possible to state that (5) and (7) express mere tautological propositions, while (6) and (8) 
express self-contradictory propositions. In fact, (5) and (7) should be read as: there is something 
that is a lion and there is such a thing; there is something that is Obama and there is such a thing. 
On the other hand, (6) and (8) should be read as: there is something that is a unicorn and there is 
no such thing; there is something that is Sherlock Holmes and there is no such thing.  
Yet, as we have already noticed, non-actualists might deny that the meaning of  the first 
"there is" is identical with the meaning of  the second "there is": while the first means that there is 
at least one object that is such-and-such, the second might mean that that object exists. 
 Furthermore, even accepting the actualist thesis, G. Nakhnikian and W. C. Salmon, 
considering (5) and (6), argue that Ayer's and Broad's argument is not sound. If, by (5), I claimed 
that something is a lion, this would not be a mere tautology. In fact, I would state that it is not 
true that, for everything, if  that thing is a lion, then that thing does not exist, i.e., that there is at 
least one thing that is a lion. On the other hand, (6) might be read as: for everything, if  that thing 
is a unicorn, then it does not exist. Ayer’s and Broad’s argument against that informativeness of  
existential statements assumes, in (5), that, for everything, if  that thing is a lion and it exists, then it 
exists, and, in (6), that, for everything, if  that thing is a unicorn and it exists, then it does not exist. 
These assumptions are not legitimate when we affirm or deny the existence of  things66.  
 
I.2.1.7. Meinong's Realms of Non-Existence. 
A. Meinong is perhaps the most influential among non-actualist philosophers. I cannot consider 
all his theses concerning the theory of  objects. I shall only examine some principles of  this 
theory and what follows from these principles in order to deal with our initial data67. Meinong 
                                                 
63 Pears (1967) and Griffiths (1975) make other interesting remarks about Moore’s position, that I cannot examine 
here. Partly following Alston (1960) and Pears (1967) and somehow anticipating Sommers’ theses (see below), Peetz 
(1982) argues that there are some informative uses of the predicate "exist": for example, we could claim that it is true 
that King Arthur exists as long as we predicate something of the world of legend (i.e., that it has someone such as 
King Arthur) and we could claim that it is true that tame tigers exist as long as we predicate something of the real 
world (i.e., that it has stame tigers). 
64 See Ayer 1936 (1971): 26. 
65 See Broad (1939), in Broad (1953): 182-183. 
66 See Nakhnikian and Salmon (1957). For further discussions on this argument, see, among others, Kiteley (1964) 
and Child and Goldberg (1970). 
67 Concerning Meinong's philosophy, see, for example, Findlay (1933), Grossmann (1974), Lambert (1983) and Orilia 
(2005): 81-92. Meinong was deeply influenced by Bernard Bolzano’s distinction between presence in the universe 
and existence (roughly, every item is present in the universe, but not every item exists, e.g., mathematical items do 
not exist) (see Bolzano (1837)), Brentano’s intentionality thesis and Kamizierz Twardowski’s distinction between 
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accepts as a datum that 
 
(dm6) we can single out, refer to, think of  objects that do not exist. 
 
 If  this datum is true, then it seems that actualism is in serious troubles. However, how 
should we judge the truth of  (dm6)? Non-existent objects, such as Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus, 
seem to be different from one another, even though they do not exist. Namely, it seems that two 
non-existent objects can be different iff  they bear different properties. Furthermore, it seems that 
they bear properties: in fact, they are at least fictional, for example, or mythical. They are also 
detectives, winged horses, and so on, and this seems to be the case even though they do not exist. 
Thus, we can claim something true about them, both concerning their properties, so that (12) 
seems to express a true proposition, and their ontological status, as in (13). If  there were no such 
objects (i.e., if  such objects were not objects), what would we think, thinking about them?  
 Thus, Meinong, accepting (dm6), argues that: the Sosein of  an object (its being such-and-
such) does not depend on its Sein (its being or non-being and its kind of  being) (principle of  the 
independence of  Sosein); objects are beyond being and non-being (principle of  the indifference 
of  objects); we can assume whatever property or set of  properties we want in order to constitute 
an object (freedom of  assumption). Thus, in general, Meinong seems to deny (datum4): there is 
no existence-entailing property.  
 With regard to (5)-(8), Meinong’s theses are somehow difficult to understand. According 
to Meinong, objects can have at least two different kinds of  being: existence and/or subsistence. 
Concrete objects exist and subsist, while objectives (the objects of  thoughts, similar to states of  
affairs or propositions) subsist or do not subsist (e.g., the objective that Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective, expressed by (12), subsists, so that it is true that (12), while the objectives expressed by 
statements that are false do not subsist) and ideal objects only subsist. Furthermore, there are 
objects that are not determined with regard to being or non-being and there are objects that are 
not. Among objects that are not, some of  them are logically possible, while others are logically 
impossible: Sherlock Holmes does not exist but he is logically possible, because the conjunction 
of  his properties does not imply any contradiction, while Meinong's well-known round square is 
logically impossible. Objects are complete or incomplete, regardless of  their ontological status: 
there are complete objects that do not exist and merely subsist (i.e., ideal objects), complete 
objects that do not have being, incomplete objects that do not have being or whose being or non-
being is not affirmed68. However, it is worth noticing that every object, following (dm6), is what it 
                                                                                                                                                        
acts, contents and objects of thought (objects of thought are different from and independent of the acts by which we 
think of them and the contents of our thoughts, so that they have their properties and their ontological status 
independently of our mental activities) (see Twardowski 1894 (1977)).  
68 See Meinong 1904 (1960) and Grossmann (1974). See also Meinong 1899 (1978), 1910 (1983) and (1915). 
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is, and is different from any other object, only in virtue of  its properties.  
 However, existent objects must be complete in order to exist. Being complete is a 
necessary, yet non-sufficient condition for existence. Furthermore, as Grossmann remarks69, 
according to Meinong, existence is strictly connected with time: existent objects are temporal 
objects, while non-existing ones are timeless. Thus, it seems that something exists iff  it is 
temporal. Existence turns out to be a first-order and informative property.  
 Yet, is it legitimate to assert that the property of  existing is equivalent to the property of  
being temporal? These two properties seem to have different contents. In fact, it seems 
counterintuitive to accept that some timeless objects, such as God (if  we admit God's existence), 
do not in fact exist. When we state that God exists, we do not state that He is temporal. An 
atheist might hold that, as a matter of  fact, only temporal beings exist and that God does not 
exist, since He is eternal. It is perfectly legitimate to do this. Yet, a theist might legitimately reply: 
"this is not true! God exists, even though He is timeless, and I can demonstrate that He exists in 
such-and-such a way". In such discussions, it happens that the two arguers have to find out some 
common meaning of  the predicate "exist", in order to demonstrate that God exists or that He 
does not exist. This meaning cannot be identified with the meaning of  the predicate "is 
temporal". In this latter case, in fact, there would be no dialogue, while, accepting that to exist is 
to be P, the atheist might try to demonstrate that only temporal beings are P, while the theist 
might try to demonstrate that not only temporal beings are P and that God is P.  
 However, following these intuitions about existence, we can claim that an object is 
temporal, only if  it exists. Being temporal is a sufficient, yet not a necessary condition for 
existence. Furthermore, if  existence is a first-order property, then, according to Meinong's 
principles, as Russell remarks70, it is legitimate to assume it as one of  the properties that 
constitute an object. Thus, an existent golden mountain exists (it is a priori true that it exists, 
because existence is assumed to contribute to that object’s constitution), even though it does not 
exist. Following Russell, Meinong's theory implies that the principle of  non-contradiction fails, 
since there are impossible objects, and that existence, in Meinong's theory, can be discovered a 
priori (at least in some cases, namely when it is taken to be part of  what constitute an object), 
while we all know that existence can be only discovered a posteriori. In his 1906 reply71, Meinong 
claims that we should distinguish between two senses of  "existence": existence1 (what is 
expressed by the predicate "being existent") can be assumed as a constitutive property of  objects, 
while existence2 (what is expressed by the predicate "exist") cannot be thus assumed. Yet, are they 
                                                 
69 See Grossmann (1974): 103. 
70 See Russell’s well-known 1904-1907 letters to Meinong in Russell (2003): 81-84. See also Orilia (2005): 109-115. 
71 For a detailed examination of the Russell-Meinong Debate, see Smith (1985) and Swanson (2011). 
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the same property? Or: is there any unity of  meaning between these two senses of  "existence"? 
If  they are not the same property, every property might be duplicated, at least in principle: for 
example, the property of  being a detective instantiated by Sherlock Holmes would turn out to be 
different from the property of  being a detective instantiated by a real detective. Is such a 
duplication of  properties legitimate and well-grounded? As we will see, Neo-Meinongians will 
deal with this kind of  problems.  
 However, what is for something to exist2? According to Meinong
72, existence2 seems to be 
identical with the subsistence of  an affirmative objective of  being (an objective that affirms the 
being of  something) concerning the object that exists2. Thus, (5)-(8) can be interpreted as 
 
(5meinong) there is at least one object that is a lion and for which the objective of  being that that 
lion exists subsists; 
 
(6meinong) for all the objects that are unicorns, the objective of  being that that unicorn exists 
does not subsist (or: for which the negative objective of  being that that unicorn does not exist 
subsists); 
 
(7meinong) there is one and only one object (Obama) that is such-and-such and for which the 
objective of  being that Obama exists subsists; 
 
(8meinong) there is one and only one object (Sherlock Holmes) that is such-and-such and for 
which the objective of  being that Sherlock Holmes exists does not subsist (or: for which the 
negative objective of  being that Sherlock Holmes does not exist subsists). 
 
 The predicate "exist" in these statements expresses existence2 since, if  it expressed 
existence1, that predicate could not be part of  an objective of  being, but only of  an affirmative 
objective of  essence (an objective affirming what an object is). Yet, if  it expresses existence2, 
existence2 turns out to be unexplained. In fact, this kind of  explanation would have the same 
form of  the following explanation: for Obama to exist is for the proposition expressed by (7) to 
be true. This is not an explanation of  existence at all.   
 Before leaving Meinong's theory, we should mention some problems concerning non-
existent objects. Some of  them, in fact, as I have already remarked, seem not to obey to logical 
laws, such as the law of  non-contradiction (contradictory objects) and the laws of  excluded 
middle and of  bivalence (incomplete objects). In fact, provided that some object is incomplete 
and provided that P is not one of  that object's constitutive properties, it is neither true nor false 
that, for some property P, that object has P or does not have it. Furthermore, does an incomplete 
object only have its constitutive properties or its constitutive properties plus all the properties 
                                                 
72 See Grossmann (1974): 116-120. 
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implied by them? Finally, if  I thought of  Sherlock Holmes and my friend Francesca thought of  
Sherlock Holmes too, both assigning to it the same properties, yet, in my case and not in 
Francesca's case, assigning to it the property of  having a sister too, would we both think of  the 
same object or of  two different objects? Following Meinong, we could state that Francesca's 
Sherlock Holmes is involved (implektiert) in my Sherlock Holmes, even though they are two 
different objects. Yet, it seems that we think of  the same object: Sherlock Holmes, to whom I 
ascribe one further property, that Francesca does not ascribe to it. I shall deal with these 
problems in the next chapter. 
 With regard to (13), one might argue that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character because 
it does not exist and is incomplete and is created by someone. Yet, if  the property of  being 
created by someone is assumed by me in Sherlock Holmes' constitution and it is not assumed in 
it by Francesca, do we have two different Sherlock Holmes or not? It seems that we both refer to 
the same Sherlock Holmes, who is, in fact, a fictional character.   
 
I.2.2. Actualists at Work 
In this section, I shall explore some varieties of  actualism. Actualists are characterized by their 
acceptance of 
 
(actualism) there are no items that do not exist. 
 
 Furthermore, many actualists believe that it is also true that 
 
(actualism-a) existence is not a first-order and informative property. 
 
 On the other hand, non-actualists believe that (actualism) is false, even though some of  them 
might accept (actualism-a). There are other philosophers who accept (actualism) and do not 
accept (actualism-a): I shall consider them in the fourth section of  this chapter. However, all the 
philosophers mentioned in this section accept (actualism). On the other hand, there might be 
internal and external objections against such versions of  actualism: internal objections are directed 
against particular forms of  actualist paraphrases that do not quantify over non-existent items and 
such objections try to show that these forms of  paraphrases do not preserve the truth-value 
and/or the meaning of  the original statements; external objections are directed against those 
arguments that aim at defending (actualism) and/or (actualism-a). 
 
I.2.2.1. Ryle's Conditionals. 
According to G. Ryle, the predicate "exists" is a bogus ontological predicate: by claiming that 
something exists, in fact, we only claim that that thing has some property73. In particular74, when 
                                                 
73 See Ryle (1933), in Ryle (2009): 67-68. 
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we claim that (7) expresses a true proposition, we claim that 
 
(7ryle) something is obamish, 
 
while, when we claim that (5) expresses a true proposition, we claim that 
 
(5ryle) something is lionish. 
 
 The properties of  being obamish and of  being lionish might be better understood as 
identical with the properties of  being Obama and of  being a lion. However, this thesis seems to 
presuppose the truth of  (actualism). Ryle argues that, when we claim that 
 
(29) there are non-existent detectives, 
 
we always claim something false, because we cannot distinguish between existent and non-
existent detectives, i.e., between objects that are detectives and exist and objects that are 
detectives and do not exist: non-existent detectives are not detectives at all75. This seems to 
happen because the property of  being a detective is an existence-entailing one. Non-existent 
detectives are imaginary objects and no imaginary object is a detective.  
 However, how can we deal with data (datum2) and (datum3), i.e., with the fact that both 
(12) (at least in one sense) and (13) seem to express true propositions? Following Ryle76, 
"Sherlock Holmes" is a quasi-name, because it has no referent, and (12) is a quasi-statement, 
because it contains a quasi-name. (12) means that 
 
(12ryle-1) if  "Sherlock Holmes" had a referent (i.e., if  "Sherlock Holmes" were a name), then that 
referent would be a detective. 
 
 Yet, it seems that "Sherlock Holmes" could name someone in reality and that person 
could not be a detective: in that case, "Sherlock Holmes" would have a referent, but that referent 
would not be a detective. Furthermore, if  there were a real detective named "Sherlock Holmes", 
then (12) would turn out to be true: the fictional character named "Sherlock Holmes" and the real 
detective thus named would turn out to be the same person. However, the fictive Sherlock 
Holmes and the real Sherlock Holmes would have different so-called ontological properties: for 
example, the fictive Sherlock Holmes would be created by Conan Doyle, while the real Sherlock 
Holmes would not be created by him. Furthermore, they could have different non-ontological 
properties (e.g., the property of  having a friend named Watson, attributed to the fictive Sherlock 
Holmes but that the real Sherlock Holmes could lack). The real and the fictive Sherlock Holmes 
                                                                                                                                                        
74 See Ryle (1932), in Ryle (2009): 46. 
75 See Ryle (1933), in Ryle (2009): 68. 
76 See Ryle (1930), in Ryle (2009): 36. 
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would turn out to be different: contra hypothesin, they would not be the same person.  
 Furthermore, Ryle sketches a theory of  imaginary objects that I can only summarize77. 
Considering Conan Doyle's stories, all the propositions used by Conan Doyle in order to claim 
something about Sherlock Holmes only pretend to be true, but they are neither true nor false. 
Furthermore, when the reader states that (12) expresses a true proposition in the story, s/he does 
not refer to someone named "Sherlock Holmes": s/he only refers to Conan Doyle's novels and 
s/he claims that those novels contain the proposition expressed by (12). Finally, when s/he 
claims that (13) expresses a true proposition, s/he claims that "Sherlock Holmes" pseudo-
designates, i.e., that it purports to designate someone but, as a matter of  fact, it does not 
designate anything. Against this latter thesis, I might remark that Ryle does not distinguish 
between kinds of  non-existent objects: in his account, in fact, all the imaginary objects turn out 
to be characterized by the same feature (the pseudo-designation of  their names), without 
distinguishing, for example, theoretical objects (e.g., numbers in anti-realist theories of  
mathematics) from fictional objects and hallucinations. Furthermore, as we have already seen, 
deep problems arise when "Sherlock Holmes" does designate someone.  
 With regard to the second aforementioned thesis, (12) would turn out to be interpreted as 
 
(12ryle-2) Conan Doyle's novels contain the proposition that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, 
purporting to be about Sherlock Holmes. 
 
 If  we wanted to deny the existence of  propositions about Sherlock Holmes, we could 
state that (12) is equivalent to78 
 
(8ryle-3) some of  the sentences in Conan Doyle's books say or imply that Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective. 
 
However, there are imaginary objects that are not described in books. Thus, according to my 
perspective, we could accept that 
 
(imag.ob.-thesis-1) if  x is an imaginary object and it seems true that x is P, then someone, 
thinking of  x, thinks of  x as P, 
 
or that 
 
(imag.ob.-thesis-2) if  x is an imaginary object and it seems true that x is P, then there is a thought 
in someone's mind representing x as P. 
 
 Yet, this thought would be about the imaginary object x. In someone's mind, x is an 
                                                 
77 See Ryle (1933), in Ryle (2009): 66-85. 
78 See Ryle (1933), in Ryle (2009): 74. 
66 
 
object, even though an imaginary one.  
 
I.2.2.2. Quine: Bound Variables and Possible Fat Men (in the doorway). 
W. v. O. Quine is the most influential among actualist philosophers. In his well-known article On 
what there is79, Quine argues that existence cannot be considered a first-order, informative property 
and that there are no non-existent objects, provided that such objects do not have definite 
identity conditions. Quine develops some theses of  Russell's in an original way. 
According to him, (7) can be paraphrased as follows80: 
 
(7quine-1) something obamizes. 
 
 Obama, in fact, is the unique thing that obamizes. Thus, the predicate "obamizes" 
(plausibly denoting the property of  obamizing, even though Quine might not agree with this 
claim, as we will see) can be used to form a definite description abbreviated by the proper name 
"Obama". Yet, the property of  obamizing seems to be a mysterious one. The idea behind Quine's 
intuition is that, in order to deal with true singular existential statements, such as (7), we should 
introduce properties that are instantiated by at least and at most one object. To claim that 
something exists, then, is tantamount to claim that there is an object that instantiates that 
property. Thus, it seems necessary that properties such as the property of  obamizing are 
instantiated by at least and at most one object. In other terms, there is no possible world (even 
though Quine could not accept this interpretation of  necessity) in which two different objects 
obamize. Russell's uniqueness condition is incorporated in such properties.  
 However, the property of  obamizing seems to be logically equivalent to the conjuntive 
property (or to the conjunction of  properties) of  being Michelle Obama’s husband in 2013 and 
of  the President of  the United States in 2013, and so on. Quine suggests a different account. In 
the second edition of  his Philosophy of  Logic81, the philosopher constructs predicates such as 
"obamizing" as follows: (14) is logically equivalent to 
 
(14quine) there is a x, such that x is identical with Obama and x is a politician. 
 
 Put formally: 
 
(14quine-f1)  x(x = o & POLx) 
 
where "o" is an individual constant standing for Obama and "POL" stands for the property of  
being a politician. The identity sign = is incorporated in one predicate: the predicate "being 
identical with Obama", that is logically expressed by "OBAM". Something is OBAM iff  there is 
                                                 
79 See Quine (1948), in Quine (1961): 1-19. 
80 See Quine (1948), in Quine (1961): 7-8. 
81 See Quine (1986): 25-26. See also Quine (1960): 176-181. 
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nothing different from that thing that is OBAM.  
 Thus (14quine-f1) is logically equivalent to: 
 
(14quine-f2)  x(OBAMx & POLx &  y(OBAMy → x = y)) 
 
and the mysterious predicate "obamizes" is thus explained in terms of  the predicate "being 
identical with Obama". (7) is interpreted as 
 
(7quine-1) there is something that is identical with Obama. 
 
 Since Obama is identical with himself, it is legitimate to claim that (7) is equivalent to 
 
(7quine-2) Obama is identical with himself. 
 
 Further theses follow from such an interpretation of  (7). First, everything exists, since 
everything is identical with something, namely with itself82. On the other hand, non-existent 
objects are not objects at all: there is no entity without identity83. Secondly, "exist" can be 
considered a first-order predicate, even though a non-informative one84. Thirdly, to be is to be the 
value of  a bound variable: in order for an atomic proposition Px to be true, for example, x must 
be replaced by an individual constant denoting something existent, i.e., simply denoting 
something85. Fourthly, "a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the 
bound variables of  the theory must be capable of  referring in order that the affirmations made in 
the theory be true"86. Against this latter thesis, Kit Fine points out that, in order to accept the 
truth of  mathematical affirmations, one does not have to believe that numbers are real, i.e., that 
                                                 
82 See Quine (1960): 176. 
83 For a critical discussion of the Quinean dictum, see Strawson (1997): 21-51 and Jubien (1996). 
84 See Ibidem. 
85 See Quine (1948), in Quine (1961): 12-13. 
86 Quine (1948), in Quine (1961): 13-14. Quine’s ontologically committing interpretation of quantifiers is not the only 
option that is available in the philosophical market. As we will see, Meinongians, for example, argue that our primary 
quantifiers are not ontologically committing, so that they range over both existing and non-existing items. I shall 
accept a similar reading of quantifiers in the chapter II.2. Other philosophers provided a substitutional interpretation 
of them (see, for example, Barcan Marcus (1962) and (1972) (in Barcan Marcus (1993): 75-88)), Dunn and Belnap 
(1968)). Finally, many thinkers have argued that our quantifiers are always used under some restriction to some 
domain of the discourse or relatively to some concept (see Eklund (2006) and Chalmers, Manley, Wasserman (eds.) 
(2009)). I do not wish to argue against such positions. Concerning the latter proposals, it seems to me that it has to 
assume that: there is no ontologically committing use of quantifiers in the metalanguage that we use when we talk of 
the different domains of restricted quantifiers; that the domain of such metalanguage quantifiers should not be 
simply defined by the domain of our richest domain of quantification – roughly, by the domain of the quantifiers 
that are less contextually restricted. Otherwise, quantifiers ranging over wider domains of the discourse (i.e., 
ontologically richer ones) would be per se apter than quantifiers ranging over narrower domains in order to be used in 
our ontological investigation and to express our best ontological commitments – contra Ockham’s razor. For a similar 
criticism, see Eklund (2008). Another proposal concerning quantifiers consists in distinguishing external and 
inferential readings (see Hofweber (2000) and (2005)). See also Fine (2009) and Cameron (2010) for further 
discussion. In particular, Cameron distinguishes between what there is (that is revealed by the Quinean criterion of 
ontological commitment) and what there really is (i.e., roughly, what carves nature at its joints) and argues that 
ontology is primarily interested in what there really is. Furthermore, according to Cameron, not everything there is is 
what there really is. 
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they exist. One coul be anti-realist in respect of  numbers' existence, even accepting that it is true 
that 2 + 2 = 487.  
 However, Quine could accept that (7) expresses a true proposition (or that (7) is simply 
true) iff  the predicate "is identical with Obama" is truly predicable of  something. Does this 
predicate denote anything or not? If  it denotes something, what does it denote? The answer is far 
from being clear. As I have already noticed, one could state that it denotes a property uniquely 
instantiated by Obama, i.e., the property of  being identical with Obama and with no one/nothing 
else (or, simply, the property of  being identical with Obama). Even though Quine could not 
accept this answer, it seems to be the most reasonable one. Otherwise, what would that predicate 
denote? Thus, it is legitimate to claim that this property exists iff  Obama exists. 
 However, can this property exist without Obama’s existing? For example, provided that 
Pegasus does not exist, does the predicate "being identical with Pegasus" denote the property of  
being identical with Pegasus and with nothing else (or, simply, the property of  being identical 
with Pegasus) or not? If  it denoted that property, that property would exist uninstantiated. Yet, 
given that Pegasus does not exist, this property would not have define identity conditions. Hence, 
according to Quine, it would not exist!88 Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that this property 
exists iff  Pegasus exists, i.e., that this property is what it is iff  Pegasus is what it is. Yet, this seems 
to explain Obama’s existence and Pegasus' non-existence in a circular way: Obama exists because 
there exists the property of  being identical with Obama; yet, this latter property exists (it is what 
it is) because Obama is what it is, i.e., because Obama exists. A Quinean actualist could reply that we 
do not have to explain things' existence: things just exist. However, we need at least a non-trivial 
criterion to non-circularly determine what exists and what does not exist, while the property of  
being self-identical only provides us with a trivial (it seems obvious that ordinary objects are self-
identical) and circular one. I shall explore this objection in more depth in chapter I.4. 
 On the other hand, if  those predicates did not denote properties, what would they 
denote? Perhaps, concepts. Yet, first, it seems reasonable to ask whether our concepts of  being 
identical with Pegasus or with Obama can be individuated, provided that we cannot know all the 
properties of  Obama’s and that we cannot determine all the properties of  Pegasus. Such 
concepts could be constructed by selecting a set of  uniquely individuating features of  Obama or 
of  Pegasus. However, a parte subjecti, nothing guarantees that, in reality, there is only one thing that 
                                                 
87 See Fine (2009).  
88 It is worth noticing that this problem cannot be solved by Plantinga's argument concerning the existence of 
uninstantiated thisnesses (i.e., haecceities, that can exist instantiated or not). In fact, Plantinga argues that such 
properties can exist uninstantiated in possible worlds in which Obama does not exist. Yet, on a Quinean account, 
that does not accept the existence of possible worlds, they do not have definite identity conditions. See, for example, 
Plantinga (1974) and Plantinga (2003). Wiggins (1995) seems to accept the theory based on thisnesses. 
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has all the corresponding features. Secondly, we could understand the concepts of  being identical 
with Pegasus and with nothing else, even without knowing that Pegasus does not exist: a nosse ad 
esse non valet consequentia. If  we chose non-subjective concepts (something like Fregean senses), 
such concepts would be similar to Platonic properties and, as we have already seen, there would 
arise problems concerning their identity and existence. Finally, if  those predicates did not denote 
anything at all (if  they were just predicates), it seems difficult to understand how their use could 
determine or explain things' existence. 
 With regard to propositions such as the one expressed by (15), Quine believes, roughly, 
that "thinks-of-a-hobbit" should be considered a predicate of  the subject "John"89. Hence, John 
seems to instantiate the property of  thinking of  a hobbit. Thus, it is not legitimate to infer, by the 
introduction of  the existential quantifier, (15') from (15): there is nothing that is thought of  by 
John. It is not clear how a Quinean interpretation could turn out to make the proposition 
expressed by (13) true.  
 However, after having accepted both (actualism) and (actualism-a) and after having dealt 
with all the difficulties concerning the denotation of  individuating predicates, Quine's theses 
could be accepted. On the contrary, denying that such assumptions are true, one could reply that 
non-existent objects have identity conditions, that it is legitimate to claim something true about 
them, and so on. Are there independent reasons for accepting such assumptions and the Quinean 
thesis according to which there is no entity without identity, that Quine accepts as equivalent to 
(actualism)? Let me consider the well-known argument of  the (merely) possible fat man in the 
doorway:  
 
"Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they 
the same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that 
doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of  them are alike? Or would their being alike 
make them one? Are no two possible things alike? Is this the same as saying that it is impossible for two things to be 
alike? Or, finally, is the concept of  identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can be 
found in talking of  entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one 
another? These elements are well-nigh incorrigible"90. 
 
 Quine seems to assume that: merely possible objects (i.e., unactualized possibles) seem to 
be mind-independent entities; no two merely possible objects can be identified nor distinguished 
in virtue of  spatio-temporal criteria of  identity (they are not in space-time). Thus, Quine seems 
to argue that their being alike does not guarantee that they are two objects or one and the same 
object and that their supposed countability does not guarantee that they are alike or not. It seems 
to be undetermined whether two merely possible objects are alike (perhaps because they are 
incomplete objects, so that they are undetermined with respect to at least one of  their properties) 
                                                 
89 See, for example, Quine (1986): 32-34. 
90 Quine (1948), in Quine (1961): 4. 
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and whether they are two or one and the same object (the possible bald man and the possible fat 
man in the doorway seem to be two different objects; yet, it could happen that they are one and 
the same object). Since no clear criterion of  identity is applicable to merely possible objects, they 
do not exist (no entity without identity) and they are not objects at all.  
 This argument has been widely discussed. For example, N. Rescher argues that there are 
as many merely possible objects as they can be described and that they are identical iff  their 
defining descriptions are logically equivalent91. Yet, if  they are incomplete objects, it seems not to 
be possible to determine whether their defining descriptions are logically equivalent: in Quine's 
example, it is only claimed that there is one possible object that is a fat man in the doorway and 
one that is a bald man in the doorway. How is it possible to find out whether such defining 
descriptions are logically equivalent or not? With regard to their undetermined properties, their 
descriptions seem to be at best disjunctions of  predicates. Thus, no two merely possible objects 
characterized by different properties can turn out to be identical with one another. 
 T. Parsons claims that there are at least as many possible men in the doorway as there are 
sets of  nuclear properties that contain the properties of  being a man and being in the doorway92, 
i.e. there are infinite possible men in the doorway. Yet, since the possible fat man and the possible 
bald man in the doorway are characterized by different nuclear properties (it is not stated whether 
the possible fat man is bald or not), they turn out to be different. Yet, if  they are merely possible 
(i.e., actualizable yet unactualized) objects and if  every actualized or actualizable object should be 
complete with regard to its properties, they cannot be actualizable objects: if  they were 
actualizable, in fact, they would turn out to be identical or (aut) different, not simply different.  
 R. Routley, in his article On what there isn't93, argues that we should distinguish between 
two aspects of  the question: if  one asks how many merely possible men (actually) are in the 
doorway, one should reply that there are no such men in the doorway, because the property of  
actually being in the doorway cannot belong to merely possible men; on the other hand, if  one 
asks how many merely possible men possibly are in the doorway, one should reply that there can 
be from zero to a certain definite number of  such men, depending on some physical criteria 
(such as how small men can be and how large can the doorway be). Concerning the identity 
between the merely possible fat man and the merely possible bald man in the doorway, Routley 
claim that one can find out identity criteria for indeterminate objects too. I think that Routley's 
answer is partially correct. In fact, one should consider that two different (existing) persons can 
                                                 
91 See Rescher (1959): 173-174. 
92 See Parsons (1980): 27-29. 
93 See Routley (1979): 411-426. Routley argues that there are indeterminate existing objects too: quarks (it is not 
always determinate whether two quarks are identical or not), forests, clouds, etc. See also Priest's criticisms of 
Quine’s argument in Priest (2005): 110-115. 
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give different replies to such questions and that such answers could turn out to "create" more or 
less merely possible men in the doorway.  
 I shall deal with Quine’s argument in the chapters II.3 and II.4. However, I think that one 
can provide identity criteria for such non-existent objects. In this case, they would turn out to be 
legitimate objects.  
 
I.2.2.3. Carnap's Existential Questions and Chakrabarti's Games. 
Accepting Quine's criterion of  ontological commitment, it seems that existence is strictly 
connected with the acceptance of  some theory: in fact, by accepting a theory, we are committed 
to the existence of  those entities that make the propositions (or the statements) of  that theory 
true.  
 In 1950, R. Carnap develops a theory of  existential questions that seems to be similar, at 
least under some respects, to Quine's view94. Carnap thinks that we have to distinguish between 
two kinds of  existential questions: internal and external ones. Internal existential questions 
concern the existence of  entities within some linguistic framework (or given the acceptance of  
some linguistic framework): for example, given the linguistic framework of  mathematics, one can 
affirm that there exists an even prime number between 6 and 8. It seems always legitimate to 
positively or negatively give an answer to these questions. On the other hand, external existential 
questions concern the existence of  the whole system of  entities (e.g., given the system of  spatio-
temporal entities, they concern the existence of  that system). These latter questions cannot be 
dealt with by rational means: it is only a matter of  choice whether we accept that system or not, 
because it is only a matter of  choice whether we accept that form of  language or not.  
 However, it seems that, when one claims that numbers or physical things exist, s/he does 
not claim anything about linguistic frameworks: numbers or physical things simply exist or do not 
exist. It is true that, within some fictional linguistic framework, some physical existing things do 
not exist and that, within the linguistic framework of  our talks about the physical world, fictional 
entities (that exist within fictional linguistic frameworks) do not exist. Yet, if  someone aims at 
explaining fictional entities' nonexistence by their absence within the physical linguistic 
framework and by their presence within fictional linguistic frameworks, s/he has already to 
presuppose that entities within the physical linguistic framework exist and that entities within 
fictional linguistic frameworks do not exist. There is at least one meaningful sense of  existence 
that framework-dependent existence does not explain, i.e., existence simpliciter (or reality). 
Furthermore, this latter kind of  existence concerns both entities and the real world, not simply 
                                                 
94 See Carnap (1950). I shall set the Quine-Carnap metaontological debate about the usefulness of metaphysical 
investigation aside. For this debate, see, for example, Quine (1951) and Eklund (2006) and (2011). 
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the acceptance of  lingustic frameworks. External existential questions are both legitimate and 
individual (they are about individual entities). Finally, there should be some neutral linguistic 
framework within which it could be legitimate to claim that fictional entities do not exist within 
the linguistic framework of  our talks about the physical world, while they do exist within fictional 
linguistic frameworks. 
 Developing this idea of  (partial, at least) context-dependency of  existence and some 
intuitions of  Wittgenstein's about linguistic games, A. Chakrabarti constructs a complex and 
interesting theory of  existential and fictional statements95. According to him, by talking of  
something as existing or not existing, we always play some linguistic game. In particular, there are 
five major games that we can play: game 1 is the game that we play when we talk of  physical 
items; game 2 is played when we talk in and about fiction; game 3 is played when we talk of  our 
phenomenal experience; we play game 4 when we talk about abstract entities (such as numbers 
and types); finally, we play the master-game when we simply try to deal with the existence or non-
existence of  items of  all the other games (i.e., when we try to deal with those external individual 
existential questions that Carnap seems not to recognize as rational).  
 Thus, existence seems to be game-dependent: playing game 2, for example, we can 
assume that Sherlock Holmes exists, even though, playing game 1, we cannot assume that he 
exists, because, within this latter game, we cannot refer to him. However, accepting the paradox 
of  non-existence, if  we cannot refer to Sherlock Holmes within game 1, we cannot deny his 
existence within that game. Thus, we need to talk of  Sherlock Holmes within the master-game 
too. In order for (8) to express a true proposition, we have to recognize, within the master-game, 
that Sherlock Holmes is neither an item of  game 1, nor an item of  game 4. Yet, Sherlock Holmes 
is an item, because we can assume that, in order for something to be an item (i.e., in order to 
assert that it is legitimate to existentially generalize propositions about it), it must be an item of  
game 1 or (vel) an item of  game 2 or (vel) an item of  game 3 or (vel) an item of  game 4.  
 Chakrabarti seems to claim that "exist" is a first-order, informative predicate and that, in 
order for something to be an item, it is not necessary that it exists (i.e., it is not necessary that it is 
an item of  game 1 or of  game 4). Thus, why can he be considered an actualist? First, it is not 
clear whether existence is a first-order informative property or not (i.e., within Chakrabarti's 
theory, an item of  game 4). Secondly, existence turns always out to be game-dependent. In fact, 
when we claim that something simply exists, we always claim it while playing some game (the 
master-game): playing the master-game, items exist or not, while the denial of  (actualism) states 
that there are objects that simply do not exist. However, it is true that every object must exist 
                                                 
95 See Chakrabarti (1997). 
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within at least one game.  
 It seems to me that Chakrabarti does not adequately consider the metaphysical aspects of  
the questions concerning existence and non-existence. In fact, it seems reasonable to accept that 
a linguistic game is something that exists iff  there is a community of  speakers playing it. 
Chakrabarti's theory seems to deal with the linguistic meaning of  existential statements. Yet, it 
does not deal with what is for something to exist. In fact, if  we affirmed that, in order for a chair 
to exist, it must be an item of  game 1, we would not explain what is for that chair to exist, 
because that chair would depend on the existence of  a linguistic game and, since linguistic games 
existentially depend on the existence of  communities of  speakers, it would derivatively depend 
on the existence of  that community and of  those speakers. Furthermore, something could be an 
item, even without being an item of  any game: if  no game were played, chairs and animals could 
in any case remain existing items, while Sherlock Holmes could remain a non-existing item.  
 In general, it seems to me that theories of  existence connected with linguistic frameworks 
neither adequately explain what is for something to exist, nor what valid and non-subjective 
criteria should be accepted to distinguish what exists from what does not exist.  
 
I.2.2.4. Neo-Russellian Denoting Concepts. 
Those philosophers who accept both (actualism) and (actualism-a) maintain, in general, that, 
when it seems that we quantify over non-existing objects, we do not actually quantify over them, 
but over something else, and that, when it seems that they instantiate properties, we quantify over 
them within intensional contexts, expressed by intensional operators (such as "it is believed 
that..." or "in the story s..."). This thesis seems to express the received view on non-existents, that 
represents one further development of  Frege's and Russell's theses. Before dealing with the 
second aspect of  this thesis (concerning intensional contexts), I shall try to analyze one plausible 
interpretation of  the first one.  
 According to some Neo-Russellians (such as N. Cocchiarella, G. Landini and F. Orilia96), it 
is legitimate to reduce fictional entitities to non-referring denoting concepts. Roughly, following 
Orilia, definite denoting concepts are (non-subjective) concepts (i.e., properties) that are the 
meanings of  definite descriptions: [the politician who is the U.S. President in 2013], for example, 
is a definite denoting concept that is the meaning of  the definite description "the politician who 
is the U.S. President in 2013", that uniquely denotes Obama. Definite denoting concepts are 
properties of  properties (second-order properties) and they can be referring or non-referring, if  
they denote or do not denote at least and at most one (existent) object. If  they are referring, they 
have the property E* (namely, a third-order property); otherwise, they do not have it. Thus, 
                                                 
96 See Cocchiarella (1982), Landini (1990) and (2012) and Orilia (2012a). 
74 
 
accepting the definite descriptions already provided for Obama and Sherlock Holmes and given 
that definite denoting concepts are not mind-independent, it is legitimate to claim that (7) and (8) 
are paraphrasable as 
 
(7orilia) E*[ the politician who is the U.S. President in 2013]; 
 
(8orilia) ~E*[the detective who lives in London and who is one of  Watson's friends]. 
 
 Thus, it seems that all definite denoting concepts (referring and non-referring ones) exist 
and that something exists iff  at least one of  its denoting concepts has E*. So far, so good. 
However, what about (12) and (13)? The proposition expressed by (12) is false because the one 
expressed by (7orilia) is true. However, within the scope of  some story operator, it could turn to 
be true. For example, within the story The Valley of  Fear, Sherlock Holmes is a detective (D), 
namely 
 
(12orilia) The Valley of  Fear([the detective who lives in London and who is one of  Watson's 
friends]D). 
 
 Within The Valley of  Fear, the property of  being a detective is predicatively linked with the 
definite denoting concept [the detective who lives in London and who is one of  Watson's 
friends], i.e., a second-order property (the definite denoting concept) is instantiated by a first-
order one (the property of  being a detective). Furthermore, it is also true that, in The Valley of  
Fear, that definite denoting concept has E*, since Sherlock Holmes exists according to that story.  
Different definite denoting concepts constitute the character set of  the fictional character 
Sherlock Holmes. What about (13)? It seems legitimate to argue that (13) is true iff  it is true that 
 
(13orilia) ~E*[the detective who lives in London and who is one of  Watson's friends] & within 
some story(E*[the detective who lives in London and who is one of  Watson's friends]). 
 
 However, (13orilia) seems to quantify over stories, since the operator "within some story" 
could be replaced by "there is at least one story according to which". Stories, according to Orilia, 
are complex conjunctions of  propositions. Thus, the second conjunct of  (13orilia) seems to 
express the fact that, within some complex conjunction of  propositions, the definite denoting 
concept under consideration has E*. Yet, this seems not to be sufficient to distinguish fictional 
stories from, for example, true reports of  facts. In the case of  fictional stories, that complex 
conjunction of  propositions should have some properties distinguishing it from true reports, e.g., 
the property of  having being created by someone. Furthermore, in order to be fictional, that 
complex conjunction should not be true. I shall deal with such properties of  stories in the next 
section. 
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 Orilia's strategy seems to provide paraphrases for many statements that seem to concern 
fictional entities. Yet, at first sight, there are many properties that seem to be instantiated by 
fictional entities and that are not instantiated by definite denoting non-referring concepts: for 
example, fictional entities do not exist, while those concepts exist; they are detectives or winged 
horses, while those concepts are simply concepts, and so on. It should be observed that, 
considering our ordinary language data about ficta, these paraphrases cannot have the form of  
logical equivalences. In fact, if  (13) were logically equivalent to (13orilia), the logical equivalence 
would turn out to be false, at least from an actualist viewpoint, since (13) (by existential 
generalization) seems to quantify over non-existent items and is always false (there are no such 
items), while (13orilia) is true. Moreover, since definite denoting non-referring concepts exist and 
are mind-dependent, it is legitimate to ask what is for them to exist. If  their existence consisted in 
their having some relation E* with some other denoting referring concept, there would be an 
infinite regress concerning E*, because the latter denoting referring concept should be related to 
some other denoting referring concept, and so ad infinitum. Otherwise, they could simply exist. 
On the other hand, do non-referring denoting concepts concerning fictional characters mind-
independently exist? I think that there are strong intuitions against this thesis: where and how would 
the non-referring definite denoting concept [the detective who lives in London and who is one 
of  Watson's friends] exist before Conan Doyle's creation? If  this non-referring definite denoting 
concept is mind-dependent, however, it seems legitimate to think that there is a mind-dependent 
object (Sherlock Holmes) that is different from it. In fact, when Conan Doyle thinks of  Sherlock 
Holmes, he does not think of  a non-referring denoting concept. Yet, he uses at least this latter 
non-referring denoting concept in order to refer to some non-existing object, that is different 
from the former concept. Thus, if  it is mind-dependent, Sherlock Holmes seems not to be a 
non-referring denoting concept and it seems to be an object. Perhaps, it would be much simpler 
and less revisionary (at least with respect to ordinary language) to admit that John thinks of  an 
object that does not exist. 
 
I.2.2.5. Leave the Object, Keep the Context (whatever it is). 
As we have already seen, it seems that there is a sense according to which propositions such as 
the one expressed by (12) are true, even though they are not literally true (it is not literally true 
that Sherlock Holmes is a detective). One of  the most interesting and accepted actualist 
suggestions is that such propositions are embedded in fictional operators (or, in general, in 
intensional operators). Correspondingly, to state that (15) expresses a true proposition amounts 
to state that, within some intensional context (such as the one expressed by the intensional 
operator "John believes that"), that proposition is true. Thus, it seems legitimate to quantify over 
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non-existent objects within intensional contexts, even though it is not legitimate to quantify over 
them outside such contexts. Hence, (15') does not follow from (15).  
 What intensional contexts do we have to consider in order to make these kinds of  
propositions true? After having made some general remarks about intensional contexts theories97, 
I shall analyze J. Searle's and G. Evans' pretense theory and D. Lewis' possible worlds theory.  
 Such theories work as follows. Let us consider some true proposition that seems to be 
about non-existent objects, such as (8), (12) and (13). Outside intensional contexts, in order to 
interpret such propositions, we do not have to quantify over non-existent objects, but on 
something else. For example, with regard to (12) and (13), we can quantify over stories (that can 
be thought of  as sets of  propositions), authors (roughly, Conan Doyle could have the property 
of  having written that Sherlock Holmes is detective), definite denoting concepts (as in Orilia's 
case), conjunctions of  properties, and so on. With regard to (15), we can quantify over minds, 
concepts, beliefs, and so on. By quantifying over such existent items (i.e., over items we are 
ontologically committed to), we can try to provide adequate paraphrases for such propositions 
that do not ontologically commit to non-existent objects. Such paraphrases cannot be considered 
logically equivalent to the original propositions, since such paraphrases do not always preserve 
the original meaning and/or truth-value: if  we accept (actualism), they only express their true 
logical form. However, we could also try to state that, within some intensional context c, such 
propositions are literally true, because, within such contexts, it is legitimate to quantify over non-
existent objects. Thus, we could try to claim that (12) can be interpreted as 
 
(12int.cont.) c(Sherlock Holmes is a detective), 
 
where "c" could be replaced by "in Conan Doyle's stories" or something else. Propositions such 
as the one expressed by (15) are more difficult to paraphrase. In fact, they seem to express some 
relation between an existent item (John) and a non-existent one (a hobbit). Outside intensional 
contexts (such as the one expressed by "John thinks"), John could have some relation with some 
concept of  a hobbit (or some conjunction of  properties). Yet, it seems that John attributes to the 
hobbit properties that he does not attribute to his concept of  a hobbit. If  the predicate "thinks 
of" denotes a relation between John and something else, (15) is not paraphrasable as 
 
(15ext.int.cont.) John thinks of  the concept of  hobbit, 
 
since John seems to think of  two different things, when he thinks of  a hobbit and when he 
thinks of  the concept of  hobbit. It could be true that (15), even without being true that 
(15ext.int.cont).  
                                                 
97 For a classical view on the matter, see Williams (1981): 81-107, 218-276. 
77 
 
 However, if  we consider intensional contexts, we could try to paraphrase (15) as 
 
(15int.cont.) Johns thinks that(there is something that is a hobbit). 
 
 Yet, this paraphrase does not work, since it seems that John does not state anything about 
there being hobbits (in actualists' terms, he does not state that there exist hobbits). Concerning 
(12), we could try to paraphrase it as 
 
(12int.cont.') in Conan Doyle's stories(Sherlock Holmes is a detective). 
 
 We could try to restrict fictional contexts in order to grasp relevant stories. However, how 
can we reidentify the same item across different contexts? How can we claim that we are talking 
of  one and the same item when we are talking of  Sherlock Holmes in Conan Doyle's stories and, 
for example, in some recent movie about Sherlock Holmes? Since we cannot quantify over non-
existent items outside intensional contexts, we need to establish that there is some relation 
between existing items such as definite concepts, conjunctions of  properties, authors, stories, and 
so on, and non-existing items within intensional contexts. This relation cannot be embedded in 
intensional contexts and, since actualists cannot mantain that there are relations between non-
existing items and existent ones (relations are properties and non-existent items cannot have 
properties outside intensional contexts), there cannot be such a relation. Actualists could deny 
that this relation cannot be embedded in intensional contexts. For example, they could state that 
there is some intensional context such as "many people believe that", in which it is true that the 
denoting concept of  Sherlock Holmes pretends to refer to Sherlock Holmes. Yet, first, we would 
need to identify the items within this context with the items outside it. Secondly, this paraphrase 
does not work, since people can think that Sherlock Holmes is the same character across 
different contexts, even without believing that there is some denoting concept that pretends to 
refer to Sherlock Holmes. This general objection seems to run against several versions of  
intensional contexts theory.  
 Furthermore, what about (13)? We could try to claim that (13) is paraphrasable as 
 
(13ext.int.cont.) there is nothing that is identical with Sherlock Holmes and there is a story (i.e., a 
set of  propositions created by someone with fictive intentions) that contains some proposition 
about Sherlock Holmes, 
 
or as  
 
(13int.cont) there is nothing that is identical with Sherlock Holmes and c(Sherlock Holmes has 
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some property P)98. 
 
 However, considering (13ext.int.cont.), what does the name "Sherlock Holmes" denote in 
the second conjunct? Accepting ordinary language intuitions, it does not denote the definite 
concept of  Sherlock Holmes, because the story does not state that Sherlock Holmes is a definite 
concept: it states that it is an object (in the story, an existing one). Considering (13int.cont.), as we 
have already seen, there are problems concerning the identity of  Sherlock Holmes across 
intensional contexts.  
 Two of  the most well-known intensional contexts theories are J. Searle's pretense theory99 
and G. Evans' make-believe theory100. According to Searle, when we use the proper name 
"Sherlock Holmes" in statements such as (12), we do not really refer to an object. Yet, we only 
pretend to refer to it: it is only pretended that "Sherlock Holmes" refers to an object that 
instantiates the property of  being a detective. On the other hand, when we use it in statements 
such as (13), we really refer to it, since it seems that we refer to a fictional character, that exists 
qua fictional character (even though it does not exist qua detective or qua man). Conan Doyle, by 
pretending to refer to Sherlock Holmes (i.e., by pretending that "Sherlock Holmes" denotes 
something), creates the fictional character Sherlock Holmes, to which we can really refer when we 
claim that (13). However, at least from my perspective, it would be equally legitimate to argue that 
we could use the real reference to the fictional character Sherlock Holmes in order to explain the 
pretended reference: for example, it is equally legitimate to claim that the fictional Sherlock 
Holmes instantiates the property of  being a detective within some pretense context. The pretense 
operator would be embedded in the property.  
 Furthermore, Searle's theory does not avoid our general objection against intensional 
contexts theories. In fact, the fictional character Sherlock Holmes (existing qua fictional 
characters) seems to be different from the objects we pretend to refer to when we claim that 
Sherlock Holmes is a man. There should be some kind of  relation between the former and the 
latter objects. Yet, if  such latter objects (e.g., Sherlock Holmes qua man) do not exist, from the 
actualist viewpoint, how can they bear relations to the fictional character Sherlock Holmes? 
Finally, developing my early criticism against Frege, if  we claim that (8) expresses a true 
proposition iff it is only pretended that the name "Sherlock Holmes" refers to something, it seems 
that we claim something false: even if  there were no names pretending to refer to anything, 
Sherlock Holmes would not exist. If  we claimed that (8) expresses a true proposition if (or only if) 
                                                 
98 In Orilia's terms, this means that the definite denoting concept of Sherlock Holmes does not have E* and that it is 
a property of P within c. 
99 See, for example, Searle (1975). 
100 See Evans (1982): 343-372. As we shall see in the next chapter, even K. Walton and G. Currie accept similar 
theses. 
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it is only pretended that the name "Sherlock Holmes" refers to something, we would nevertheless 
claim something false: facts about our use of  names do not explain facts about the existence or 
non-existence of  things.  
 We could make similar objections against Evans' theory. According to him, everything 
exists, since "exists" is a first-level, formal (hence, trivial) predicate101. When we use empty names, 
we can use them within make-believe games, in order to state, for example, that it is only make-
believedly true that (12). Furthermore, when we claim something true about fictions, we only 
quasi-understand our statements. Finally, it is possible to argue that there are criteria of  identity 
between things within make-believe games: within such games, two things are identical iff, had 
the pretense been true, two (or more) people would have thought of  the same thing102. Yet, given 
that we could attribute different properties to the same fictional object, we could turn out to have 
two different objects, had the pretense been true. For example, if  it were make-believedly true for 
me that Sherlock Holmes has a brother and if  it were make-believedly true for Francesca that he 
has no brothers, had the pretense been true, we would have had two different (even though very 
similar) objects or no object at all (given that an object such as Sherlock Holmes that has and does 
not have brothers is inconsistent and cannot exist). However, Evans distinguishes between the 
meaning of  the adverb "really" and that of  the predicate "exist"103. Hence, it seems that he 
recognizes that there are at least two meanings of  the predicate "exists". 
 Finally, let me briefly turn to David Lewis' possible worlds theory. According to him, 
fictional contexts can be considered possible worlds different from the actual world. I quote 
Lewis' analysis 2 of  fictional discourse, that expresses the philosopher's view about statements 
such as (12):  
 
"A sentence of  the form 'in the fiction f, φ' is non-vacuously true iff  whenever w is one of  the collective belief  
worlds of  the community of  origin of  f, then some world where f is told as a known fact and f is true differs less 
from the world w, on balance, than does any world where f is told as a known fact and f is not true. It is vacuously 
true iff  there are no possible worlds where f is told as known fact"104. 
 
 However, it seems that there are many possible worlds w where (12) can be thus 
interpreted. Thus, given that, according to Lewis, individuals are world-bounded, there are many 
Sherlock Holmes for whom (12) is true, even considering only one fiction involving Sherlock 
Holmes. Yet, it seems that, when we talk of  Sherlock Holmes within the same context or across 
different contexts, we talk of  one and the same object. Thus, it seems to me that Lewis' analysis 
does not grasp this important aspect of  our talks about ficta and that it complicates (much more 
                                                 
101 It seems to me that Q. Gibson expresses similar theses about existence, even if his account is more detailed. See 
Gibson (1998). Salmon (as we will see) and Rami (2013) accept a first-order, non-informative property view of 
existence.  
102 See Evans (1982): 368. 
103 See Evans (1982): 370-372. 
104 Lewis (1978): 45. 
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than Searle's and Evans' analyses) reidentification of  ficta across contexts, since it turns out to be 
difficult to reidentify them within singular contexts too. 
 
I.2.2.6. Ficta exist, or: the Existence of Non-Existents (Kripke and van Inwagen). 
In his 1973 lessons on Reference and Existence, S. Kripke argues that there is a sense according to 
which seemingly non-existing objects (e.g., fictional ones) exist. Fictional objects are abstract 
objects that depend on mental and authorial activities105. Nevertheless, they exist qua fictional 
objects, i.e., they are part of  reality, since we can identify, refer to and talk about them (e.g., in 
literary criticisms). Furthermore, Kripke argues that, when we deny that Santa Claus exists, we do 
not simply mention the name "Santa Claus" in order to claim something about him, but we use 
the name in order to claim something about the object to which the name refers106. Thus, 
according to him, there is nothing incoherent in claiming that there exist fictional objects such as 
Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus. Sherlock Holmes is not a man and Pegasus is not a horse. Yet, they 
are both fictional objects: they both exist as fictional characters. Thus, the proposition expressed 
by (13) is made true by the fact that Sherlock Holmes exists and is a fictional character.  
 What about (8)? At first, given Kripke's thesis, it could seem that (8) expresses a false 
proposition, since there exists a fictional object that is the referent of  the name "Sherlock 
Holmes". However, we know that Sherlock Holmes does not really exist: it does not have real 
existence. Thus, following Kripke, we have to distinguish between fictional and real existence, 
that cannot be considered kinds or degrees of  existence, as well as real ducks and toy ducks 
neither belong to two different kinds of  ducks, nor instantiate two different degrees of  the 
property of  being a duck107.  
 It seems that, in Kripke's theory, existence can be considered a summum genus: whatever is 
an acceptable referent of  our talks exists. Real existents and fictional existents do not differ qua 
existents, but in respect of  other features: one might add, for example, that real existents are 
causally efficacious and/or spatio-temporally located and/or mind-independent, while fictional 
entities are mind-dependent, even accepting that they both exist. Yet, when we talk of  existence, 
it seems that we are primarily interested in real existence, namely in that sense of  existence 
according to which Sherlock Holmes does not exist and Obama does. Kripke's theory is 
revisionary in respect of  our use of  common language, according to which (8) simply expresses a 
true proposition. Is this revision necessary? If  we want to preserve the truth of  (actualism), it 
could be. Yet, if  we do not want to preserve it, there are no independent reasons for assuming 
that fictional objects exist. 
                                                 
105 See Kripke (1973): 53. 
106 See Kripke (1973): 114-116. 
107 See Kripke (1973): 61. 
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 Finally, Kripke accepts fictional operators, such as "fictionally" or "it is fictionally the case 
that"108. Thus, (12) expresses two different kinds of  propositions. It could express the true 
propositions expressed by 
 
(12kripke1') it is fictionally the case that Sherlock Holmes is a detective,  
 
(12kripke1'') Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective, 
 
but it could express the false proposition expressed by 
 
(12kripke2) Sherlock Holmes is a (real) detective. 
 
 The same strategy could be used with regard to real and fictional existence: it is true that 
it is fictionally the case that Sherlock Holmes really exists and it is false that it is fictionally the 
case that Sherlock Holmes fictionally exists (at least according to some relevant fictions), but it is 
false that Sherlock Holmes really exists and it is true that Sherlock Holmes fictionally exists, i.e., 
that he exists as a fictional character.  
 P. van Inwagen accepts a Quinean account of  existence109 and Kripke's thesis about the 
existence of  fictional objects110, since such objects are considered legitimate theoretical entities of  
literary criticism. According to him, there are no kinds of  existence. Furthermore, he does not 
talk of  real existence, as opposed to fictional one: fictional entities simply exist. What does the 
distinction between a fictional detective, such as Sherlock Holmes, and a real one amount to? Van 
Inwagen does not use fictional operators and he does not distinguish between real and fictional 
properties, e.g., the property of  being a fictional detective and the property of  being a real 
detective. I have already discussed some problems concerning the first solution. With regard to 
the second one, I think that this distinction is highly counterintuitive, as we will see in the next 
chapter.  
 However, van Inwagen thinks that fictional entities have some properties, such as logical 
and ontological ones (e.g., the properties of  being self-identical, of  being fictional characters, of  
being talked about in some particular fictional work), and that there are properties that are ascribed 
to them within fictional works. Ascription can be considered a three-place relation between some 
property, some fictional object and some fictional work: some property P is ascribed to some 
fictional object x within some fictional work y. Thus, for example, reading (13) from van 
Inwagen's perspective, Sherlock Holmes has the property of  being a fictional character. 
Furthermore, reading (12) from the same perspective, it is false that Sherlock Holmes has the 
                                                 
108 See Kripke (1973): 74-76. 
109 See, for example, van Inwagen (1998), (2005) and (2009). 
110 See van Inwagen (1977) and (2000). 
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property of  being a detective, even though it is true that the property of  being a detective is 
ascribed to Sherlock Holmes within Conan Doyle's stories.  
 What about (8)? Here some difficulties seem to arise within van Inwagen's account. In 
fact, (8) turns out to be always false, since existence does not make any difference and since real 
existence is not different from fictional one: there truly exists a fictional object such as Sherlock 
Holmes. However, how can we maintain that (8) is true in respect of  reality and that it is false in 
respect of  Conan Doyle's stories, since in these stories it seems that Sherlock Holmes exists? If  
we claimed that the property of  existing is ascribed to Sherlock Holmes within Conan Doyle's 
stories, it would seem reasonable to accept that, for example, the property of  non-existing is 
ascribed to Hercule Poirot within Conan Doyle's stories or that the property of  existing is not 
ascribed to him within such stories. Fictional talks seem to accept that existence is a first-order, 
informative property. However, if  this move is allowed with regard to the ascription mechanism, 
why cannot it be allowed with regard to our talks about reality? Even though van Inwagen could 
reply that fictional objects really exist (i.e., that they simply exist), there is at least one use of  the 
predicate "exist" that does not legitimize this position: they do not really exist. Since van Inwagen 
neither accepts that there are kinds nor modes of  existence, nor that the properties of  fictionally 
existing and really existing are distinct, he has to account for this datum.  
 It would be possible to develop the following solution. Everything (i.e., every object in 
Quinean terms) exists. Let me now consider some mass noun, e.g. "water", and some count 
noun, e.g. "man": they seem to define kinds of  things that exist, since they provide identity 
and/or countability conditions for them. Even though there are many problems concerning the 
existence and identity conditions of  kinds, I take this account for granted. It would be possible to 
claim that some fictional object does not really exists, i.e., that there is a sense according to which 
(8) expresses a true proposition, iff  it belongs to the kind of  fictional objects (i.e., it has the 
property of  being a fictional object and this property is a kind-property) and the property of  
being a fictional object is not ascribed to it within some fictional work (i.e., within some fictional 
work, it does not belong to the kind of  fictional objects) and the property of  being P is ascribed 
to it within some fictional work, where P is any kind-property that is different from the kind-
property of  being a fictional object. Thus, there is a sense according to which (8) expresses a true 
proposition, since there is no man that has Sherlock Holmes' properties and Sherlock Holmes is a 
fictional object (i.e., Sherlock Holmes has the kind-property of  being a fictional object) and the 
kind-property of  being a fictional object is not ascribed to Sherlock Holmes within Conan 
Doyle's stories and the kind-property of  being a man (or something else) is ascribed to him within 
such stories.  
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 However, if  we accept this solution, we can state that everything has the property of  
really existing iff  it is not a fictional object, i.e., iff  it does not to belong to the kind of  fictional 
objects (it does not have the kind-property of  being a fictional object) and it belongs to some other 
kind (i.e., it has some kind-property different from the property of  being a fictional object). This 
seems to assume that fictional objects are the only non-really-existent objects. However, real 
existence turns out to be a first-order, informative property: every fictional object is a non-really-
existing one, while every non-fictional object is a really-existent one. Furthermore, against 
(actualism), what seems to be involved by (8) is not the contradictory assumption (at least from 
the actualist perspective) that there are objects that do not exist, but the acceptable assumption 
that there are objects that do not really exist, i.e., that there exist fictional objects.  
 On the other hand, if  we assumed that real existence and fictional existence are not 
different properties and that they are not kinds of  existence, we could state that they are two 
ultimate determinates of  the determinable existence. Determinates under the same determinable 
are incompatible (there is no object that has two different determinates of  the same 
determinable) and each determinate belongs to one and only one determinable. Even accepting 
this solution, real existence would turn out to be informative. 
 In sum, if  real existence is what is denied in propositions such as the one expressed by (8) 
(and it seems legitimate to assume this perspective), real existence turns out to be an informative, 
first-order property. If  fictional objects really exist (i.e., if  van Inwagen's Quinean interpretation 
of  existence is true), then it seems difficult to provide an acceptable interpretation for the truth-
value of  such propositions.  
 Furthermore, it seems essential to define the ontological status of  fictional works. Are 
they objects or sets of  propositions or something else?  
 
I.2.2.7. The Obamishness of the World (Sommers). 
F. Sommers argues that, when we deal with existential propositions, we can think of  them as 
substitutable by beliefs about the world (beliefs de mundo)111. In fact, by claiming that (5) and (7), it 
seems that we attribute properties to the world: such (true) statements denote the world. For 
example, (7) turns out to express the (true) belief  that the world has the property of  being 
Obamish, namely 
 
(7sommers) the world is Obamish, 
 
while (8) turns out the express the (true) belief  that the world does not have the property of  
being Sherlockholmish, namely 
                                                 
111 See, for example, Sommers (1996) and Sommers (2005). 
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(8sommers) the world is not Sherlockholmish. 
 
 In the former case, Sommers claims that the property of  being Obamish is a 
characteristic of  the world, while in the latter case the property of  being Sherlockholmish is not a 
characteristic of  the world. Mondial properties are properties that express the presence of  
something in the world: the (true) belief  that the mondial property of  being Obamish 
characterizes the world is identical with the (true) belief  that the presence of  something (in this 
case, of  Obama) characterizes the world.   
 On the other hand, when we claim that Sherlock Holmes exists (within some story), that 
he is such-and-such, we refer to domains that are different from the domain of  the actual world: 
fictional domains. For example, in the fictional domain of  Greek mythology, it is true that 
Pegasus exists, i.e., that the fictional world of  Greek mythology is characterized by the presence 
of  Pegasus. The world itself  does not exist, i.e., we cannot attribute to the world the property of  
existing, since such a property would not be a property of  the world itself, but of  something else. 
 It is difficult for me to understand how Sommers' account can be considered a good 
interpretation of  things' existence and non-existence. First, if  (7sommers) and (8sommers) 
express beliefs about the world, I do not see how they can be identical with the beliefs expressed 
by (7) and (8). People could believe that Obama exists and that Sherlock Holmes does not exist, 
even without believing that there is something such as the world and that the world is such-and-
such. Children, when they believe that Santa Claus exists, do not believe anything about the 
world, perhaps because they do not know that there is an (actual) world, i.e., that there is 
something that comprehends every existing item.  
 Furthermore, even if  we accept a propositionalist reading of  Sommers' account, 
according to which (7sommers) and (8sommers) do not express beliefs, but propositions that are 
true of  the world, there seem to arise further ontological problems. In fact, Sommers' account 
seems to be committed to two kinds of  entities: the world (or the worlds, since it is plausible that 
there are non-actual worlds, such as fictional ones) and mondial properties. On the other hand, 
accepting that (7) and (8) express true propositions, we are committed to one (or two) kinds of  
entities: objects (Obama) and, perhaps, first-order properties (such as the first-order property of  
existing) or (vel) second-order ones too (Obama’s properties, that, according to one plausible 
interpretation of  the Russellian account, jointly have the property of  being instantiated). Mondial 
properties seem to be parasitic entities: they depend on the existence of  Obama, of  lions, and so 
on. If  the (actual) world has the property of  having the presence of  Obama's (or of  being 
characterized by Obama), Obama must exist in order for such a property to exist. In this case, the 
fact of  the (actual) world's being Obamish would be parasitic on Obama’s existence and it would 
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not ground this latter fact. On the other hand, if  the property of  being Obamish existed even 
without the existence of  Obama, Sommers' account, in order to be an actualist account of  
existence, would have to deal with the aforementioned problems concerning individualizing 
properties. 
 Finally, why is it not legitimate to attribute the property of  existing (or of  being real, or of  
being actual) to the existing (real, actual) world? Since there could be many worlds (for example, 
the worlds of  fiction), one of  them could be considered the actual world and could have the 
property of  existing. Yet, if  there were such a property, this could be a legitimate mondial 
property too, yet a property different from Obama’s existence, and this thesis seems to be highly 
counterintuitive since, when we claim that our world exists and that Obama exists, it seems that 
we attribute one and the same property to two different things. Furthermore, even accepting that 
there is a mondial property such as the existence of  the actual world, Obama’s existence would 
depend on the actual world's being actual and on its being Obamish. An object's existence would 
depend on (or be identical with) the molecular fact constituted by the fact of  some mondial 
property's (such as the property of  being Obamish) being instantiated by the world and by the 
fact of  some peculiar mondial property's (the property of  existing) being instantiated by the same 
world. In this latter case, Sommers' account would not be an actualist account (it would admit 
that there is a property such as the property of  existing truly attributed to something, the world, 
and not to other things) and it would still have to deal with the aforementioned difficulties 
concerning mondial properties. On the other hand, if  we claimed that something else (another 
world? A set of  possible worlds?) has the property of  having the presence of  the (actual) world, 
this would not seem to be sufficient to distinguish the actual world from other worlds in virtue of  
its actuality112.  
 
I.2.2.8. External Unifications (Vallicella). 
W. Vallicella develops an interesting and original approach to the problem of  existence. I can only 
summarize his theses and make some brief  remarks about them, even though Vallicella provides 
a detailed defense that is deeply connected with many ontological problems (e.g., the status of  
facts and individuals and Bradley's regress concerning the instantiation of  properties)113. 
 According to him, concrete individuals (thick particulars) should be considered concrete 
facts. They have ontological constituents that are contingently unified and the contingent unity of  
such constituents corresponds to the existence of  that individual. Thus, concrete individuals' 
existence is neither a property of  individuals, nor a property of  properties. Furthermore, it seems 
                                                 
112 For a more detailed critical exposition of Sommers' account, see Vallicella (2002): 127-151. 
113 See Vallicella (2002): 159-271. 
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that Vallicella rejects non-existent objects. Thus, it seems that his theory accepts both (actualism) 
and (actualism-a). 
 In fact, concrete individuals exist iff  their ontological constituents are unified by an 
external unifier, that is the paradigm existent or existence as such. There is at least and at most 
one paradigm existent, that determines itself  to ground the contingent unity of  individuals, that 
necessarily exists and determines itself  to exist and that is a transcendental mind. Thus, Vallicella 
claims that, for any contingent individual x (e.g., Obama), x exists iff  there is a necessary y such 
that y is the paradigm existent and y, as the external unifier of  x's ontological constituents, 
directly produces the unity/existence of  x114. On the other hand, it seems that, following the 
truth expressed by (8), Sherlock Holmes does not exist iff, even if  there is a necessary y that is the 
paradigm existent, y does not externally unifies Sherlock Holmes' ontological constituents and it 
does not produce his unity/existence. So far, so good.  
 However, Vallicella claims that properties are ontological constituents of  objects. In fact, 
existence cannot be considered a property of  concrete individuals because it is the unity of  that 
individual and the unity of  an individual cannot be one of  its constituents, since, in this latter 
case, it would be unified with other constituents in order to produce some other kind of  unity, et 
sic ad infinitum. Unity/existence is the result of  the activity of  the external unifier on concrete 
individuals' ontological constituents.  
 Yet, what about Sherlock Holmes? It seems that Sherlock Holmes really has ontological 
constituents: it really is a fictional object, it is really considered a detective within some story, and 
so on. Does he have any kind of  unity? It seems that he has it, since he is really distinct, for 
example, from Pegasus, D'Artagnan, Michele and other objects, and since he is some thing that is 
such-and-such (as we have already seen, he is not reducible to other things, such as the collection 
of  his properties). Yet, he does not exist, since his ontological constituents are not externally 
unified by the paradigm existent. However, why is it not legitimate to consider Sherlock Holmes 
an object, even though a non-existent one? Within Vallicella's account, he could be considered an 
object whose unity is not produced by the external unifier, but by some other mind's activity (e.g., 
Sherlock Holmes' author's mind). Yet, in this latter case, Sherlock Holmes, in virtue of  having 
some kind of  unity different from unity/existence, could have some different kind of  being or 
no being at all. If  an object's being and its unity were one and the same, there would be some 
different kind of  being for any different kind of  unity. If  they were not one and the same, there 
would be objects with no being at all, yet provided with some kind of  unity. As it will be clear in 
the second part of  this work, I accept the latter solution, because I think that objects can be 
                                                 
114 See Vallicella (2002): 269. 
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considered objects in virtue of  their identity, even without having being.  
 In this work, I shall not deal with Vallicella's paradigm existent, since I cannot discuss in 
depth all the problems connected with exemplification, relational and non-relational ties between 
objects and properties. However, if  the paradigm existence is considered existence as such, we 
have two different perspectives on existence within Vallicella's theory: existence is both an object 
(the paradigm existent) and a feature of  concrete individuals (even though it is not a property of  
them). I have only tried to argue that it is not true that only concrete objects have unity and that, 
by having unity, they have existence too. Even non-existent objects have some kind of  unity or, 
according to my perspective, they have unity in virtue of  their being objects. 
 
I.2.2.9. Azzouni's Talks about Nothing(s). 
J. Azzouni deeply and exhaustively explores the world of  non-existent objects and their 
connection with the problem of  reference115. Following Azzouni, there are thoughts (e.g., 
thoughts about Sherlock Holmes) that should be considered empty singular thoughts: they are 
singular, because they are about singular objects (about an object, not simply about a set of  
properties); they are empty, because they are about objects that do not exist. However, there 
seemingly is a contradiction in this thesis, at least from an actualist’s perspective: in order for such 
thoughts to be about singular objects, such objects must exist qua objects; in order for them to be 
empty, such objects must not exist, i.e., they must not be objects at all. Thus, empty singular 
thoughts are singular, object-less thoughts.  
 In brief, Azzouni deals with such a difficulty by distinguishing two different senses of  
reference and aboutness: a thought is aboutr something (or a term refersr to something) iff  what 
it is about exists (or the term refers to something existent); otherwise, a thought is aboute 
something (or a term referse to something). Aboutnessr and referencer are real relations between 
thoughts (or terms) and objects, while aboutnesse and referencee are not relations, since they do 
not relate objects and terms to anything at all. 
 Yet, since there are true statements that contain referringe terms and true thoughts aboute 
non-existent objects, it seems legitimate to assume that there are truth-value inducers for such 
statements and such thoughts. These inducers need not include such objects. In particular, 
Azzouni deals with hallucinated objects, numbers and ficta. I cannot discuss here Azzouni's 
theory of  such objects. In general, it seems to me that the author tries to overcome the conflict 
between actualists and Meinongians by admitting that our experiences and verbal practices can 
involve some kind of  reference to things that do not exist, even though this latter kind of  
                                                 
115 See Azzouni (2010). See also Azzouni (2004). Another interesting theory of reference without referents is 
defended in Sainsbury (2005). 
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reference can be explained away by referring to practices, "as-if" statements, and so on. 
 However, the core of  Azzouni's proposal lies in his distinction between two kinds of  
reference and aboutness. Following him, the proposition expressed by (7) is made true by the fact 
that "Obama" refersr to something (or that every thought about Obama is aboutr Obama), while 
the proposition expressed by (8) is made true by the fact that "Sherlock Holmes" does not referr 
to anything and it referse to something (or that every thought about Sherlock Holmes is not a 
thought aboutr anything and it is a thought aboute Sherlock Holmes). In this latter case, since 
these two kinds of  reference (and aboutness) are exclusive, it is legitimate to claim that "Sherlock 
Holmes" simply referse to something (or that every thought about Sherlock Holmes is a thought 
aboute him). This seems to be acceptable, only if  one assumes that, if  something exists, there can 
be thoughts aboutr it, while, if  something does not exist, there cannot be thoughts aboutr it and 
there can be thoughts aboute it. However, this is not a good theory of  existence. In fact, in a 
world where dinosaurs exist and where there is no minded subject, there cannot be thoughts 
aboutr dinosaurs, even if  dinosaurs exist. One could accept some weaker theory of  existence, 
according to which something exists if, in every world where there are minded subjects, it 
possible to have thoughts aboutr that thing. However, in this latter case, since it is possible to 
have thoughts aboutr things only if  (among other necessary conditions) those things exists, the 
explanation turns out to be circular. 
 Furthermore, why cannot aboutnesse be considered a relation? It cannot be so considered 
because one of  the necessary conditions for the existence of  a relation – at least from an 
actualist’s perspective – is the existence of  its relata. Since non-existent objects do not exist, there 
cannot be relations involving them. However, if  it is true that thoughts about Sherlock Holmes 
are thoughts aboute him, what does it make true the proposition expressed by this latter 
statement? Since there exist thoughts aboute Sherlock Holmes and since Sherlock Holmes is not 
reducible to any other kind of  entity, it seems to me that one should admit that there can be 
relations with non-existent objects. Thus, it is not true that one of  the necessary conditions for 
the existence (or, if  we do not want to state that relations properly exist, for the instantiation) of  
a relation is the existence of  its relata. 
 
I.2.3. Meinongianisms and some other kinds of non-actualism 
Some philosophers deny that both (actualism) and (actualism-a) are true. Many of  them are 
inspired by the works of  Meinong in their refusal of  the truth of  (actualism)116. Yet, it is not true 
that every Meinongian denies (actualism-a), i.e., that existence is not a first-order, informative 
property. As we will see in this section, there are at least three varieties of  Meinongianism: 
                                                 
116 For a first approach with Meinongian and Neo-Meinongian theses, see Chisholm (1973).  
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property-centered Meinongianism (that accepts the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear 
properties), instantiation-centered Meinongianism (that accepts that there are different kinds or 
modes of  instantiation of  properties by objects) and world-centered Meinongianism (that uses 
possible and impossible worlds in order to explain some ontological features of  objects)117. Other 
philosophers deny the truth of  (actualism), even though they are not so deeply inspired by 
Meinong. In this latter case, I shall deal with H.-N. Castañeda's and C. McGinn's theories. Finally, 
in section I.2.4, considering the works of  P. T. Geach and B. Miller, I shall briefly explore a third 
way between actualism and non-actualism, according to which there are at least two different 
senses of  existence and two different ways to deal with it. 
 
I.2.3.1. Extra-Nuclear Philosophical Weapons (Routley, Parsons, Jacquette). 
The first Meinongian strategy to deal with non-existent objects and their features is grounded on 
the distinction between two kinds of  properties: nuclear and extra-nuclear ones. This distinction 
was first proposed by one of  Meinong's pupils, E. Mally, and it has been accepted by R. Routley, 
T. Parsons and D. Jacquette.  
 Routley distinguishes characterising and non-characterising features of  objects118. 
However, this distinction is more clearly and deeply explained in Parsons' works, where it plays an 
important role. According to Parson119, it is necessary, in order to avoid contradictions (such as in 
the case of  the existent round square), to restrict the principle of  the freedom of  assumption to 
some properties: nuclear ones. Thus, a property F is nuclear iff, given a set of  nuclear properties 
X, not containing F, F does not characterize any object characterized by every member of  X. 
This happens because X-objects are only characterized by the members of  X and cannot be 
characterized by F. On the other hand, X-objects are not characterized by the lack of  F. Such 
objects simply do not have F, nor non-F.  
 On the other hand, extra-nuclear properties are (intuitively) those properties that express 
the ontological or the modal status or some intentional or technical feature of  an object. For 
example, the properties of  existing or of  being fictional (ontological), of  being possible or 
impossible (modal), of  being thought of  by Michele (intentional), of  being complete (technical) 
are extra-nuclear properties. It is not legitimate to assume such properties in order to constitute 
an object, so that the Meinongian principle of  the freedom of  assumption should be restricted to 
nuclear properties. Parsons, for example, claims that, since every object that is a unicorn (i.e., that 
is characterized by the nuclear property of  being a unicorn) lacks the property of  existing, 
                                                 
117 See also, for the history and the characterization of Neo-Meinongianism, Paolini Paoletti, Mari (2013). 
118 See, for example, Routley (1979): 506-510, 595-598. See also Routley (1966). For more details about Routley’s 
theses, see Paolini Paoletti (2013). 
119 See Parsons (1980): 226-26, 42-44, 52-57. See also Parsons (1974), (1975), (1979a), (1979b) and (1982).  
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existence cannot be considered a nuclear property.  
 Concerning (5)-(8), it is possible to claim that, according to Parsons, (5) is not true, 
because there are lions (i.e., objects characterized by the nuclear property of  being a lion) that do 
not exist; (6) is true since no unicorn has the extra-nuclear property of  existing; (7) is true since 
there is an object characterized by some nuclear properties (Obama’s ones) that has the extra-
nuclear property of  existing; (8) is true, because there is an object characterized by some nuclear 
properties (Sherlock Holmes' ones) that lacks the extra-nuclear property of  existing and does not 
exist (perhaps there is a corresponding property of  non-existing or, more simply, for every 
object, if  that object lacks the property of  existing, then it does not exist). Furthermore, (13) is 
true because the same object (Sherlock Holmes) has the extra-nuclear property of  being fictional. 
It is possible to deal with (15) in a similar way: there is an object that is a hobbit (i.e., that is 
characterized by the nuclear property of  being a hobbit) that has the extra-nuclear property of  
being thought of  by John. A corollary: Parsons allows that there are negative nuclear properties, 
i.e., properties whose instantiation is entailed by the negation of  the instantiation of  their 
corresponding nuclear properties120.  
 What about the problem of  existence-entailing properties and of  the consequent 
ambiguity of  propositions such as the one expressed by (8)? It seems that, since the property of  
being a detective is a nuclear one, Parsons would deny that (12) simply entails that Sherlock 
Holmes, in virtue of  his being a detective, exists. There is no ambiguity in (12): Sherlock Holmes 
really is a detective, even though a non-existent one. Furthermore, if  there were a non-existent 
politician named "Obama", (14) would still be true. However, there remains at least one difficulty, 
expressed by the Russellian example of  the existent round square. It seems legitimate to assume 
that there is an object characterized by the properties of  being round, of  being a square and of  
existing, and to assume that Sherlock Holmes exists (at least in Conan Doyle's stories). Yet, 
existence is an extra-nuclear property and it cannot be assumed to constitute an object. If  
existence simply were an extra-nuclear property, Sherlock Holmes would turn out to be a 
contradictory object, both having and not having existence.  
 In order to deal with such problems, Parsons introduces watered-down versions of  extra-
nuclear properties, i.e., nuclear properties that are so strictly related to their corresponding extra-
nuclear properties that it is really difficult to distinguish them121. Thus, there is a watered-down 
version of  existence that characterizes Sherlock Holmes, even though he has no extra-nuclear 
existence, since he is a fictional object. Concerning real objects, the instantiation of  their extra-
nuclear properties is coextensive with the instantiation of  their respective watered-down versions. 
                                                 
120 See Parsons (1980): 105-106. 
121 See Parsons (1980): 44, 68. 
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Thus, if  it is true that (7), Obama has the watered-down version of  existence iff  he has extra-
nuclear existence122. On the other hand, watered-down existence and extra-nuclear existence are 
two distinct properties and it is not true that, for every object, that object has extra-nuclear 
existence, if  it has watered-down existence. 
 Some problems affect Parsons' account123. First, let me consider two objects: a flying 
horse and a unicorn. Are they characterized by the same properties, since it seems legitimate to 
accept that unicorns are flying horses? Strictly speaking, Parsons seems not to concede this. In 
fact, objects that are characterized by the nuclear properties of  being a horse and of  flying are 
distinct from objects that are characterized by the nuclear property of  being unicorns. Since there 
could be unicorns not characterized by the properties of  flying and of  being horses, nor by the 
nuclear negations of  such properties, these two kinds of  objects are not identical. However, what 
would the property of  being a unicorn amount to, without being coinstantiated with the 
properties of  flying and of  being a horse? Secondly, it seems legitimate to assume that, within 
Conan Doyle's stories, Sherlock Holmes exists. Yet, Conan Doyle does not literally claim that 
Sherlock Holmes exists: since Sherlock Holmes is such-and-such in his stories, it seems legitimate 
to infer that he exists. Unfortunately, following Parsons' account, it seems difficult to accept that 
there is such an implicit watered-down property of  existing that characterizes Sherlock Holmes. 
For example, Parsons does not allow that all the squares are not round, but that this is true 
provided that the laws of  Euclidean geometry are true124. Yet, no one can guarantee that the law 
of  nature according to which material objects can move only if  they exist is valid within Sherlock 
Holmes' stories: Sherlock Holmes walks within those stories, even if  it is neither legitimate to 
assume that he exists, nor that he does not exist (i.e., it is neither legitimate to assume that he has 
watered-down existence, nor that it does not have it). Yet, there seems to be a strong intuition 
according to which Sherlock Holmes exists, at least within those stories. If  there were no implicit 
Sherlock Holmes' watered-down existence, Sherlock Holmes qua existent (i.e., qua having 
watered-down existence) would be distinct from Sherlock Holmes, because the latter would 
neither have, nor not have watered-down existence, while the former would have it. 
 Thirdly, is there any clear and non-circular criterion to define the distinction between 
watered-down versions of  extra-nuclear properties and their corresponding extra-nuclear 
correlates? The existing Sherlock Holmes has watered-down existence, but he does not have 
extra-nuclear existence. He has these properties iff  it is assumed that Sherlock Holmes exists, 
even though he does not exist (i.e., he does not have extra-nuclear existence). Yet, it is possible to 
                                                 
122 See Parsons (1980): 44, 159. 
123 For a more detailed critical exposition, see Orilia (2005): 164-167, Sainsbury (2010): 52-67, Berto (2013a): 116-
128. See also Kit Fine (1984)’s critical review of Parsons’ book, Hintikka (1984) and Howell (1983). 
124 See Parsons (1980): 39-40. 
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assume that Sherlock Holmes exists, even though he does not exist, only if  watered-down 
existence is different from extra-nuclear one, thus having a circular explanation. If  there were no 
such criterion, this distinction would seem suspiciously ad hoc.  
 Thus, is there a more systematic way to deal with the distinction between nuclear and 
extra-nuclear properties125? According to Jacquette126, a property is nuclear iff  it is not true that, 
for every object that instantiates it (or whose Sosein is constituted by it), that object does not have 
that property iff  it has its complement (i.e., the corresponding negative property). On the other 
hand, a property is extra-nuclear iff  it is true that, for every object that instantiates it, that object 
does not have that property iff  it has its complement. Thus, the property of  having a father 
named John is nuclear, since it is not true that all the objects do not have it iff  they have the 
property of  non-having a father named John (many fictional objects neither have such a property, 
nor its complement). On the other hand, the property of  existing is extra-nuclear, since it is true 
that, for every object, that object does not exist iff  it has non-existence. Jacquette does not admit 
watered-down properties: Sherlock Holmes simply does not exist, i.e., he does not have the extra-
nuclear property of  existing. There is no existent Sherlock Holmes, even though it could be true 
that Sherlock Holmes exists according to some story, i.e., within some fictional context127. 
According to the author, an object exists (i.e, it has extra-nuclear existence) iff  it is both complete 
and non-overdetermined (possible). It is complete iff, for every nuclear property, it has that 
property or its complement. It is non-overdetermined (possible) iff, for every nuclear property, it 
is not the case that it has both that property and its complement128.  
 Since I have already criticized the approach based on fictional contexts and since I shall 
consider the definition of  existence as completeness in the second part of  this work, I shall deal 
with two other problems concerning Jacquette's theory. First, how do objects instantiate 
properties according to this theory? An object instantiates a nuclear property iff  that property 
constitutes that object's Sosein. Yet, this is not true with regard to extra-nuclear properties, even 
though objects instantiate them. Jacquette maintains that there is only one kind of  instantiation, 
that cannot nevertheless be identical (following my remark) with an object's Sosein's constitution. 
On the other hand, if  we admitted that there are two different kinds of  instantiation, we would 
have an instantiation-centered version of  Meinongianism, according to which properties can be 
instantiated by objects in different ways.  
 Secondly, is Jacquette's criterion for the nuclear-extranuclear distinction circular or not? 
Let me recall that a nuclear property is a property for which there are objects that neither 
                                                 
125 Cocchiarella (1982) presents this problem. 
126 See Jacquette (1996): 114-116. 
127 See Jacquette (1996): 256-264. 
128 See Jacquette (1996): 116. 
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instantiate it, nor its complement. It is essential for the truth of  this definition that some objects 
are incomplete. Yet, an object is incomplete, following Jacquette, iff  there is at least one nuclear 
property for which it is neither true that that object has it, nor its complement129. Thus, some 
object is incomplete, only if  (among other) some constituting property of  that object is nuclear. 
Yet, on the other hand, some property is nuclear, only if  some object is incomplete with regard 
to it. This seems to be a circular explanation.  
 
I.2.3.2. Castañeda's Guises. 
In order to deal with Meinongian paradoxes and with many other data and problems concerning 
the structure of  the world and of  our thought, H.-N. Castañeda outlines a complex theory, 
grounded on guises and many kinds of  relations between them130. Roughly, a guise is a concrete 
individual that can be the referent of  a definite description. A guise is made up of  a set of  
properties (even a singleton) and a concretizer operator c. For example, c{being the present King 
of  France} is the guise to which the definite description "the present King of  France" refers. 
 When we attribute properties to objects, following Castañeda, we do not univocally use 
the copula "is". There are many kinds of  uses of  the copula and many kinds of  predication. For 
example, we could state that the present King of  France is the present King of  France, thus 
analytically attributing a property to an object. If  the object that we consider is the guise, we 
claim that the property of  being the present King of  France is internally predicated of  that guise. 
On the other hand, if  we consider the ordinary object that is the present King of  France (i.e., 
according to Castañeda, a cluster of  guises having different external relations among them), we 
have to introduce further kinds of  instantiation. This seems to happen with many other 
properties too: the property of  being bald, of  being a man, and so on.  
 In this section, I shall only consider two kinds of  external relations: consubstantiation and 
consociation. Consubstantiation is a relation among guises that stands for their contingent 
sameness (identity, in fact, properly holds among guises that have the same nucleus, namely are 
internally constituted by the same properties). This relation is expressed by C*. For example, in 
order to interpret (14), we will have: 
 
(10castañeda) C*(c{being the bearer of  the name "Obama", being a man}, c{being the bearer of  
the name "Obama", being a man, being a politician}) 
 
 The proper name "Obama" denotes a guise that has, within its nucleus, the property of  
being the bearer of  the name "Obama" and some other properties that can be found out 
                                                 
129 See Jacquette (1996): 117. 
130 See, in particular, Castañeda (1974), in Castañeda (1989): 235-261, Castañeda (1979), in Castañeda (1989): 176-
205, and Castañeda (1985-1986). See also Voltolini (1996).  
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according to the context (e.g., the property of  being a man, since we are talking of  the man 
named "Obama"). However, the proper name "Obama" does not directly refer to Obama, since 
we do not have to consider ordinary objects, but concrete individuals (guises) that constitute 
them131. If  we did not want to accept this account of  proper names, we could try to use guises 
internally constituted by individual properties (e.g., the property of  being Sherlock Holmes or of  
being Obama). Since Castañeda cannot be considered an actualist, it is not necessary for him to 
admit that there exist ordinary objects such as Sherlock Holmes in order for these properties to 
exist.  
 Existence is self-consubstantiation and it is neither a property of  ordinary objects, nor of  
guises. Whenever something is contingently the same as itself, that thing exists. Namely, (7) can 
be interpreted as 
 
(7castañeda) C*(c{being the bearer of  the name "Obama", being a man}, c{being the bearer of  
the name "Obama", being a man}) 
 
 On the other hand, since Sherlock Holmes does not exist, (8) can be interpreted as the 
negation of  a proposition similar to the one expressed by (7castañeda), after having replaced the 
proper name in it with "Sherlock Holmes". There are many principles connected with 
consubstantiation and existence, in respect of  completeness, logical closure, compossibility, and 
so on132. In particular, consubstantiated guises obey existence-entailing principles, while non-
consubstantiated ones do not obey them. Furthermore, Castañeda claims that existing ordinary 
objects are reducible to infinite sets of  consubstantiated guises, while fictional characters can be 
reduced to finite sets of  guises133.  
 In respect to them, he introduces one further kind of  relation between guises: 
consociation (C**), that holds (at least) among two guises that are only thought of  as being 
consubstantiated. This kind of  relation can hold with respect to a context (in this case, we have 
to introduce a context-index) or not (when we consider culturalized fiction, i.e. fiction that is not 
restricted to a context). Accordingly, using the context-index i, (12) can be interpreted as 
 
(12castañeda) C**i(c{being the bearer of  the name "Sherlock Holmes", being a man}, c{being the 
bearer of  the name "Sherlock Holmes", being a man, being a detective}) 
 
 Since (12castañeda) does not express any consubstantiation relation, no problem arises in 
considering Sherlock Holmes a detective, even though a non-real one.  
 Intentional relations, such as the one expressed by (15), are somehow more complicated 
                                                 
131 See also Castañeda (1974), in Castañeda (1989): 251-252. 
132 See Castañeda (1974), in Castañeda (1989): 243-244. 
133 See Castañeda (1979), in Castañeda (1989): 196. 
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and I shall not deal with them. What about (13)? Fictional objects are systems of  consociated 
guises, i.e., systems of  guises that are actually thought of  as being consubstantiated134. Thus, it 
seems not legitimate to analyze (13) in terms of  consubstantiation. Perhaps, within the context of  
culturalized fiction (i.e., without using any context-index), it could be legitimate to claim that 
some guise denoted by the proper name "Sherlock Holmes" is consociated with some other guise 
internally constituted by the properties of  the first guise and by the property of  being fictional. 
Otherwise, it could be legitimate to claim that, within the same context, there is at least one guise 
to which the first guise is consociated. Furthermore, if  we wanted to preserve the fact that, in 
order for Sherlock Holmes to be a fictional object, there must be contexts different from the 
context of  culturalized fiction in which he has some property, we could add one corresponding 
consociation relation. I shall deal with other aspects of  Castañeda's theory of  fictional entities in 
the next chapter.  
 It is really difficult to provide a general evaluation for Castañeda's guise theory. Since he 
does not primarily consider ordinary objects (real and fictional ones), this theory admits of  no 
simple comparison with other theories. I just want to focus on the notion of  existence. Guises 
exist iff  they are self-consubstantiated. On the other hand, it seems that ordinary objects exist 
only if  they are infinite sets of  consubstantiated guises. In order for an ordinary object to exist, it 
must be a set of  self-consubstantiated guises that are consubstantiated with one another. Thus, 
non-existent guises are those guises that are not self-consubstantiated. Furthermore, in general, it 
could be legitimate to claim that, for Castañeda, non-existing objects can bear properties, given 
that non-existing (non-self-consubstantiated) guises can bear other relations to each other 
(consociation relations, and so on). Yet, consubstantiation (even in its reflexive form) of  guises 
seems to presuppose that the ordinary object constituted by a system of  consubstantiated guises 
exists. In Castañeda's system, existence must be assumed as primitive and somehow redundant, 
even if  the contingent existence of  guises and ordinary objects seems to be explained135. In fact, if  
we wanted to explain existence in se in terms of  consubstantiation, we would have to assume the 
existence of  ordinary objects, thus having a circular explanation, even though Castañeda does not 
strictly concede that there are ordinary existing objects. Existence cannot be non-circularly 
defined in terms of  consubstantiation, since consubstantiation must be somehow defined in 
terms of  existence.  
 This seems to be a general difficulty that characterizes non-actualist analyses of  existence. 
In fact, even if  we denied (actualism) and (actualism-a), we would have to find out a non-circular 
and informative definition of  existence (of  what is for something to exist) or to assume existence 
                                                 
134 See Castañeda (1979), in Castañeda (1989): 192-193. 
135 See Castañeda (1974), in Castañeda (1989): 246-247. 
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as primitive. In the latter case, we would provide no definition for existence, while the former 
task seems to be really difficult to deal with, as I have already tried to show. 
 
I.2.3.3. Dual strategies (Zalta). 
In this section, I shall analyze one of  the most interesting dual-copula strategies, that well 
represents the key-features of  the instantiation-centered Meinongianism: the theory developed by 
E. N. Zalta in his work Abstract Objects136. Developing another suggestion of  Mally's, according to 
whom it would be possible to deal with Meinongian paradoxes by using two different meanings 
of  the copula "is" and being perhaps inspired by W. J. Rapaport's distinctions between 
constitution and exemplification and between Meinongian and actual objects137, Zalta 
distinguishes two ways in which an object can instantiate a property: encoding and 
exemplification. This distinction is assumed as primitive, even if  one could try to understand it 
after having defined the notion of  abstract object. An object is abstract iff  it does not exemplify 
existence. Thus, (8) expresses a true proposition, because Sherlock Holmes is an abstract object, 
i.e., an object that does not exemplify existence. On the other hand, in order for (7) to express a 
true proposition, Obama must be considered a non-abstract object, i.e., an existing one (at least 
according to this sense of  existence, since Zalta distinguishes different senses of  existence). 
 Abstract objects encode properties and "for every expressible condition on properties, 
there is an abstract object which encodes just the properties meeting the condition"138. They 
exemplify properties too, such as the property of  being abstract. Non-abstract objects fail to 
encode properties: they only exemplify them139. Given two different objects (an abstract and a 
non-abstract one), that seem to instantiate the same properties (e.g., Obama within a work of  
fiction and the real Obama), it is legitimate to claim that one of  such objects (the abstract one) is 
the blueprint of  the other (the non-abstract one), i.e., of  its correlate, iff  the former object 
encodes all the properties that the latter object exemplifies140. I shall not consider here two 
paradoxes (Clark's and McMichael's ones) that instantiation-centered Meinongianism seems to 
                                                 
136 See Zalta (1983). 
137 See Rapaport (1976), (1978) and (1985). Rapaport was one of Castañeda's pupils. Thus, it seems to me legitimate 
to consider Castañeda one of the fathers of instantiation-centered Meinongianism. As Rapaport claims in Rapaport 
(1978), if we simply assumed guises as ordinary existing or non-existing objects (i.e., if we turned to a Meinongian 
interpretation of Castañeda's theory), constituency would correspond to internal predication, while exemplification 
would correspond to external relations, such as consubstantiation. 
138 See Zalta (1983): 12, 34. Furthermore, Zalta claims that: two objects can be considered identical iff they exemplify 
the same properties (if they are non-abstract objects) or they are both abstract and encode the same properties; two 
properties are identical iff they are encoded by the same objects. 
139 See Zalta (1983): 33. 
140 See Zalta (1983): 35. This distinction seems to recall Rapaport's distinction between blueprints and Sein-correlates: 
see Rapaport (1978): 163-165. 
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entail141. 
 However, dealing with (12)-(14), it is legitimate to claim that, according to Zalta, (12) 
expresses a true proposition since there is an abstract object (Sherlock Holmes) that encodes the 
property of  being a detective. We can also introduce a fictional context operator, in order to 
explain the fact that, according to that context (for example, Conan Doyle's stories), Sherlock 
Holmes exemplifies the property of  being a detective142. In general, native fictional objects 
(namely, objects that are native with respect to some fiction), are those objects that encode all the 
properties that, according to that fiction (or that story), they exemplify. On the other hand, such 
objects do not exemplify those properties. Thus, there remains no ambiguity in (12). With regard 
to (13), the abstract object Sherlock Holmes exemplifies the property of  being fictional, while, 
with respect to (14), we could claim that Obama’s being a politician entails Obama’s existence iff  
Obama exemplifies the property of  being a politician. However, considered apart from the 
exemplification nexus between objects and properties, the instantiation of  the property of  being 
a detective does not entail the instantiation of  the property of  existing or the fact that Sherlock 
Holmes exists. With respect to (15), we could claim that the object thought of  by John only 
encodes the property of  being a hobbit143: there is such an object, even if  it does not exist. 
Furthermore, we could introduce an intensional-context operator in order to deal with John's 
beliefs (or John's thoughts) about that hobbit144. 
 Meinongian paradoxes are thus eliminated by claiming that, for example, the existent 
golden mountain encodes existence, even if  it does not exist (i.e., it does not exemplify 
existence); that the round square is both round and square, since it encodes the properties of  
being round and of  being a square, even if  no existent object exemplifies both these 
properties145. Furthermore, the round and non-round square encodes the properties of  being 
round and of  being non-round: since this object only encodes these properties, it does not entail 
any "logical explosion" following the Pseudo-Scotus Law (ex falso quodlibet)146.  
 Yet, Zalta recognizes that there are many senses of  existence, that cannot be simply reduced 
to the property of  being concrete (or existent), i.e., of  being non-abstract147. This seems to be 
one of  the most interesting parts of  Zalta's book – at least with regard to the topic of  this work. 
The first sense of  existence (existence1 or real existence) has been already considered by claiming 
                                                 
141 For a brief exposition and discussion of these paradoxes, see, for example, Orilia (2005): 167-171. See also Clark 
(1978). 
142 See Zalta (1983): 146. 
143 Concerning the problems connected with intentionality, see also Zalta (1988). 
144 See Zalta (1983): 140-145. 
145 See Zalta (1983): 47-50. 
146 See Zalta (1983): 145-146. 
147 See Zalta (1983): 50-52. 
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that abstract objects do not exist1. The second sense of  existence (existence2) characterizes 
abstract objects that have correlates: in this case, an abstract object exists2 iff  it encodes all the 
properties that some object exemplifies. Finally, existence3 (or, following Zalta, Platonic 
existence) characterizes every object: both abstract and concrete objects (non-abstract ones) exist3 
and no object fails to exemplify this property148. In sum, abstract objects do not exist1, they could 
exist2 (e.g., a fictional character such as Napoleon in War and Peace has a correlate, i.e., the existing 
Napoleon) and they exist3.  
 Zalta's theory seems not to be immune to the problems that characterize Parson's 
account. For example, the existent Sherlock Holmes (i.e., the abstract object that encodes the 
properties of  being Sherlock Holmes and of  existing) is different from Sherlock Holmes, just as 
the round square is different from the round non-round square, even though we all know that the 
property of  being a square entails the property of  non-being round, at least according to the 
Euclidean geometrical laws. In reply to these problem, one could try to distinguish encoding 
from exemplification as follows: when an object encodes some property, it does not encode all 
the properties that are implied by that property when it is exemplified. This seems to be a good 
solution to preserve the Meinongian freedom of  assumption principle against such criticisms. 
 However, Zalta assumes that the distinction between encoding and exemplification is 
primitive. In fact, if  it were defined in terms of  the distinction between abstract and non-abstract 
objects, the criterion of  distinction between encoding and exemplification would turn out be 
circular, since abstract and non-abstract objects are defined in terms of  encoding and 
exemplification. Yet, there is no intuition that guarantees the legitimacy of  this primitive 
distinction: objects simply seem to have properties, regardless of  their being abstract or non-
abstract. 
 Finally, since it is assumed that Sherlock Holmes encodes all the properties that are 
attributed to him within his native story, it would be possible to ask whether Sherlock Holmes, 
when he appears within other stories, is the same object or not. It seems plausible to answer that 
he is not the same object, since other properties are attributed to him within other stories. Yet, 
how could we individuate similar Sherlock Holmes’ characters across different stories? We could 
admit some kind of  similarity between different objects that are Sherlock Holmes in terms of  the 
possession of  (i.e., of  encoding) some relevant properties. Thus, there would be some "essential" 
Sherlock Holmes (some Sherlock Holmes who encodes all and only those relevant properties) 
                                                 
148 See also Zalta (1988): 102-105. There are three senses of existence in Rapaport’s accounts too (see Rapaport 
(1978): 165): existence as an assumptible property that can constitute a Meinongian object too; existence as actuality 
(that only characterizes actual objects); existence as having a Sein-correlate. Yet, Rapaport seems to follow the 
original theory of Meinong’s more than Zalta, since he does not mention any Platonic existence. In fact, according to 
Meinong, it is simply not the case that every object has Sein. 
99 
 
who resembles every Sherlock Holmes’ character. We could claim that Sherlock Holmes in the 
story a resembles Sherlock Holmes in the story b, even if  they are two different objects, since 
they both resemble the "essential" Sherlock Holmes. Yet, this seems to run against the intuition 
that it is one and the same Sherlock Holmes that appears in the story a, in the story b and that 
encodes all the properties of  the "essential" Sherlock Holmes too. In sum, in order to preserve 
Zalta's theory, we could have to multiply objects. On the other hand, it seems to me that a theory 
of  fictional objects that could justify the reference to one and the same object across different 
stories is preferable to a theory that explains the same datum by introducing many objects. 
 
I.2.3.4. Strange Worlds (Priest, Berto). 
G. Priest149 and F. Berto150 both develop a modal version of  Meinongianism, that I have called 
world-centered Meinongianism. As we will see, this version has some advantages over the other 
two forms of  Meinongianism. The idea behind this proposal is that we should accept an 
unrestricted Meinongian principle of  freedom of  assumption, even if  we should qualify it in 
respect to worlds. Thus, for example, Berto claims that, for any given condition on properties, 
there is some object that satisfies it in some world151. In addition to the actual world, there are 
other possible worlds and impossible ones too (i.e., worlds where the law of  non-contradiction 
does not hold). In fact, such theories are strictly connected with particular solutions given to 
some logical and ontological problems (concerning consistency and modality), that I shall not 
discuss here152. Furthermore, existence is considered by these authors a first-order, informative 
property153: there are things that exist and things that do not exist. Finally, since we can quantify 
over, talk about and refer to objects that do not exist, it seems acceptable that, even in our world 
(the actual world), there are such non-existing objects. This is a crucial assumption, since it 
simplifies the interpretation of  propositions such as the one expressed by (13). Finally, there are 
some properties that are existence-entailing: for example, the property of  being taller than 
someone is an existence-entailing property154. We could add that there are properties that are 
non-existence entailing (e.g., the property of  being fictional) and properties that are indifferent 
(e.g., the relation of  being more famous than someone: both existent and non-existent objects 
can be the relata of  this relation). In general, world-centered Meinongianism tries to preserve the 
fact that the instantiation of  some properties implies the instantiation of  some other properties: 
                                                 
149 See, for example, Priest (2000a) and Priest (2005). For Priest’s well-known defense of the thesis that there are true 
contradictions, see Priest (2006). 
150 See Berto (2010) and (2013a). 
151 See Berto (2013a): 141. 
152 For example, it seems that these theories are better justifiable if one accepts that there is some kind of trans-world 
identity, grounded on the fact that singular terms such as "Sherlock Holmes" rigidly denote objects. 
153 See, for example, Priest (2005): 13-14. 
154 See Priest (2005): 59-60. 
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for example, the instantiation of  the property of  being a square implies the non-instantiation of  
the property of  being round, so that, within some impossible world, there really is a round square 
that is not round too, in virtue of  its being a square. This seems to be a great advantage over 
other versions of  Meinongianism. Furthermore, this solution does not counter-intuitively 
distinguish between different kinds of  predication or of  properties. On the other hand, it 
modifies our logic in order to allow that there are at least impossible worlds (since there are 
impossible objects, such as the round square), where the law of  non-contradiction does not hold, 
even though the Pseudo-Scotus law is not valid.  
 Thus, concerning (7), one could state, from this perspective, that it expresses a true 
proposition, since, in the actual world, the object Obama instantiates the property of  existing. On 
the other hand, (8) expresses a true proposition too, since Sherlock Holmes does not instantiate, 
in the actual world, the property of  existing, while he instantiates it in other worlds (e.g., the 
relevant worlds defined by Conan Doyle's stories). Conan Doyle's worlds can be considered 
fictional worlds, i.e., worlds in which what Conan Doyle claims in his stories is true. In order to 
select such worlds, one has to consider implicit information too. For example, it could be 
implicitly (but not explicitly) claimed in Conan Doyle's stories that London is in England. Thus, 
one has to select all the worlds where there is a town named London that is in England. 
Concerning (13), Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character since he instantiates the property of  
being a fictional character in the actual world. In respect to (12), world-centered Meinongianists 
claim that it does not express a true proposition in the actual world (the property of  being a 
detective is an existence-entailing one and, since Sherlock Holmes does not exist in the actual 
world, he cannot instantiate this property in it), while it express a true proposition in some non-
actual world (where Sherlock Holmes exists). On the other hand, (14) expresses a true 
proposition, at least in respect to the actual world, since Obama actually exists and he is a 
politician. Finally, with regard to (15), since the property of  thinking of  does not entail existence, 
John can think of  non-existent objects too. Furthermore, as Priest claims155, many intentional 
attitudes define possible (and impossible) worlds where objects have properties that do not have 
in the actual world.  
 Even though the introduction of  worlds seems to resolve many problems connected with 
Meinongian theories, it seems to me that there remain at least three problems to deal with. Since 
such problems concern fictional objects and the attribution of  modal properties, I shall explore 
them to a larger extent in the next chapter. First, if  we accept that Conan Doyle's stories are 
consistent, even though incomplete, there could be many possible worlds in which Sherlock 
                                                 
155 See Priest (2000a). 
101 
 
Holmes is such-and-such. In fact, such stories do not claim, with regard to every object and every 
property, whether that object has or does not have that property. Being human and having hands, 
Sherlock Holmes is right-handed or left-handed or both, but this is not claimed in Conan Doyle's 
stories. Thus, (12) could express a true proposition in at least three worlds where Sherlock 
Holmes exists: one world in which he is right-handed, one world in which he is left-handed and 
one world in which he is both right-handed and left-handed. Yet, it seems that, when we claim 
that Sherlock Holmes is such-and-such according to some story, we only refer to one world (the 
world defined by that story). Thus, it seems that, following the world-centered Meinongian 
perspective, one has to maintain that there are many maximal possible worlds in which it is true 
that (12) or that there is only one world (at least considering only one story) where it is true that 
(12) and that this world is not maximal in respect to some feature(s) (it is not maximal since 
Sherlock Holmes must be right-handed or left-handed or both, given the assumption that 
possible worlds are maximal, but neither alternative is true, nor false). Accepting that there are 
many worlds in which it is true that (12) for one and the same object (Sherlock Holmes), Priest 
argues that such incompleteness does not involve that there are non-maximal worlds156. In fact, it 
is true that, in the actual world, Sherlock Holmes is represented by Conan Doyle as being right-
handed or left-handed or both, but it is false that, in the actual world, he is represented by Conan 
Doyle as being right-handed (or that he is represented by Conan Doyle as being left-handed, or 
right-handed and left-handed). With regard to other worlds, there will be worlds where he is 
right-handed, worlds where he is left-handed and worlds where he is right-handed and left-
handed. However, even though this solution seems to work, it seems to me preferable and nearer 
to our intuitions about fictional objects to maintain that there is a one-one correspondence 
between stories and fictional worlds. This will be clearer in the second part of  this work, where I 
shall develop a theory grounded on the thesis that both fictional objects and fictional worlds are 
mental objects.  
 Furthermore, Priest argues that, by creating Sherlock Holmes, his author selects some 
features characterizing that object across fictional possible (and impossible) worlds. One and the 
same object has such features in many worlds. Authorial creation (and the creative 
representations of  its products in different minds) bifurcates worlds. Yet, following this account, 
there is no proper creation of  fictional objects. In the actual world, there is one fictional object 
that is represented as being such-and-such. In other worlds (the worlds corresponding to the 
story), it has other features that it is not represented as having in the actual world: in Conan 
Doyle’s stories’ worlds, for example, Sherlock Holmes neither has the property of  being created 
                                                 
156 See Priest (2005): 123-124. 
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by Conan Doyle, nor he is represented as having it. Thus, one has to deny that, in the actual 
world, a fictional object is created (and this seems to be highly counterintuitive), since it is not 
created by any author in other worlds, or s/he has to affirm that one and the same fictional 
object is created in the actual world and it is not created in other worlds, where it exists and it is 
not fictional. However, accepting this latter solution, there would be no unique definition of  the 
ontological status of  fictional objects: they would be fictional in this world and non-fictional in 
other worlds. On the other hand, if  someone in other worlds represented Obama as being such-
and-such, Obama could be a fictional object in other worlds, even being a non-fictional one in 
the actual world. Thus, if  we do not give any special status to the actual world, we can only state 
that an object is fictional or non-fictional in respect to some world. We cannot state that it is 
simply fictional or non-fictional, since this seems to happen only in respect to the actual world.  
 Finally, concerning the round square, it seems that it is both round and non-round in 
some impossible world w1, even though it only has the properties of  being represented as round 
and of  being represented as non-round in the actual world. However, might it have, in the actual 
world, the property of  being round in the impossible world w1? If  it had this property, it would 
also not have the same property in the actual world: since in w1 it is also not round, it would not 
have, in the actual world, the property of  being round in the impossible world w1. Yet, given this 
situation, the actual world would turn out to be an impossible one! One could try to deal with 
such a difficulty in several ways. It is possible to claim that the actual world is an impossible 
world, i.e., that there are counterexamples to the law of  non-contradiction in the actual world too. 
Furthermore, it is possible to argue that, in the actual world, there is no property such as the 
property of  being such-and-such in some world, even though there are properties such as the 
property of  being represented as such-and-such. In contrast with the modal properties that I 
have introduced in my objection, these latter properties, as we have already seen, do not entail 
any contradiction in the actual world. Yet, assuming that there are non-existent objects and that 
such objects can have, in the actual world, properties that do not entail existence (such as the 
modal properties introduced), I do not see any reason to exclude that, in the actual world, they 
really instantiate those properties too. Finally, one could try to argue that the round square has, in 
this property, the property of  being round in w1 and the property of  non-being round in w1, so 
that no contradiction results. However, this strategy seems legitimate only if  we admit that there 
are negative properties and that the instantiation of  a negative property does not correspond to 
the non-instantiation of  the corresponding positive one. In the second part of  the work, I shall 
try to deal with this problem by both preserving this datum and the validity of  the law of  non-
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contradiction in the actual world157.  
 
I.2.3.5. Free-style Semi-Meinongianism (McGinn). 
C. McGinn argues that existence is a first-order informative property, even though a sui generis 
one158. After having criticized what he calls the Russellian orthodox view159, McGinn claims that it 
is legitimate to quantify over and refer to things that do not exist by accepting a non-existentially-
loaded interpretation of  the partial quantifier  160. According to this perspective, it seems to him 
legitimate to admit that some things exist, i.e., that some things instantiate the first-order property 
of  existing (since "exist" can be considered a legitimate first-level predicate, that attributes a 
property to an object), and that some things do not exist. However, non-existent things are those 
things that are not mind-independent161: Sherlock Holmes, for example, as a fictional character, is 
mind-dependent (he depends for his having properties on the authorial mind and, perhaps, on 
other minds thinking of  him). Properties are ascribed to non-existent objects by minds. Thus, for 
every object, that object exists iff  it is mind-independent. On the other hand, according to 
McGinn, there are objects that seem not to exist, but that are not properly mind-dependent. For 
example, my merely possible sister is a merely possible object that does not depend on my mind 
for her having properties. Impossible objects such as round squares are mind-independent too. 
Following him, merely possible objects and impossible objects are objects that exist (since they 
are mind-independent), even if  the former ones do not actually exist and could actually exist and the 
latter ones do not actually exist and could not actually exist162. Thus, existence is a first-order, 
informative and sui generis property. It is sui generis since, while for every ordinary first-order 
property if  that property is a contingent one, then its negation is contingent too, there is nothing 
to support the same view about existence: in fact, even if  existence is contingently instantiated by 
objects, its negation (non-existence) is necessarily instantiated by those objects that do not exist163. 
Non-existence can be considered equivalent to failed intentionality of  mental acts directed 
towards objects (I think of  Sherlock Holmes, but Sherlock Holmes fails to exist), representation-
dependence of  objects, and so on164. 
 It seems quite easy to interpret our data according to McGinn's perspective, so that I shall 
not focus on them. Yet, why do we have to think that merely possible and impossible objects are 
                                                 
157 For another objection concerning the relation between existent and non-existent objects in modal 
Meinongianism, see Sauchelli (2012). See also Berto’s reply in Berto (2013b). 
158 See McGinn (2000): 15-51. For an interesting semantic analysis of "exist" as a predicate of individuals that partly 
agrees with McGinn’s account, see Moltmann (2011) and (2013). 
159 See McGinn (2000): 21-30. 
160 See, in particular, McGinn (2000): 35-37. 
161 See McGinn (2000): 37. 
162 See McGinn (2000): 38-41. 
163 See McGinn (2000): 39. 
164 See McGinn (2000): 42-44. 
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not mind-dependent? Perhaps, this seems legitimate because their modal properties do not 
depend on minds' ascriptions. My merely possible sister does not actually exist, even though she 
could actually exist, not simply because I ascribe to her these properties. Thus, she exists, i.e., she 
is mind-independent. On the other hand, round squares do not actually exist and could not 
actually exist, not simply because I think of  them as such. Thus, they exist, because they are 
mind-independent. On the other hand, fictional objects such as Sherlock Holmes are fictional 
only because someone thinks of  them as such-and-such: if  there were no thinking minds, there 
would be no such objects, so that they would not be fictional.  
 However, what does the property of  actually existing amount to? Or, if  we do not wish to 
accept that there is such a property, how does the operator expressed by "actually" work? 
McGinn does not explain this point. Plausibly, something does not actually exist iff  it does not 
exist in the actual world. Merely possible objects do not exist in the actual world, even if  they 
could exist in it, while round squares do not exist and could not exist in the actual world. Thus, 
actual existence is different from existence simpliciter. There follows that non-actual worlds exist 
too, since they are mind-independent. Yet, how can we justify McGinn’s thesis that existent 
objects contingently exist (simpliciter), while non-existent ones necessarily do not exist (simpliciter)? 
Existent objects contingently exist in the actual world (they might not exist in it, since there are 
other possible worlds, that are accessible from the actual world, in which they do not exist), but it 
seems that they necessarily exist (simpliciter). In fact, if  we claim that, in the actual world, merely 
possible objects do not actually exist, even if  they exist (simpliciter) since there are non-actual 
worlds in which they actually exist, Obama exists (simpliciter) in every world in which he does not 
actually exist, i.e., he necessarily exists165. One could reply that these assumptions are 
contradictory, since, if  merely possible objects exist (simpliciter) in the actual world, they do actually 
exist. Yet, they do not actually exist. Thus, they do not exist (simpliciter) in the actual world. True. 
Yet, what would existence (simpliciter) and actual existence amount to? Existence (simpliciter) could 
be considered actual existence in some world. However, in this case, actual existence would not 
be simply equivalent to existence in the actual world, since merely possible objects would turn out 
to exist in the actual world too: it is true, in the actual world, that merely possible objects actually 
exist in some world, i.e., that they have existence simpliciter in the actual world (they are mind-
independent in the actual world too). Thus, we should have to find out one definition of  
existence in the actual world that does not involve the notion of  existence simpliciter. In other 
terms, existence in the actual world cannot be considered equivalent to existence simpliciter in the 
actual world. Following McGinn's account, this task is really hard to deal with.  
                                                 
165 For a similar objection, see van Inwagen (2008). 
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 We could reply that an object contingently exists (simpliciter) iff  there are worlds in which 
it does not exist (simpliciter), i.e., where it is mind-dependent. Yet, in this case, nothing guarantees 
that the same cannot be claimed with regard to Sherlock Holmes: there might be worlds in which 
Sherlock Holmes is mind-independent, as well as there might be worlds in which Obama (a 
mind-independent object in the actual world) is mind-dependent. Thus, non-existing objects 
would turn out not to be necessarily non-existent. 
 In sum, if  we accept some kind of  distinction between actual existence and existence 
(simpliciter), it turns out to be really difficult to claim that some objects contingently exist 
(simpliciter) and that some objects necessarily do not exist (simpliciter). If  we do not accept any kind 
of  distinction between them, we cannot claim that there are objects that exist (simpliciter), even if  
they do not actually exist. In the second part of  this work, I shall accept McGinn's definition of  
non-existent objects as mind-dependent ones (at least with regard to fictional objects). However, 
I shall argue that merely possible objects and impossible ones are mind-dependent too.  
 
I.2.4. The Third Way: Many Senses Theories of Existence (Geach, Miller) 
As I have already remarked, Frege distinguishes two different senses of  existence: existence as 
actuality and existence as the second-order property of  being instantiated in at least one case. P. 
T. Geach develops this intuition166 in order to explain some data concerning pretended use of  
names, the relation between existence and change (a relation that I shall explore in the chapter 
I.4), and between form and existence. According to him, it is possible to find out three different 
senses of  existence167. In fact, in respect to (5) and (6), one could claim that they express true 
propositions in virtue of  some kind of  "there is" sense of  existence: there are lions, since the 
Fregean concept (in our terms: the property) of  being a lion is instantiated in at least one case, 
while there are no unicorns, since the Fregean concept of  being a unicorn is not instantiated. On 
the other hand, by claiming (8), we claim something about the use of  the proper name "Sherlock 
Holmes", i.e., the fact that, by using it, we do not refer to anything: we only pretend to refer by that 
name. There is no Sherlock Holmes (no object) to which we can refer by that name. Thus, Geach 
seems to accept (actualism). What about (12) and (13)? Even though Geach does not claim 
anything about the propositions expressed by statements such as (12), it is legitimate to argue 
that, according to his Fregean perspective, they are neither true, nor false. However, Geach could 
have accepted a pretense theory of  fiction, according to which, by using the proper name 
"Sherlock Holmes" and by claiming that the object to which that name seems to refer is a 
detective, we only pretend to use that name and pretend to claim something true about its 
                                                 
166 See Geach (1955) and Geach (1968). 
167 See Geach (1955): 262-268. 
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pretended bearer. Yet, since that name has no real bearer, (12) would not express a true 
proposition, but a pretended true one. This seems to contrast with our data: there is at least one 
sense according to which (12) expresses a simply true proposition. Finally, in respect to (13), we 
might qualify the pretense involved by the use of  "Sherlock Holmes" as fictional pretense. 
However, it seems to me that Geach's account does not solve the problems involved by the meta-
linguistic analysis of  non-referring names and by the pretense theories of  fiction that I have 
already mentioned.  
 Yet, there is at least one sense of  existence according to which it seems legitimate not to 
accept (actualism-a). In fact, when we claim something like 
 
(30) Socrates exists,  
 
at least if  we appropriately interpret it, we do not claim anything about the use of  the proper 
name "Socrates": we claim something about Socrates. On the one hand (even if  Geach does not 
mention this part of  the Fregean theory of  existence), if  we simply claimed that Socrates exists 
(regardless of  time), we would simply claim something about the use of  the proper name 
"Socrates" (i.e., that that proper name is used to refer). Yet, on the other hand, if  we state by (30) 
that Socrates exists now, we express by (30) a false proposition. On the contrary, if  we state 
something like (7), we express a true proposition, since Obama is now existent. On the other 
hand, by 
 
(31) Socrates does not exist, 
 
we could express the (unluckily) true proposition that Socrates does not exist anymore. 
Accordingly, there is a third use of  "exist" that corresponds to the use of  an acceptable predicate 
of  individuals. We use this predicate when we claim that something comes to exist, no longer 
exists, still exists, and so on. Furthermore, mentioning an argument of  Wittgenstein's, Geach 
claims that, in (31), "Socrates" still refers, since the reference of  a proper name does not die when 
its bearer dies168. What are the ontological implications of  such an analysis? According to Geach, 
for an individual to continue to exist is for that individual to be the same X for a certain period 
of  time (where "X" expresses a Begriffswort, so that it stands for a form, according to him)169. 
Existence seems to be a property of  individuals: it is the X-individual that continues to exist. 
However, if  we claimed that the form expressed by "X" is nothing more than a property, then 
continued existence would turn out to be a peculiar property. In fact, it would be equivalent to 
the property of  being the same X for a certain period of  time.  
                                                 
168 See Geach (1955): 267. 
169 See Geach (1955): 268. 
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 Yet, provided that we can find out appropriate criteria of  identity for him, why cannot we 
claim that Sherlock Holmes continues to exist, i.e., that he is the same fictional character for a 
certain period of  time (e.g., as long as stories about him exist)? In order to deal with this problem 
from Geach's perspective, we could try with five different solutions. First, we could distinguish 
between independent and dependent continued existence: Sherlock Holmes has dependent 
continued existence iff  he is the same fictional character for a certain period of  time, that 
corresponds to the period of  time of  the continued existence of  the stories about him (on which 
Sherlock Holmes depends for its existence), while Socrates' (and Obama’s) continued existence 
does not depend on stories' existence. However, Sherlock Holmes’ stories seem not to have 
independent continued existence. Thus, we should have to find out something independently 
existing on which both Sherlock Holmes and his stories depend. Secondly, we could deny that 
Sherlock Holmes is an object, by adopting the strategies already analyzed and rejected (at least in 
my perspective). Thirdly, we could simply deny that Sherlock Holmes exists, so that he cannot 
have continued existence.  
 Fourthly, we could deny that forms are properties. Geach's account is ambiguous. In fact, 
according to him, the same form X-ness can occur both in nature (as having esse naturale) and in 
mind (as having esse intentionale)170. In this latter case, is it an object (the individualized form, not 
identical with its bearer) or a property that occurs in two different ways? By definition, objects 
cannot be borne by other objects. Thus, forms are objects that are not borne by other objects in 
the same way as properties are borne by objects. It seems to me that Geach thinks of  forms as 
Fregean concepts’ (i.e., properties’) correlates: humanity is the correlate of  the property of  being 
human, while Socratishness or Obamishness, for example, are the correlates of  the properties of  
being Socrates and of  being Obama. Even accepting this distinction (according to which, for 
example, humanity has esse naturale in men and esse intentionale in minds), the criterion of  continued 
existence does not work with forms, but with properties. Socrates, for example, continues to exist 
iff  he is the same man (i.e., he instantiates the property of  being a man) for a certain period of  
time. Thus, Sherlock Holmes can be the same fictional character for a certain period of  time, 
since the property of  being a fictional character seems to be a legitimate property. Fifthly, we 
could reply that this criterion is restricted to actual, existing objects. 
 Yet, accepting the third and/or the fifth solution, we could also be able to find out a 
notion of  existence that could ground the notion of  continued existence, i.e., the third Geachean 
sense of  existence. There might be a fourth sense of  existence, corresponding to actuality. 
Furthermore, accepting a presentist view of  the relationship between property instantiation and 
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time, this fourth sense would be identical with the third one: something exists now iff  it is actual 
now. On the other hand, if  we do not accept this perspective, we can claim that the property of  
being actual expresses an independent sense of  existence and that it can express, for example, 
tenseless real existence too. Geach clarifies this notion when he claims that something is actual iff  
it either acts, or undergoes change, or both171. Continuants are actual in this sense, as well as other 
entities, while there are entities that are not actual. Nevertheless, what about the notion of  change 
involved in this definition? According to Geach, one has to consider here real changes, in 
contrast with mere Cambridge ones: for example, the change involved by Plato's being thought 
of  by Socrates (according to which, at first, Plato is not thought of, then he is thought of  by him) 
is a mere Cambridge change in Plato. Yet, since, following Geach, thoughts are actual entities172, 
Socrates' thinking of  Plato is a real change in Socrates. Thus, it seems to me that, in Geach’s 
perspective, one and the same action can produce two different changes: a real and a mere 
Cambridge one. However, in order to define real changes in some non-circular way, it is 
preferable to claim that real changes are not simply non-mere Cambridge changes: in this case, in 
fact, it could seem that real changes are those changes that are undergone and/or produced by 
actual entities.  
 B. Miller develops one of  the most interesting and detailed contemporary accounts of  
existence173. According to him, there are two meanings of  the predicate "exist": it can be 
considered a second-order predicate or a first-order one. For example, when we claim that (6) 
expresses a true proposition, we claim that the property of  being a unicorn does not have 
instances, while when we claim that 
 
(32) dinosaurs do not exist, 
 
we do not claim that some property is not instantiated (since there were dinosaurs, i.e., instances 
of  the property of  being a dinosaur), but that individual dinosaurs no longer exist174. Yet, in order 
to preserve the second-order property account of  existence, one could reply that (32) expresses a 
true proposition under some temporal qualification: in particular, we could claim that it was the 
case that the property of  being a dinosaur had at least one instance (i.e., that dinosaurs existed) 
and that it is now the case that it has no instances. It is legitimate to accept Miller's objection 
against the second-order property account only by accepting a presentist interpretation of  the 
instantiation of  properties.  
 Accepting this second meaning of  "exist", there is a real, first-order property of  existing, 
                                                 
171 See Geach (1968): 7. 
172 See Geach (1968): 14. 
173 See, in particular, Miller (1975), Miller (1986) and Miller (2002). 
174 See Miller (1975): 342-346 and Miller (1986): 246-250. 
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even if  this property is somehow unique. The property of  existing is a real one (in Miller’s terms), 
since it can be demonstrated that "exist" is not a Cambridge predicate (Miller provides an 
interesting interpretation for such predicates175) and since existence makes a real and important 
difference: in fact, if  Obama did not exist, he would not have any property. Let me now consider 
Socrates, in order to analyze Miller’s account. In respect to (30), Miller argues that, (a) since the 
possession of  his thisness (i.e., the possession of  some property that is Socrates’ individual 
essence) has made a real difference for Socrates and (b) since his having possessed existence has 
been a necessary and sufficient condition for his having possessed his thisness, Socrates’ 
possession of  existence has made a real difference for him176. In order to argue for the second 
premise, as I have already remarked, Miller accepts a presentist perspective. Furthermore, he 
claims that the proper name "Socrates" did not refer to anything before the existence of  Socrates 
and that Socrates had no properties before his having come into existence177. Yet, Socrates' 
thisness and Socrates' existence are not one and the same thing: they really differ, since it is true 
and non-contradictory that Socrates no longer exists, while it is contradictory to claim that he is 
no longer characterized by his thisness, and since Socrates' existence has been a sufficient 
condition for Socrates’ having possessed his own thisness, while Socrates' having possessed his 
own thisness has not been a sufficient condition for his existence178. However, this formulation is 
not clear: in fact, following a presentist perspective, it is not only non-contradictory, but also true 
that Socrates is no longer characterized by his thisness (Socrates does not exist anymore and he 
cannot instantiate any property). Moreover, if  we add to the presentist perspective the acceptance 
of  (actualism) (Miller seems to accept this thesis), then the possession of  every property is a 
sufficient condition for Socrates to exist, since the instantiation of  existence is implied by the 
instantiation of  any property.  
 Miller discusses such aspects of  his theory in his last work: The Fullness of  Being: A new 
Paradigm for Existence179. He argues that Socrates had his own instance of  existence (i.e., his 
individual existence, interpreted as an individual first-order property, yet different from a trope), 
that is logically prior to Socrates' element (i.e., to what Socrates was, to his essence) in respect to 
actuality, since Socrates could neither be actual, nor instantiate any property before his having 
come into existence, and logically posterior to it in respect to individuation, since Socrates' element 
individuated Socrates' instance of  existence (i.e., it made Socrates' existence that particular instance 
                                                 
175 See Miller (1986): 258-264. 
176 See Miller (1986): 264-269. 
177 See the interesting argument in Miller (2002): 87-95. 
178 See Miller (1986): 269. 
179 See Miller (2002). 
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of  existence)180. Yet, how could Socrates' element individuate Socrates' existence, even without 
having any kind of  independent actuality (or existence)? Miller admits that Socrates' instance of  
existence was not borne by Socrates in the same way as every other property of  Socrates'. 
Socrates' instance of  existence was bounded by Socrates181. Yet, it seems to me that this relation is 
far from being clear: perhaps it did not involve Socrates qua individual, but Socrates' element. If  
one were not an actualist and a presentist (i.e., if  one admitted that objects have properties 
independently of  their existence and of  their existence at some time), it would be less complicate 
to defend Miller's account182.  
 What about (8), (12) and (13)? At first, Miller clarifies that there is no negative property 
of  non-existing: when we claim that something does not exist, we simply deny that it is true that 
that thing exists. We deny the truth of  a proposition. Thus, we do not have to use any negative 
property183. However, what does "Sherlock Holmes" refer to? Miller claims that Sherlock Holmes 
is a fictional character, i.e., a collection of  properties (that can include inconsistent properties, 
namely conjunctions of  positive and corresponding negative properties, and that can be 
indeterminate in respect to some property)184. A collection of  properties is not a set of  
properties, since it does not depend for its identity on its members: one can add, subtract and 
change the properties within a collection, even accepting that that collection is still identical with 
itself. Thus, we can interpret (13) by claiming that "Sherlock Holmes" refers to a collection of  
properties. Furthermore, we can claim that (12) expresses a true proposition since the property 
of  being a detective is one of  the properties within Sherlock Holmes' collection. However, first, 
Sherlock Holmes as a fictional object and Sherlock Holmes as a collection have different 
properties, at least within intensional contexts. One could ask: if  Miller’s account is correct, what 
do we think of  when we think of  Sherlock Holmes as a fictional object? This account seems not 
to resist the objections that I have already made against the Neo-Russellian accounts. Secondly, it 
seems to me that the identity conditions for collections of  properties are not clear at all.  
 
 
 
                                                 
180 See, for example, Miller (2002): 95-99. 
181 See Miller (2002): 103. 
182 Following Geach, Miller tries to interpret Aquinas' thesis concerning the real distinction between essence and 
existence. Yet, it is far from being clear that our notion of existence is identical with Aquinas' notion of actus essendi. 
Furthermore, the author wishes to maintain that objects cannot have properties (nor essences) without existing, so 
that existence should be interpreted as a unique property. This seems to be guaranteed by Aquinas' metaphysics. 
However, one could argue that, at least with regard to some properties (those that are existence-entailing), existence 
is a unique property and that non-existent objects have some other kind of being (ens commune, for example) or no 
being at all.  
183 See Miller (1986): 255-258. 
184 See Miller (1985). 
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I.3. The Importance of Being (Non-)Existent 
In this chapter, I shall investigate the ontological status of  seemingly non-existent objects and I 
shall deal with some problems and some theories concerning them. It seems that there are many 
kinds of  seemingly non-existent objects, at least in accordance with different concepts of  
existence and different kinds of  ontological commitment. For example, accepting nominalistic 
theories of  universals, universals can be considered non-existent objects. Furthermore, if  one 
considers existence equivalent to concreteness, mathematical objects (numbers, geometrical 
figures) do not exist, even though one might nevertheless accept that there are such objects. 
 However, I shall concentrate here on one kind of  non-existent objects: fictional objects. 
In fact, it is widely accepted that, if  there are such objects (i.e., if  they can be adequately 
considered objects), there is at least one sense of  existence according to which they do not exist. 
Recalling the propositions expressed by 
 
(8) Sherlock Holmes does not exist 
 
and 
 
(13) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character, 
 
it seems legitimate to ask whether there are fictional objects that make the propositions expressed 
by such statements true or not (provided that something else could make them true). 
Furthermore, if  there are such objects, are they necessarily non-existent? Namely: could it be the 
case that some existent object turns out to be identical with Sherlock Holmes? Fictional objects 
seem to be somehow dependent on their creators, i.e., on their authors. The proposition 
expressed by 
 
(33) Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' creator 
 
seems to be true, even if  the relation of  being some fictional object's creator is far from being 
clear. First, what does this relation imply with regard to Sherlock Holmes' ontological status? 
Secondly, is this a necessary or a contingent relation between Sherlock Holmes and Conan 
Doyle? Namely: could Sherlock Holmes have had a different creator? However, modal problems 
concerning non-existent objects can be only mentioned here, since I shall deal with them in the 
next chapter. Fictional objects can be killed off  and resurrected by their creators, as it happened 
in Sherlock Holmes' case: 
 
(34) Conan Doyle killed off  Sherlock Holmes; 
 
(35) Conan Doyle resurrected Sherlock Holmes. 
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 Yet, it seems that only living, existing objects can be killed off  and (perhaps!) resurrected. 
Furthermore, if  we take (34) and (35) non-metaphorically, non-existent objects could have 
intermittent existence. 
 Finally, Sherlock Holmes is the protagonist of  many stories written by Conan Doyle. 
Namely,  
 
(36) Conan Doyle is the author of  Sherlock Holmes' stories 
 
seems to express a true proposition. Yet, as regards the relation of  being some fictional story's 
author, it seems legitimate to ask the same aforementioned questions connected to the relation of  
being some fictional object's creator. With regard to other features of  fictional objects, we have 
already noticed that such objects always seem to be incomplete and that they sometimes seem to 
be impossible. This seems to be problematic, since it implies that the laws of  bivalence, of  
excluded middle and of  non-contradiction do not hold for every object. 
 When we read Sherlock Holmes' stories, we all believe that Sherlock Holmes does not 
exist and that he is somehow bounded to his stories. Yet, there are fictional objects that are not 
story-bounded and/or that are believed to exist, even though they do not exist. For example, 
Greeks believed that mythical gods such as Apollo existed. Furthermore, we do not believe that 
Santa Claus exists, even if  he is not explicitly bounded to any story. Thus, what does the relation 
of  story-boundedness amount to? And what is a story?  
 Furthermore, partly following A. Voltolini's list of  sentences involving fictional objects185, 
we can individuate, at first, internal fictional sentences (and the corresponding propositions), 
such as  
 
(12) Sherlock Holmes is a detective 
 
and  
 
(37) Sherlock Holmes exists, 
 
that seem to express true propositions at least in some story, even though, as we have already 
noticed, they express false propositions outside stories. There are problematic true internal 
fictional sentences, that seem to imply the migration of  real objects to fictional stories:  
 
(38) Sherlock Holmes lives in London; 
 
(39) Sherlock Holmes had a tea with Gladstone. 
 
 On the one hand, it seems that Conan Doyle refers to the real London and to the real 
                                                 
185 See Voltolini (2006): 127-186. 
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Lord Gladstone when he talks of  them in his stories. On the other hand, the real London and the 
real Lord Gladstone do not have the properties of  having been inhabited by and of  having had a 
tea with Sherlock Holmes. Thus, by the law of  the indiscernibility of  identicals, they cannot be 
identical with London and Lord Gladstone in Conan Doyle’s stories. 
 Internal fictional sentences should be distinguished from internal metafictional sentences, 
such as 
 
(40) in The Hound of  the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
 
 Internal fictional and metafictional sentences can be explicit (they can be present in the 
list of  a story's sentences) or implicit (they can be deduced by that list). For example, 
 
(41) in The Hound of  the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is English 
 
seems to express a true proposition, even though Conan Doyle (perhaps) does not explicitly 
claim that Sherlock Holmes is English. Are such inferences acceptable? And to what extent are 
they acceptable? There are also mixed sentences, such as the one expressed by 
 
(42) although Sherlock Holmes is a detective, he is a fictional character. 
 
 Finally, there are sentences in which fictional objects are considered independently of  
their stories. These are external metafictional sentences. For example, (8), (13), (33)-(35) can be 
classified into this category. Other examples of  such sentences are 
 
(43) Sherlock Holmes is more intelligent than Emma Bovary; 
 
(44) Sherlock Holmes is more beloved than Darth Vader; 
 
(45) John admires Sherlock Holmes; 
 
(46) Conan Doyle died some years after Sherlock Holmes; 
 
(47) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective; 
 
(48) Sherlock Holmes is still the paradigmatic detective character; 
 
(49) Ulysses inspired both Dante Alighieri and James Joyce; 
 
(50) the Faust of  Goethe's Faust is an aspect of  Faust itself; 
 
(51) the Sherlock Holmes of  The Hound of  the Baskervilles is the same as the Sherlock Holmes of  
A Study in Scarlet; 
 
(52) the Sherlock Holmes of  Conan Doyle's stories is the same as the Sherlock Holmes of  a 
recent movie directed by Guy Ritchie; 
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(53) in Hamlet, Gonzago is a fictional character, 
 
since The Murder of  Gonzago is a story within the story Hamlet. 
 In particular, in order to justify the truth of  the propositions expressed by (51) and (52), it 
seems necessary to define a criterion of  identity for fictional objects. J. L. Borges, for example, 
imagined a fictional character which had all the properties of  Cervantes' Don Quixote but which 
was created by another (fictional) author, Pierre Menard. Are Cervantes' Don Quixote and Pierre 
Menard's Sherlock Holmes identical or not? Are they the same fictional object?  
 In general, a complete theory of  fictional objects needs to define and justify the truth-
value of  the propositions expressed by all the aforementioned examples of  sentences.  
 
I.3.1. Taking Fictional Objects (too) Seriously: Meinongian Theories. 
I cannot analyze all the Meinongian interpretations of  the statements that I have mentioned. In 
this section, I shall only focus on the ontological status of  stories (and on the subsequent 
problem of  the identification of  fictional objects across different stories), on the relation of  
authorship, on comparative propositions, such as the ones expressed by (43), (44), (47), and on 
the relations between real objects and fictional ones, such as the relations paradigmatically 
expressed by (38) and (39).  
 In fact, we have already seen (at least in part) what is, according to Meinongian theories, 
for an object to be fictional and what is for it not to exist and instantiate some property. It is quite 
easy to understand the different interpretations given by the three versions of  Meinongianism to 
many of  the aforementioned statements. Yet, what about stories? In a recent paper186, Zalta 
defines stories and fictional characters as follows: a story is a situation (i.e., an abstract object that 
encodes propositional properties) that is authored by some existing object. Thus, stories are 
individuated in virtue of  their encoded propositional properties. When we assert that a 
proposition is fictional in a story, we assert that that proposition is implied by that story, i.e., that 
that story has a propositional property that corresponds to that proposition. By definition, a 
character of  a story is an object that encodes some property that is implied by the story. There 
are characters that originate in stories and characters that do not originate in them. A character 
that originates in a story is an abstract object that is a character of  that story and that is not a 
character of  any earlier story. Thus, a fictional character is a character that originates in some 
story. In Zalta's terms, we could claim that a fictional character encodes all and only the 
properties that it exemplifies according to the story. The difference between (12) and (40) lies in 
the fact that, according to (12), the abstract object Sherlock Holmes encodes the property of  
                                                 
186 See Zalta (2000). 
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being a detective while, according to (40), he exemplifies that property according to the story The 
Hound of  the Baskervilles in which he originates. Yet, it might be noticed that Sherlock Holmes 
does not originate in The Hound of  the Baskervilles, but in A Study in Scarlet.  Thus, he encodes all 
the properties that he exemplifies according to A Study in Scarlet. Sherlock Holmes is a fictional 
character in The Hound of  the Baskerville, but he is a fictional character that originates in A Study in 
Scarlet. However, this (partly) new version of  Zalta's theory does not explain how it is possible 
that one and the same object both encodes the properties it exemplifies according to two 
different stories without being contradictory (it could happen that that object encodes 
incompatible properties according to those stories). We could try to widen the story operator, in 
order to consider Sherlock Holmes' originating stories all the stories authored by Conan Doyle 
about Sherlock Holmes, but there would remain the problem of  understanding whether or not 
one and the same Sherlock Holmes (Conan Doyle's one) encodes all the properties he 
exemplifies according to stories not authored by Conan Doyle. If  the answer to this latter 
question were positive, then Sherlock Holmes would probably encode contradictory properties 
or, at best, he would encode too many properties (all the properties ascribed to him by several 
stories): depending on stories, he could be a gardener, a cook, a taxi driver, and so on. If  the 
answer were negative, then there would be many Sherlock Holmes and we would have to deal 
with the problems of  identification already considered in the last chapter. In sum, one could try 
to deal with (51) in Zalta's terms by widening the story, but it seems to me difficult to deal with 
(52). Furthermore, if  there are no definite identity conditions for fictional objects across different 
stories and if  stories are abstract objects that encode propositional properties, it is possible to ask 
if  it is truly necessary to admit that there are fictional objects. In fact, an anti-Meinongian could 
notice that, once we admit that stories are not real (i.e., that they perhaps do not exemplify the 
property of  reporting real facts), stories could do all the work that fictional objects are supposed 
to do. This seems to be one of  the major arguments in favor of  a make-believe theory of  
fictional objects. 
 With regard to the other Meinongian theories, Routley claims that a fiction is an authored 
discourse or communication consisting of  imagined or invented statements or narrative, which 
conveys a story, as contrasted with factual or reportative discourse, and which is about fictional 
items187. A work of  fiction defines a world of  fiction, which has some structural requirements 
(e.g., it should be as coherent as possible) and which does not have many requirements of  other 
worlds, e.g. modal worlds (it is not complete and it might be impossible). This world does not 
only include what is true according to the author "sayso", but it requires some formal and 
                                                 
187 See Routley (1979): 539. 
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material additions too. It seems to me that this distinction is a good one: by claiming that 
Sherlock Holmes has some properties in a story, we do not claim that it has some properties in a 
set of  sentences (provided that a story can be considered a set of  sentences), but within a world 
(or a context) which is determined by those sentences and which is somehow different from our 
world. Fictional objects are characterized by the properties they have in these worlds. Yet, how 
can it be possible to identify a fictional object across different worlds? Routley replies that it is 
necessary to consider the author's sayso and, in particular, a core of  features uniquely identifying 
that fictional object188. Sherlock Holmes, in virtue of  such core features, is one and the same 
object in many worlds and in the actual world too (since it is possible to claim, for example, that 
Sherlock Holmes, in the actual world, does not have extra-nuclear existence). Yet, let me assume 
that the core of  features includes three properties: the property of  living in Baker Street 221B, 
London, of  being a detective and of  having a friend named Watson. If  in a fictional world w1 
Sherlock Holmes is a detective who lives in Baker Street 221B, London (but he does not have a 
friend named Watson), in a fictional world w2 he is a detective who has a friend named Watson 
(but he does not live in Baker Street 221B, London) and in a fictional world w3 he lives in Baker 
Street 221B, London, and he has a friend named Watson (but he is not a detective), would we 
claim that we are talking of  one and the same fictional character or not? There are strong 
intuitions in favor of  the first hypothesis, even if  the properties of  the core seem not to identify 
Sherlock Holmes across such three fictional worlds189.  
 Concerning Priest's and Berto's accounts, we have already noticed in the last chapter that, 
according to them, there is no one-one correspondence between stories and possible worlds. On 
the one hand, their solution justifies the re-identification of  fictional objects across worlds. Yet, 
on the other hand, it might be preferable to maintain that each story (even a large one, such as 
the story constituted by Conan Doyle's stories) defines a world. These latter worlds do not have 
to be complete, such as modal worlds, while the acceptance of  the completeness assumption 
seems to be the reason for which they deny that one-one correspondence. 
 There are at least two different ways for Meinongians to deal with the authorship relation. 
One the one hand, Priest argues that fictional objects are inhabitants of  other possible worlds, 
that exist in those worlds with all their properties and that authors only fix the reference to such 
objects by their names, by telling stories about them190. Sherlock Holmes, for example, lives in all 
the worlds in which Conan Doyle's stories are realized, but such worlds are not properly created 
by Conan Doyle. On the other hand, Castañeda claims that fictional objects are created (at least 
                                                 
188 See Routley (1979): 593-594. 
189 For another problem concerning Routley’s account, see Paolini Paoletti (2013). 
190 See Priest (2005): 118-121. 
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in some sense) by their authors by putting some individual guises together (e.g., the detective who 
lives in Baker Street) and by giving them some properties. Yet, such individual guises preexist as 
possible objects of  thought, i.e., as possible referents of  definite descriptions within some 
linguistic framework191. Thus, according to Meinongians, there is at least something, within the 
constitution of  fictional objects, that is not created. Yet, it is not clear how it is possible to assert, 
within such a theory, that (34) and (35) express true propositions: Sherlock Holmes can neither 
die, nor resurrect. What about the possible destruction of  all the literary works about Sherlock 
Holmes and of  every memory connected with this character? Priest could argue that, in such 
cases, the name "Sherlock Holmes" would not refer, because this name would have stopped 
existing. Yet, if  someone else used another name in order to pick out an object with the same 
properties ascribed to Sherlock Holmes, would Sherlock Holmes have been resurrected or not? 
Facing such problems, Meinongians might continue denying that fictional objects are neither 
created, nor killed off, nor resurrected. Yet, no explanation would have been given for the 
apparent truth of  the propositions expressed by (33)-(35). Following Castañeda, a Meinongian 
could argue that such objects are created by putting different properties together. This seems to 
be intuitively true. Yet, extending the analysis beyond Castañeda's account (which is not purely 
Meinongian), there would nevertheless be problems for this position. For example: would there 
be anything true about fictional objects before their supposed creation? Are fictional round 
squares impossible objects, even before people put together the properties of  being a square and 
of  being round in order to create them? If  the answers were positive, then creation would simply 
amount to something like what is suggested by Priest. If  the answers were negative, then such 
objects’ Sosein would depend on their Sein: they would not be round, for example, before their 
creation, i.e., (intuitively) before acquiring some being. I shall try to solve this problem in the 
second part of  this work. 
 Before dealing with the third problem I have mentioned (the comparison between 
objects), it seems to me interesting to deal with the fourth one, i.e., the relation between real and 
fictional objects. In this case, Meinongians can assert, following Zalta, that real objects do not 
encode properties and that there are real objects' blueprints (such as Lord Gladstone in Conan 
Doyle's stories) that encode all the properties exemplified by their correlated real objects, or at 
least some of  them. Yet, Lord Gladstone's blueprint might not encode, within Conan Doyle's 
stories, properties exemplified by his real correlate: in such a case, Lord Gladstone would turn 
out to have too many properties, since he would encode both the properties exemplified by his 
real correlates (but not explicitly encoded according to the stories) and the properties attributed 
                                                 
191 See Castañeda (1979), in Castañeda (1989): 192. 
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to them within the stories. This object would turn out to be, if  not an impossible one (both 
encoding and not encoding some properties), at least problematic with regard to its consistency. 
Yet, there seems to be nothing problematic in Lord Gladstone when we think of  him within 
Conan Doyle's stories. If  Lord Gladstone's blueprint encoded just some properties exemplified 
by his correlate, it would be difficult, as we have already seen, to individuate his core features and 
to maintain this core across different fictional contexts (or different fictional works). 
 On the other hand, Meinongians could argue that, dealing with propositions such as the 
one expressed by (39), we refer to the real Lord Gladstone. Yet, the real Lord Gladstone does not 
stand in the relation of  having taken a tea with Sherlock Holmes, roughly because rules 
governing relations between real objects cannot be applied to fictional objects, as it is argued by 
Routley and Parsons192. Yet, if  not ad hoc, such strategies seem to presuppose the negation of  the 
principle according to which, when we think of  properties as attributed to fictional and real 
objects, such properties work in the same way. It seems to me that the best solution has been 
suggested by Priest and Berto: according to them, some real object stands in some relation (at 
least in some existing-entailing relation) with some fictional one in all those worlds where they 
both exist. 
 Finally, what about comparisons involving fictional objects? Roughly, Zalta claims that 
such comparisons do not involve blueprints and correlates, but real and fictional objects as such. 
For example, with regard to (43), he argues that there is a degree of  intelligence that Sherlock 
Holmes encodes and another degree of  intelligence that Emma Bovary encodes and that the first 
degree of  intelligence is greater than the second one193. Introducing worlds, world-centered 
Meinongianists follow a similar path194. However, comparisons between degrees of  intelligence 
are based on what happens in the real world. Thus, Emma Bovary and Sherlock Holmes would 
be comparable in such a way only according to the laws of  our world. Yet, they do not exist in 
our world! Even in this case, world-centered Meinongianists, by selecting those worlds in which 
there are rules similar to the ones of  the real world, seem to develop a better strategy.  
 
I.3.2. Make-Believing that Conan Doyle is right (Walton, Currie and Wolterstorff's kinds). 
K. Walton's theory of  make-believe is one of  the most remarkable and complete theories of  
fiction. In order to understand what is for something to be a fiction and what distinguishes 
                                                 
192 Parsons, for example, introduces functions that transform relational predicates into non-relational ones. He also 
suggests that we can consider the property of having taken a tea with Lord Gladstone, that is attributed to Sherlock 
Holmes, as an unanalyzable one. See Parsons (1980). Routley, on the other hand, argues that we do not have to use, 
in the case of Sherlock Holmes and London, the rules that govern the conversion between active and passive 
relational sentences. See, for example, Routley (1979): 579-588. 
193 See Zalta (2000). 
194 See, for example, Berto (2008), (2011). 
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fiction from non-fiction, Walton introduces the key-concept of  make-believe games: roughly, 
whenever we deal with fiction, we take part in such games and, following some rules  that are 
given by certain elements of  reality (the props), we make-believe that something is the case. At 
first, Walton considers fictionality a property of  propositions: to claim that p is fictional amounts 
to claim that, within some fictional world, it is true that p195. Fictional worlds are sets of  
propositions as indicated by a given work (or by a game of  make-believe or a dream or a 
daydream). They are associated with clusters of  fictional truths (since the fact that a proposition 
is fictional is a fictional truth) and they are distinct from possible worlds because they are usually 
incomplete and sometimes impossible196. Thus, what is fictional is fictional in a given world, the 
world of  a game of  make-believe. Yet, it seems to me different to claim that some proposition is 
true within a world of  a game of  make-believe and that the same proposition is fictional in the 
same world. That proposition is simply true in that world: considered from an external point of  
view, that proposition is a fictional truth and it is one of  the fictional truths that are associated 
with that world. However, considered within that world, p is not fictional: p is true in that world.  
 Yet, this is only a preliminary sketch of  Walton's theory, since he does not aim at using 
the concepts of  fictional proposition and of  fictional world as basic elements of  his account of  
make-believe. The concept of  make-believe (and all the other concepts associated with it, such as 
the concept of  game of  make-believe) seems to be a primitive one. It seems to be grounded on 
the phenomenology of  imaginative and aesthetic experience. As I have already noticed, games of  
make-believe have rules, that are introduced by their props. A prop is a generator of  fictional 
truths, since it introduces what is mandatory in an imaginative experience. Props generate 
fictional truths independently of  particular (actual) imaginers. Yet, they do not work without any 
actual or potential imaginer. Furthermore, they function within social settings (e.g., within 
linguistic conventions). Thus, these features of  props seem to give some peculiar features to 
make-believe too: objectivity, control, possibility of  joint participation, spontaneity, a certain 
freedom from the constraints of  the real world197. A literary work can be considered a prop: it 
introduces what is mandatory within a game of  make-believe, by introducing some principles of  
generations, i.e., some conditional rules according to which, given the existence and the features 
of  the prop, people should make-believe that something is the case. Since props prescribe both 
propositional and non-propositional imaginings, fictionality cannot be just considered a property 
of  propositions. Furthermore, Walton adds that, in some cases (e.g., dreams), we could have 
                                                 
195 See Walton (1990): 35. 
196 See Walton (1990): 67-69. 
197 See Walton (1990): 68. 
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fictionality without props198.  
 Thus, restricting our examination to works of  fiction, what is fictional in a certain work is 
what is fictional in every game of  make-believe where that work serves as prop and whose 
fictionality is generated by that work alone199. Literary works seem to generate authorized games 
of  make-believe, i.e., games of  make-believe that follow acceptable rules (at least, with regard to 
what is claimed in those works)200. In order to deal with the semantics of  empty names (such as 
"Sherlock Holmes") and in order to deny that they refer, Walton does not talk of  fictional 
propositions anymore: he talks of  statements that appear to refer to fictional entities, such as the 
ones mentioned in our examples. In order to deal with statements such as (12) and (37), Walton 
uses the concepts of  authorized game and of  pretense and he must refer to some work of  fiction 
(for the sake of  the argument, Conan Doyle's stories). Thus, this is Walton's interpretation of  
(12): 
 
(12walton) Conan Doyle's stories are such that one who engages in pretense of  kind K (i.e., in a 
certain relevant kind of  pretense) in a game authorized for it makes it fictional of  himself/herself  
in that game that he speaks truly when s/he states that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
 
 And the same seems to happen with (37)201. With regard to (8) and (13), the situation is a 
little bit more complicated. By asserting (8), one both indicates and betrays a kind of  pretending-
to-refer, possibly by engaging in or alluding to a further pretense: for example, s/he indicates and 
betrays the kind of  pretending-to-refer that is involved in (12walton) and, perhaps, s/he engages 
in a different kind of  pretending-to-refer, such as the one indicated by (13)202. On the other hand, 
if  someone says that something exists, s/he claims that to attempt to refer in a certain manner 
(e.g., the manner in which we ordinarily attempt to refer to something by a certain proper name) 
is to succeed in referring to something203. Precisely to that thing? Yes, if  in the ordinary manner we 
attempt to refer to precisely that thing. However, we have already seen the problems of  
metalinguistic analyses of  existential statements. By statements such as (13), at least if  we pretend 
to refer to purely fictional characters, we acknowledge, while betraying the pretense, that there is a 
work in whose authorized games pretending to refer by those empty names is fictionally to refer 
successfully204. A similar betrayal might be expressed (in a somehow more complicated manner) 
by (42). Furthermore, we could appeal to works of  fiction and to similar pretenses to refer in 
                                                 
198 See Walton (1990): 35-43. 
199 See Walton (1990): 60. 
200 See Walton (1990): 397-398. 
201 See Walton (1990): 400. 
202 See Walton (1990): 424. 
203 See Walton (1990): 427. 
204 See Walton (1990): 422. 
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order to deal with statements such as (36). With regard to the implicit (and fictional) truth of  
(41), it seems that it is guaranteed by two principles: the reality principle and the mutual belief  
principle. The first principle affirms that, if  the fictionality of  some propositions is directly 
generated by some representation, another proposition p is fictional iff, were the former 
propositions true, then it would be the case that p. The second principle affirms that the 
fictionality of  some propositions (generated by some representation) implies the fictionality of  a 
proposition p iff  it is mutually believed in the artist's society (i.e., in the society of  the narrator, 
not of  the author) that, were the former propositions true, then p would be true205. Yet, the 
second principle seems to make too many fictional inferences valid: for example, inferences about 
cultural and religious beliefs that are not relevant to the stories. And the same thing seems to 
happen with regard to the first principle. Furthermore, it is difficult simply to ground the 
inferences on the artist’s society mentioned in the second principle: the author could introduce in 
the story his/her own beliefs, in contrast with the beliefs of  the story's narrator's society.  
 In order to deal with the other kinds of  statements, we have to talk of  unofficial games 
of  make-believe, i.e. of  games of  make-believe that are partly inspired by, but not authorized by 
works of  fiction, since some of  their principles of  generation are modified206. Among others, 
there are unofficial games that combine the games of  two different works of  fictions and 
unofficial games in which it is legitimate to assert that (33), (34) and (35). For example, even if  it 
is not literally true that Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' creator, since we cannot successfully 
refer to anything by the name "Sherlock Holmes", one who engages in an unofficial game could 
assert (33), by pretending to refer to something by the name "Sherlock Holmes" and by 
fictionally giving to Conan Doyle the property of  being that thing's creator207.  
 Furthermore, in order to deal with (47), one could invoke degrees of  fame and get 
engaged in some unofficial game. With regard to (43), one could get engaged in an unofficial 
game which is the combination of  two authorized games. Statements such as (44) and (45) are 
more difficult to interpret. Yet, one could think of  himself  as being engaged in an unofficial 
game in which he has some fictional relation with something, even though this seems highly 
counterintuitive: John seems to really admire Sherlock Holmes, even if  this relation might depend 
on getting engaged in some game of  make-believe208. On the other hand, concerning (48)-(52), it 
                                                 
205 See Walton (1990): 144-152. 
206 See, for example, Walton (1990): 407, 410. 
207 See, concerning creation, Walton (1990): 410-411. Concerning (34), see Walton (1990): 414. 
208 This point is somehow connected with Walton’s counterintuitive solution to the paradox of fiction (see Walton 
(1978)), that invokes quasi-emotions. See more in Paolini Paoletti (forthcoming). Other problems for Walton’s 
account of intentional and non-intentional relations between ficta and real objects are examined in Kroon (1994a) and 
(1994b): roughly, if one maintains that occurrences of real proper names in fictional contexts have their usual 
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is possible to simply introduce relations between works of  fiction209. Finally, what about (38) and 
(39)? There might be unofficial games of  make-believe in which what we believe about reality is 
mixed with some authorized game of  make-believe.  
 So far, so good. Yet, I think that Walton's account has at least one defect: it does not 
explain the ontological status of  games of  make-believe. Such games are not identical with works 
of  fiction. Perhaps, they can be considered mind-dependent objects, even though not private 
ones. They can be considered objects, since it is legitimate to claim something true about them 
and since they have some properties, while on the other hand they cannot be exemplified by (or 
instantiated by, or attributed to) anything else (roughly, they are not properties). They seem to be 
mind-dependent since, with regard to the relation between props and such games, we have 
already noticed that it is not possible that props generate fictional truths, if  there is no actual nor 
potential imaginer living in a social setting. Thus, in general, it seems that there cannot be games 
of  make-believe without such imaginers: there would be no game, without anyone (at least 
potentially) playing it. Yet, if  games of  make-believe can be considered mind-dependent objects 
and if  they are invoked in every statement that seemingly concerns fictional objects, such as in 
(12walton), it is not clear to me how it is possible to successfully refer to such games and not to 
successfully refer to fictional objects. In fact, if  we considered fictional objects mind-dependent, 
they would be on a pair with games of  make-believe and they would be intentionally 
distinguished from such games. In sum, why do we have to admit that there are games of  make-
believe, provided that they are mind-dependent objects, and not to admit that there are mind-
dependent fictional objects? If  Zalta does not provide adequate reasons for admitting in our 
ontology fictional objects, as distinct from stories, it seems to me that Walton does not provide 
adequate reasons for excluding them and for accepting mind-dependent games of  make-believe. 
 G. Currie's account shares many features with Walton's theory. However, it is perhaps 
more adequate with regard to the definition of  fictional works and the semantics of  fictional 
names. According to Currie, something is fictional iff  it is the product of  some fictional intent 
and, if  it is true, it is only accidentally true210. Fictionality is a property of  propositions: to claim 
that some proposition is fictional amounts to claim that it is fictional that that proposition is 
true211. Partly following Lewis, Currie adds that it is legitimate to assert that some proposition is 
fictional in a story iff  it is reasonable for the informed reader to infer that the fictional author of  
                                                                                                                                                        
reference (e.g., "Napoleon" in War and Peace refers to Napoleon), then it turns out to be difficult to make attitude 
ascriptions without invoking fictional surrogates, i.e. without committing to their existence. 
209 See Walton (1990): 414.  For a recent defense of the make-believe approach towards fiction, see Everett (2013). 
210 See Currie (1990): 45. For the definition of fictional intent, see Currie (1990): 33. 
211 See Currie (1990): 56. 
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that story believes that that proposition is true212. Concerning Sherlock Holmes' stories, for 
example, the fictional author is not Conan Doyle but, more generally, a member of  Conan 
Doyle's community (the late Victorian society). Yet, the introduction of  fictional author's beliefs 
seems not to be appropriate: what about, for example, a fictional author who lies? If  the 
informed reader finds out that the fictional author lies, i.e., that s/he does not believe that 
something is such-and-such, even if  s/he tells that thing in the story, that reader could 
nevertheless accept that the propositions expressed by the fictional author's sentences are part of  
the story.  
 However, I cannot discuss Currie's general theses about fiction to a large extent, since his 
theory of  the semantics of  fictional names seems to be more interesting and original. A fictional 
proper name is an empty name: a name that picks out a fictional character, i.e., a character that 
does not exist and that is part of  a fiction. In order to understand the use of  fictional proper 
names, it is not necessary to introduce particular individuals referred to by those names. It is 
sufficient to understand the content of  the fiction and to pick out the worlds where that content 
is realized, i.e., the worlds in which there is someone who, for example, does (and is) everything 
that Sherlock Holmes is said in the story to do (and to be) and in which everything else that is 
part of  the story is literally true. Nevertheless, in order to understand the uniqueness of  Sherlock 
Holmes, it is also necessary to postulate an authorship relation between the story and its author: 
this seems to guarantee that Cervantes' use of  the name "Don Quixote" is different from  Pierre 
Menard's use of  that name213. Thus, the fictive use of  fictional proper names, such as in (12), 
neither requires that such names properly are names, nor that they refer to fictional individuals: 
(12) does not express any independent proposition, but it is part of  a larger proposition (the one 
expressed by the content of  the whole authored story) that is fictionally true. In fact, in the 
former case, (12) would require a reference for "Sherlock Holmes" that should be independent 
of  the way in which we use that fictional proper name in other sentences. However, it seems to 
me that this solution is highly counterintuitive: if  there are two stories in which Holmes is a 
detective, why is it not legitimate to think that there is only one proposition, the one expressed by 
(12), that is a part of  the contents of  both stories? The assumption behind this thesis seems to be 
that logical constituents of  propositions need to refer to something existent, in order for those 
propositions to refer to the True or to the False. However, could it not be the case that 
propositions have logical constituents that refer to things that to do not exist (e.g., fictional 
objects) and are nevertheless true or false? In sum, by denying that there are fictional objects 
referred to by fictional proper names, it seems that we have to introduce useless complications in 
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our account.  
 Yet, there are two other uses of  fictional proper names: metafictive and transfictive ones 
(I follow here Currie's terminology). Sentence (40) is a typical metafictive sentence: it seems to 
mean that it is part of  The Hound of  the Baskervilles that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Roughly, in 
such cases, fictional proper names seem to abbreviate definite descriptions: within the worlds of  
some fiction, there is at least and at most one individual that is such-and-such (e.g., that has all or 
at least all the relevant features of  Sherlock Holmes') and that is a detective. Outside those 
worlds, there is no such thing as that individual. Thus, we have to introduce fictional operators in 
order to preserve the apparent truth of  such sentences: the fictional proper name "Sherlock 
Holmes" works like a definite description within the scope of  such operators214. Many difficulties 
surrounding this approach have already been shown. 
 Finally, Currie considers the transfictive use of  fictional proper names. We transfictively 
use a fictional proper name when we do not use it within the scope of  some fiction operator. In 
order to deal with transfictive cases, Currie uses the concept of  role: a role is an office of  some 
individual defined in terms of  what is true in a story or, better said, it is a function from worlds 
to individuals, i.e. to those individuals that occupy that role. It can be considered a theoretical, 
non-concrete entity. There are roles for all the fictional objects.  
 The identity of  fictional objects across different stories, such as the identity expressed by 
(51) and (52), can be explained in terms of  the fusion between two different stories: there is only 
one story, in which the Holmes role is enlarged in order to comprehend what is ascribed to 
Sherlock Holmes, for example, in a recent movie directed by Guy Ritchie. Fictional objects might 
turn out to be contradictory. Yet, as Currie remarks, this is not a problem: first, we can deal with 
contradictions within stories even without denying the truth of  the law of  non-contradiction; 
secondly, Holmes needs to be consistent as a person, but not as a fictional character. In other 
terms, if  it cannot be true that Holmes, as a person, is P and non-P, it can be fictionally P and 
fictionally non-P qua fictional character. However, it does not seem to me that, when one 
considers Holmes across different stories, s/he enlarges the same role, so that s/he includes 
within that role contradictory features. Sherlock Holmes, qua fictional character, should remain, if  
possible, non-contradictory within singular stories (at least if  no one explicitly ascribes to him 
contradictory properties within those stories) and across stories. If  there were an account capable 
of  preserving this intuition, it would be preferable to Currie's account. However, concerning (52), 
Currie complicates his account by claiming that roles are author-bounded. Thus, Guy Ritchie's 
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Sherlock Holmes' role seems to be different from Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes' role215. 
However, it seems to me not to be necessary to duplicate entities just in order to preserve an 
account based on roles. The limits of  such an account are best shown by the interpretation of  
(47). One could state, following Currie, that Sherlock Holmes is more famous that any fictional 
detective in virtue of  some features of  roles216. Yet, since real detectives are plausibly not identical 
with roles, one would have to affirm that (47) expresses a true proposition one of  whose 
constituents does not refer to individual detectives, but to the role of  being a real detective. This 
seems to introduce some troubles that I cannot discuss now, since I have partly discussed them in 
the previous chapter.  
 Is it possible to give a more plausible account of  roles? I shall briefly examine N. 
Wolterstorff's theory of  fictional characters. According to Wolterstorff, the task of  a fictional 
work is to project a fictional world, that obeys certain rules in its being connected with that work 
and anchored to reality217. I cannot deepen this aspect of  his theory. I shall only claim that, 
according to Wolterstorff, each work is connected to its world, i.e., to the world it projects. 
Fictional characters play some role within such works' worlds. In particular, they are not properly 
objects, but kinds, i.e., complex conjunctions of  properties that are essential in order to define 
each character. Kinds are properties218. Thus, each work's world is partly anchored to existing 
objects (e.g., existing persons, countries, and so on)219 and partly inclusive of  such kinds. In 
particular, a kind that is a component of  a state of  affairs (and a work's world is a state of  affairs) 
is such that, by definition, if  that state of  affairs occurs, it is essential for that state that an 
example of  that kind exists at some time220. 
 Thus, fictional characters are, for example, person-kinds and fictional names introduce 
them. Fictional characters exist qua kinds, but they are not exemplified in the actual world221. 
Every property attributed to fictional characters is an essential property of  their kinds. Yet, this 
seems not to be sufficient to grasp all the features of  fictional characters. Wolterstorff  adds that, 
for example, Sherlock Holmes in the Sherlock Holmes' stories is a maximal component of  those 
works' world, i.e., there is no other kind different from Sherlock Holmes in Sherlock Holmes' 
stories' world such that every property essential within the latter kind is essential within the 
former and some property essential within the former is not essential within the latter. 
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Furthermore, fictional characters' kinds are non-determinate since, given at least one property P, 
neither being P, nor being non-P is essential to them, even if  it is perhaps essential the disjunctive 
property of  being P or non-P222. 
 It seems to me that Wolterstorff's account is in trouble in identifying characters across 
different works, i.e. it is in trouble with propositions such as the ones expressed by (50)-(52). In 
fact, Wolterstorff  claims that we should distinguish, for example, the Ulysses’ character-kind (or 
the Sherlock Holmes’ one) in a certain tradition or in a certain set of  works, by individuating 
some central features of  that character, and the Ulysess-in-the-work-w’s (or the Sherlock Holmes-
in-the-work-w’s) character-kind: the former is not a maximal component of  work w's world, while 
the latter is a maximal component of  it and included in the former223. This theory does not seem 
to resist the objection I have made against Routley's theory of  fictional objects, based on 
characters that have some, but not all the essential features of  a character-kind. Furthermore, by 
claiming that all the properties of  Sherlock Holmes' kind are essential, Wolterstorff  multiplies 
entities: if  there were a solution based on only one character (or character-kind), it would be 
preferable.  
 Concerning other data and problems about the relational fictive statements, such as (38), 
(39), (43)-(45) and (47), Wolterstorff  adds that such relations are borne by fictional character-
kinds in different ways. For example, the relation of  being one of  Watson's friends turns out to 
be essential within Holmes' kind. Yet, what about the relation of  being more intelligent than 
Emma Bovary? Is it essential within Holmes' kind, even if  Holmes' stories do not tell anything 
about it? Intuitively, this option does not seem to be a good one, since every character-kind might 
have too many properties (even non-ascribed ones) essential within it. The same seems to happen 
with regard to (38), (39), (44), (45): relations turn out to be essential within character-kinds, even 
if  real objects (London or Lord Gladstone) do not stand in such relations with those 
characters224. Yet, even if  we accepted that such relations are essential within one and the same 
work's world, as it happens with (38) and (39), it is highly difficult to accept that they are essential 
in all the other cases. For example, would the Sherlock-Holmes' character-kind that has the 
relation of  being more intelligent than Emma Bovary be the same character-kind that is 
exemplified within Conan Doyle's stories' world, even if  no such relation is ascribed to Sherlock 
Holmes within that world?  
 Finally, concerning (38) and (39), one character might occur historically or mythically or 
fictionally within the same story or within different stories. For example, it seems that Napoleon 
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occurs historically in War and Peace. However, according to Wolterstorff, to claim that such 
characters occur in different ways mostly amounts to claim that they are different characters225. 
Thus, does Lord Gladstone in (38) (and in Conan Doyle's stories) occur historically or fictionally? 
Do we have a character-kind or a real entity that historically occurs within a work of  fiction? I do 
not know how Wolterstorff  could answer.  
 
I.3.3. Nothing More than Artifacts (Thomasson). 
One of  the most discussed recent theories of  fictional objects is A. Thomasson's artifactualism. 
Roughly, Thomasson thinks that, in order to explain the existence and identity conditions of  
fictional objects (provided that there are such objects), we have to deal with two intuitions. First, 
fictional objects seem to depend on the particular (mental and physical) creative acts of  their 
authors: if  there were no particular creative acts of  Conan Doyle's, such as his thinking of  a 
detective with certain features and his writing books about him, there would perhaps have not 
existed a particular fictional object such as Sherlock Holmes. Secondly, in order to continue to 
exist, fictional objects seem to depend on the existence of  fictional works about them226.  
 Fictional objects are abstract artifacts: they are artifacts, since they depend on some 
creative act in order to exist; they are abstract, since they lack spatio-temporal location. Yet, after 
their coming into existence, i.e., after their creation, they cannot be considered Meinongian non-
existent objects: they simply exist, even if  they lack concreteness (provided that something is 
concrete iff  it has spatio-temporal location). Concerning their existence conditions, fictional 
objects (or entities, as Thomasson calls them) rigidly historically depend on the intentional 
creative acts of  their author(s) and generically constantly depend on some literary work227. Some 
entity constantly depends on some other entity iff, necessarily, the former entity's existence 
requires the latter entity's existence at every time at which the former entity exists. On the other 
hand, some entity historically depends on some other entity iff, necessarily, the former entity's 
existence requires the latter entity's existence at some time prior to or coincident with every time 
at which the former entity exists. Furthermore, some entity rigidly depends on some other entity 
iff  it is necessary that, whenever the former entity exists, the latter entity exists too. Finally, some 
entity generically depends on some other entity of  a certain kind K iff, necessarily, whenever the 
former entity exists, some other entity of  kind K exists too228. 
 Thus, considering Sherlock Holmes qua abstract artifact, he rigidly historically depends on 
Conan Doyle's creative acts: if  those acts had not existed, then Sherlock Holmes would have not 
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existed. Yet, Sherlock Holmes does not remain in existence as long as those acts exist: Conan 
Doyle and his creative acts have died, but Sherlock Holmes still exists. In fact, Sherlock Holmes 
constantly generically depends for his existence on fictional works about him, i.e., he exists as 
long as there exists at least one copy (or one memory) of  Sherlock Holmes' stories (i.e., one copy 
of  a certain kind of  literary work). This seems to justify the truth of  the propositions expressed 
by (13), (33) and (36). However, it seems that Conan Doyle cannot kill off  Sherlock Holmes and 
resurrect him: one might properly kill off  a fictional object not only by writing a story in which 
Sherlock Holmes dies, but by destroying all the copies (and memories) of  fictional works about 
him. However, in this case, would it be possible to resurrect Sherlock Holmes? After this 
destruction, another author could create another object with all the properties of  Sherlock 
Holmes'. Would this latter character be identical with the old Sherlock Holmes? No, he would 
not, at least following Thomasson's account. Yet, he would have all the properties of  the old 
Sherlock Holmes'! This seems to be an interesting problem for every artifactualist account. 
Perhaps, the case I have outlined is not quite plausible: it might be really difficult to meet another 
author creating by coincidence another exactly similar fictional character. Yet, it is not impossible 
and, since the artifactualist account is expressed in modal terms, it has to deal with every possible 
situation involving fictional objects. Furthermore, Voltolini adds that, if  Shakespeare had written 
Hamlet some years after his date of  creation, Hamlet, qua fictional object, would have been 
dependent on another creative act. Hence, he would have been a different fictional character229.  
 However, before dealing with the identity conditions for fictional objects within and 
across different works, it seems necessary to deal with Sherlock Holmes' non-existence, as it is 
expressed by (8). Like van Inwagen, Thomasson has to recognize that fictional objects, qua 
abstract artifacts, exist, namely that (8) expresses a false proposition. According to Thomasson, 
given a proper name such as "Sherlock Holmes", the proposition expressed by (8) might turn out 
to be true iff  there is an erroneous use of  "Sherlock Holmes" in order to refer to an entity of  a 
certain ontological kind K and that use is then recognized as erroneous, since that entity does not 
belong to K. For example, I might have erroneously used "Sherlock Holmes" in order to refer to 
a concrete object, and then I might have recognized that Sherlock Holmes (the entity to which I 
meant to refer) is not a concrete object230. Sainsbury has criticized this thesis by claiming that 
"Sherlock Holmes" has no referent, when I tell a story about him231. Yet, it might be possible to 
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maintain that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional object, that "Sherlock Holmes" refers to that object 
and that, nevertheless, Thomasson's thesis is false. In fact, it seems that her account does not 
work with every ontological kind K: if  I claimed that Sherlock Holmes is a man, but then I 
recognized that he is a frog, I would not have to claim that Sherlock Holmes does not exist in 
order to deny my previous erroneous use of  his proper name. Thus, there are kinds whose 
members are concrete objects (e.g., frogs and humans) and Thomasson’s strategy does not work 
when we consider two of  such kinds. On the other hand, there are kinds whose members are not 
concrete (e.g., fictional objects). Thus, if  we recognize that (8) is meaningful as long as it 
expresses the negative state of  affairs of  Sherlock Holmes' non-being concrete, there is no need 
to introduce any previously-erroneous-then-recognized-as-erroneous use: by claiming (8), we 
simply claim that Sherlock Holmes is not concrete. Is it necessary to claim that Sherlock Holmes 
exists qua fictional, i.e., abstract entity, even if  he does not exist, i.e., he is not concrete? No, it is 
not, since there is no need to attribute to fictional objects any kind of  being nor existence, as I 
shall try to argue in the second part of  this work232.  
 Concerning the identity of  fictional characters, Thomasson claims that two fictional 
characters are identical if  they both appear in the same fictional work and exactly the same 
properties are attributed to them within that work233. Yet, even if  the author declares that 
properties are attributed to fictional objects within fictional works, the ontological status of  
attribution is still not clear: it cannot be identical with ordinary instantiation of  properties, since, 
in this latter case, Sherlock Holmes would both be and not be a detective. Perhaps, it might be 
better to think of  attribution as a relation between literary works, fictional objects and properties 
(as it is thought of  by van Inwagen234): some literary work attributes to Sherlock Holmes the 
property of  being a detective. However, Thomasson adds one necessary condition for the 
identity of  fictional objects, which turns out to solve the problem of  identification across 
fictional works: some fictional character x in a literary work K and some fictional character y in a 
literary work L are identical only if  the author of  L is competently acquainted with x of  K and 
intend to import x into L as y235. The author of  L is competently acquainted with x of  K 
whenever s/he is a competent user of  the name of  x, provided that x is named. Thus, it might 
happen that the author uses the name of  the fictional character, but s/he does not want to 
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import it into the new literary work. In this case, we would have two different fictional characters. 
It is easy to show that both (51) and (52) express true propositions, since Conan Doyle and Guy 
Ritchie are both competently acquainted with Sherlock Holmes and they wish to import him into 
their works.  
 However, it seems to me that this theory turns out to be problematic in at least two 
different cases. First, let us imagine a situation in which the author of  L is competently 
acquainted with x of  K, but s/he attributes to y in L properties that are completely different from 
the ones attributed to x within K and attributes to y the negation of  these latter properties: there 
might be a literary work L where a fictional character named "Sherlock Holmes" is a rapper who 
lives in New York. The author of  L is competently acquainted with Sherlock Holmes in A Study 
in Scarlet. Does s/he want to import Sherlock Holmes within the new literary work? It seems that 
s/he does not want to, since x and y seem to have completely different properties. Yet, if  that 
author actually wants to import the fictional character Sherlock Holmes into L, following 
Thomasson's criterion, we have a necessary condition for the identity of  such fictional characters. 
Thus, the author's intentions and competent acquaintance constitute a criterion for the identity 
of  fictional characters that seems to be too weak. In fact, it does not define any sufficient 
condition for the identity of  fictional characters. Perhaps, author's intentions should be better 
specified in order to define cases in which such intentions follow some objective rule that is 
grounded, for example, on the attribution of  some essential properties to x and y.  
 Secondly, let me consider a quite similar case to the one examined with regard to the 
resurrection of  fictional characters: the author of  L is not acquainted at all with x in K and she 
does not want to import it into L, but she produces a fictional character y in L that is very similar 
to x in K, perhaps by using the same name. Following Thomasson's criterion, y is different from 
x. Yet, on the other hand, it seems that they are the same character or that, at least, they are much 
more similar than Guy Ritchie's Sherlock Holmes and Conan Doyle's one, that are the same 
fictional character in Thomasson's perspective.  
 However, the artifactualist theory, by admitting that there exist fictional objects, seems to 
deal in some better way with propositions such as the ones expressed by (44), (45), (47)-(49). On 
the other hand, Thomasson does not investigate the difference between attribution and 
instantiation and she uses fictional works' operators in order to deal with (38) and (39), thus 
having all the aforementioned problems involved by the use of  such operators236. 
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I.3.4. Holmesque Syncretism (Voltolini). 
Before concluding this chapter, it is appropriate to briefly examine A. Voltolini's syncretistic 
theory. Voltolini tries to combine elements from Meinongian, artifactualist and pretense/make-
believe theories in order to give a complete account of  the ontology of  fictional objects and of  
the semantics of  fictional statements. According to Voltolini, fictional objects are abstract and 
existent. They exist because they are part of  the necessary conditions for the identity of  fictional 
works: since fictional works exist and have definite identity conditions, fictional objects must exist 
and have definite identity conditions too237. A make-believe process-type (that is part of  a story-
telling process-type) is a necessary condition for the existence of  an abstract object (i.e., fictional 
objects generically and historically depend for their existence on story-telling processes), while a 
set of  properties is a necessary condition for its identity. Put together, these two conditions 
constitute a sufficient and necessary condition for the identity of  two fictional objects: fictional 
objects x and y are identical iff  they share both the same make-believe process-type and the same 
property set, since that process-type and that set literally constitute those objects238. A fictum is 
"the outcome of  an operation: the result of  taking the make-believe process-type as regarding a 
certain property set"239. Thus, in Menard's case, there is no single fictional object, but there are 
two different ficta, since they are constituted by two different make-believe process-types. 
 Concerning (33), one could claim that, in Voltolini's perspective, Conan Doyle is Sherlock 
Holmes' creator since a make-believe process-type depending on Conan Doyle is a necessary 
condition for Sherlock Holmes' existence. What about the idea that there might be, in another 
possible world, a fictional object provided with all Sherlock Holmes' properties, created by an 
author different from Conan Doyle? In this case, since the make-believe process-type is different 
(following Voltolini, the two processes are not causally-related, even if  they imply the same make-
believe instructions, hence they are not tokens of  the same make-believe process-type240), this 
latter Sherlock Holmes is different from the former one. On the other hand, if  one denies the 
necessity of  origins thesis concerning transworld identity, it seems legitimate to assert that they 
are trans-worldly identical. 
 Concerning (52), Voltolini seems to admit that a movie about Sherlock Holmes and his 
stories, even when they involve causally related make-believe process-tokens, do not have the 
same make-believe instructions, hence they do not imply the existence of  two different process-
tokens of  one and the same process-type. However, these two different make-believe process-
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types take part in the constitution of  a larger Sherlock Holmes character241. In fact, Guy Ritchie's 
Sherlock Holmes' make-believe process-type protracts Conan Doyle's one, thus creating one 
larger Sherlock Holmes. Thus, (52) turns out to express a literally false proposition. On the other 
hand, concerning (51), do two different stories involve two different make-believe process-types? 
On the one hand, the process-tokens involved by them might be causally related. Yet, on the 
other hand, they do not contain the same instructions. Thus, (51) would turn out to express a 
false proposition too. 
 However, developing this account, one might focus on properties and on the contrast 
between (12) and (40)242. Voltolini thinks that stories are sets of  propositions. Since stories exist 
and since they can contribute to the identity conditions of  properties, one might introduce story-
indexed properties. Thus, it is possible to imagine that there is one large Sherlock Holmes that 
has the property of  being such-and-such in the story S1. In this sense, there would be only one 
Sherlock Holmes, having properties in different stories and according to different make-believe 
process-types. In fact, if  one did not want to admit a one-one correspondence between stories 
and such process-types, s/he could nevertheless introduce properties provided with make-believe 
process-type indexes. Process-types' protractions would turn out to be useless: non-protracting 
process-types might involve Sherlock Holmes and attribute to him different (and, perhaps, 
contrasting) properties.  
 In other parts of  his book, Voltolini examines almost all the statements I have mentioned 
in the first section of  this chapter. He thinks, for example, that there are no concrete immigrant 
objects. Hence, roughly, Sherlock Holmes' London and Sherlock Holmes' tea-partner Lord 
Gladstone are different from their real correlates243. It is not possible to further discuss his 
analyses, that constitute the most detailed account of  fictional objects ever provided. I have only 
tried to demonstrate that problems do not disappear by accepting both the existence of  fictional 
objects and their dependence on make-believe process-types.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
241 See Voltolini (2006): 105. 
242 Voltolini analyzes propositions such as the one expressed by (40) in Voltolini (2006): 193-200. 
243 See Voltolini (2006): 122. See also Voltolini (2013). 
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I.4. The Times and Worlds They Are A-Changin' 
In this chapter, I shall investigate some problems concerning the connections between existence, 
modality and time. In particular, with regard to modality, I shall deal with the status of  merely 
possible non-existent objects (i.e., objects that do not exist and might have existed), of  
contingently existing objects (objects that exist and might have not existed) and fictional non-
existent objects (fictional objects that do not exist and might perhaps have existed – even though 
most philosophers, inspired by Kripke244, would deny such a possibility). With regard to time, I 
shall focus on existent objects' coming-to-existence and ceasing-to-exist and, more generally, on 
the possibility of  such existential changes245. 
 
I.4.1. There Actually Is a Problem: Noman and Some Other Problematic Guys. 
Let me imagine one particular sperm cell of  my father's and one particular ovum of  my mother's 
that do not unite in reality. If  that sperm cell had fertilized that ovum, there would have existed 
one particular individual: Noman246. It seems legitimate to accept that 
 
(54) Noman might have existed. 
 
 Furthermore, let me consider my possible non-existence, i.e., the fact that 
 
(55) I might have not existed. 
 
 Finally, with regard to some fictional object (e.g., Sherlock Holmes), one might argue that 
such an object, even if  it does not exist, might have existed, i.e., that 
 
(56) Sherlock Holmes might have existed. 
 
 (54) and (55) both seem to express true propositions or, if  we do not wish to accept that 
there are propositions, their particular tokens in this page seem to be tokens of  true sentence-
types. Yet, considered from an actualist viewpoint, according to which 
 
(actualism) there are no items that do not exist247, 
 
                                                 
244 See Kripke (1973). 
245 It is important to investigate such topics, provided that some philosophers (such as Pears (1967)) believe that, 
even if the predicate "exist" is not an informative predicate in statements such as "tame tigers exist", it nevertheless is 
informative when it is used in order to affirm the existence in other possible worlds of things that do not exist in the 
actual world and in order to affirm that something no longer exists.  
246 An analogous example is discussed by Salmon (1987), in Salmon (2005): 9. 
247 It is worth remarking in this chapter that I distinguish between actualism and modal actualism: actualism is more 
comprehensive than modal actualism, since even modal realists (who do not accept modal actualism) such as D. K. 
Lewis, as we will see, accept the thesis (actualism), that implies that there are no (purely) non-existent objects. Modal 
actualists assert that there is only one actual and real possible world, while modal realists assert that there is more 
than one real possible world and that each possible world is actual at itself. For the distinction between modal 
actualism and modal realism, see, for example, Divers (2002).  
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their truth-values might turn out to be problematic. First, let me consider (54). If  we accept that 
 
(arg.mod.I.1) the sentence-type (54) has a truth-value; 
 
(arg.mod.I.2) for every sentence-type and for every proper part of  a sentence type, if  that 
sentence-type has a truth-value and that proper part is a part of  that sentence-type, then there 
exists something to which that proper part refers; 
 
(arg.mod.I.3) "Noman" is a proper part of  the sentence-type (54), 
 
then there follows that 
 
(arg.mod.I.4) the sentence-type (54) exists and there exists something to which "Noman" refers. 
 
 The premise (arg.mod.I.2) is a combination of  the Fregean principle of  compositionality 
and of  (actualism). If  we accept this argument, then "Noman" has to refer to something existent. 
Yet, this thing cannot be Noman, since it is implied by (54) that Noman does not exist. One 
might use propositions instead of  sentence-types: 
 
(arg.mod.II.1) the sentence-type (54) expresses the proposition [Noman might have existed]; 
 
(arg.mod.II.2) the proposition [Noman might have existed] has a truth-value; 
 
(arg.mod.II.3) for every proposition and for every logical constituent of  a proposition, if  that 
proposition has a truth-value and that constituent is a logical constituent of  that proposition, 
then that proposition exists and there exists something to which that logical constituent refers;  
 
(arg.mod.II.4) if  "Noman" is a proper part of  the sentence-type (54) and the sentence-type (54) 
expresses the proposition [Noman might have existed], then [Noman] is a logical constituent of  
the proposition [Noman might have existed]; 
 
(arg.mod.II.5) "Noman" is a proper part of  the sentence-type (54); 
 
then 
 
(arg.mod.II.6) the proposition [Noman might have existed] exists and there exists something to 
which [Noman] refers. 
 
 An actualist might deny that the sentence-type (54) expresses the proposition [Noman 
might have existed]. Yet, if  we accept that there exists such a proposition and that it is expressed 
by sentence-type (54), it is possible to give another argument, based on truthmakers and that do 
not involve the principle of  compositionality: 
 
(arg.mod.III.1) the proposition [Noman might have existed] has a truth-value; 
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(arg.mod.III.2) for every proposition, if  that proposition has a truth-value, then there exists 
something that makes it true; 
 
then 
 
(arg.mod.III.3) there exists something that makes [Noman does not exist] true. 
 
 Thus, actualists aiming at maintaining all the assumptions of  at least one of  these 
arguments have to deal with a problem: since Noman does not exist, "Noman" and/or [Noman] 
do not refer to Noman or Noman is not the truthmaker (or part of  the truthmaker) for [Noman 
might have existed], provided that truthmakers (and their parts) should exist, at least according to 
actualists248. 
 It is more complicated to construct a similar argument with (55), since I exist. Yet, it 
seems that no feature of  mine guarantees my possible non-existence: I exist and I have all my 
properties. Yet, if  it is true that (actualism), my possible non-existence is neither a property of  
mine, nor a property whose instantiation by me is implied by the instantiation of  other properties 
of  mine. In a similar vein, there exists nothing such as Sherlock Holmes in order for sentence-
type (56) to be true or for it to express a true proposition. 
 
I.4.2. Possible Worlds: With or Without Them - We Can't Live. 
Possible worlds can be considered in different ways: for example, maximal and consistent  
propositions, maximal and possible states of  affairs, properties or worlds just like ours. Possible 
worlds are often introduced in order to deal with (54), (55) and (56). Yet, can we (Noman, 
Sherlock Holmes and I) live (or not live) without possible worlds? In this section, I shall briefly 
examine some strategies that use or do not use possible worlds. 
 At first, it is possible to distinguish between de dicto and de re readings of  (54)-(56) (or of  
the propositions expressed by them).  The distinction is justified by the fact that, while a de re 
reading of  (54)-(56) presupposes the existence of  Noman and Sherlock Holmes and my possible 
non-existence (at least from an actualist perspective), a de dicto reading does not have such 
presuppositions. Thus, adopting a de dicto reading, (54) turns out to express that: it is possible that 
Noman exists and it is true that Noman does not exist. On the other hand, it is not legitimate, 
from an actualist viewpoint, to adopt a de reading, according to which Noman might exist and he 
does not exist (in this case, the latter conjunct would be obviously made true by something 
different from Noman): Noman does not exist and he cannot have the property of  possibly 
existing. The same might happen with (56). Finally, adopting a de dicto reading, (55) turns out to 
                                                 
248 The problem of merely possible non-existents for modal actualists is examined, among others, by McMichael 
(1983), Lewis (1986): 158-165, and Bennett (2005). For general inquiries into possible worlds’ ontology, see, for 
example, Divers (2002) and Melia (2003). 
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express that: it is possible that I do not exist and I exist, even if  the corresponding de re reading (I 
exist and I might not exist) is not legitimate or it is legitimate only if  it is legitimate to introduce 
properties such as my possible non-existence. Yet, it is important to ask what truth-conditions 
can be given to our de dicto readings. For example, is (54)'s de dicto reading true because the 
proposition [Noman exists] has some property? Is it true because some state of  affairs (the state 
of  affairs of  Noman's existence) has some property? From an actualist viewpoint, such 
propositions and states of  affairs must exist, in order to have such properties. Can such 
propositions and states of  affairs exist, even if  Noman does not exist? Do they have any different 
way of  existing? Do they exist in other possible worlds? Thus, de dicto readings' truth-values have 
still to be grounded on something existent. 
 Furthermore, if  we accept the Barcan formula249, according to which 
 
(Barcan formula) if  it is possible that something is P, then there is something such that it is 
possible that is P (i.e., such that it is possibly P), 
 
and if  it is possible that Noman is my twin, then there is something (Noman) that is possibly my 
twin, so that actualists are forced to quantify over mere possibilia, that do not exist. The de dicto/de 
re distinction does not help250. 
 Secondly, one might notice that "Noman" and "Sherlock Holmes" do not pick out any 
particular individual and do not have to refer to any particular existent individual in order for the 
sentence-types (or the propositions) in question to be true251. However, even if  this objection 
might seem legitimate with regard to "Sherlock Holmes", it does not seem to me legitimate with 
regard to Noman (Noman is the particular individual that might have existed, if  one particular 
sperm cell of  my father's and one particular ovum of  my mother's, both existent, had united and, 
obviously, if  the resulting zygote had not split into two) and it is obviously not legitimate with 
regard to me (provided that I am one particular individual). However, as we will see, many 
philosophers look for an interpretation of  (54) and (55) not involving any particular individual. 
 Yet, a Spinozian necessitarianist might deny that (54)-(56) are true sentence-types or 
express true propositions: it is necessary that everything is such as it actually is, there is no non-
obtaining possibility and, in general, states of  affairs that do not occur cannot occur. I cannot deal 
here with such a thesis. I shall assume that Spinozian necessitarianism is false and that it is at least 
                                                 
249 See Barcan Marcus (1946) and Barcan Marcus (1961), in Barcan Marcus (1993): 3-38. 
250 See also Menzel (2008) and, for an actualist analysis of the Barcan formula, Simchen (2013). 
251 The specificity problem for mere possibilia is mentioned, among others, by Yagisawa (2009), recalling the problem 
of the identity conditions for Quine’s merely possible fat man in the doorway. 
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true that (55)252.  
 A fourth strategy that does not give too much weight to possible worlds was elaborated 
by D. M. Armstrong253. The key idea behind Armstrong's account is that the actual world is 
constituted by states of  affairs and that merely possible worlds and merely possible states of  
affairs are recombinations of  actual simple individuals and actual simple properties instantiated 
by them. A simple individual is an individual that does not have any individual as a proper part, 
while a simple property is a property that is not constituted by any other property. When an 
actual simple individual instantiates an actual simple property, there is an atomic state of  affairs. 
More complex (i.e., molecular) states of  affairs supervene on atomic ones and are "ontological 
free lunches". Merely possible atomic states of  affairs are possible recombinations of  actual 
simple individuals and actual simple properties: they are possible, because those individuals and 
those properties can be recombined, but they are just merely possible, because they are not 
combined. However, what is the rule that determines what actual simple individuals and what 
actual simple properties can or cannot recombine with one another? If  actual simple individuals 
are bare individuals, they do not have any nature, i.e., they do not have any essential property 
determining what recombinations are possible and what are not possible. On the other hand, if  
they have a nature, then actual atomic and essential states of  affairs (i.e., actual simple individuals 
instantiating their essential properties) are the real subjects of  recombinations. However, in this 
latter case, it would still not be determined what atomic and essential states of  affairs can 
recombine with one another and how this can happen. Furthermore, what about merely possible 
existence or possible non-existence? Armstron'g solution is not clear in this respect. Finally, if  we 
invoke the notion of  recombination, then we have to accept that only actual recombinations 
(produced by some minded subject?) define possibilities or that recombination should be in turn 
defined in modal terms, as recombinability, so that modality would be grounded on... modality! 
 Some strategies to ground the truth of  (54)-(56) are based on the notion of  essence. An 
object's essence is its own nature, what that object is. Many philosophers agree that essences are 
properties or conjunctions of  properties and that they are somehow connected with modal 
notions. However, during the last 20 years, after the publication of  an important article of  K. 
Fine's254, this connection has been investigated in several ways, in order to deal with the following 
question: do essences precede necessity or do they have to be defined in terms of  necessity? 
                                                 
252 As regards the problem of necessitarianism, see, among others, Nelson (2009). I shall not consider here the 
fictionalist approach to possible worlds proposed by Rosen (1990) and (1995) and recently defended by Woodward 
(2008), (2011), (2012).  
253 See Armstrong (1989): 37-87. 
254 See Fine (1994) (see also other papers in Fine (2005)). Lowe (2012), (2013a) and (2013b): 139-160, adopts a 
similar strategy. 
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Before Fine's article, essences were generally regarded as properties that it is necessary that 
objects possess, if  they exist: P is an essence of  an object x iff  it is necessary that, if  x exists, 
then x is P. Yet, Fine demonstrates that this thesis proves too much: for example, that too many 
properties (even existence) are essential to an object. On the other hand, Fine claims the an 
object's essence can be found out by considering its real definition and that necessity and all the 
other modal notions can be defined in terms of  essences. In particular, it seems to me that, from 
this viewpoint, necessity can be considered what is essential to an object and what is somehow 
implied by the essence of  an object, i.e., something whose negation is excluded by that object's 
essence: it is necessary that an object x is P iff  ~Px is excluded by x's essence. It is contingent 
that x is P iff  Px is true but ~Px is not excluded by x's essence. It is merely possible that x is P 
iff  ~Px is true but Px is not excluded by x's essence. However, it is still not clear what an object's 
essence is. Furthermore, how can we define exclusion? 
 With regard to the former question, many answers are available: an object's essence is its 
natural kind (e.g., with regard to Obama, his being human), or the conjunction of  all (or some) 
of  its properties, or its origin (e.g., with regard to me, some relation connecting me with the 
actual sperm cell and ovum that actually united in order to constitute my zygote), or its material 
constitution, or some relation between its material constituents, or some non-qualitative property 
(e.g., with regard to Socrates, its haecceity, i.e., the property of  being Socrates or of  being 
identical with Socrates). An actualist essentialist has to deal with (54)-(56) by only introducing 
existing essences or essences of  existent objects. For example, considering Noman, the actualist 
essentialist should try to demonstrate that our premise (arg.mod.II.1), admitting the existence of  
the proposition [Noman might have existed], is false or that, even if  there is such a proposition, it 
is made true by some existing thing's essence or by some existing essence. 
 What about exclusion or, in general, the relation between an object's essence and the 
necessity/contingency/mere possibility that that object has some property? If  we defined this 
relation in modal terms, then Fine's task would fail, since we would obtain that: it is necessary 
that an object x is P iff  it cannot be the case that ~Px, i.e., iff  it is necessary that Px! Yet, if  what 
is necessary for an object is its essence and what is implied by its essence, then essences turn out 
to be defined in modal terms. 
 Let me consider, at first, the position of  those actualist essentialists who accept essences' 
priority on modality. Such philosophers can neither invoke non-obtaining facts, nor non-actual 
objects. How do they deal with (54)-(56)? It obviously depends on what essences they accept255. 
An actualist maximal essentialist (i.e., someone who accepts that an object's essence is the 
                                                 
255 For a survey of the different kinds of essential properties, see Robertson (2008). 
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conjunction of  all its properties) should immediately deny that it is true that (54)-(56). Let us 
consider Noman: Noman depends for his existence on the particular union of  those particular 
gametes that do not actually unite. If  the essences of  those gametes comprehend their external 
relations too, then it is excluded that they unite, so that it is necessarily false that (54). If  such 
essences do not comprehend their external relations, then maximal essentialists have to select 
monadic properties on which such relations cannot supervene, since they are external. Yet, they 
would have to reintroduce modal discourse in order to define essences: they cannot simply claim 
that, as a matter of  fact, such relations do not supervene on their monadic properties. This point is 
quite important and can be appreciated by using a different example. If  all the ever existing men 
had black eyes, then, as a matter of  fact, it would be essential for every man to have black eyes. Yet, 
that all men have black eyes seems only to be an accidental generalization: it does not seem to be 
a law of  nature, nor the property of  having black eyes is comprehended within the essence of  
every man. Let us call R1 the external relation between Noman's gametes (the union relation), 
that does not in fact hold between them. If  all the ever existing gametes had, by accidental 
generalization, some property (or properties) on which there seems to supervene a relation R2 
that is incompatible with R1, then R1 is excluded by those gametes' essences. On the other hand, a 
similar property preventing my non-existence might have been accidentally instantiated by 
existing objects. Furthermore, Sherlock Holmes would be essentially fictional, because he would 
have the property of  being fictional within his essence. Thus, he would be essentially non-
existent. 
 Among others, Armstrong and E. J. Lowe have tried to avoid this situation, by defining 
laws of  nature not simply in terms of  actual instantiation of  properties by objects. According to 
Armstrong, a law of  nature is a relation between universals256. Following Lowe, it consists of  
some kind's being characterized by some attribute (or of  two kinds' standing in some relation, i.e., 
of  their being characterized by a relational attribute)257. This seems to introduce us into sortal 
essentialism, i.e., that version of  essentialism according to which kinds (or sorts) are essential to 
an object's being that object. Let me consider gametes again. Roughly, there is no attribute of  the 
gametes' kind that prevents that Noman's particular gametes unite, nor that my particular 
gametes do not unite. Thus, it is both true that (54) and (55). Yet, it is difficult to find out what 
attributes characterize each kind (its propria?). It is also difficult to adopt a method that does not 
simply generalize on objects. Furthermore, might I have had most of  the properties I actually 
have, even without being human? If  I had been a disembodied minded subject, for example, 
would I have existed as this particular individual I am or not? In order to exclude such 
                                                 
256 See Armstrong (1983). 
257 See, for example, Lowe (2006): 24-133. 
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possibilities, sortal essentialism would have to reintroduce modalities. 
 If  his origin is essential to Noman and my origin is essential to me, then there must be 
some relation connecting Noman with his origin and me with my origin. This relation turns out 
to be essential. Such a relation is not instantiated in Noman's case (since Noman does not exist) 
and it is instantiated in my case (since I exist): this seems to ground Noman's non-existence and 
my existence. However, we should add that it is also essential to me (and to Noman) that my (or 
Noman's) zygote did not (would not have) split into other zygotes. Yet, how can this particular 
relation (the origin relation) be defined? It seems to me that it can be only defined in terms of  the 
essences of  the particular gametes taking part in it. Thus, we shall have at first to define such 
gametes' origins, and the essences of  objects originating them, and so on, until we shall have one 
non-originated object's essence. Thus, origins are only in part essential to an object. Furthermore, 
Noman's origin relation seem to exist uninstantiated, floating in the actual world, and this seems 
to be a high ontological price to pay, at least for many theorists of  properties. 
 I shall spend few words on other solutions, at least from the perspective according to 
which modality depends on essence. Material constitution and relations between material 
constituents do not seem sufficient to define an object's essence: I change my constitution, even 
without stopping existing, and relations between my constituents seem to change too. If  only 
some constituents (or some relations among constituents) were essential, then we would perhaps 
have to justify our choice in terms of  the constituted objects' nature: if  such-and-such 
constituents (or relations among constituents) do not exist anymore (do not hold anymore), then 
that particular object stops existing, thus stopping being what it is. Finally, with regard to 
haecceities, they would have to exist uninstantiated (at least in Noman's case), thus lacking 
identity conditions. Furthermore, with regard to me, it seems that my haecceity exist because I 
exist, and not the opposite. I shall examine the solution based on haecceities and possible worlds 
in few pages. 
 What does it happen if  we use essences with possible worlds? Before analyzing this case, 
it is worth talking of  the ontology of  possible worlds. Let me recall that, from an actualist 
perspective, it is true that 
 
(actualism) there are no items that do not exist. 
 
 Yet, as I shall try to demonstrate, actualists fall in trouble when they try to ground the 
truth of  some modal propositions258. I shall summarize here such difficulties. First, the actual 
world can be considered the sum of  everything that exists. Accepting (actualism), the actual 
                                                 
258 For an interesting outline of the modal actualist strategy for dealing with mere possibilia (that seems to be valid for 
actualists in general too), see Einheuser (2012).  
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world is thus the sum of  everything there is, i.e., the sum of  everything. This is the actual world1. 
Secondly, the actual world2 can be considered a maximal and consistent proposition (or a set of  
propositions, or a conjunction of  propositions) that has all non-modal true propositions as 
constituents. This seems to be the most commonly held view of  possible worlds from the 
actualist perspective: the actual world2 is a maximal and consistent existing (non-modal) 
proposition (or conjunction of  propositions, or set of  propositions); something is a maximal and 
consistent existing (non-modal) proposition (or conjunction of  propositions, or set of  
propositions) iff  for every (non-modal) proposition [p] it is not the case that both [p] and its 
negation [~p] are constituents of it and it is the case that [p] or [~p] is a constituent of  it. 
Furthermore, considering possible worlds in general, each possible world can be considered a 
maximal and consistent existing (non-modal) proposition (or conjunction of  propositions, or set 
of  propositions). Thus, there will be non-modal propositions such as [Noman exists] or [I do not 
exist] or corresponding propositions [p1] and [p2] not involving any reference to Noman, nor to 
my possible non-existence, that will be parts of  possible worlds different from the actual world2. 
Since they exist qua propositions, possible worlds (and the actual world2) are part of  the actual 
world1. Thus, their constituent propositions ([Noman exists] and [I do not exist] or [p1] and [p1]) 
exist too. Thirdly, the actual world3 can be considered a maximal and consistent proposition (or a 
set of  propositions, or a conjunction of  propositions) that has all true propositions (included 
modal ones) as constituents. Thus, the actual world3 has propositions [54] and [55] as 
constituents. In order to avoid the reference to non-existent objects (such as Noman) and in 
order not to commit to my merely possible non-existence, actualists can substitute [54] and [55] 
with other propositions, such as [p54] and [p55]. The propositions [54] and/or [55] and/or [p54] 
and /or [p55] are parts of  the actual world3 and their truth is somehow grounded on the actual 
world2. Thus, there might be in the actual world2 propositions that, in turn, ground the truth of  
proposition(s) [54] and/or [p54] and of  proposition(s) [55] and/or [p55]. The truth of  the actual 
world2 is in turn grounded on the actual world1. Since it is legitimate to choose among different 
options with regard to propositions (e.g., we can choose to admit [54] and [55] or [p54] and 
[p55]), there will be different actualist solutions. So far, so good. Yet, as we will see, if  we do not 
admit Noman as an object (i.e., if  we do not admit that there is something like Noman, even if  
he does not exist), it will turn out to be problematic to ground the identity of  [54] and [p54]. 
Furthermore, if  there is nothing such as Noman (since he does not exist), how will the truth of  
propositions [54] and/or [p54] be grounded on element(s) of  the actual world1? In fact, it seems 
that Noman might have existed and I might have not existed in the actual world1. With regard to 
[55] and [p55], there seems to be nothing in me in the actual world1 that non-circularly (i.e., 
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without using modal discourse) grounds the truth of  such propositions.  
 I shall now consider individual essences from a possible worlds perspective. [p1] and [p2] 
can be respectively substituted by: [Noman's individual essence is instantiated] and [my individual 
essence is not instantiated]. 
 If  one accepts that individual essences are properties, s/he can think of  them as 
Aristotelian individual essences (they are instantiated iff  they exist) or as Platonic individual 
essences (they exist even if  they are not instantiated). 
 Let me first consider Aristotelian individual essences. The problem with the actualist 
solutions is that Noman's Aristotelian individual essence does not exist in the actual world1 (since 
Noman's does not exist) and it cannot contribute to the truth of  any conjunct. With regard to my 
individual essence, things are less clear. Provided that my Aristotelian individual essence exists iff  
I exist, my Aristotelian individual essence exists (and can contribute to the truth of  propositions) 
iff  I exist and I instantiate it. Thus, my Aristotelian individual essence turns out to be redundant 
and parasitic on me for existing: provided that I exist, I am the truthmaker (or I am part of  the 
truthmaker) for [55] and/or [p55]. 
 What about Platonic individual essences? Such essences exist even if  their bearers do not 
exist. However, in Noman's case, if  Noman does not exist, such essences do not have any clear 
identity condition: what does it differentiate two distinct merely possible individuals' Platonic 
individual essences, if  such individuals do not exist and cannot contribute to their identity and 
distinctness conditions? Thus, they do not contribute to the identity conditions of  propositions 
[Noman's individual essence is instantiated] and [Noman exists]. Yet, such propositions must be 
identified, in order to attribute to them some properties and to deny that they have other 
properties. However, with regard to my Platonic individual essence, this solution seems to work. 
Thus, in general, the Platonic individual essences' solution, even if  it works with existent 
individuals, does not work with non-existent ones and it is a partial solution to our problems. 
Furthermore, it might turn out to be trivial. 
 In order to justify my latter claim, let me consider Plantinga's theory of  possible worlds, 
that combines Platonic individual essences (conceived of  as haecceities) with states of  affairs259. 
Plantinga claims that possible worlds are maximal and consistent states of  affairs, that actually 
exist but are abstract: they do not obtain, even if  they might have obtained, and they are 
somehow part of  the actual world, since they actually exist. Furthermore, he adds that haecceities 
necessarily exist, i.e., that they exist in every possible world, that they are constituents of  every 
possible world, even if  there do not exist in those worlds individuals instantiating them. Thus, 
                                                 
259 See Plantinga (1974) and (2003). 
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they are Platonic haecceities. Since the actual world is the only obtaining maximal and consistent 
state of  affairs, Noman's (and perhaps Sherlock Holmes') haecceities exist in the actual world1, in 
the actual world2 and in the actual world3 too. Furthermore, my Platonic haecceity exist even in 
worlds in which I do not exist. Let me take one such world: it is true that (55) since it is true that, 
if  one such world had obtained, my Platonic haecceity would have not been instantiated, even 
existing in that world. On the other hand, it is true that (54) since, assuming a world in which 
Noman actually exists, it is true that, if  one such world had obtained, Noman's Platonic haecceity 
would have been instantiated, but it is not actually instantiated, even if  it actually exists. This is, 
roughly, Plantinga's theory. However, it seems to me that Noman's Platonic haecceity must be 
identified by Noman, that does not actually exist. Does Noman qua object exist in other possible 
worlds, so that he exists in the actual world1? It seems that he does not: when we analyze such 
worlds, we just find out that some Platonic haecceity might have been instantiated, had that world 
obtained. In sum, Noman's Platonic haecceity is identified (and thus actually exists as that 
particular Platonic haecceity) iff  Noman actually1 exists
260. Yet, Noman does not actually1 exist! 
What about me? I identify my actually existing Platonic haecceity and that haecceity would not 
have been instantiated, had a world in which I do not exist been actual. Yet, is this not trivially 
true? A world in which I do not exist is a world in which my Platonic haecceity is not instantiated. 
Thus, this would amount to claim that, had a world in which my Platonic haecceity is not 
instantiated been actual, then my haecceity would have not been instantiated. Right! Yet, what 
contribution does this analysis give to our understanding of  contingent existence? 
 R. M. Adams argues that there are only thisnesses of  actual individuals261. Noman is not 
actual (he does not exist in the actual world1), so that he does not have any thisness. Furthermore, 
he claims that world-stories, i.e., maximal and consistent sets of  propositions, define types of  
worlds. This distinction among worlds and world-stories make it difficult to apply to Adams the 
above mentioned distinctions among different senses of  the expression "actual world". On the 
one hand, it seems that the actual world1 comprehends both Adams' worlds and world-stories. 
On the other hand, it seems that worlds and world-stories do not properly exist in the actual 
world1, since there exist in other worlds propositions that neither exist in in the actual world1, nor 
are part of  the actual world2 (i.e., of  the actual world-story). In order to respect Adams' original 
theses, we can consider possible worlds different from the actual one useful fictions. Anyway, we 
cannot introduce into world-stories propositions about non-actual individuals: such propositions 
do not exist. Thus, we should paraphrase them into something else. Let me now focus on (55). It 
                                                 
260 Concerning this point, see Fine (1985), in Fine (2005): 176-213. For Plantinga’s replies, see the papers in Plantinga 
(2003). For another interesting defense of haecceities, see Rosenkrantz (1993). 
261 See Adams (1981). See also Adams (1974) and (1979). 
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is true that (55), since it is true that I am only contingently existent, i.e., that I do not necessarily 
exist, i.e., that my thisness is not necessarily exemplified. The proposition [I might have not 
existed] exists in the actual world, since I actually exist, and this proposition is true in it for the 
reasons already explained. Yet, why is my thisness not necessarily exemplified? In order to give an 
answer to such question, we should consider the difference between truth in a world and truth at 
a world. A proposition is true in a world iff  it is contained within the world-story that defines that 
type of  world. A proposition is true at a world iff  it is not contained within the world-story that 
defines that type of  world, but it correctly characterizes that type of  world. For example, [I do 
not exist] is not true in worlds in which I do not exist, since it does not exist in those worlds 
(because I do not exist in them), but it is true at those worlds: it aims at expressing something 
true about those worlds, i.e., that they do not contain me. Can we claim that [I might have not 
existed] is true in the actual world iff  I exist in the actual world but there are worlds at which it is 
true that I do not exist? Well, it does not seem that this solution makes it the case that [I might 
have not existed] is true in the actual world: it only claims something that is true at other worlds. 
Thus, should we accept as a primitive fact that [I might have not existed] simply expresses my 
contingent existence? It seems that we should. Furthermore, if  propositions such as [I do not 
exist] are not true in our world, they seem to be part of  world-stories that exist in our world. 
Thus, when we claim that [I do not exist] is true at some world, why cannot we claim that the 
proposition [it is true at some world that I do not exist] is true in the actual world that? However, 
such a proposition seems to be partly constituted by the proposition [I do not exist], that does 
not exist in the actual world. Thus, how can the proposition [it is true at some world that I do not 
exist] exist and be true in our world? On the other hand, if  such a proposition is only true at the 
actual world, the actual world would be truly and correctly characterized by a proposition that 
does not exist, since it does not actually exist! It is true that the actual world is not a world-story. 
However, since world-stories exist in the actual world, the latter remark does not seem to imply 
that propositions such as [it is true at some world that I do not exist] do not exist in the actual 
world. One might reply that propositions such as [Noman does not exist] exist simpliciter. Yet, in 
order to find out their identity conditions, we have to accept the existence of  Noman (i.e., the 
existence of  a non-existent) or we have to claim that we are ontologically committed to some 
individual haecceity of  Noman's or to some conjunction of  properties constituting Noman's 
essence. I have already criticized such theses. If  we now go back to our terminology, it seems 
that, if  Adam’s actual world is the actual world1, then all the aforementioned problems arise. On 
the other hand, if  Adam’s actual world is the actual world2, then it is not clear what is the place of  
true modal propositions within the actual world. Finally, if  it is the actual world3, then it is not 
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necessary to introduce the distinction between truth at a world and truth in a world: every true 
modal proposition is true in the actual world3, even though the problem of  grounding the truth 
of  true modal propositions about mere possibilia on something actual3 is left unresolved.  
 There are two strategies that try to deal with modal problems by relativizing existence to 
worlds (and times). These solutions are (partly) inspired by D. Lewis' claim that actuality is 
relative to worlds. Thus, before dealing with such strategies, I shall briefly deal with Lewis' modal 
realism. Lewis claims that possible worlds are worlds just like ours262. He thinks that possible 
worlds are existing, concrete, maximal spatio-temporal regions, occupied by existent, concrete 
things. Possible worlds (and things that live in them) are isolated: they do not have relations with 
one another. Furthermore, things existing in possible worlds are world-bounded: they only exist 
in their world, they do not exist in other worlds. It is worth noticing that Lewis distinguishes 
between existence and actuality: every world and every possible individual exists, while worlds are 
just actual at themselves and no world is absolutely actual. In fact, "actual" is, for Lewis, an 
indexical term, i.e., a term whose reference varies from context to context: within the context of  
our world, our world is actual (and everything contained in our world is actual too), but within 
the context of  another world, that world is actual. Existing within another possible world, 
Noman is not actual, even if  he exists (he exists in that world, he is concrete, he exists simpliciter, 
since that world exists simpliciter). On the other hand, I am actual and I exist. Yet, since I am 
world-bounded to the actual world (i.e., to this world), I do not exist in any other world. It is not 
true that I might have not existed in this world (I exist in this world) and it is not true that Noman 
might have existed in this world (he does not and he cannot exist here). Yet, it is true that there 
are many worlds in which I do not exist (I only exist in this world) and that there is one world in 
which Noman exists. Thus, if  (54) and (55) state something about this world, they are false; if  
they state something about other worlds, they are true. How can they be made true? Perhaps by 
claiming that (54) expresses the proposition [Noman is not actual and Noman exists simpliciter and 
Noman is actual in another world], that is made true by the fact that Noman is not actual and 
Noman exists simpliciter and Noman is actual in one other world, and (55) expresses the 
proposition [I am actual and I exist simpliciter and I am not actual in many other worlds, except 
ours], that is made true by the fact that I am actual and I exist simpliciter and I am not actual in 
many other worlds, except ours. In order to make such propositions true, it is not necessary to 
deny the truth of  (actualism). However, in Lewis’ perspective, one should accept the following 
principle: 
                                                 
262 See Lewis (1986). I shall not deal here with counterparts theory, since counterparts seem not to be able to 
guarantee the truth of (54)-(56). For example, I do not exist in other worlds, not a counterpart of mine, and it is not 
one of Noman's counterparts that does not exist in the actual world, but Noman himself. See the famous example of 
Humphrey in Kripke (1980): 45n. 
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(actualism-lewis) there are things that exist and are not actual, but there are no things that do not 
exist. 
 
 The problem with our propositions is that they are made true, at least in the third 
conjunct, by facts (or by entities, in Noman's case, or by worlds) that exist and that are not actual. 
If  one claimed that there exists the proposition [I am not actual in infinitely other worlds, except 
ours] and that such a proposition is true, I would not be the truth-maker for this truth, nor would 
it be the actual world, nor any other fact in the actual world. This proposition is true in the actual 
world, but it is not made true by anything actual (even if  it is made true by something existent). 
Furthermore, the proposition [Noman is actual in one other world] exists and is true in the actual 
world, but it is not made true by Noman, nor by the actual world, nor by facts in the actual world. 
Thus, there would be some kind of  transworld relation between such propositions in the actual 
world and something that does not exist in the actual world, i.e., that is not actual. Yet, if  other 
possible worlds are inaccessible from our world, such a relation cannot exist. Furthermore, it is 
impossible that it exists, because it does not exist in any possible world (it does neither exist in 
our world, nor in any other possible world, since in both cases it would lack one of  its relata).  
 It is now time to examine the two aforementioned strategies that consist in relativizing 
existence to worlds (and times). As well as Lewis' account, such strategies are not grounded on 
our distinction between different senses of  the expression "actual world". Possible non-actual 
worlds seem to be something more than propositions. Anyway, if  we accept (actualism), we can 
think of  such worlds (whatever they are) as elements of  the actual world1. The last two solutions 
I shall consider (grounded on some distinction between actuality, or existence, and concreteness) 
seem to involve the same assumption. 
 T. Yagisawa thinks of  possible worlds in terms of  modal parts. Yagisawa argues that, 
while reality is a monadic property (something is real), existence is always relative to time, space 
and worlds, i.e., to temporal, spatial and modal parts263. Such parts are always real. However, 
things exist or do not exist at different times, at different spaces and at different worlds by having 
or not having some temporal, spatial or modal parts at those times, spaces and worlds. Thus, I do 
not exist in some possible worlds, since there is at least one possible world in which I do not have 
a modal part (i.e., simply, I do not have some modal part, since possible worlds seem to be 
constituted by modal parts). Yet, it seems to follow that I do not wholly exist in possible worlds in 
which I exist: I only have some modal parts (and, perhaps, some temporal and spatial parts too) 
in those worlds. This might be unacceptable for a modal endurantist. However, even conceding 
that Yagisawa's thesis is true, what about (54)-(56)? I am real, such as Noman and (perhaps) 
                                                 
263 See Yagisawa (2010): 49-61. 
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Sherlock Holmes. Noman does not exist in our world (i.e., he does not have modal parts in our 
world or, simply, he does not have some modal part), but he exists in some world, by having 
modal parts in that world, and it is legitimate to claim that we can truly attribute something to 
Noman in all the other worlds (this is one of  Yagisawa's assumptions). However, this does not 
amount to claim that Noman might have existed in our world: what we claim is that Noman has 
some modal parts in other worlds (perhaps similar to ours), but not that he might have had 
modal parts in our world. What about me? By claiming that I do not have modal parts in some 
world and that I have a modal part in our world, I do not claim that I might have lacked modal 
parts in our world, that is what (55) seems to imply. 
 One of  the most interesting and complex theories of  the relation between existence and 
modality is N. Salmon's theory264. According to Salmon, it is necessary to distinguish between two 
different kinds of  actuality predicates: actualityA- and actualityB-predicates. I shall only consider 
such predicates when they are applied to individuals. The predicate "actualA" correctly applies to a 
possible individual, with respect to a context of  utterance c, a possible world w and some other 
parameters (such as a time t) iff  that possible individual exists in the world of  c (at t). On the 
other hand, the predicate "actualB" correctly applies to a possible individual, with respect to a 
context of  utterance c, a possible world w and some other parameters (such as a time t) iff  that 
possible individual exists in the world w (at t). With regard to Noman, Salmon claims that 
"Noman" is a weakly non-referring term, namely a term that does not actuallyA (i.e., in the world 
of  the context c in which we are) refer to anything, even if  there might have been someone to which 
that term would have referred. The reference of  such a term is fixed by description. On the other 
hand, "Sherlock Holmes" is perhaps not a weakly non-referring term, because there is no 
description that fixes the reference to one and only one individual. [Noman might have been 
such-and-such] is actuallyA true, even though [Noman is such-and-such] is not actuallyA true (at 
least with respect to many properties supposedly instantiated by Noman). This latter proposition, 
according to Salmon, does not exist, even if  it might have existed and it might have been true: 
this is the reason for which the former proposition is actuallyA true. However, there are some 
properties that Noman has (that he really has, not only that he might have had): for example, 
Noman has the properties of  non-existing and of  merely possibly existing.  
 However, what about [Noman might have existed]? If  we simply affirm that such a 
proposition is true only because "Noman" is a weakly non-referring term, it seems that we affirm 
something false: it is because Noman is not actualA that "Noman" is a weakly non-referring term! 
Furthermore, do we have to use actualityA or actualityB in order to talk of  Noman's merely 
                                                 
264 See Salmon (1987) and (1998), in Salmon (2005): 9-90. 
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possible existence? Since actualityB is, according to Salmon, what we mean when we talk of  
existence (it is what is meant by Hamlet in asking his question: "to be or not to be?"), it seems 
that Noman might have been actualB. Yet, if  he is not actualA (i.e., he does not actuallyA exist), 
how might he have actuallyA existed? Perhaps, he might have actuallyB existed in some other 
world, but not in our world. Thus, it is perhaps true that Noman might have actuallyA existed, but 
what we are interested in is actualB existence.  
 With regard to my contingent existence, Salmon might claim that I actuallyA exist and I 
actuallyB exist. It is false that I do not actuallyA exist, and perhaps it is necessarily false, because it 
is not actuallyA the case that I do not exist (there is no context c where the proposition [I do not 
exist] is true). What about actualityB? Perhaps, there is a world in which I am not actualB, but it is 
not this world: I am actualB since I exist in this world. Thus, with regard to this world, it is not the 
case that I might have not been actualB (i.e., the proposition [I might have not been actualB] is not 
true with regard to this world). 
 Two other strategies to deal with (54)-(56) are grounded on a distinction between 
concreteness (and abstractness) from existence and actuality. B. Linsky and E. Zalta, for example, 
claim that actualists might accept that there are three kinds of  objects: actually concrete, 
contingently non-concrete and essentially abstract ones265. Concrete objects are spatio-temporal, 
while abstract objects are non-spatio-temporal. However, both concrete and abstract objects exist 
and they exist in the actual world. Furthermore, it seems that they necessarily exist, even if  
concrete objects, that are essentially concrete, are not necessarily concrete (necessity is different 
from essentiality). There are contingently non-concrete objects, such as Noman, that exist in the 
actual world (and in every world), even if  they are abstract in the actual world. On the other 
hand, I am concrete in the actual world, but I am abstract in other worlds, so that I do not exist 
(= I am not concrete) in such worlds. Sherlock Holmes is essentially abstract, since he is a 
fictional object. Is he only contingently (i.e., non-necessarily) abstract? It is not clear. However, 
given Zalta's theory of  abstract objects, it seems that Sherlock Holmes cannot be concrete. 
 T. Williamson also seems to accept such a distinction between existence and 
concreteness266. With regard to (55), he argues that, since  
 
(williamson1) necessarily, if  I do not exist, then the proposition [I do not exist] is true; 
                                                 
265 See Linsky, Zalta (1994). After Tomberlin's criticisms (see Tomberlin (1996)), the authors clarified their theory in 
Linsky, Zalta (1996). See also Bennett (2006), according to whom Linsky’s and Zalta’s theory is not a form of modal 
actualism, as it claims to be, since it distinguishes between two different domains of quantification within the actual 
world. For a reply, see Nelson, Zalta (2009). More recently, Cowling (2013) has suggested that concreteness and 
abstractness should be understood as relations and in terms of being worldmates. Thus, an object is concrete in 
respect to another object iff those objects are worldmates, while an object is abstract in respect to another object iff 
they are not worldmates. 
266 See Williamson (2002). See also Williamson (2013). 
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(williamson2) necessarily, if  the proposition [I do not exist] is true, then that proposition exists; 
 
(williamson3) necessarily, if  the proposition [I do not exist] exists, then I exist; 
 
then 
 
(williamson4) necessarily, if  I do not exist, then I exist, 
 
so that 
 
(williamson5) necessarily, I exist. 
 
 I cannot deal here with Williamson's arguments in defense of  such premises. They seem 
to assume some of  the actualists' intuitions that I have already discussed. According to 
Williamson, there are possible worlds in which I exist and I am not concrete, so that it is true that 
(55). Perhaps, if  Noman is an individual, he might accept that (54) is true for similar reasons: 
even if  Noman is not concrete in the actual world, he nevertheless exists here and there are 
possible worlds in which he is concrete. However, first, how is it possible to positively 
characterize the property of  being abstract, in order to guarantee that there actually exist abstract 
objects? It seems that I do not become something abstract like a number or a proposition 
(paradigmatic abstract objects) when I do not exist in some possible world. Furthermore, even if  
Noman is concrete in other worlds, what is required by (54) is that he might have been concrete 
in the actual world, where he is, in fact, not concrete267.  
 
I.4.3. A Matter of Tense. 
We have already seen in the chapter I.2 that it is arguably true that 
 
(7) Obama exists 
 
and that, provided that Socrates is not a purely non-existent object (e.g., he is not a fictional 
object), 
 
(30) Socrates exists. 
 
 However, with regard to (30), things are not so easy. In fact, one might notice that, even 
if  it is true that 
 
(57) Socrates existed, 
 
it is not true that Socrates now exists, i.e., it is true that 
                                                 
267 I cannot examine here R. Stalnaker’s analysis of possible world as properties and his theses on mere possibilia. His 
solution is grounded on the admission that there are propositions that only contingently exist and that it is legitimate 
to distinguish between specific and generic containment properties. See Stalnaker (1976), in Stalnaker (2003): 25-39 
(revised version) and Stalnaker (2012). 
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(58) Socrates does not exist anymore, 
 
that explicitly conveys the true information already implicitly conveyed by our (31).  
Why does (58) seem to be true? Because it seems to be true that 
 
(59) Socrates has ceased to exist. 
 
 On the other hand, it is arguably true that 
 
(60) Michele exists now, 
 
 that seems to convey the true information that is already implicitly conveyed (with regard 
to Obama, provided that Obama now exists) by (7). Yet, since it is also true that, before my birth, 
 
(61) Michele did not exist, 
 
by (60) and (61), it seems legitimate to infer the truth of 
 
(62) Michele has started to exist. 
 
 Let me now consider one particular individual that will exist, provided that two particular 
and now existing gametes of  two persons will unite and the resulting zygote will not split into 
two. Let me call him (or her) Nothan. Is it true that 
 
(63) Nothan will exist? 
 
 All the aforementioned statements have two features in common: they use tensed forms 
of  the verb "to exist" (I have used the adverb "now" in (60) only to remark that we are talking of  
Michele's present existence); their truth seems to imply that there is something like substantial (or 
absolute) change, i.e., that things start to exist and (unfortunately) stop existing. On the other 
hand, (30) does not seem to contain a tensed form of  the verb "to exist" or, perhaps, it is not 
clear whether it contains it or not. I shall distinguish between tensed and untensed verbal forms 
by adding an index t (or u) to the verb. We now have two major problems: 
 
(I) is it true that (57)-(63) (or that just some of  them)? And why? 
 
(II) What is the relation between the existence in (30) and the existence in (57)-(63), namely 
between seemingly untensed existence and tensed one? 
 
 Before trying to examine the answers given to such questions, I shall introduce the 
distinction between A-theories and B-theories of  time. In order to do this, let me first distinguish 
between statements, such as (57)-(63), propositions, such as [57]-[63], and the facts that (57)-(63). 
There are philosophers (i.e., those who defended old B-theories) who think that statements such 
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as (57)-(63) can be paraphrased into other statements that do not contain any tensed verbal form. 
On the other hand, there are philosophers who think that such statements are irreducibly tensed, 
even if  their logical reading might be somehow different from the natural language reading. New 
B-theorists seem to think that, even if  (57)-(63) are irreducibly tensed, the propositions that they 
express or the facts that make such statements (or such statement's tokens, or such propositions) 
true (or false) are somehow untensed. In fact, according to A-theorists, there is something like 
objective present, while B-theorists deny that there is such an objective present (at best, present is 
regarded as subjective)268. Since verbs in (57)-(63) are tensed because of  their reference to the 
present, this is the first and most relevant distinction among ontological theories of  time.    
 Furthermore, I shall distinguish between presentist and non-presentist theories of  time. 
According to presentists 
 
(presentism) there are no items that are not present269, 
 
while, according to non-presentists, (presentism) is not true: there are things that are not present 
(there are also merely past and, perhaps, merely future things). Thus, presentists roughly claim 
that, even if  Socrates existed, he does not exist now, i.e., he does not exist. The thesis (presentism) 
is accepted by presentists with regard to objects, events and times. Yet, it seems to me legitimate 
to deal, at first, with presentist theories of  objects. I shall talk of  merely past and merely future 
objects, in order to refer to objects that do not exist anymore and do not still exist (at least 
according to presentists). In fact, since I exist now, but I also existed two minutes ago, I am a past 
object too, but not a merely past one. Presentism is one of  the most important A-theories of  
time. However, there are many A-theorists that are not presentists. Since many presentists are 
actualist too, it is legitimate to combine actualism and presentism as follows: 
 
(actualist-presentism) there are no items that do not existt (i.e., that do not exist now). 
 
 In what follows, I shall examine some varieties of  presentism and non-presentism, in 
order to deal with the truth of  (57)-(63). 
 
I.4.4. Carpe Present! 
Before examining the problems connected with merely past and merely future objects and 
absolute change, let me first consider the thesis (presentism). Some philosophers have argued that 
this thesis is trivially true or necessarily false. In fact, if  we interpret the quantifier "there are" as 
tensed, presentists seem to claim that there are no present things (i.e., that there aret no things) 
that are not present things. This is trivially true, but it does not exclude that there areu things that 
                                                 
268 See Mellor (1998), Dainton (2010) and Orilia (2012b). 
269 Or: necessarily, everything is present. See Markosian (2004). 
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are not present. On the other hand, one could try to interpret the quantifier in a disjunctive or 
untensed way. Thus, if  we follow the first strategy, what is asserted by (presentism) is that there 
neither was, nor aret, nor will be things that are not present. The second strategy turns out to 
assert that there areu no things that are not present. However, both strategies are problematic. 
The first one is plainly false: for example, there were things that are not present (e.g., Socrates). 
Concerning the second one, presentists seem forced to admit that there is an untensed reading of  
the existential quantifier, that is somehow different from the disjunctive tensed reading. Yet, what 
does this untensed existence expressed by this reading of  the quantifier amount to? It might 
amount to Socrates' existence as it is expressed in (30), that seems to be untensed. Yet, for a 
presentist, it is also true that Socrates does not existt anymore (or his individual essence ist not 
instantiated anymore, or the proper name "Socrates" does not havet a referent anymore). Thus, 
he ist not present anymore. This second strategy turns out to express something that is plainly 
false, provided that, even if  Socrates existsu (or his individual essence isu instantiated, or the 
proper name "Socrates" hasu a referent), Socrates does not existt (or his individual essence ist not 
instantiated, or the proper name "Socrates" does not havet a referent), i.e., Socrates ist not 
present270. 
 I cannot discuss all the answers to this problem. According to me, the best reading of  
(presentism), even if  a non-standard one, is given by: 
 
(presentism') there were no things that were not present and there aret no things that aret not 
present and there will be no things that will not be present. 
 
 This reading seems to capture the fact that, for presentists, everything existent is present. 
On the other hand, it does not use untensed quantifiers, that some presentists do not accept. 
Finally, even if  it is denied that there are now things that are not now present, it is not denied that 
there were such things. Is (presentism') consistent with (actualist-presentism)? If  we read the first 
quantifier in (actualist-presentism) ("there are") in a tensed, or untensed, or disjunctively tensed 
way and if  we granted that to exist now is the same as to be present, we would have the same 
troubles already met with (presentism), since (actualist-presentism) would simply turn out to be 
identical with (presentism). Does (actualist-presentism) tell us anything more than (presentism) 
or, better, (presentism')? In order to answer this question, we should compare negative existential 
statements with positive and negative tensed ones. Let me consider: 
 
(8) Sherlock Holmes does not exist; 
 
(60tensed) Michele existst; 
                                                 
270 Concerning the triviality objection against presentism, see Meyer (2005) and Lombard (2010). 
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(58tensed) Socrates does not existt anymore. 
 
 (60tensed) and (58tensed) seems to express what is expressed by (60) and (58), i.e., that 
Michele exists now and that Socrates does not exist anymore. If  we wanted to analyze (8) from 
an actualist-presentist perspective, we could claim that Sherlock Holmes was not present and he 
ist not present and he will not be present. Yet, this seems not to be sufficient to grasp what is 
expressed by (actualist-presentism). In fact, we could obtain, following this analysis, a tensed 
version of  the paradox of  non-existence: Sherlock Holmes should have existed in order not to 
have been present (i.e., presently existing in the past), and so on. Thus, from the actualist-
presentist perspective, there was no Sherlock Holmes that was not present and there ist no 
Sherlock Holmes that ist not present and there will be no Sherlock Holmes that will not be 
present, i.e., Sherlock Holmes did not have and does not havet and will not have any property 
such as present existence: in order to lackt this property, he did have to be present and hast to be 
present and will have to be present. Thus, those who accept (actualist-presentism) seem to be 
forced to accept a presentist version of  (actualism-a) too, i.e., that 
 
(actualist-a-presentism) present existence was not and ist not and will be not a first-order and 
informative property. 
 
 Yet, if  we accept (actualist-a-presentism), why do we have to accept that the present is so 
special, at least following presentists? In order to answer this question, let me now examine (30). 
According to (presentism'), even if  Socrates ist not present and he will not be present, he was 
present. Thus, it is true that (30). However, from the actualist-presentist perspective, in order to 
avoid any kind of  disjunctivism, we should accept (actualist-a-presentism) in this case too, i.e., we 
should accept that present existence is not a first-order and informative property that Socrates 
had and that he does not havet anymore: there should be no asymmetry between present 
existence in Sherlock Holmes' case and in Socrates' case. Furthermore, there cannot be any first-
order, informative property of  existing that objects haveu, in virtue of  having been present or of  
beingt present or of  going to be present. In fact, if  there were such a property, it would 
contradict (actualism-a), i.e., the thesis that existence is not a first-order and informative property, 
so that it would sound strange to accept the tensed and presentist version of  (actualism-a), i.e., 
(actualist-a-presentism), and not to accept (actualism-a).  
 Yet, considering (60tensed) and (58tensed), if  what we have claimed with regard to 
presentist actualism is true, Michele cannot existt now in virtue of  presently instantiating present 
existence and Socrates cannot existt anymore in virtue of  presently lacking present existence, 
even if  he had present existence, at least according to this perspective. Thus, present existence is 
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not a property that some objects instantiatet, so that, if  they instantiatet it, they simply instantiate 
it too. However, it seems to me legitimate to be a presentist even from a non-actualist (and a non-
actualist-a) perspective, so that there might be non-actualists thinking of  present existence as a 
first-order informative property without accepting the tensed version of  the paradox of  non-
existence. Furthermore, as I have already claimed, that something ist not present, according to my 
latter analysis, does not imply that there is a fundamental first-order property of  being present 
that things havet or lackt. In fact, there might primarily be present facts, or present events, or 
whatever else. Finally, using tensed quantifiers, one could interpret (presentism') by claiming that, 
for example, in order for something to have been present, a certain individual essence might have 
been instantiated by that thing. In sum, those who accept (presentism') and (actualist-presentism) 
seem to be forced to accept (actualist-a-presentism) too. On the other hand, nothing forces us, in 
order to accept (presentism'), to accept (actualist-presentism) and (actualist-a-presentism) too. As 
we will see, it is legitimate to imagine at least one version of  (presentism') not committed to the 
truth of  (actualist-presentism) and (actualist-a-presentism). 
 Yet, if  actualist presentists have to accept both (actualist-presentism) and (actualist-a-
presentism) and if  they want to avoid any kind of  disjunctivism, they cannot introduce the 
property of  being present as a first-order and informative property. On the one hand, they could 
try to paraphrase statements such as the ones considered (and the ones introduced in the section 
I.4.3) or they could try to argue that those statements express propositions that do not contain 
[Socrates] or [Michele] or [Sherlock Holmes] as their constituents. On the other hand, they could 
accept that there are propositions such as [60tensed], i.e., [Michele does not existt now], but they 
are not made true by any fact such as Michele's presently existing, i.e., Michele's presently 
instantiating the first-order property, informative of  presently existing.  
  In what follows, I shall consider two actualist versions of  presentism (property-based 
and proposition-based presentism), using tense operators before quantifiers. In turn, property-
based presentism can be defined in three different ways: Russellian-based presentism (by 
introducing conjunctions of  properties), reference-based presentism (by introducing reference of  
proper names such as "Socrates") and Plantinga-based presentism (by introducing haecceities).  
 After A. Prior's works271, presentists commonly use tense operators in order to render our 
talks of  past or future events. In particular, the operator P is used as meaning "it was the case 
that" and the operator F is used as meaning "it will be the case that". The existential quantifier   
is always used as tensed, i.e., as meaning "there ist some". Is there any tenseless quantifier? Given 
a disjunctive tensed reading, there might be, even if  it would not be primitive. However, let me 
                                                 
271 See, for example, Prior (1957), Prior (1967) and Prior (1968). 
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now try, using tense operators, to analyze property-based presentism. The idea behind this 
strategy is that singular existential statements can be paraphrased into statements about 
properties and/or reference of  proper names or that they express propositions about properties 
and/or reference of  proper names or are made true by facts about properties and/or reference. 
Let me consider, at first, the Plantinga-based version of  property-presentism. I shall assume "M" 
as standing for the property of  being identical with Michele; "NOTHAN" as standing for the 
property of  being identical with Nothan; "S" as standing for the property of  being identical with 
Socrates. Finally, the operator Pn means that, at some n-degree of  the past (a degree that precedes 
my existence, in my case), it was the case that such-and-such. Thus we shall have: 
 
(57plantinga) P xSx 
 
(58plantinga) ~ xSx & P xSx 
 
(60plantinga)  xMx 
 
(61plantinga) ~Pn xMx 
  
(63plantinga) F xNOTHANx 
 
 The problem with this strategy is that haecceities have to exist even when the object that 
instantiate them did not or do not or will not exist. Thus, as we have already argued, the most 
coherent way to interpret haecceities consist in considering them Platonic properties. However, 
such haecceities do not have clear identity conditions when Socrates, Michele or Nothan do not 
instantiate them, since they do not exist. The haecceity NOTHAN, for example, does not have now 
and did not have before now clear identity conditions. The haecceity M did not have clear identity 
conditions before my birth (and, perhaps, it will not have it after my death). Finally, the haecceity 
S does not have now clear identity conditions, since Socrates does not exist anymore. On the 
other hand, it seems highly counterintuitive to claim that objects depend for their identity on 
their haecceities – and not the opposite. Thus, the Plantinga-based account of  property-
presentism seems not to be a good solution. 
 What about a Russellian account? Perhaps, it seems to work better. A conjunction of  
properties was instantiated by at least and at most one thing, so that there was at least and at 
most one thing that was such-and-such. Yet, this conjunction of  properties is not instantiated by 
anything anymore, even if  the conjuncted properties (in a Platonic conception of  properties) 
continue existing. However, at first, one has to clarify what properties we have to introduce when 
it is made true that it is not the case that there is now at least and at most one individual that is 
such-and-such. We cannot use properties that do not now have definite identity conditions, even 
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if  they had such conditions: for example, with regard to Socrates, we cannot use the property of  
being the master of  Plato, since Plato does not exist anymore. If  not impossible, it is not easy to 
find out such properties. Again: I am not talking here of  names, predicates and other linguistic 
entities.  
 Finally, the third solution, namely the one based on reference of  names, seems to be really 
attractive. It is followed by some presentists and it is worth considering it. N. Markosian, for 
example, talks of  the truth-conditions of  (58) by analyzing an attributive statement about 
Socrates272. However, one could claim that, according to this solution, (57), (58), (60), (61) and 
(63) are true, respectively, iff 
 
(57ref.) P x("Socrates" refers to x) 
 
(58ref.) ~ x("Socrates" refers to x) & P x("Socrates" refers to x) 
 
(60ref.)  x("Michele" refers to x) 
 
(61ref.) ~P x("Michele" refers to x) 
 
(63ref.) F x("Nothan" refers to x) 
 
 The problem with this account is that it seems to explain the existence of  things in terms 
of  linguistic facts and I have already criticized such an approach. However, even granting that this 
is legitimate, what about the first conjunct of  (58ref.)? According to it, the proper name 
"Socrates" does not have any referent: it exists, it referred to Socrates but it does not refer to 
anyone presently existent (and this is the reason for which we can claim that it is now true that 
(58)). If  we accept the perspective grounded on (presentism'), (actualist-presentism) and 
(actualist-a-presentism), there cannot now be such a relation of  referring to between "Socrates" 
and Socrates, since Socrates does not exist anymore. However, "Socrates" seems to have a 
reference, as long as we use this name: perhaps this reference is given by something that 
happened in the past (an initial baptism) and that was prolonged until today by some causal chain 
of  reference transmission; perhaps it is now given by the fact that "Socrates" abbreviates some 
definite description that stands for a conjunction of  properties, that was in turn instantiated by at 
least and at most one individual. The problem is that what seems to relate (directly or via a 
conjunction of  properties) "Socrates" with its referent is something that existed in the past (some 
initial baptism and some part of  the causal chain or, in the other case, the instantiation of  that 
conjunction of  properties by at least and at most one individual). Again: we can meaningfully use 
"Socrates" (an existing grammatical proper name) in order to refer to Socrates but, from the 
                                                 
272 See Markosian (2004). 
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actualist-presentist ontological perspective, there exists now no appropriate reference relation. 
Perhaps, "Socrates" just has a reference, even if  the referent has died. Yet, this seems to be a fact 
about language, not a fact that is relevant from an ontological viewpoint and it needs to be 
grounded from that viewpoint. We are not interested here in the reference of  grammatically 
proper names as a linguistic fact: we are interested in the ontological implications of  such a 
reference relation273.  
 What about proposition-based actualist presentism? C. Bourne argues that temporal 
propositions can be considered present-tensed propositions that can be embedded or not 
embedded within tense operators274. Thus, we will have, for example, the proposition [Michele 
existst]. This proposition is true simpliciter, since it is now true. Other tensed propositions, such as 
[Socrates existst] are not true simpliciter (they are false simpliciter), even if  they are true at a time. 
Furthermore, after having embedded [Socrates existst] within a past operator, thus having 
P[Socrates existst], that proposition is true simpliciter. This happens because times are maximal and 
consistent sets of  true tensed (not embedded) propositions and because, roughly, there is some 
relation between some time at which [Socrates existst] is true and the present time
275. Bourne, 
however, could not accept the proposition [Socrates existst], since it is perhaps better to use a 
proposition with a tensed quantifier and some conjunction of  properties. Yet, the problem with 
this account does not lie in which proposition we choose, but in the counterintuitive conception 
of  times it adopts. If  times simply are maximal and consistent sets of  true tensed and not 
embedded propositions, time's passage seems to depend on change within the present set of  true 
propositions: some propositions become false simpliciter (e.g., the proposition [Socrates' existst] 
becomes false after Socrates' death) and other propositions become true simpliciter, and this seems 
to be the reason for which the present set of  true propositions becomes a past one and a new set 
arises (i.e., times change). However, it seems that the truth and falsity of  propositions depend on 
facts that happen in time: the proposition [Socrates' existst] becomes false only because there is a 
time at which Socrates does not exist anymore, and this seems to be the reason for which a new 
time (a new set of  true simpliciter propositions) arises, only after Socrates' death. The passage of  
time seems to be presupposed by (and it does not depend on) change within the present set of  
true propositions. 
 Another interesting account of  proposition-based presentism (even if  not necessarily an 
actualist one) can be given in the following terms. Tensed propositions are abstract objects that 
exist at every time. However, they aret true if  they havet truth-makers and they aret false if  they 
                                                 
273 For some replies to this problem, see Orilia (2012): 118-125. 
274 See Bourne (2006).  
275 However, it is worth remarking that Bourne talks of relations between ordered pairs. 
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lackt them. A proposition such as [Socrates existst] ist false, because it lackst a truth-maker but, 
since it had a truth-maker, [Socrates existed] ist true. Thus, it seems that the proposition [the 
proposition that [Socrates existst] had a truth-maker] existst and ist true. The truth-maker needs 
not to existt, in order for this latter proposition to bet true. We could defend this conception even 
claiming that propositions are atemporal, i.e., that they do not exist in time. However, in this case, 
a problem would arise: propositions change their truth-values, thus having tensed truth-values, so 
that they turn out to exist in time. If  we gave them eternal truth-values, in order to make them 
atemporal, such as the truth-value of  being true at t1, then tensed propositions would have 
untensed truth-values (and this is denied by many A-theorists). In this latter case, how would we 
be able to avoid fatalism, i.e., a doctrine that most presentists do not accept?  
 On the other hand, what does it happen if  we accept that propositions exist at every 
time? Well, [Nothan existst], for example, or some corresponding proposition about some 
particular future individual, might bet false. However, in order for such propositions to exist at 
every time, they must have clear identity conditions at every time. Hence, what identity conditions 
would they have before Nothan's existence? Thus, there aret no propositions that will be true or 
there aret propositions that will be true, but which aret not about Nothan (and we have already 
noticed the difficulties of  this position). So far, so good. However, every singular tensed 
proposition such as [x existst] is a proposition that, before having a truth-maker (i.e., at least 
before x's existence), ist false and existst, even without having definite identity conditions. Thus, 
providing the difficulty of  finding out such identity conditions, it is perhaps not true that every 
proposition exists at every time. At the end of  the first part of  this work, we are left with a 
twofold problem: on the one hand, it seems neither legitimate to claim that singular tensed (or 
untensed) existential statements can be paraphrased into non-existential ones, nor that they 
express non-singular and/or non-existential propositions, nor that they are made true by anything 
not implying singular objects' existence. On the other hand, it seems that there are (tensed or 
untensed) singular existential propositions (positive or negative, true or false ones) iff  there exist 
singular objects that give them definite identity conditions. Thus, the propositions [Socrates 
existst] and [Socrates existsu] can neither exist, nor have any truth-value, before Socrates' 
existence, since they do not have any definite identity condition before Socrates' birth. This does 
not merely happen because Socrates himself  is a constituent of  such propositions: even denying 
this latter thesis, one could maintain that, before Socrates' existence, the singular existential 
proposition [Socrates existst] does not exist, because it can have an identity by only referring to 
Socrates and, since Socrates does not existt before his existence, that proposition has no identity 
and, from the Quinean perspective, no existence. With regard to [Socrates existsu], this 
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proposition would not existu (for the same reasons) and would not be false, if  Socrates did not 
existu: it cannot exist and be false only because Socrates does not existu. This is the ultimate 
difficulty of  Quinean existence. Is it possible to escape from it?  
 Before leaving presentism, let me consider one non-actualist versions of  the same 
doctrine. According to Q. Smith276, only present things fully exist. Yet, past and future things are 
not simply non-existent: they are less existent (or less real) than present ones. Present existence is 
full existence or, better, present existents are fully existent. Thus, Socrates still exists, even if  he 
does not fully exist, while I fully exist, even if  I (unfortunately) will decrease in my existence, and 
Nothan does not fully exist, even if  he will fully exist. Things that do not fully exist do not have 
monadic properties: they have their properties by a relation to times. I confess that I do not 
understand such a kind of  presentism. For example, accepting Smith’s solution, it is not true that 
Socrates does not exist anymore, since Socrates continues existing: it is true that Socrates does 
not fully exist anymore. Nevertheless, this would merely turn out to avail a verbal dispute: full 
existence can be considered a yes/no property, while it seems to be far from clear that it is 
necessary to introduce degrees of  existence in order to state that Socrates existed and that 
Nothan will exist. Perhaps, this strategy is dictated by an actualist worry. Yet, it seems to me that 
few actualists would consider it acceptable. 
 Yet, the problem of  absolute change perhaps reveals the major virtues of  presentism. If  
we accept that it is true that (59) and that (62), i.e., that Socrates has ceased to exist and that 
Michele has started to exist, presentists could argue that their theory is the most compatible 
ontological theory with such facts. Furthermore, it is the most compatible one with what 
common sense takes it to be absolute change: something that involves Socrates and Michele 
themselves. In fact, presentists think, roughly, that something were present but it is now not 
present anymore (considering Socrates) and that something were not present, but it is now 
present (considering Michele). If  this analysis does not work, then it turns out to be really 
difficult to conceive of  absolute change. However, if, according to the actualist presentists, there 
are no things that do not exist now and existence was/is now/will be not a first-order and 
informative property, things become more complicated. In order for (59) and (62) to be true now, 
there must now be something different from Socrates and from Michele's existence that make 
them true.  
 For example, property-based actualist presentists could reply that some property or 
relation (some individual essence or haecceity or some conjunction of  properties or 
grammatically proper names' having a referent) has ceased to be instantiated (in Socrates' case) or 
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has started to be instantiated (in Michele's case). However, in order to claim that it is the case that 
such-and-such property has started or has ceased to be instantiated, one has to presuppose that it 
was the case that it was not instantiated and it is now instantiated (in Michele's case) or that it was 
the case that it was instantiated and it is now not instantiated (in Socrates' case). Regardless of  the 
problems of  identity and existence for properties that are not now instantiated (or that was not 
instantiated in the past, with regard to the past), one could think that it is because Socrates existed 
and does not exist anymore that such things happened (and happen) to properties, and not the 
opposite. What happened and happens now to these properties seems to depend on Socrates' 
and Michele's present and past existential status.  
 The same seems to happen with propositions. Regardless of  the problems of  identity and 
existence of  propositions such as [Socrates has ceased to exist] and [Michele has started to exist], 
they seem to be true (and to be true now) in virtue of  something that happened to Socrates' 
existential status and Michele's existential status. To appeal to the opposite would amount to 
reverse the order of  explanation. 
 Thus, if  presentism is true, actualist presentism seems nevertheless to be forced to face 
many problems. If  it were the most attractive perspective for a presentist, as many presentists 
argue, then the task of  presentism would be quite complicated, as I have tried to argue. However, 
it is not necessary to be an actualist in order to be a presentist and, if  what I have claimed is true, 
a non-actualist presentism seems to define a legitimate and not so "frivolous"277 variety of  
presentism. 
 
I.4.5. Thank Goodness it still exists! 
In general, non-presentists deny both the truth of  (presentism) and (presentism'), i.e., they claim 
that 
 
(non-presentism) there are things that are not present; 
 
(non-presentism') there were things that were not present or (vel) there aret things that are not 
present or (vel) there will be things that will not be present. 
 
 However, many non-presentists argue that we do not have to talk of  what happens in 
time by using tensed forms and properties such as the ones of  being present, past or future or 
that, even though it is legitimate to use such forms and properties, no tensed statement is made 
true by irreducible A-facts (e.g., the fact that Michele exists in the present). There are many 
varieties of  non-presentist theories. For example, according to eternalists, there areu events (and 
things) that are not properly present, but are future or past. When we claim that some event is 
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present or that something exists in the present, we do not talk in a perspicuous way or our 
statements express propositions that do not involve any reference to the objective present for 
their being true or such tensed statements and propositions are made true by B-facts. If  the 
present is not objective, then everything exists, regardless of  its being present, past or future, i.e., 
of  its being simultaneous with us (and with the tokens of  our tensed statements) or of  its being 
many years distant from us. While presentists generally think that there is no analogy between 
time and space, eternalists generally admit that time is analogous to space, that it is something like 
a fourth dimension, in which events (and things) are more or less distant from one another. Yet, 
not all the non-presentists are eternalists. For example, I shall briefly analyze one position 
according to which, while past and present events (and things) exist, future events (and things) do 
not exist or are less-than-real.  
 D. H. Mellor has developed one of  the most interesting versions of  eternalism. While 
"old" eternalists thought that each tensed statement should be reduced to an untensed one, 
Mellor argues that there are legitimately true or false irreducible tensed statements' tokens and 
beliefs, that nevertheless express B-propositions and are made true by B-facts. Thus, what about 
the statements (57)-(63)? Mellor argues that it is always true, given any event e, that e existsu. In 
fact, if  e exists at some time t, the B-proposition [e exists] is true and, accepting eternalist theses, 
it is always true278. Concerning things, it is possible to argue that, since it is always true that there 
exists some event involving something, then it is always true that that thing exists too. In fact, if  
we argued that there exist events even if  things involved in those events do not exist, we should 
defend an account of  events as existentially independent of  things and of  things as existentially 
independent of  events.   
 Yet, if  events always exist and things always exist, it is literally false that (58), (59), (61)-
(63). In fact, Socrates simply existsu, even if  he livesu in spatio-temporal regions that are 
inaccessible to us: he has not ceased to existu. On the other hand, I have not started to exist: I 
simply existu, even before my birth, and Nothan simply existsu too. Yet, with regard to such 
statements, I think that Mellor's account falls in trouble. In fact, Mellor argues that there are B-
facts that make A-beliefs and A-statements' tokens true or false at given times (or that, in general, 
determine the truth-value changes of  such beliefs and statements). So far, so good. Yet, there is 
no B-fact that makes the A-statements (58), (59), (61)-(63)'s tokens true at any time! In sum, there 
is no true token of  such statements. Thus, there are some A-statements' tokens that are always 
false. One could reply that they are not always false, since their truth-makers do not involve any 
reference to Socrates' or Michele's or Nothan's existence. However, as I have already tried to 
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argue with regard to specular presentist attempts, such strategies do not seem to work.  
 Even if  Mellor does not accept that events' existence is time-relative, we could try to 
introduce time-relative existence in order to deal with such statements' tokens279. Thus, for 
example, a token of  (58) is true at some time t (i.e., it is simply true, since it exists at that time) iff  
Socrates existsu at some time before t and does not exist at t. Yet, it is literally false that Socrates 
does not exist at t: if  eternalism is true, it is always (i.e., at every time t) true that Socrates existsu. 
On the other hand, if  it were true that there are things that exist at some time t (e.g., that have the 
property of  existing at t), but that do not simply exist, there would be non-existent things that 
would nevertheless exist: eternalism would contradict (actualism) and (actualism-a). If  that token 
of  (58) were true at some time t (i.e., if  it were simply true) iff  some event involving some 
property (e.g., some individual essence) occurred at t, then that property would nevertheless have 
to exist at t. Thus, according to eternalism and (actualism), it would exist at any time, with all the 
problems already examined with regard to its existence and identity.  
 This is only a sketch of  the eternalist doctrines of  existence. The result of  such a sketch 
is simply that, if  every object and event always existu, then things and events neither start to exist, 
nor they stop existing. There is no substantial change. Furthermore, if  what Mellor claims about 
existence at times is correct, then events' existing at times does not seem to be relevant with 
regard to their existential status: to claim that some event exists at some time simply is to claim 
that that event occurs at that time. Yet, if  every event exists at every time, then every event also 
exists at every time before and after the time at which it occurs.  
 However, Mellor, even being an eternalist, seems to adopt an endurantist approach on 
things' change. What about a perdurantist or an exdurantist eternalism? T. Sider defends an 
exdurantist version of  eternalism, according to which, roughly, things are temporal stages of  
processes280. In order to deal with the problem of  change and, more generally, with tensed true 
statements, Sider introduces temporal counterparts relative to kinds. For example, if  we claim 
that it is true that Michele once was a boy, the truth-value of  this statement depends on there 
beingu a person stage x at some time prior to the time of  utterance, such that x isu a boy and x isu 
a temporal counterpart of  Michele's (who is, in turn, a person stage)281. Yet, it seems to me that 
the relation of  being a temporal counterpart is too weak in order to guarantee any continuity 
between Michele and that past person stage. For example, I could have two different past 
temporal counterparts relative to one and the same kind and one and the same criterion of  
identity determined by that kind. If  we claim, for example, that, in order for some person stage x 
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at some time t1 to be a temporal counterpart of  some person stage y at some time t2 it is 
necessary that x is at t1 the most similar person stage to y at t2 according to some criterion C, then 
nothing excludes that there could be some other person stage z at t1, different from x, that is 
equally similar to y at t2 according to C. Furthermore, following Sider's account, stages could have 
different temporal counterpart relations in respect of  different kinds. On the other hand, with 
regard to qualitative change, it seems legitimate to admit that there must be some one-one 
relation between stages, even if  we do not wish to admit that the whole thing changes its 
properties while remaining one and the same thing. Furthermore, when we claim that things 
substantially change, i.e., that they start and cease to exist, that they did not exist before some 
time and that they will not exist after some other time, it seems that there must be no temporal 
counterpart at all of  this stage of  Michele's (i.e., the present stage of  Michele's, the stage that is 
simultaneous with the time of  these true written utterances) before the time of  Michele's birth. 
Finally, Sider's account is still committed to an eternalist notion of  existence, according to which 
everything existsu at every time, i.e., nothing properly starts nor ceases to existu.  
 Yet, not all the non-presentists are eternalists. For example, M. Tooley believes that there 
are past and present events, while there are no future events, i.e., the past and the present are real, 
while the future is not real. He distinguishes two different notions of  actuality: actuality simpliciter 
and actuality as of  a time. Both notions are primitive: we cannot reduce actuality as of  a time to 
actuality simpliciter. A state of  affairs or an event is actual as of  the time of  its occurrence: it does 
not exist before that time282. If  a state of  affairs exists at a time, then its constituents exist at that 
time too283. Yet, when it is actual as of  a time, it becomes actual simpliciter too. In fact, Tooley 
thinks that, in general, x is an actual, temporal entity or state of  affairs iff  x is part of  the 
mereological whole that is composed of  every state of  affairs that is actual as of  some time t or 
other284. Since, considering all the times, no future state of  affairs (or entity) is actual as of  some 
time, no future state of  affairs (or entity) is actual simpliciter. According to Tooley, the present is 
the point at which states of  affairs come into existence (and entities too). It is possible to think 
that some entity comes into existence at the time as of  whose its first state of  affairs (i.e., the first 
state of  affairs having that entity as one of  its constituents) is actual.  
 The problem with Tooley's account is that, while it tries to preserve the truth of  many 
commonsensically true statements by differentiating actuality simpliciter and actuality as of  a time, 
the primitiveness of  actuality as of  a time is not well-grounded. In fact, as we have already 
noticed, it seems that actuality simpliciter depends on actuality as of  a time. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
282 See Tooley (1997): 113. 
283 See Tooley (1997): 237. 
284 See Tooley (1997): 153. 
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notions of  actuality as of  a time and of  the totality of  existence are both primitive. From 
Tooley’s perspective, this is requested by a dynamic view of  the world: if  such notions were not 
primitive, then the world would not be dynamic285. In fact, the eternalists' world is a static one: 
things do not really come into existence, nothing substantially changes. In order for something to 
come into existence, it cannot be thought of, at first, as actual simpliciter and then, secondly, as 
actual as of  a time. However, what is for something to be actual as of  a time, if  being actual 
simpliciter is something different? What does the non-actuality of  Socrates' being a philosopher as 
of  a time after Socrates' death amount to, if  actuality as of  some time is not connected with 
actuality simpliciter? In general, what does being actual mean in this case? I confess that I do not 
understand this notion: one might well take it as a primitive one, even if  s/he does not 
understand it, but I think that this would not be a good philosophical move.  
 Furthermore, following Tooley's account, things do not cease to exist: there are states of  
affairs involving Socrates that are actual simpliciter, even though they are not actual as of  a time 
after Socrates' death (e.g., Socrates' being a philosopher). Yet, there are other states of  affairs (e.g., 
the state of  affairs of  Michele's thinking of  Socrates) that are actual as of  a time after Socrates' 
death. Are they legitimate states of  affairs? Do they involve the actuality of  Socrates as of  a time 
after Socrates' death? If  they are legitimate states of  affairs, then Socrates must be actual simpliciter 
and actual as of  a time at which Michele thinks of  him: Socrates neither stops being actual 
simpliciter, nor he is not actual anymore as of  any time after his death. If  such states of  affairs do 
not involve the actuality of  Socrates as of  a time after Socrates' death, why is it necessary to 
admit (at least in this case) that Socrates is actual simpliciter and that the past is actual simpliciter? 
 Finally and more generally, is the past, being actual simpliciter, actual as of  any time after its 
occurring? On the one hand, it seems that past states of  affairs cannot be actual as of  times after 
their occurring, even being actual simpliciter. On the other hand, if  we claim that the past and the 
present are both real and if  we do not wish to adopt a presentist perspective, I do not understand 
how it is possible not to consider past states of  affairs actual as of  the present time (or the time 
which is simultaneous with some utterance of  ours). This difficulty is caused by the confusion 
between actuality simpliciter and actuality as of  a time that we have already analyzed and that seems 
to be part of  the general confusion between different meanings of  existence from non-presentist 
perspectives. 
 Yet, a non-presentist could simply grant this point and reply that there is no evidence in 
favor of  substantial change. In particular, a non-eternalist non-presentist could argue that there is 
no evidence in favor of  things' ceasing to exist. I do not have any knock-down argument against 
                                                 
285 See Tooley (1997): 39-42. 
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such a thesis, i.e., I cannot demonstrate that there is something like substantial change. However, 
I think that, if  one rests on commonsensical assumptions, Socrates is something that does not 
exist anymore: perhaps his atoms (and/or his soul, or whatever else) continue existing, but it 
seems to me legitimate to accept that Socrates himself  is now non-existent. The ambiguity 
between non-existence simpliciter and non-existence at a time (provided that it is legitimate to 
introduce existence and non-existence at times as something different from existence and non-
existence simpliciter, and I have tried to argue that it is not) constitutes a case against non-
presentism. Is this sufficient to demonstrate that non-presentism is wrong and presentism is 
right? I do not think it is. Yet, if  we do not have any acceptable argument against substantial 
change, it is perhaps better to accept a theory that accommodates this commonsensical datum, 
rather than a theory that denies it.  
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II.1. One and Many: Objects and Properties 
The first chapter of  this second part is concerned with a preliminary account of  objects and 
properties. In fact, in order to know whether existence is a first- or second-order property and 
whether there is any real difference between existent and non-existent objects, we have first to 
clarify the notions of  object and property. According to my perspective, these notions are 
primitive and strictly connected. They are primitive, because they cannot be reduced to other 
notions. They are strictly connected, because it is legitimate to think of  an object as something 
which bears properties and to think of  a property as something which is borne (or it is thought 
of  as being borne) by (at least) one object or by (at least) one property. However, even though 
these notions are primitive, it is important to characterize objects and properties by describing 
some of  their relevant features and to distinguish between them, i.e., we wish to find out some 
distinguishing feature(s) of  objects qua objects and of  properties qua properties. Secondly, we 
wish to deal with four problems concerning properties:  
(I) how many properties are there? Namely, is there a property for each grammatical predicate? 
(II) If  it is possible, how can we identify one property with another property? 
(III) What is the nexus/relationship between objects and properties? 
(IV) Are there seemingly "superfluous" properties, such as negative ones? 
The answers to problems (II)-(IV) strictly depend on the answer to problem (I). In 
particular, given that predicates represent one of  our most immediate ways of  access to 
properties, we have to clarify the nature of  the connection between predicates and properties.  
In the next sections, I shall try to deal with such problems, in order to ground the 
solutions to the several problems concerning objects' existence and non-existence. 
 
II.1.1. Objects and Properties: Some Preliminary Definitions. 
What is for something to be an object? At first sight, this question seems to be redundant. In 
fact, in order for something to be an object, it seems that it must simply be something. However, 
we do not have to confuse this question with another, quite different one: is some thing (e.g., this 
table, my pen, Tibbles the cat) an object? In asking the former question, we wish to know if  there 
is some distinguishing feature of  something's objecthood, while in asking the latter one we wish 
to know if  some definite thing is an object.  
Let me consider something, e.g., Obama. Obama is an object. Yet, why is Obama an 
object? Quite trivially, he is an object because he is something. Yet, what is for something to be 
something? And, provided that something can also be a property, are properties objects? Our 
experience of  the world, our knowledge of  reality seems to be qualified by objecthood: we have 
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to distinguish objects, to separate different things, which can be counted as one and which cannot 
be identical with other things. However, we could think of  the world as one object and of  the 
several objects of  our experience and knowledge as several aspects of  this all-embracing object. 
Yet, this would not be a good objection to objecthood in reality and/or in our field of  
knowledge: even if  there were only one object (the world), this object would nonetheless be an 
object. It is possible to claim that objecthood qualifies not only our thoughts and experiences, but 
also reality, even if  we can ask whether there are several real objects or only one real object (the 
world). However, it seems acceptable that there are many real objects, given that it is legitimate to 
think of  something without thinking of  other things. For example, in order to think of  Obama, I 
do not have to think of  a chair. Why do we have to think that there is only one real object (the 
world) and that all the apparent objects of  our knowledge and experience (i.e., Obama, my chair) 
are different aspects of  the world? We think of  real objects as independent objects, which can be 
thought of  by themselves. Yet, we can find out that, for example, in order for something to have 
existence, there must exist some other thing and in order for something to be thought of  we have 
to think of  other things. For example, if  I wish to claim that Obama is (exists), I have to think 
that he was generated by something and that he lives because there are other things (the food, the 
water, the air), so that he has no independent existence. And if  I wish to think of  Obama as a 
man, I have to know what is for something to be a man and (perhaps) I have to know things/real 
objects which are men. Yet, there is another datum: Obama, this definite object, is different from 
my chair or from Putin, so that I can think of  Obama even without thinking of  my chair or of  
Putin, and Obama would perhaps exist, even if  Putin and/or my chair did not exist. In the 
former case, there would be at least three real objects: Obama, Putin and my chair. Thus, I do not 
think that the former remarks on Obama's independent existence and conceivability would be 
sufficient to prove that there is only one real object (the world). It may be true that some things 
are existentially or conceptually dependent on other things. Yet, this is not sufficient to prove that 
nothing is existentially independent, except the world286. 
However, if  we accept that we think of  several objects and that there are several (real) 
objects, it seems that we have already accepted that, in order for something to be an object, it is 
sufficient that it is something. The notion of  something is qualified by some relevant features: being 
a thing and being one. An object is one because it has some kind of  intrinsic unity (if  it has parts, 
it is not identical with its parts, nor with the sum of  its parts), in virtue of  which it bears certain 
properties which are not borne by its parts nor by the sum of  its parts, and because it is 
legitimately considered different from other objects (it is not identical with other objects). 
                                                 
286 For a defense of existence monism, see Horgan, Potrĉ (2012).  
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Furthermore, it seems that an object is a thing because it has some kind of  independence (in our 
mind and/or in reality): I can think of  Obama, even without thinking of  Putin, and it seems that 
Obama’s existence does not depend on Putin’s existence (even though it perhaps depends on the 
existence of  Obama’s atoms).  
Thirdly, an object bears properties, both trivial and non-trivial ones (e.g., a trivial property 
is the property of  being an object)287. The properties which are borne by an object imply other 
properties, which are also borne by that object. For example, if  it is true that Obama is a man and 
if  it is true that all the men are animals, it is also true that Obama is an animal. Obama bears the 
property of  being an animal only because he bears the property of  being a man. Finally, 
accepting an Aristotelian conception of  objects qua primary substances, objects are neither borne 
by objects, nor by properties288. Our first definition of  objects goes as follows: 
 
(d1) x is an object = x is something = it is one (it has some kind of  intrinsic unity and it is different 
from other entities, so that is has definite identity conditions) and it is a thing (it has some kind of  
independence, in mind and/or in reality) and it bears trivial and non-trivial properties and it is not 
borne by any entity. 
 
With regard to properties and considering properties which are directly expressed by 
predicates (abundant properties), I think that they share certain features of  objects: one property 
(e.g., the property of  being human) is different from other properties; it can bear certain trivial 
and non-trivial properties (e.g., the property of  being a property and all the other properties 
which are implied by it; concerning the property of  being human, the property of  implying the 
instantiation of  the property of  being an animal). Do properties have some kind of  intrinsic 
unity? Are they independent? Let me consider the property of  being human: it can be defined, 
following a traditional definition, as logically equivalent to the conjunction of  the properties of  
being an animal and of  being rational (i.e., its instantiation by any object is logically equivalent to 
the instantiation of  that conjunction of  properties by that object). This property is connected 
with other properties, which are implied by the properties of  being an animal and/or by being 
rational: the property of  being able to think, the property of  living, etc. Yet, we do not claim that 
the property of  being human has the property of  thinking. We only claim that Obama, for 
example, qua human, thinks or can think.  
                                                 
287 I accept here an abundant conception of properties (that will be discussed in the next sections), according to 
which, roughly, every predicate denotes a property. For the distinction between abundant and sparse conceptions of 
properties, see Lewis (1986): 50-69, and Swoyer, Orilia (2011). Furthermore, as we will see in the next page, I accept 
the idea that every property is borne (or it is thought of as being borne) by (at least) one object or (at least) one 
property. 
288 I shall ignore here Ramsey’s problem concerning the distinction between particulars and universals on the basis of 
the distinction between bearers and borne entities (see Ramsey (1925)). However, for a solution to that problem, see 
Lowe (2006): 101-118. 
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Moreover, is the property of  being human identical with the conjunction of  its defining 
properties? And is this conjunction a mere sum? Following Armstrong's theses289, if  a property is 
logically equivalent to a conjunction of  properties (which are not reducible to conjunctions of  
other properties), these latter properties have ontological import (we are ontologically committed 
to their existence or, if  we do not aim at accepting that properties exist, to there being such 
properties), while the former property does not have any ontological import. Well, it does not 
seem that the property of  being human does not have any ontological import, even though it 
seems to be strictly connected with other properties, i.e., even though it seems to be logically 
equivalent to the conjunction of  at least two properties (the properties of  being an animal and of  
being rational). In fact, we cannot eliminate the property of  being human by only claiming that 
there are the properties of  being an animal and of  being rational: even provided that the property 
of  being human is the conjunction of  those latter properties, that conjunction is one further 
property, i.e., the property of  being human. Thus, that object seems to have three properties: the 
property of  being human and, in virtue of this property, the properties of  being an animal and of  
being rational. I do not see any reason for claiming that there are only two properties or only one 
conjunctive property290. I shall discuss this problem in the next sections. However, given that 
properties seem to be ways objects are, it is legitimate to accept this definition: 
 
(d2) P is a property = P is one (it has some kind of  intrinsic unity and it is different from other 
entities, so that it has identity conditions) and it is an attribute of  some entity (in mind and/or in 
reality) (i.e., it is borne or it is thought of  as being borne by some entity). 
 
It is worth adding to (d2) that: a property bears some trivial properties (the property of  being a 
property and all the other properties which are implied by it) and it has relations with other 
properties. 
After having defined objects and properties, it is possible to make four important 
remarks. First, according to our definitions, it is legitimate to quantify both over objects and 
properties, since they both have identity conditions. Thus, on the one hand, only objects are 
things. Yet, on the other hand, even properties are something. In order to distinguish these two 
meanings of  "something", I shall claim that everything that is an object is something, while 
everything that has identity conditions (i.e., both objects and properties) is something* or, better, 
an item. Secondly, we can be sure that objects cannot be properties and that properties cannot be 
                                                 
289 See Armstrong (1997): 12, and Armstrong (1978). 
290 This point can be reinforced by considering Moore’s paradox of analysis and, in particular, by claiming that, if the 
properties of being a human were identical with the conjunctive property of being an animal and being rational, then 
they would nevertheless not be substitutable within non-extensional contexts. See, for example, Moore (1968), Varzi, 
Orilia (1998), Orilia (2000). 
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objects. Properties are always properties of something, i.e. of  an object or of  another property. 
On the other hand, it is possible that objects (really and/or conceptually) depend on other 
objects, but they are not borne by anything and there is always at least one property that can be 
instantiated by and/or be thought of  as attributed to an object and which is not instantiated by 
and/or be thought of  as attributed to the objects on which it depends. Thus, for example, it is 
legitimate to claim that Obama and his body are two different objects (at least in our minds), 
since there are properties that we think of  as being instantiated by Obama and not by his body 
(and/or the opposite), even though they might be one and the same concrete object. Thirdly, as it 
has been already implicitly claimed, I have to remark that I am not only thinking of  concrete 
objects, but also of  non-concrete ones, which can be considered objects too, according to 
object's definition (d1), of  events, facts, and so on, i.e., of  everything that fits that definition. 
Thus, my framework will be a two-category ontology, even though the category of  objects 
comprehends items that are traditionally not thought of  as primary substances. Fourthly, there is 
no need to mention the existential status of  an item (i.e., to claim or to presuppose that that item 
exists) in order to consider it an object or a property. In the next chapter, I shall develop this 
intuition. 
 
II.1.2. Properties are only Properties. 
After having defined the notions of  object and property, we should deal with problems (I)-(IV). 
With regard to problem (III), it seems to me that we should at first distinguish two different, yet 
strictly connected problems: 
(IIIa) are objects simple entities (simple in regard to their properties)? And, if  they are not 
simple, what is their internal structure? Are the differences between their supposed constituents 
real or only conceptual? 
(IIIb) What is the nature of  properties in regard to their being instantiated by objects? 
Let me consider the true proposition expressed by 
 
(64) Obama is human. 
 
In regard to problem (IIIa), we should investigate the nature of  the object named 
"Obama": is Obama a simple object or not? What is his internal structure? Does Obama have 
internal constituents which are really distinct from one another?  
Accepting a classical distinction between theories of  objects, it is legitimate to interpret 
(64) in two different ways, i.e., as 
 
(64aa) Obama is a particular which bears the property of  being human, 
 
or as 
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(64ab) Obama is a bundle of  properties (universal and/or particular ones), which comprehends 
the property of  being human. 
 
Such solutions follow from two radically different assumptions: given (64aa), which 
generally expresses substance theorists' positions, the object seems to be considered more 
primitive than its properties; given (64ab), which generally expresses bundle theorists' positions, 
properties are considered more primitive than their object(s)291. Among substance theories, it is 
possible to introduce further distinctions: 
 
(64aaa) Obama is a bare particular, numerically distinct from other bare particulars, which bears 
Obama's properties, including the property of  being human. 
 
(64aab) Obama is a thick particular, which is constituted by a thin particular and all of  Obama’s 
properties, including the (universal) property of  being human. 
 
(64aac) Obama is a substance which has a real essence and which belongs, in virtue of  its 
essence, to one or more type(s) of  substances, including the type expressed by the property of  
being human. 
 
Accepting some traditional objections, it is possible to show that solutions (64aaa) and 
(64aab) present some problems: if  it is true that (64aaa), then bare particulars seem to be 
qualitatively identical with one another and they nevertheless have to bear some properties qua 
bare particulars (e.g., the property of  being particular), even though this seems to be excluded by 
the fact that they are bare; if  it is true that (64aab), then the nature of  thin particulars is not clear 
because, if  they have no qualities, they are only bare particulars, while, if  they have qualities, they 
are similar to essences of  objects, so that thick particulars (at least according to Armstrong, who 
defends this position292) are nothing more than objects considered in regard to all their 
properties, while thin particulars turn out to be the same objects considered only in regard to 
their essential properties. Yet, if  it is true that (64aac), then we should remark that each substance 
can belong to several types, that it is not simple to identify such types and that the nature of  
ontological dependence of  substances on other substances (e.g., of  complex substances on 
simple ones) is not clear.  
Among bundles theories, it is legitimate at least to distinguish between properties bundle 
theorists and tropes bundle theorists: 
 
(64aba) Obama is a bundle of  universal properties, one of  which is the property of  being human. 
 
                                                 
291 For this distinction, see, for example, Armstrong (1978): volume I. 
292 See Armstrong (1978): vol. II. 
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(64abb) Obama is a bundle of  particular properties (tropes), one of  which is the particular 
humanity of  Obama. 
 
There are several problems connected with bundle theories: does an object remain the 
same object, if  it changes one of  its properties/tropes over time? Does it have essential 
properties? How do we explain the similarity between two different bundles?293  
I think that the best theory of  objects' constitution is the one expressed by (64aac). In 
particular, if  something is an object, it must have some kind of  identity-independence in regard 
to its properties (as it is made clear by the arguments in chapter I.4, I do not think that objects 
identity-depends, for example, on their haecceities). Furthermore, if  we consider identity-
dependence grounded on identity of  properties, it seems reasonable to accept the following 
definitions: 
 
(d3) a certain object a is totally ontologically identity-dependent on a certain object b iff  every property 
of  a is instantiated by b or it is implied by the properties of  b. 
 
(d4) A certain object a is partly ontologically identiy-dependent on a certain object b iff  at least one 
property of  a is instantiated and/or implied by one or more than one property of  b, but not all 
the properties of  a are instantiated by b or implied by the properties of  b. 
 
(d5) A certain object a is totally conceptually identity-dependent on a certain object b iff  every property 
of  a should be thought of  as instantiated by b or implied by the properties of  b. 
 
(d6) A certain object a is partly conceptually identity-dependent on a certain object b iff  at least one 
property of  a should be thought of  as implied by one or more than one property of  b, but not all 
the properties of  a should be thought of  as instantiated by b or implied by the properties of  b. 
 
It follows from these definitions that two objects can be ontologically identity-dependent, 
even without being conceptually identity-dependent. 
I shall not report all the objections against the theories expressed by (64aaa), (64aab), 
(64aba), (64abb) and against nominalism of  predicates and conceptualism, i.e., against the major 
rivals of  the theory expressed by (64aac). It seems to me that the intuition behind the 
interpretations expressed by (64aaa), (64aab), (64aba) and (64abb) is that properties should be 
considered objects, which constitute other objects. Yet, from my perspective, properties cannot 
be objects: where can we find properties, except in objects or as properties instantiated by other 
properties? What kind of  ontological identity-independence do they have from objects? How do 
they subsist without objects? Objects, in fact, if  they are not identical with other objects, have 
                                                 
293 For a detailed examination of theories of universals, see also Moreland (2001) and Calemi (2012). 
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some kind of  identity-independence. Yet, with regard to properties, even though it is true that the 
property of  being human is not identity-dependent on its instantiation by certain human beings, it 
seems to me unreasonable to assume that this property subsists without being instantiated (or 
without being thought of  as instantiated) by objects that are human. From my Aristotelian 
perspective, it is part of  the nature of  properties that they are instantiated (or that they are 
thought of  as being instantiated) by objects or by other properties.  
In sum, the distinction between a certain object and its properties is different from the 
distinction between different objects: the object and its properties do not really subsist apart 
from one another, as different objects. Furthermore, properties have other properties: for 
example, the property of  being human has the property of  being a property. Properties can be 
related with other properties too, but they do not seem to properly instantiate these latter 
properties: the property of  being human, for example, is related to the property of  being an 
animal, but the property of  being human does not instantiate the property of  being an animal. 
If  properties are not objects and if  we accept (64aac), there follows that properties 
depend on objects in a peculiar way, which is different from the kinds of  identity-dependence 
expressed by (d3)-(d6). The following thesis seems to me acceptable: 
 
(t1) every property P depends on at least one object (or on at least one other property) because 
there must be at least one object (or at least one other property) which instantiates it and/or 
which is thought of  as instantiating it. 
 
The notion of  object is assumed with a wide range, in order to comprehend both 
concrete and non-concrete objects.  
Thus, I do not wish to claim that there are no uninstantiated properties (i.e., properties 
that are not instantiated by concrete objects). Yet, I wish to claim that  
 
(t2) every property must be instantiated by and/or thought of  as being instantiated by at least 
one object (or by at least one other property). 
 
This is nothing more than a widened version of  the Principle of  Instantiation. I think 
that (t1) and (t2) express adequate replies to our problem (IIIb). With regard to (IIIa), it is 
legitimate to claim that objects are simple with regard to their properties, because they are not 
really constituted by properties.  
Before leaving this topic, I would like to face two questions: the question of  nominalized 
predicates and the question of  uninstantiated and alien properties.  
According to Frege294, when we use "is human" in (64), we refer to the concept of  being 
                                                 
294 See Frege 1892 (1960): 42-55. 
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human as a concept. Concepts, in this case, are not mental and subjective entities: they seem to 
be functions, so that the Fregean term "concept" seems to have a meaning quite similar to the 
meaning of  our term "property". Yet, if  we use "the concept of  'being human'" or "the concept 
of  'humanity'" or simply "humanity" as subject in 
 
(65) humanity is a concept, 
 
we claim something false, because "humanity", in this case, at least from the Fregean perspective, 
does not refer to a concept, it does not occupy the predicate-place, but it refers to a concept-
correlate, i.e., to an object.  
On the other hand, according to Russell295, this distinction is not well-grounded. In fact, 
following our example, when we truly claim that 
 
(66) being human is a concept, 
 
we claim something true, even though "being human" is used in subject-place. A concept does 
not become a concept-correlate (i.e., an object) when we talk of  it: it only remains a concept. In 
general, I agree with the Russellian view and I think that properties can bear other properties, 
even without becoming objects. Both properties qua properties and objects qua objects can bear 
properties. However, I think that we can build non-concrete objects out of  properties: for 
example, the (subjective) concept of  humanity. Yet, these objects are objects, they are not 
properties, and the difference between the property of  being human and the (subjective) concept 
of  humanity is not revealed by syntactic analysis, but only by metaphysical analysis.  
With regard to alien properties, I would like to distinguish between 
 
(d7) alien properties = properties which cannot be instantiated by this world's objects; 
 
(d8) natural not yet instantiated properties = properties which have not been instantiated by this 
world's objects, but which can nevertheless be instantiated by them; 
 
(d9) natural no longer instantiated properties = properties which have been instantiated by at 
least one object in this world, but which are no longer instantiated. 
 
It is difficult to distinguish between alien properties and natural not yet instantiated ones. 
For example, the property of  being a unicorn can be considered an alien property (it is not 
possible in our world that something is a unicorn) or a natural not yet instantiated property (it is 
possible that, in the future, something will be a unicorn). Yet, alien properties and natural not yet 
instantiated properties are not simply non-instantiated properties: they can be thought of  as 
being instantiated by non-concrete objects (e.g., by mental ones, as I shall claim in the next 
                                                 
295 See Russell 1903 (1996): 44-46. 
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chapters). This preserves (t2) from objections grounded on this distinction between properties.  
However, even though I admit that there are both concrete and non-concrete objects 
(e.g., Obama and Pegasus) and I do not think, in general, that there are predicates which do not 
refer to properties, I do not consider other possible worlds real entities: as I shall argue, other 
possible worlds are nothing more than fictional contexts. Thus, alien properties and natural not 
yet instantiated properties can be considered properties of  non-concrete objects (or, better, of  
mental objects) within fictional contexts, even though natural not yet instantiated properties can 
become genuine natural properties. Genuine natural properties are properties instantiated by 
concrete objects and properties no longer instantiated by them.  
Furthermore, I think that the following principle is generally valid: 
 
(t3) alien properties and natural not yet instantiated properties are constituted by an act of  
abstraction and by a recombination of  genuine natural properties instantiated by concrete objects. 
 
Yet, (t3) seems not to hold for mathematical objects' properties and for other properties 
implied by them. For example, how can we constitute the property of  being perfectly elastic, 
provided that there are elastic concrete objects, but there is no perfectly elastic object? And how 
can we constitute the property of  being circular, provided that there are no perfectly circular 
concrete objects? However, the perfect circle is thought of  by our minds and it can be studied. 
For now, I assume that mathematical properties and other properties involving them are special 
alien properties, for which (t3) is not valid. We can restate (t3) as follows: 
 
(t3*) except some alien properties (mathematical properties and other properties involving them), 
alien properties and natural not yet instantiated properties are constituted by an abstraction and a 
recombination of  genuine natural properties instantiated by concrete objects. 
 
II.1.3. The Identity of Properties. 
In order to answer questions (I) and (II), I shall consider one typical example of  (supposed) 
identity between properties: 
 
(67) being trilateral is being triangular. 
 
Are the properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular identical? If  they are 
identical, it seems to me that it is legitimate to justify this answer in two different ways: 
 
(67a) the properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular are identical because something is 
trilateral iff  the same thing is triangular. 
 
(67b) The properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular are naturally identical because 
something is trilateral iff  the same thing is triangular, but they are not intentionally identical, 
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because some minded subject can believe that something is trilateral even without believing that 
that thing is triangular, and the opposite. 
 
The former solution (67a) expresses a purely extensionalist approach: two properties are 
identical iff  they have the same extension. Yet, this solution has to deal with many troubles. For 
example, according to this solution, it is legitimate to claim that  
 
(68) having a kidney is having a heart, 
 
because everything which has a kidney has a heart too and everything which has a heart has a 
kidney too. Yet, we know that the property of  having a kidney is different from the property of  
having a heart: it is only a contingent fact that they have the same extension. Let me imagine a 
possible world in which all the men are blue and men are the only blue objects: could we claim 
that the property of  being human is identical with the property of  being blue? We could 
obviously not.  
Yet, extensionalists could deal with this trouble by introducing extensions over possible 
worlds. In this respect, (67) is true because there is no possible world in which something is 
trilateral without being triangular, nor there are possible worlds in which something is triangular 
without being trilateral. On the other hand, (68) is false, because there are possible worlds in 
which the properties of  having a kidney and of  having a heart do not have the same extension. 
In other terms: 
 
(67a*) the properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular are identical iff  it is necessary that 
they have the same extension. 
 
This solution seems to be intuitively acceptable. Yet, I have some doubts. How do we fix 
the possibility of  something? According to the laws of  geometry, it is necessary that something is 
trilateral iff  the same thing is triangular. Yet, can there be possible (non-contradictory) worlds in 
which these laws are different, so that there are things (in those worlds) which are trilateral, but 
not triangular? The fact that we cannot conceive of  them does not imply that they are not 
possible: a serious modal extensionalist should admit this possibility. Yet, the modal extensionalist 
could answer in three different ways: s/he could claim that (67) is analytically true; s/he could 
reply that a world with different geometrical laws is an impossible world; s/he could reply that 
there are different properties in worlds with different geometrical laws. The first solution seems 
to be circular or incomplete: is this analytical truth grounded on the necessary sameness of  
extension or not? If  it is, the solution is circular. If  it is not, the modal extensionalist has to find 
out other criteria for analyticity. The second solution is rather vague: an impossible world could 
be a world too. Furthermore, even if  the modal extensionalist did not admit impossible worlds, 
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s/he should demonstrate that it is overtly contradictory that something is trilateral without being 
triangular. In order to demonstrate this contradiction, s/he should use those geometrical laws 
from which there follows that it is not possible that something is trilateral and not triangular. In 
order to demonstrate that those geometrical laws are necessary, a reductio ad absurdum of  their 
negation should be possible. Given the postulates of  Euclidean geometry, this reductio is possible. 
Yet, what if  such postulates were not accepted and/or were not valid in other possible worlds?  
According to the third solution, if  we define in different ways in another possible world 
w1, different from the actual world a, the properties of  being trilateral and being triangular and 
the properties used in the postulates, we can obtain different properties and different laws. In w1, 
the properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular would not be instantiated, while in a and 
in other possible worlds accessible from a (at least with regard to these properties) the same 
properties would be instantiated. Thus, (67) is necessarily true because, in every possible world in 
which the properties of  being trilateral and being triangular are instantiated, they have the same 
extension. This solution seems to represent the best modal extensionalist approach. Yet, it is 
legitimate to address at least one objection to it: is there (at least) one possible world in which, for 
example, the property of  being trilateral is instantiated, while the property of  being triangular is 
not instantiated? If  there is such world, those properties do not necessarily have the same 
extension. On the other hand, we should find out some reason for which there is no such a 
world. The range of  possible worlds, in fact, is much wider than the range of  what is conceivable. 
Thus, there are possible worlds in which there are trilateral geometrical figures, but not triangular 
figures (perhaps because angles are absent). Are these worlds impossible? We do not know, as we 
have seen. Yet, if  we wish to affirm that the third modal extensionalist solution is true, we must 
exclude the fact that there are possible worlds in which one of  the considered properties is 
instantiated, while the other is not. This supposed non-instantiation could not be a mere fact 
about possible worlds: in this case, in fact, it would be something contingent and the supposed 
necessary identity of  extension between properties would be contingent too. Yet, if  this non-
instantiation is necessary, what is the necessary law which implies it? It must be a trans-wordly 
necessary law: a law which holds in every possible world. Are there such laws? I do not know. Yet, 
I suspect that the necessary coinstantiation (i.e., instantiation in the same possible worlds) of  
these two properties is not one of  such laws. In fact, if  it were a trans-wordly necessary law, it 
would be a highly suspicious one, because it would be grounded on the geometrical laws of  our 
world.   
Furthermore, if  the properties of  being trilater and of  being triangular were one and the 
same property, that property would be neither exhaustively defined by our concept of  
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triangularity, nor by our concept of  trilaterality, that would at best express two different aspects 
of  that property. Thus, it would be a neutral and partly mysterious property, since it would be 
only partly described by the (supposed) property of  being triangular and only partly described by 
the (supposed) property of  being trilateral. 
I have tried to show that the extensionalist approach expressed by (67a) and/or (67a*) is 
not satisfactory. 
With regard to the approach expressed by (67b), I think that we can consider at least two 
different interpretations of  it: 
 
(67ba) the properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular are naturally identical qua 
properties (they stand for the same natural property), but they are different qua concepts. 
 
(67bb) The properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular are naturally identical qua 
properties, yet they are intentionally non-identical, because someone can ascribe to some object, 
e.g., the property of  being trilateral, even without ascribing to it the property of  being triangular 
or without ascribing the negation of  this property. 
 
The first interpretation (which is somehow inspired by Bealer's approach296) is grounded 
on a distinction between the notions of  property (in Bealer's terms, quality) and concept, which 
does not correspond to the distinction between sparse and abundant properties. A concrete 
object (or a mathematical one, in our example) may have two properties which stand for one 
natural property in virtue of  some logical equivalence. Yet, an abstract object (in Bealer’s terms), 
thought of  by a minded subject, may have two different corresponding concepts which are not 
logically equivalent. Thus, the properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular are naturally 
identical. Yet, the concepts of  being trilateral and of  being triangular are not identical.  
This interpretation has to face some problems. First, I do not think that logical 
equivalence between extensions of  properties is sufficient to admit that two properties are 
identical, as I have already shown, and necessary logical equivalence, when it is interpreted using 
possible worlds, seems to run into difficulties too. Secondly, even if  there were such a necessary 
logical equivalence between properties, this would not suffice to delete the two coextensive 
properties and to claim that there is only one (natural) property, P1. In fact, the object which has 
P1 really has the properties of  being trilateral and of  being triangular too. Those who adopt 
(67ba) could reply that these two concepts stand for only one property. Yet, thirdly, these two 
concepts express two different aspects of  the same (natural) property: their distinction seems to 
have some fundamentum in re. In this case, would P1 be a composite property or a simple one? If  it 
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were composite, the composing natural properties could be the properties of  being trilateral and 
of  being triangular and some other properties and P1 would supervene on the conjunction of  
these properties. If  it were simple, we would have to find out some fundamentum in re of  this 
conceptual difference. Yet, if  P1 were not really constituted by other properties, what would this 
fundamentum be? Fourthly, there is at least one intuition against (67ba): when we think of  an object 
as having a property, we do not think of  it as having a concept, in contrast with its having a 
property in reality. It seems that we think of  the same properties. 
Following (67bb), (67) expresses a natural identity between properties, but it cannot 
express an intentional identity between them. In other terms, two properties are naturally 
identical iff  they have the same real extension, while they are intentionally identical iff  they have 
the same intentional extension, i.e., iff  they are thought of  as being instantiated by all and only 
the same objects. Thus, it is almost impossible that two properties are intentionally identical: we 
think of  an indefinite number of  objects and nothing prevents us from thinking of  those objects 
in different ways. It seems to me that this second interpretation runs into the same difficulties 
expressed with regard to the first one, except the fourth difficulty: it has to admit that two 
properties are naturally identical iff  they are necessarily logically coextensive; it has to deal with 
the nature (composite or simple) of  the natural property; it has to find out some fundamentum in re 
of  that intentional distinction.   
I will sum up my replies to problems (I) and (II) as follows: 
 
(t4) the identity of  properties is primitive. We can try to find out the nature of  properties by 
studying their extensions and the relations between objects which instantiate them, but this is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that one property is identical with another property. 
 
(t5) We should be tolerant with regard to the number of  properties. For example, if  I claim that 
something is a man, that thing really has the properties of  being human, of  being an animal and 
of  being rational.  
 
There could be an infinite (or an indefinite) number of  properties and this is not a deep 
problem for our metaphysics: properties are not objects, which constitute other higher objects 
and which can be superfluous for the constitution of  such higher objects. Properties are only 
properties. Thus, it seem to me legitimate to accept an abundant conception of  properties. 
 
II.1.4. Superfluous and Non-Superfluous: the Case of Negative Properties. 
There are (or there could be) properties which are considered impure and superfluous: negative, 
conjunctive and disjunctive properties. These properties seem to be reducible to the union 
between some positive property (or some positive properties) and (or by means of) some logical 
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operator. Yet, every serious metaphysician should reflect on the ontological status such properties 
without prejudices: are these properties really superfluous? Are there only positive properties? 
I shall only consider here negative properties. Accepting a truthmaker theory of  truth 
(according to which a true proposition – or some other truthbearer – is made true by something, 
e.g., a fact), it is possible to argue that there are true negative propositions, which are made true 
by negative facts, which consist of  the instantiation of  some negative property by an object. 
Thus, there really are negative properties. This is the thesis that I shall defend. Let me consider 
the false proposition expressed by 
 
(69) Obama is a dog. 
 
This proposition is false because there is some fact which makes it false (a falsemaker). 
For once we accept that there are truthmakers, it is not really difficult to accept that there are 
falsemakers too. What is this fact? It is the fact that makes it true that 
 
(70) Obama is not a dog, i.e., Obama is a non-dog. 
 
If  it is true that (70), there must be some fact which makes it true. This fact is a negative 
one. Thus, there are negative facts. Against this thesis, which was partially defended by Russell297, 
many objections have been made: 
 
(nf1) the truthmaker principle is not acceptable. Yet, the acceptance of  the truthmaker principle 
is perhaps the best way to find out if  there really are certain properties. Furthermore, if  we deny 
that there are truthmakers, how is the difference between true and false propositions grounded? 
Thus, those who deny the truthmaker principle should develop a better alternative to investigate 
the reality of  properties and to give reason to the truth-values of  propositions. 
 
(nf2) The truthmaker principle only holds for true propositions and it does not hold for false 
ones. Yet, it is true that (70). Thus, (70) must be made true by something: by what? 
 
(nf3) When we claim that it is true that (70), we claim something redundant298. In fact, we express 
the same thing as 
 
(70') it is false that Obama is a dog. 
 
Yet, a proposition such as the one expressed by 
 
(64) Obama is human 
 
is made true by the same (positive) fact which makes it true that 
                                                 
297 See Russell 1918-1919 (2010): 41-45. 
298 See, for example, Mumford (2007). 
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(64') it is true that Obama is human; 
 
(64'') it is true that it is true that Obama is human. 
 
We do not have to admit another fact, in addition to the one which makes it true that 
(64). Thus, (64) more directly reveals the fact which makes it true that (64), (64') and (64''). Yet, 
even though (70) and (70') are made true by the same fact, this fact is the same fact which makes 
it false that (69). If  (69) did not have a falsemaker, in fact, we could not claim that it is true that 
(70'). And this falsemaker, according to my perspective, is a fact. 
 
(nf4) There are no negative facts, nor negative properties, but only positive facts and 
incompatibilities between properties299. Yet, such incompatibilities are nothing more than general 
negative facts or negative facts about properties: the fact that the properties of  being human and 
of  being a dog are incompatible is the general negative fact that it is not the case that something 
is both human and a dog or it is a negative fact about properties (the fact that the properties of  
being human and of  being a dog are not compatible). Thus, there must be negative facts (at least 
general ones or negative facts about properties). 
 
(nf5) The proposition expressed by (69) is false not simply because there is some negative fact 
which makes it false, but because it does not have a positive fact which makes it true, i.e., it does 
not have any truthmaker300. Yet, is this absence of  truthmakers a genuine fact or a genuine entity? 
If  it is, there must be negative facts and/or mysterious negative objects (such as absences). If  it 
were not, there would be no truthmakers for some true propositions, such as the ones expressing 
the absences of  truthmakers. And if  the truthmaker principle were restricted to positive true 
propositions, how would we ground the truth of  true negative propositions? 
 
(nf6) (69) is made false by a totality fact involving Obama: Obama has just a set of  properties 
which exhaust all of  his properties301. Yet, this totality fact about Obama can be expressed in 
negative terms too: there are no other properties of  Obama’s, except the ones which constitute 
his set of  properties. Is it legitimate to accept the positive interpretation and to refuse the 
negative one? I do not think it is. Furthermore, if  we accept that both such interpretations are 
legitimate, let me consider the positive one: it seems to involve that there is a huge conjunctive 
fact (the fact that Obama has positive property P1 and positive property P2 and so on) and that 
there is no other property instantiated by Obama, except the ones which constitute the former 
conjunctive fact. This latter fact is a negative one.  
                                                 
299 See Demos (1917). 
300 See, for example, Mellor (2003). 
301 See Armstrong (2004): 53-62. I shall not consider here of the so-called "polarity solution" (see, for example, Beall 
(2000) and Priest (2000b)), because its metaphysical implications are still not clear. 
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Thus, if  there are negative facts, there are negative properties too. I do not see other 
means to interpret negative facts, except the instantiation (or the attribution of  instantiation) of  
negative properties: the nexus of  negative exemplification or the presence of  a negative 
constituent, expressed by "not" or "non" in (70), are much more mysterious and less simple 
solutions. Thus, (70) is made true and (69) is made false by the fact that Obama instantiates the 
negative property of  non-being a dog. 
D. M. Armstrong and L. Wittgenstein notoriously argued against the reality of  negative 
properties. According to Armstrong302, these properties have four inacceptable features: 
 
(Anp1) they are not grounded on any kind of  identity between particulars (e.g., between the 
things which are not dog). Yet, it seems that there is some kind of  identity between them: a 
negative one, grounded on the fact that such particulars are non-dogs.  
 
(Anp2) Admitting negative properties, every particular would have the same number of  
properties. Yet, it seems to me that there would be no trouble in admitting that particulars have 
the same (indefinite or infinite) number of  properties. 
 
(Anp3) Negative properties do not have (or confer) causal powers. Yet, within an agnostic 
metaphysics (agnostic at least with regard to Armstrong's physicalism), it is not obvious that 
particulars have just those properties which give them causal powers. Moreover, negative 
properties seem to have causal powers in determining negative effects, in counterfactuals and in 
determining positive effects too. Furthermore, there are some properties that we admit in our 
scientific explanation (e.g., the property of  being inert) which seem to be negative properties. 
Thus, it seems that an object can have negative scientifically relevant properties too. 
 
(Anp4) If  we admit negative properties, by means of  logics, we have to admit disjunctive 
properties too. Yet, if  we accept that properties are ways things are, I do not see any problem in 
admitting that one of  such ways is, for example, the property of  being a philosopher or a 
carpenter. 
 
Wittgenstein notoriously made another objection303: 
 
(Wnp1) if  we accept that there is a property such as the property of  non-being a dog, we have to 
accept that there is a property such as the property of  non-non-being a dog, which is 
nevertheless logically equivalent to the positive property of  being a dog. Thus, there are infinite 
logically equivalent properties. Yet, I have already remarked that I do not think that logical 
                                                 
302 See Armstrong (1978), volume II: 23-29. 
303 See Wittgenstein 1921 (1961), 5.44. See also Grossmann (1992): 79-80. I have not analyzed here conceptions of 
truthmaking that do not involve facts, e.g. Cameron (2008)’s and Schaffer (2010)’s ones.  
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equivalence is a good criterion for properties' identity. Furthermore, the negation in non-non-
being a dog could be considered recursive and not metaphysically relevant (while the negation in 
the property of  non-being a dog is metaphysically relevant, since it plays a role in determining the 
falsemaker for some false propositions and the truthmaker for some true ones). However, even 
though there were this property of  non-non-being a dog, it would be true that something which 
has the property of  being a dog has the property of  non-non-being a dog. Thus, being tolerant 
with regard to the number of  properties, I would have no troubles in admitting this last property 
too. 
 
Thus, in reply to question (IV), I admit that there are negative properties. They obviously 
seem to be acceptable by any abundant conception of  properties. Are they acceptable by sparse 
conceptions of  properties too? For the sake of  this chapter, I cannot investigate the legitimacy of  
the distinction between abundant and sparse conceptions properties. However, as I have already 
tried to explain, I think that every way an object (or a property) is can be considered a legitimate 
property of  that object (or of  that property).  
Yet, accepting the validity of  this distinction, sparse properties have three functions: they 
ground objective similarity between things; they carve out causal powers; they serve as a minimal 
ontological base. As I have already claimed in my reply to Armstrong's objections (Anp1) and 
(Anp3), I think that negative properties ground objective similarity between things and that they 
carve out causal powers too. Furthermore, if  negative facts are not reducible to positive facts, 
negative properties cannot be reduced to positive ones. Thus, they can serve as a minimal 
ontological base. Therefore, it seems to me that negative properties are acceptable by sparse 
conceptions of  properties too. 
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II.2. Existence: about a Genuine Property 
In this chapter, that represents the core of  this work, I shall try to develop and defend a 
conception of  existence as a first-order, informative property. Furthermore, I shall argue that, 
even though existence cannot be identified with any other property, there are properties that 
characterize only existent objects: dispositions to act (i.e., dispositions to make, to produce 
something). Finally, I shall deal with the problem of  non-existents (what are non-existent 
objects?) and with some other questions connected with existence, such as: are there degrees of  
existence? And are there kinds of  existence?  
 
II.2.1. A Genuine and Really Robust First-Order, Informative Property. 
It is commonsensical to take first-order predicates in true atomic statements as denoting first-
order properties. For example, if  it is true that 
 
(14) Obama is a politician, 
 
then it seems reasonable to accept that there is an object (Obama) that instantiates a first-order 
property (the property of  being a politician). This statement seems to be made true by Obama's 
instantiating the property of  being a politician. Why cannot we claim that the same happens with  
 
(7) Obama exists? 
 
 As we have already noticed, there are many strategies to deny that we can deal with (7) in 
the same way as we deal with (14). However, is it necessary to adopt one of  these strategies? In 
general, actualists argue that we cannot deal with (7) in the same way as we deal with (14), since 
every object must exist in order to have some property. Yet, this does not imply that existence is 
not a first-order property. In fact, in order to maintain the validity of  (actualism), actualists could 
argue that existence is a first-order property instantiated by every object. Other actualists claim 
that (7) does not express the true proposition [Obama exists], whose truth somehow 
ontologically commits us to Obama’s being an object and existence’s being a first-order property 
instantiated by Obama. There is another proposition, that I shall call [p7], whose truth does not 
commit us to such things. For example, one could claim that there are such true propositions: 
 
[p7a] [the grammatical proper name "Obama" has a referent]; 
 
[p7b] [the logical proper name304 [Obama] has a referent]; 
 
[p7c] [some conjunction of  properties or some conjunctive property (e.g., comprehending the 
properties of  being a politician, of  being Michelle Obama’s husband, and so on) is uniquely 
                                                 
304 Logical proper names are names that directly aim at referring to their referents. 
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instantiated]; 
 
[p7d] [some haecceity (e.g., the property of  being Obama or of  being identical with Obama or of  
obamizing) is instantiated]; 
 
[p7e] [there is some peculiar property (e.g., a kind, or any other existence-entailing property) that 
Obama instantiates]; 
 
[p7f] [the world is Obamish], 
 
and so on. In such cases, there is no constituent of  such propositions that involves any reference 
to existence as a first-order property. However, why is it legitimate to claim that there is no true 
proposition such as the proposition [Obama exists] expressed by the statement (7)? Actualists 
cannot reply by claiming that the acceptance of  the proposition [Obama exists] implies the 
paradox of  non-existence. First, it is possible to maintain that existence is a first-order property 
that is instantiated by every object, so that [Obama exists] is always true and [Obama does not 
exist] is always false. Secondly, every formulation of  the paradox of  non-existence seems to 
assume that (actualism) is true. Yet, why do we have to assume that (actualism) is true? 
 Furthermore, even maintaining that there is a true proposition such as [Obama exists], 
actualists could reply that that proposition is not made true by an atomic fact, such as the fact 
that Obama exists, that he instantiates the first-order property of  existing, but by something else. 
In particular, one could argue that Obama himself  makes such a proposition true or that some 
other fact (e.g., the world's being Obamish, or some property's being instantiated) makes it true. 
However, why do we have to accept such solutions, if  we do not accept the truth of  (actualism)? 
Perhaps, it is true that Obama himself  makes [Obama exists] true, but only if  Obama himself  
exists! Furthermore, it is true that some property's being instantiated makes [Obama exists] true, 
but only if  there exists some object (i.e., Obama) that instantiates such a property! As I have 
already noticed, there are some internal problems within each strategy. Yet, I think that the major 
problem for actualists is that the truth of  (actualism) needs to be taken as a presupposition of  
every strategy. And I do not think that we have any good reason for assuming that (actualism) is a 
true presupposition.  
 As far as I know, there is only one explicit defense of  (actualism): Quine's defense. 
According to Quine, there are no non-existent objects, given that such objects would not have 
definite identity conditions and, provided that each object has definite identity conditions, they 
would not be objects. Yet, first, let me notice that Sherlock Holmes is different from other 
objects: he is neither identical with Emma Bovary, nor with Watson. Secondly, according to the 
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best current physical theory, there are existent objects (e.g., quanta305) that do not always have 
definite identity conditions: do we have to claim that quanta cease to exist and to be objects 
whenever their identity with other quanta is not ontologically determined? Finally, even if  there 
were not only one Sherlock Holmes, but many Sherlock Holmes (in virtue of  their instantiating or 
not instantiating some properties that are not ascribed to Sherlock Holmes by Conan Doyle), 
each Sherlock Holmes would be distinct from any other Sherlock Holmes and would nevertheless 
be non-existent. Yet, I do not accept this latter solution, since I think that there is only one 
Sherlock Holmes. I shall deal with this problem in the next chapter.  
 Another strategy to deny that existence is a first-order property consists in denying that 
objects are involved in the truthmakers of  our (true) propositions concerning Obama’s existence. 
For example, with regard to [p7c], one could argue that, in order for it to be true, it is only 
sufficient that some properties stand in some relation. Thus, according to bundle theorists, there 
is no object such as Obama: there are only (universal or particular) properties that are 
coinstantiated (or, in Russell's terminology, compresent). Furthermore, with regard to [p7d], one 
could simply argue that the first-order property of  being identical with Obama has the second-
order property of  being instantiated. Yet, this latter solution seems to be quite ad hoc, since the 
property of  being identical with Obama, as we have already noticed, in order for having its 
identity conditions, requires that there is an object such as Obama. The former solution seems to 
be more attractive. However, for the same reasons concerning properties' identity conditions, one 
should not claim that [Obama exists] is true in virtue of  the instantiation (and coinstantiation, or 
compresence) of  properties involving reference to singular objects (e.g., one should not claim 
that [Obama exists] is true in virtue of  the coinstantiation of  the property of  being Michelle 
Obama’s husband with other properties). Thus, if  we do not use such properties, we are maybe 
left with properties that are not sufficient to ground the truth of  [Obama exist], i.e., to ground 
the truth of  the proposition that seems to concern that particular object's existence. In sum, if  
there are no objects, objects cannot determine the identity conditions of  properties, i.e., there 
cannot be properties that must refer to objects in order to have their identity conditions. Yet, if  
there are only properties not determined by objects in their identity conditions, it is far from clear 
how their standing in some relation(s) can provide the truth conditions for propositions such as 
[Obama exists] or [Obama is a politician].  
 After having clarified that there are no compelling reasons for accepting the truth of  
(actualism) and that there is no reason for denying that Obama is an object, I can briefly develop 
my arguments in favor of  a conception of  existence as only a first-order and informative property. 
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First, in order to argue that existence is a first-order property, one could claim that: 
 
(arg.I.1) in the true atomic statement "Obama exists", "Obama" denotes an object; 
 
(arg.I.2) in the true atomic statement "Obama exists", the predicate "exists" is attributed to the 
subject "Obama"; 
 
(arg.I.3) for every true atomic statement, if  the subject denotes an object and if  the predicate is 
attributed to the subject, then the predicate denotes a first-order property; 
 
(arg.I.4) thus, the predicate "exists" in the true atomic statement "Obama exists" denotes a first-
order property, i.e., the property of  existing. 
 
 The same conclusion could be reached by considering the true atomic proposition 
[Obama exists]. However, let me assume, for the sake of  the argument, that (7) expresses some 
other proposition [p7]. It is legitimate to formulate another argument: 
 
(arg.II.1) the proposition [p7] is true; 
 
(arg.II.2) for every true proposition, there is something that makes it true and there is whatever is 
part of  what makes that proposition true; 
 
(arg.II.3) the fact that Obama exists makes the proposition [p7] true or is part of  whatever makes 
the proposition [p7] true; 
 
(arg.II.4) if  there is a fact such as the fact that Obama exists, then Obama is an object and 
existence is a first-order property; 
 
(arg.II.5) thus, there is a fact such as the fact that Obama exists; 
 
(arg. II.6) thus, Obama is an object and existence is a first-order property.  
 
 Some brief  remarks about the premises (arg.II.2) and (arg.II.4) are in order. The premise 
(arg.II.2) does not claim that every true proposition has its own truthmaker: it does not exclude 
that there could be only one truthmaker for many propositions and there could be many 
truthmakers for only one proposition. Furthermore, it is clear that, if  we accept that there is 
some definite fact, we must also accept that there is whatever is a part of  that fact: if  there is a 
fact such as Obama’s being a politician and the property of  being a politician is a part of  that 
fact, then there is a property such as the property of  being a politician. I assume here that facts 
are not ontologically simple and that there can be no fact without its parts. With regard to 
(arg.II.4), it seems to me that, if  we do not accept (actualism), we do not have any reason for 
believing that the fact that Obama exists (if  there is such a fact) is not a fact involving an object 
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and a first-order property – as any other atomic fact, such as the fact that Obama is a politician.  
 With regard to the informativeness of  existence, I shall consider the following argument:: 
 
(arg.III.1) it is true that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character; 
 
(arg.III.2) if  it is true that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character, then it is true that Sherlock 
Holmes does not exist; 
 
(arg.III.3) Sherlock Holmes is an object (following my definition (d1)); 
 
(arg.III.4) thus, Sherlock Holmes does not exist; 
 
(arg.III.5) thus, there are objects that do not exist. 
 
 Since a first-order property is informative iff  there is at least one object that instantiates it 
and at least one object that does not instantiate it (while a first-order property is non-informative 
iff  every object instantiates it), existence is an informative, first-order property. Against 
(arg.III.1), assuming the truth of  (actualism), it has been argued that it is not literally true that 
Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character, because there is no proposition such as [Sherlock 
Holmes is a fictional character] or because such a proposition is made true by something else not 
involving Sherlock Holmes. Against (arg.III.3), one could recall the Quinean objection 
concerning the lack of  identity conditions of  non-existent objects. Yet, I have already tried to 
argue that such objections do not work. I shall defend (arg.III.2) in the next section. 
 In sum, my defense of  existence as an informative, first-order property is grounded on 
three points: first, this thesis is nearer than rival views to some commonsensical assumptions 
concerning true statements such as (7) and true propositions such as [Obama exists]; secondly, 
we have no clear and valid reason for accepting (actualism); thirdly, there are internal difficulties 
within each actualist strategy. In order to demonstrate that existence is only an informative, first-
order property, I shall now try to develop this third, dialectic line with regard to six alternative 
theses concerning existence: 
 
(a) existence is only a non-informative, first-order property (i.e., a property that is instantiated by 
all the objects and only by objects); 
 
(b) existence is only an informative, non-first-order property; 
 
(c) existence is only a non-informative, non-first-order property; 
 
(d) existence is not a property at all; 
 
(e) existence is an informative, multi-level property; 
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(f) existence is a non-informative, multi-level property (i.e., a property that every item has). 
 
 In particular, theses (e) and (f) seem to be justified by the fact that existence's being an 
informative, first-order property does not imply that properties do not exist, so that existence 
could be a multi-level property (e.g., a property of  objects, namely a first-order property, and a 
property of  first-order properties, namely a second-order property, and so on), which could be 
informative (or non-informative) with regard to objects and/or to other properties.  
 Let me consider these theses in turn. With regard to (a), some philosophers argue that 
Sherlock Holmes is not properly a non-existent: he is an object and he exists, even if  he is not a 
man, or a concrete object, and so on. There is no difference in existence between Sherlock 
Holmes and Obama: the difference between them comes from other sources. I have to remark 
that I assume, with regard to (a), that it is legitimate to take Sherlock Holmes as an object, even if  
(a) is also consistent with the denial of  Sherlock Holmes' being an object. Yet, such a denial 
implies that (actualism) is true and we are not forced to accept such a thesis. 
 First, it is legitimate to question the status of  existence according to (a). Existence turns 
out to be a property whose instantiation is coextensive with the instantiation of  the disjunction 
of  objects' categories. For example, if  we assume that there are only two categories of  objects 
(abstract and concrete objects), some object exists iff  it is an abstract or a concrete object. Since 
it is not possible that one and the same object is both abstract and concrete, this disjunction is 
strong one: the instantiation of  existence is equivalent to the instantiation of  a strongly 
disjunctive property or of  a strong disjunction of  properties or (perhaps) of  a determinable. 
Furthermore, existence turns out to be coextensive with the property of  being an object. 
Nothing prevents us from assuming that there is such a property of  existing. Yet, this property 
seems not to ground any real commonality among objects or it grounds a real commonality that is 
already grounded by the property of  being an object. On the other hand, it seems to me that 
existence in (7) turns out to ground some peculiar real commonality among existents.  
 We can understand this point by looking for the truth conditions of   
 
(8) Sherlock Holmes does not exist 
 
within this perspective. Following (a), it is not literally true that Sherlock Holmes does not exist. 
Thus, how can it seem to be true that (8)? Theorists who accept (a) can reply in two different 
ways: 
 
(aa) there are two different properties denoted by the grammatical, first-order predicate "exists" 
or by the logical, first-order predicate [exists] (e.g., by the logical constituent [exists] of  the 
proposition [Obama exists]); 
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(ab) there is only one property denoted by the grammatical first-order predicate "exists" or by the 
logical first-order predicate [exists] and singular negative existential statements (or propositions) 
are made true by something that does not involve such a property. 
 
 With regard to (aa), I shall assume, for the sake of  the argument, that such properties are 
the property of  existing according to (a) (as it has been introduced in the previous paragraphs) 
and the property of  being concrete. Yet, first, I do not see any valid reason for considering the 
grammatical predicate "exists" or the logical predicate [exists] equivocal (they would be equivocal 
since they would have two different senses and they would denote two different properties). 
Secondly, even if  such a predicate were equivocal, one could ask: if  the property of  being 
concrete is what is not instantiated by Sherlock Holmes according to (aa) and if  such a property 
is an informative, first-order one, why do we have to introduce one further non-informative, first-
order property (the property of  existing) in order to claim that it is true that (aa)?  
 With regard to (ab), one could choose a strategy grounded on kinds. Thus, it is not 
literally true that Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but it is true that Sherlock Holmes does not 
instantiate some kind-property (e.g., the kind-property of  being human), even if  such a property 
is attributed to him within some fiction, and he instantiates some other kind-property (e.g., the 
kind-property of  being a fictional character). Anyway, as we have already seen considering van 
Inwagen’s and Thomasson’s theories, this makes it necessary and legitimate to introduce one 
further property (e.g., the property of  being concrete), whose instantiation is implied by the 
instantiation of  the kind-property of  being human and is not implied by the instantiation of  the 
kind-property of  being a fictional character. If  there is such a property, why cannot we simply 
claim that Sherlock Holmes does not instantiate it, leaving kind-properties apart, and that a fact 
involving Obama (i.e., the fact that Obama instantiates the property of  being concrete) is 
precisely what makes it true that (7)?  
 Furthermore, even not accepting this objection, one could simply ask: when I believe that 
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, following the kind-based version of  (ab), do I have a true belief  
or a false one? It seems that I have a true belief. Thus, for example, I truly believe that Sherlock 
Holmes does not exist iff  I believe that Sherlock Holmes exists and is a man within some fictional 
context and, outside that context, Sherlock Holmes exists and he is not a man and he is a fictional 
character. Yet, I do not have to believe that Sherlock Holmes is a man (or whatever else) within 
some fictional context in order to truly believe that Sherlock Holmes exists within that context. 
There are stories in which it is not possible to ascribe to fictional characters definite kind-
properties, even if  it is legitimate to claim that such characters exist within those contexts.  
 In order to deal with such a difficulty, one could reply: I believe that there is a disjunction 
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of  kind-properties that might be attributed to that character within that context (e.g., the 
disjunction of  the kind-properties of  being human, of  being a cat, and so on) and that no kind-
property belonging to that disjunction is instantiated by it outside that context. Yet, not all the 
kind-properties would belong to that disjunction. For example, if  the kind-property of  being a 
fictional character belonged to that disjunction, our belief  would turn out to be a false one. In 
fact, let me consider a fictional character that is also a fictional character within some fictional 
context. I truly believe that it is a fictional character within that context and it is fictional outside 
that context too. Thus, it is simply false that, outside that context, it does not instantiate that 
kind-property that I attribute to it within that context! Philosophers who accept the kind-based 
version of  (ab) could reply that the property of  being a fictional character is not a kind-property 
and that it is only sufficient that Sherlock Holmes does not instantiate any kind-property (outside 
some fictional context). However, in such a case, there would be existing objects (since Sherlock 
Holmes would exist) not instantiating any kind-property. The difference among existents and 
(seemingly) non-existents would be stated as follows: existents instantiate kind-properties (i.e., 
they belong to kinds), while (seemingly) non-existents do not instantiate them. Yet, is it true that 
(seemingly) non-existents do not instantiate any kind-property? A mirage that I see in the desert 
and Sherlock Holmes are both (seemingly) non-existents. They seem to have something in 
common: they are produced by human imagination. Thus, why is it not legitimate to claim that 
there is one further kind-property, the property of  being imaginary objects, that they both 
instantiate? Those philosophers might in turn reply that the kind of  imaginary objects is not a 
natural kind. Yet, if  whatever exists is part of  nature, imaginary objects belong to nature too. On 
the other hand, if  nature only comprehended physical objects, they would still have to explain 
why there are only natural kinds. Furthermore, let me reconsider the aforementioned fictional 
object that is fictional within some fictional context too. If  such philosophers conceded that 
there is a kind such as the kind of  imaginary objects, they would have to add that no 
concreteness-entailing kind is instantiated by our fictional object outside the fictional context. 
This will lead them back to my first objection against (ab). 
 I shall consider (b), (c) and (d) in brief. In fact, if, according to (b), existence is only an 
informative, non-first-order property, what does objects' existence amount to? One could accept 
an ontology based only on properties. However, I have already tried to argue that such an 
ontology has to deal with heavy troubles. The same troubles seem to arise with regard to (c). The 
difference among (b) and (c), in fact, does not consist in their relationship to objects' (supposed) 
existence, but in properties' existence: according to (b), not all the properties exist, while, 
according to (c), all the properties exist. However, they both imply that objects do not instantiate 
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existence, while properties instantiate it. Furthermore, properties' existence seems to be different 
from objects' (supposed) existence (or from whatever makes it true that (7)). Finally, (d) is quite 
mysterious: if  existence is not a property at all, what is it? It could be what is expressed by an 
ontologically committed existential quantifier. Yet, what is expressed by that quantifier? 
 Theses (e) and (f) seem to be grounded on a good intuition: if  objects exist, why cannot 
we claim that properties exist too? Are not properties part of  reality? If  both objects and 
properties exist, existence is a multi-level property: it is a first-order property with regard to 
objects, but it is a second-order property with regard to first-order properties, a third-order 
property with regard to second-order properties, and so on. According to (e), there are objects 
and/or properties that do not exist, i.e., that do not instantiate existence, while, according to (f), 
there are neither objects, nor properties that do not exist: every object and every property 
instantiates existence. Furthermore, it is consistent with (e) that: 
 
(ea) existence is a multi-level property, that is informative with regard to objects and non-
informative with regard to properties; 
 
(eb) existence is a multi-level property, that is non-informative with regard to objects and 
informative with regard to properties; 
 
(ec) existence is a multi-level property, that is informative both with regard to objects and 
properties. 
 
 Concerning (ea), every property that has identity conditions (i.e., every property) exists, 
while, considering (eb) and (ec), there are properties that have identity conditions and that, 
nevertheless, do not exist. As we have already noticed in the previous chapter, in order for 
something to be a property, among other, it has to be instantiated by some object (or some 
property) or to be thought of  as being instantiated by some object (or some property). Thus, 
with regard to (ea), a property exists iff  it is a property, i.e. it is instantiated by some object (or 
some other property) or it is thought of  as being instantiated by some object (or some property). 
Yet, this hypothesis is quite strange: in order for some object to exist, it has to instantiate the 
first-order property of  existing, while, in order for some property to exist, it only has to be a 
property. Why do we have to accept such an asymmetry? 
 On the other hand, by (eb) and (ec), it is necessary to provide some criterion for 
properties' existence. One could claim, for example, that a certain property exists iff  it is 
instantiated by some existent object. Yet, since, according to (eb), every object exists, there are 
properties such as the property of  being a fictional object that exist too! On the other hand, if  
we accept that the property of  being a unicorn is not instantiated by any object, but it is only 
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thought of  as being instantiated by some object, that property does not exist. According to (ec), 
there are objects that do not exist. Thus, the property of  being a fictional object does not exist, 
since it is not instantiated by any existent object.  
 It might be objected against such an account that, in order for some property to exist, it is 
not sufficient that it is instantiated by some existent object: it should be a natural property, i.e. a 
property that grounds objective similarities, that confer causal powers to objects and that is 
fundamental. However, my account is as tolerant as possible. First, it is obvious that, in order for 
a natural property to be instantiated, it must be instantiated by some existing object (provided 
that, in order for an object to exist, it must be thus-and-thus, e.g., it must be physical, for 
physicalists, or material, for materialists, and so on). Secondly, I wish to be neutral with regard to 
what properties exist, since I am inclined to accept an abundant conception of  properties. 
However, if  existence is only a first-order, informative property, then it seems that it is also a 
natural one: it grounds objective similarities between existing objects (and those similarities could 
be explained by appealing to dispositions to act, as we will see), it is connected, within my 
account, to the possession of  causal powers, it is fundamental, as long as it cannot be reduced to 
other properties within non-foundational accounts of  existence (see below). 
 Furthermore, one might add that second-order properties exist iff  they are instantiated by 
first-order existing properties, that third-order properties exist iff  they are instantiated by second-
order existing properties, and so on. Provided that such a criterion is acceptable, both (eb) and 
(ec) imply that existence itself  exists and that it is a multi-level property with regard to itself. It 
exists, since existence itself  exists iff  it is instantiated by existing objects, which obviously 
instantiate existence. It is a multi-level property with regard to itself, since every first-order 
existent property has the property of  existing and therefore existence turns out to be a second-
order property too. Thus, existence is instantiated by entities at various levels and it instantiates 
itself  too. I shall accept such consequences for the sake of  the argument.  
 The problem with such an account does not lie in its being contradictory, but in some 
strange consequences implied by it. Except for some trivial properties (the property of  being a 
property and the negative property of  not being an object) and for the property of  being 
informative (with regard to properties and, considering (ec), with regard to objects too), existence 
turns out to be connected to opposite features. For example: if  every existing object (and no 
non-existent object) has some feature F (e.g., the property of  being spatio-temporal, or the 
property of  having causal powers), it is not guaranteed that properties, by existing, have F. In fact, 
if  every existing object (and no non-existent object) has some definite spatio-temporal location, 
this seems not to be true for existing properties (i.e., for properties that are instantiated by 
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existing objects). Furthermore, considering another example, it could be redundant to ascribe the 
same features both to properties and objects: if  only existing objects have causal powers, why do 
we have to claim that their properties, in virtue of  existing, have causal powers too? Thus, 
existence would be connected to some features with regard to objects and not connected to the 
same features with regard to properties (both existing and non-existing properties would not 
have those features). Theorists could accept such a fact, but they should try to demonstrate that 
the possession of  such features is not connected to the instantiation of  the property of  existing, 
but to something else (for example, by the fact that every property is such-and-such, whereas 
every object is so-and-so).  
 In addition, it would be unclear whether properties' existence is grounded on objects' 
existence or objects' existence is grounded on properties' existence. The existence of  the 
property of  being human seems to be grounded on the fact that some existing object (e.g., 
Obama) instantiates that property. Yet, on this account, Obama’s existence seems to be grounded 
on the fact that he instantiates some existing property, such as the property of  being human. 
Finally, considering every item (i.e., both objects and properties, regardless of  their ontological 
status), that entity exists iff  it instantiates existence. Yet, if  what we have already noticed with 
regard to properties is true, for every entity, that entity exists iff  it instantiates existence (with 
regard to object's existence) or it is instantiated by an existing object (with regard to first-order 
properties) or it is instantiated by an existing property (with regard to upper-order properties). 
This seems to imply that existence is equivalent to a mere disjunction of  properties or to a 
disjunctive property and that the attribution of  existence is not grounded on any real 
commonality between existents. Thus, items’ informative existence (that seems to be a mere 
disjunction of  properties or a mere disjunctive property) seems to be different from objects' 
existence, since this latter existence seems to be grounded on some real commonality between 
existents (see more below). In general, I think that we should not accept that existence does not 
imply any commonality, unless we can clearly demonstrate that there is no unique feature (besides 
existence itself) that all and only existents have. 
 One could reply: both existing objects and existing properties share one feature, i.e., they 
are both part of  reality. However, if  we claim that they are both part of  reality, we only claim that 
they exist. Thus, in this latter case, the question concerning what is for something to exist would 
have no informative answer: in order for something to exist, it must only... exist! On the one 
hand, we should try to settle what is for something to exist without simply concluding that the 
instantiation of  existence is only equivalent to the instantiation of  a mere disjunction of  
properties (i.e., of  a disjunction of  properties that do not share any commonality). On the other 
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hand, we should try not simply to conclude that there is nothing to explain about existence, i.e., 
that, in order for something to exist, it must only and simply exist. In sum, we should accept such 
solutions as conclusive only if  there were no other valid solution concerning the nature of  
existence.  
 Thesis (f) is perhaps the most coherent one with (actualism). In fact, according to (f), 
existence is a multi-level, non-informative property. Provided that we accept into our ontology 
both objects and properties, every object exists and every property exists, i.e., there are neither 
non-existing objects, nor non-existing properties. Thus, in order for some entity to exist, it must 
only be an entity, i.e., it must only be a property or (aut) an object. The instantiation of  existence 
turns out to be equivalent to the instantiation of  some trivial properties, such as the properties of  
being self-identical (since every object and every property is self-identical), of  being different 
from any other entity, of  being an entity, of  being an item, of  being an object or (aut) a property, 
and so on. Existence would add nothing to objects qua objects and to properties qua properties. 
For objects, the instantiation of  existence would turn out to be the instantiation of  the property 
of  being an object, while, for properties, it would turn out to be the instantiation of  the property 
of  being a property. Furthermore, existence would itself  exist, i.e., it would instantiate itself. 
Finally, it would be a multi-level property, provided that there are second-order properties, third-
order ones, and so on, and that they would exist just in virtue of  their being properties. Such an 
account has the features of  primitive and/or merely disjunctive conceptions of  existence. 
Furthermore, it implies the acceptance of  (actualism). Yet, we have no valid reason neither for 
accepting (actualism), nor for claiming that primitive and/or merely disjunctive conceptions of  
existence represent the "last word" on the nature of  existence. 
 Furthermore, it seems that existence in (f) is different from whatever property is involved  
in the truth conditions of  (7). In order to argue for such a conclusion, let me first reconsider the 
solution based on haecceities: it is true that (7) iff  it is true that some property (the property of  
being identical with Obama) has the property of  being an instantiated haecceity. In fact, we can 
claim that, if  some property (i.e., that property of  being identical with Obama) is a haecceity and 
it is instantiated, it has the property of  being an instantiated haecceity too. Furthermore, 
concerning the Russellian solution, it is true that (7) iff  it is true that some conjunctive property 
(or some conjunction of  properties) is an instantiated conjunctive property (or an instantiated 
conjunction of  properties). Thus, we could obtain the following properties as involved in the 
truth conditions of  (7): 
 
(i) the property of  being a referring grammatical proper name; 
 
(ii) the property of  being a referring logical proper name; 
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(iii) the property of  being an instantiated conjunctive property (or an instantiated conjunction of  
properties); 
 
(iv) the property of  being an instantiated haecceity; 
  
(v) the first-order property of  instantiating some existence-entailing property or some natural 
kind; 
 
(vi) the first-order property of  being a x-ish world (e.g., a Obamish world); 
 
(vii) the first-order properties of  being real or of  being spatio-temporal or of  having causal 
powers, 
 
and so on. We should add that such properties are instantiated by different items (by names, by 
other properties, by objects, etc.) in order to construct the truth-conditions of  the proposition 
expressed by (7). Thus, for example, concerning haecceities, it is true that (7) since the property 
of  being identical with Obama instantiates (iv), i.e., it is an instantiated haecceity. 
Secondly, we can claim that one necessary condition for two properties E1 and E2 to be 
identical is that they are instantiated by the same properties and by the same objects. Thus, it is a 
sufficient condition for E1 and E2 to be different that they are instantiated by different objects or 
(vel) by different properties. 
 In each case, it is easy to demonstrate that properties (i)-(vii) are not identical to the non-
informative, multi-level existence accepted by (f). Not every grammatical proper name, while 
existing, has the property of  being a grammatical referring proper name, nor any name has the 
property of  being a referring logical proper name. Not every property is an instantiated 
conjunctive property, nor is any conjunction of  properties an instantiated one or any property an 
instantiated haecceity. Finally, not every object, even if  existing (according to (f)), has the first-
order properties of  instantiating some existence-entailing property or some natural kind, or of  
being a x-ish world (since not every object is a world), nor of  being real or of  being spatio-
temporal or of  having causal powers (at least if  we do not argue that there are/exist no objects 
that do not have such properties). In sum, what seems to be requested by the truth of  (7) is an 
informative property, while existence, according to (f), is a non-informative property. Thus, the 
property that is involved in the truth-conditions of  the proposition expressed by (7) is not 
identical with the property of  existing that is described by (f). 
 In reply to this argument, one might add that there are different conditions for properties' 
and objects' existence and that we have only considered objects' existence. Thus, it might be 
possible to provide a disjunctive property, involving both objects' existence conditions (i.e., 
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properties such as (i)-(vii)) and properties' existence conditions. However, this would not be 
sufficient to claim that (f)'s existence is identical with such a disjunctive property. Furthermore, 
this reply seems to imply that existence is, by itself, only equivalent to a merely disjunctive 
property. Is my argument question-begging, since it assumes that statements such as (7) are 
informative? No, it is not, at least if  those who accept (f) recognize that there is one further task 
to perform, i.e., the task of  providing adequate truth-conditions for the seemingly true 
propositions expressed by (7) and (8) or, in other term, the task of  explaining our 
commonsensical intuition that not everything exists (i.e., that there are true statements such as 
(8)). Such theorists cannot simply deny that there are true negative existential statements (at least 
singular ones): they should at least explain why it is the case that we take some of  such statements 
as true.  
 In sum, if  we do not have any valid reason for accepting (actualism) (and it seems that we 
do not have any such reason) and if  we aim at obtaining a non-merely-disjunctive and non-
primitive account of  the nature of  existence, it seems reasonable to accept that existence is only 
an informative, first-order property306. 
 
II.2.2. It's All in your Head! 
Sherlock Holmes is a non-existent object, i.e., he does not instantiate the first-order, informative 
property of  existing. Yet, he is an object. What kind of  object? In my perspective, Sherlock 
Holmes is a mental object, i.e. an object that depends for its identity conditions (for its being an 
object) on the activity of  some mind. In order to argue for such a thesis, let me consider Sherlock 
Holmes' story in the actual world. Sherlock Holmes was invented by Arthur Conan Doyle: if  
Arthur Conan Doyle had not written Sherlock Holmes' stories, we would not have known any 
object such as Sherlock Holmes. This does not imply that Sherlock Holmes could not have had 
any other author. Yet, it is true that Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' author. Without Arthur 
Conan Doyle's mental activity, we would not have known that Sherlock Holmes is a detective 
who lives in London and who has a friend named Watson. We would not have known that 
Sherlock Holmes is different from Anna Karenina and from Watson and from Emma Bovary, 
since there would not have been such a fictional character, i.e., Sherlock Holmes would not have 
had any identity condition making it different from any other non-existent object and from any 
existent one. Yet, do we have to think that Sherlock Holmes is an object, regardless of  his 
author's mental activity? Perhaps, because he continues to be an object even if  Conan Doyle is 
                                                 
306 Crane (2011), (2012), (2013) believes that it is legitimate to quantify over non-existent objects, so that our use of 
quantifiers does not reveal our ontological commitments. I agree with him, even though I do not think that the 
domain of quantifiers only comprehends objects of thought (as Crane does), but it comprehends objects that have 
identity conditions.  
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now dead and because he might have had another author, i.e., he might have been invented by 
someone else's mental activity. I shall deal with such problems in the fourth chapter of  this part. 
However, excluding temporal and modal discourse about fictional objects, it seems fair enough to 
claim that fictional objects such as Sherlock Holmes are mental objects. Furthermore, in the next 
chapter, I shall investigate Sherlock Holmes' and other fictional objects' identity conditions qua 
mental objects and their ways of  instantiating properties such as the property of  being a 
detective, of  being a man, and so on. Moreover, I do not agree with the Meinongian perspective, 
according to which Sherlock Holmes is an object regardless of  any mental activity, at least since he 
has some ontic properties (and he always has them) even before his invention by some author. I 
shall address an objection to the Meinongian account in the conclusions of  this work. 
 However, in my perspective, authors do not properly create fictional objects, i.e., they do 
not make them existents. In fact, in such a case, these objects would be both existent and non-
existent, thus having those problems concerning existence that I have already investigated. 
Minded objects (such as authors) simply establish their identity conditions, i.e., they simply make 
them entities and, more specifically, objects (since fictional objects are objects). Given the truth 
of  such premises, it is easy to argue that Sherlock Holmes is a mental object: 
 
(arg.IV.1) for every object, that object is a mental object iff  it depends for its being an entity (and, 
more specifically, an object) on some minded object(s); 
 
(arg. IV.2) Sherlock Holmes depends for his being an entity (and, more specifically, an object) on 
some minded object; 
 
(arg.IV.3) thus, Sherlock Holmes is a mental object. 
 
 Provided that it is true that Sherlock Holmes is an object and that he does not exist, there 
are objects that do not exist, contra (actualism). Yet, someone could claim that not every mental 
object is a non-existent: for example, I could think of  my girlfriend, and she would not become a 
non-existent because of  my thinking of  her! However, in order for something to be a mental 
object, it is not sufficient that it is thought of  as being such-and-such by some minded object. It 
must be defined in its identity conditions by some minded object and my girlfriend is (luckily) not 
defined in her identity conditions by my thinking of  her. If  you wish, we can claim that 
something is a weakly mental object iff  it is thought of  as being such-and-such by some minded 
object and that something is a strongly mental object iff  it is defined in its identity conditions by 
(i.e., it depends on its being an object on) some minded object. Weakly mental objects exist or do 
not exist, while strongly mental objects do not exist. Sherlock Holmes and other fictional 
characters are strongly mental objects and they do not exist.  
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 Finally, it seems quite evident that minded objects, in order to define the objecthood of  
mental objects, must exist. Considering a fiction within a fiction, it might be true that there is 
someone, within the fiction, who defines some fictional object, that turns out to be fictional 
within the fiction too.  However, both characters (the one that seems to exist within the fiction 
and the one that is fictional within the fiction) depend on their non-fictional author in order to be 
objects. It might well be argued that reality is a fiction, that is thought of  by some minded object 
(by God?). However, God would thus be non-fictional, i.e., He would be existent. If  He were 
fictional, He would depend for His being an object on some other minded subject (a Super-God), 
and so on, ad infinitum. If  we wish to stop such a regress, we can claim that, at the end of  the 
process, there is some existing minded object that defines the objecthood of  every fictional 
object.  
 However, even if  it seems to me legitimate to conclude that fictional objects are mental 
objects, many problems are still open: how do they instantiate properties that seem to be 
existence-entailing? What are their identity conditions qua mental objects? How is their 
ontological status qua mental objects related to time and modality? For example, concerning this 
latter question, we could ask: is Sherlock Holmes now an object, even if  no one is now thinking of  
him? Could have Sherlock Holmes had another author? Could have he been existent? Some 
answers will come after having dealt with problems of  time and contingency in the fourth 
chapter of  this part. 
 
II.2.3. The Power(s) of Existing. 
My aim in this section is to provide an account of  existence in terms of  the possession of  causal 
powers. However, before explaining and trying to justify such an account, I need to deal with two 
questions: what are the features of  an adequate account of  existence? Why are other accounts 
(e.g., the ones based on the notions of  spatio-temporal extension or of  completeness) not valid 
or, at least, partial?  
 Concerning the first question, I need to clarify that I do not wish to identify the first-
order, informative property of  existing with other properties. Furthermore, I do not wish to 
defend the thesis according to which something exists in virtue of  the fact that it is thus-and-thus 
(i.e., that it has some properties, such as the properties of  being spatio-temporally extended 
and/or of  being complete and/or of  having causal powers). Such accounts of  existence, that I 
shall call "foundational accounts of  existence", immediately have to face one strong objection: 
they seem to be circular. In fact, it might be equally legitimate to claim, for example, that every 
object that has causal powers has such powers in virtue of  the fact that it exists. How might we 
break this circle? What comes first? How can we decide whether existence or the possession of  
201 
 
causal powers comes first? I do not know. Yet, I think that such a difficulty makes foundational 
accounts of  existence highly suspicious.  
 Thus, I shall use a different approach. Provided that there are objects that exist and 
objects that do not exist, I shall simply claim that all and only existing objects instantiate the first-
order, informative property of  existing E. Nevertheless, all and only existing objects have some 
property different from E, that I shall call MARK. This property is a "mark" of  existence. Even if  
it might not be true that existing objects exist in virtue of  instantiating MARK (while it might be 
true that they instantiate MARK in virtue of  existing), it seems to me legitimate to accept that such a 
logical equivalence is true: 
 
(existence) it is necessary that, for every object, it exists (i.e., it instantiates E) iff  it instantiates 
MARK. 
 
 The modal context introduced by "it is necessary that" is obviously justified by the fact 
that we are not looking for an accidental generalization about the nature of  existence. We are 
interested in finding out what is, in every metaphysically possible world (if  we interpret modality 
in possible worlds' terms), for an object to exist (i.e., what is the "mark" of  existing in every 
metaphysically possible world). Furthermore, our account should be non-relational. A relational 
account of  existence works as follows: 
 
(existence-rel.) it is necessary that, for every object, it exists iff  there is some object with whom 
the former object has some relation R. 
 
 In order to avoid complications, I shall call the first object "object1" and the second 
object with whom object1 has some relation R "object2". Does object2 have to be different from 
object1 or not? Does object2 have to exist or not? There are four possibilities: 
 
(rel-a) it is necessary that object2  is different from object1 and that it exists; 
 
(rel-b) it is necessary that object2 is different from object1 and it is not necessary that it exists; 
 
(rel-c) it is not necessary that object2 is different from object1 and it is necessary that it exists; 
 
(rel-d) it is not necessary that object2 is different from object1 and it is not necessary that it exists. 
 
 I shall consider one intuitively plausible relational account of  existence: the one based on 
being part of  reality. Thus, I shall assume that reality is object2 and that the considered relation is 
the relation of  being part of. According to this account, it is necessary that, for every object, it 
exists iff  it is part of  reality. I shall set aside further questions, such as: does reality only 
comprehend the actual world (so that it is necessary that only actual objects exist) or every 
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possible world (so that it is necessary that every object in every possible world exists)? I only aim 
at showing the structural problems of  relational accounts. If  it is true that (rel-a), then it is 
necessary that reality is different from object1 and that it exists while, according to (rel-b), it is still 
necessary that it differs from object1, but it is not necessary that it exists, i.e., it is possible that 
reality itself  does not exist. On the other hand, according to (rel-c), it is not necessary that reality 
differs from object1, but it is necessary that it exists, while, according to (rel-d), it is not necessary 
that reality is different from object1 and it is not necessary that it exists. 
 If  it is true that (rel-a), then it is necessary that reality exists and it is necessary that it is 
different from itself  in order to exist (since it is also necessary that, for every object, that object 
exists iff  it is part of  reality, given (existence-rel.)). Otherwise, it cannot be among those objects 
that exist. If  it is true that (rel-b), then it is possible that reality itself  does not exist. Yet, in this 
case, reality exists iff  it is necessary that it is different from itself  and it is possible that it does not 
exist and it is part of  itself. Yet, it is obviously not necessary that reality is different from itself. 
Thus, reality itself  does not exist – and the same happens with any other object2! It is quite 
implausible that reality itself  does not exist. However, in order not to focus on the example of  
reality, it seems to me that, if  no object2 necessarily exist, why do we have to choose certain 
possibly non-existing objects2 and not others, in order to make sense of  (rel-b)? On the other 
hand, if  there were no such criterion for choosing among objects2, then every possibly non-
existing object would turn out to be suitable and many non-existent objects would then turn out 
to exist: Sherlock Holmes, for example, would exist in virtue of  being part of  some possibly non-
existing object, i.e., of  some fictional context. 
 Concerning (rel-c), it implies that reality itself  exists iff, among other, it is necessary that it 
exists. Yet, this account is circular, since it assumes that reality itself  exists. 
 Finally, dealing with (rel-d), many non-necessarily existing object would turn out to be 
suitable for the role played by object2. Why reality? In sum, if  we accepted (rel-d), we would have 
to deal with some weaker version of  the problem already met with (rel-b). 
 I have considered this example of  relational account in order to concede as much as 
possible to those who accept relational accounts. In fact, it makes it possible to think of  the same 
relation (the relation of  being part of) as explaining both object2's (reality) and other objects' 
existence. Corresponding non-modal versions fare no better. In fact, they still have to determine 
whether reality exists or not and whether such accounts only work with objects different from 
reality or with reality too.  
 Thus, my account of  existence will provide a mark for existence and will be non-
relational and modal. This seems to exclude many accounts of  existence. It obviously excludes 
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relational accounts and accounts that seem to be non-relational, but that are covertly relational307. 
For example, every account of  existence in terms of  objects' being spatio-temporal or temporal 
is covertly relational. According to such accounts 
 
(ex.spatio-temporal) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  it is spatio-
temporal; 
 
(ex.temporal) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  it is temporal. 
 
 Yet, it is necessary that, for every object, that object is a spatio-temporal (or a temporal) 
object iff  there is some spatio-temporal (or some temporal) region such that that object occupies 
that region. Namely, it is true that 
 
(ex.spatio-temporal') it is necessary that, for every object1, that object exists iff  there is some 
object2, such that that object2 is a spatio-temporal region and object1 occupies object2; 
 
(ex.temporal') it is necessary that, for every object1, that object exists iff  there is some object2, 
such that that object2 is a temporal region and object1 occupies object2. 
 
 One brief  remark: the objectual quantifier in the right-hand of  these logical equivalences 
cannot be within the scope of  any possibility operator. In fact, in such a case, there would exist 
objects for which it would be only possible that  there is a spatio-temporal (or a temporal) region 
such that... etc. Merely possible objects would thus turn out to exist. It is easy to show that, with 
regard to the status of  that object2, we will have all the aforementioned problems of  every 
relational accounts. Furthermore, if  we do not accept a substantivist conception of  space-time or 
of  time, spatio-temporal and temporal regions' existence seem to depend on existing objects' 
relations and, in turn, on objects' existence. There are many problems connected with spatio-
temporal and temporal accounts, but I think that the most serious one lie in their being relational 
accounts. 
 One of  the most interesting (truly) non-relational accounts of  existence can be given in 
terms of  completeness: 
 
(ex.completeness) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  it is complete, 
 
namely 
 
(ex.completeness') it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff, for every property, 
that object has that property or it does not have it. 
 
 Since properties do not exist and cannot exist (at least in my perspective), such an account 
                                                 
307 For a detailed investigation of accounts of existence, see Routley (1980): 697-768. 
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can be considered non-relational. Furthermore, our choice of  properties is not arbitrary (as it 
happens with regard to supposedly non-existent objects involved in some relational accounts): we 
do not have to choose certain properties, since we only claim that existent objects are all and only 
those objects for which it is true that, for every property, they instantiate it or do not instantiate 
it. Yet, this account has to deal with notorious objections. First, if  non-existent objects are 
objects for which it is not true that, for every property, they instantiate it or they do not 
instantiate it, then the law of  bivalence (according to which every proposition exactly has one 
truth-value, either truth or falsehood) and the law of  excluded middle (according to which, for 
every proposition [p], either [p] or [not-p]) do not work for every proposition concerning objects. 
In fact, for some property not explicitly ascribed to him within his stories, it is neither true nor 
false that Sherlock Holmes instantiates that property (in fact, he is a non-existent object). One 
might reply that Sherlock Holmes does not have any property not explicitly ascribed to him 
within his stories, i.e., that it is false that he instantiates properties that are not ascribed to him 
within his stories. However, in such a case, Sherlock Holmes would turn out to be complete, so 
that he would exist!  
 Secondly, there are also (seemingly) existent objects (such as forests) that are not 
complete. Let me consider some forest and some tree that is at the edge of  the forest, such that it 
is really difficult to decide whether that tree is part of  that forest or not. Since the forest exists 
and since it is necessary that the forest exists iff  it is complete, there follows that the forest  bears 
or does not bear with the tree the relation of  having it as a part. Yet, it is not determined whether 
it bears such a relation with the tree or not. Thus, the forest both exists and does not exist. In 
order to preserve (ex.completeness'), one could argue that the forest does not exist or that it is 
determined whether it bears or does not bear with the tree such a relation or that 
(ex.completeness') works only with monadic properties. However, it seems to me that each 
solution is problematic. I do not want to set aside solutions grounded on completeness. In the 
next chapter, I shall provide an account for non-existent objects' (supposed) non-completeness. 
 My favorite account of  existence is the one based on the possession of  causal powers: 
 
(ex.causal powers) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  it has some causal 
power. 
 
 This account is partly inspired by Geach, but I do not accept his disjunctive account of  
actuality-sense of  existence, according to which, for every object, that object exists (is actual) iff  
it either acts, or undergoes change, or both308. In fact, first, even non-existent objects qua mental 
objects undergo change: for example, Sherlock Holmes somehow changes when he is thought of  
                                                 
308 See Geach (1968): 7. 
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as an expert of  martial arts within some works; he undergoes change (some kind of  substantial 
change, even if  he does not properly start to exist) when he is constituted as an object. In such 
cases, how might we individuate appropriate and non-appropriate changes in order to defend 
Geach's account? Secondly, as we will see, it is not sufficient to claim that existent objects act. 
There might exist objects that never act. Furthermore, this solution is inspired by S. Alexander's 
well-known dictum (to be real is to have causal powers) and seems to be accepted, among others, 
by F. Berto309. 
 Before trying to provide an account for objects' possessing causal powers, it is necessary 
to make some remarks. First, I do not obviously wish to argue that, necessarily, objects exists iff  
they act. A similar solution would be inconsistent with the hypothesis of  there being possible 
worlds in which objects do not produce any action. For example, a possible world in which there 
exist only two balls that are millions of  kilometers far from one another is a world in which those 
two balls do not act, i.e., according to such a hypothesis, they do not exist. The atoms that 
constitute each ball act on one another, so that they exist, but the balls do not exist, because they 
do not act on their atoms and they do not act on one another. 
 Secondly, it is important to remark that the possession of  causal powers by existing 
objects does not entail that such objects only act on existing objects. In such a case, (ex.causal 
powers) would turn out to be relational. On the other hand, if  Conan Doyle (an existing object) 
constitutes Sherlock Holmes (a fictional object, i.e., a mental one) as an object, it seems that 
Conan Doyle has the causal power of  constituting Sherlock Holmes as an object: he can produce 
something.  
 Thirdly, it is not necessary that the possession of  causal powers is relative to times. 
Namely, it is not necessary that I can produce something iff  I can produce it at some time or 
another. If  God exists and if  He aims at creating the actual world, He does not have the power 
of  producing it at some time or another, since time (if  it exists) and times (if  they exist) are 
created with the (actual) world. One might reply to this objection in different ways. For example, 
one could claim that, assuming our account, it simply turns out that God does not exist, since He 
cannot have any causal power before the (supposed) existence of  time and times. Yet, this reply 
already assumes that the possession of  causal powers entails the existence of  time and times. 
Furthermore, I have only introduced the possibility of  God's existence, i.e., I have only claimed 
that it is metaphysically (and logically) possible that God exists and that, in a metaphysically (and 
logically) possible world in which God exists, God can create the (natural) world, even without 
having the power of  creating it at some time or another. Thus, it is not true that it is 
                                                 
309 See, for example, Berto (2013a): 61-84. 
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metaphysically necessary that God exists iff  He has some causal power at some time or another. 
On the other hand, our ideal sparring partner could claim that, even if  it is logically possible that 
God exists, it is not metaphysically possible that He exists and, since we are interested in 
metaphysical possibility, we cannot "use" God's logically possible existence in order to refute that 
it is metaphysically necessary that, for every object, it exists iff  it has some causal power at some 
time or another. However, s/he might provide some reasons for such a strong claim about the 
metaphysical impossibility of  God's existence.  
 Yet, there is a second reply that it is worth considering: God has somehow the power of  
creating the natural world at one definite non-created time, i.e., the time before the existence of  
other times (i.e., of  created times). This "first" and somehow eternal time is different from any 
other time, so that it has identity conditions. However, such a time would not be an existent time. 
If  it existed, it would be different from God or identical with it. If  it were different from God, 
then there would exist two different objects before the existence of  the natural world. Yet, what 
reasons do we have for thinking that, before the existence of  the natural world, there exist two 
different objects, i.e., God and that eternal time? That time's existence would depend on God's 
existence or not. Furthermore, God's existence would depend on that time's existence or not. 
Yet, if  it is metaphysically possible that God exists, it is also metaphysically possible that God is 
an existentially independent being, while any other existing object different from God 
existentially depends on God (this seems to be implied by the metaphysical possibility of  God's 
existence). Thus, if  it is metaphysically possible that God exists, it is metaphysically possible that 
God exists and that no eternal time exists. Thus, it is metaphysically possible that God exists and 
that He has the power of  creating the natural world, even if  He does not have the power of  
creating the natural world at that eternal time. On the other hand, if  that time were identical with 
God, it would not properly be one time as other created times, but it would be God himself. 
Thus, I think that there are good reasons for thinking that that eternal time does not exist. Yet, if  
it does not exist and if  what I have claimed about relational accounts of  existence is true, why do 
we have to assume that God's power of  creating the natural world is relative to some time or 
another?  
 Fourthly, one could claim that each causal power is relative to something. For example, it 
is metaphysically possible that God has the power of  creating the natural world, so that God's 
causal power is relative to the natural world, which does not exist before its creation by God. 
Thus, God exists iff, among other conditions, there is some non-existent object that is thus-and-
thus. However, this does not imply that there must be a certain object with regard to which God 
has that power. Perhaps, every causal power is relative to something: for example, I can think iff  
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there is some thought, such that I can think of  it. This does not imply that there is a certain 
thought, such that I can think iff  I can think of  that thought. Furthermore, this account of  
existence in terms of  the possession of  causal powers is not restricted to certain causal powers, 
which are such that there are some objects with regard to whom I have those powers. Thus, it is 
not a relational account, since it does neither imply that I exist iff  there is a certain object with 
regard to whom I have a certain causal power, nor that I exist iff  there is some object with regard 
to whom I have a certain causal power. Finally, following (existence-rel-b) and (existence-rel-d), 
some objects with regard to whom I have some causal powers might be necessarily non-existents 
ones.  
 Fifthly, it might be argued that even causal powers are objects, so that this account is 
relational, because it is relative to causal powers. However, I have already claimed that no 
possession of  certain causal powers is involved in objects' existence. Furthermore, if  we think of  
causal powers as dispositions to act, they are only properties, that are instantiated by existing 
objects and only by them. For example, I have the disposition to constitute some fictional object, 
even if  (provided that I do not actually think of  fictional objects) there is no particular fictional 
object such that I actually constitute it. It is true that there might be such an object but, in fact, 
there is no such object. Nevertheless, I have that causal power. 
 It is now possible to give two different readings of  (ex.causal powers), according to two 
different notions of  having causal powers: 
 
(ex.causal powers-1) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  it is possible that 
there is some other object (regardless of  its being identical with or different from the first 
object), such that the first object acts on it; 
 
(ex.causal powers-2) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  there is some 
property, such that that property is a disposition to act and that object instantiates that property. 
 
 These readings are equivalent, since 
 
(dispositions to act) it is necessary that, for every object, that object instantiates some disposition 
to act iff  it is possible that there is some other object (regardless of  its being identical with or 
different from the first object), such that the first object acts on it310. 
 
 However, it is necessary to develop such theses in order to get rid of  two problems: the 
(supposed) possession of  causal powers by non-existent objects and the problem of  the existence 
of  too many objects that instantiate the same causal power(s) (e.g., both an ordinary object and a 
                                                 
310 This reading of dispositions to act concedes as much as possible to conditional analyses of dispositions, even 
though it admits that the second object could be a non-existing one. 
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fact could instantiate the same causal power, so that they would both turn out to exist).  
 With regard to the first problem, I shall consider the following case against my thesis311. 
Let me imagine that there is a castle in Scotland where (many people believe that) there is one 
and only one ghost. This ghost is different from any other ghost: it is different from ghosts in any 
other Scottish castle and it is different from ghosts that are supposed to "live" in any other castle 
around the world. In sum, it is exactly one ghost. Since ghosts do not exist (even if  many people 
think otherwise), it seems legitimate to claim that our unique Scottish ghost is a fictional object, 
i.e. a mental one. Let me suppose that Franz, a friend of  mine, visits that castle and that he 
believes that that unique Scottish ghost lives there (even if  this is, in fact, a false belief). Nothing 
really happens in the castle. Yet, Franz fears the ghost. Thus, it seems that the ghost, even if  it 
does not exist, has the power of  causing fear in Franz. The argument against my thesis assumes 
these premises: 
 
(ghost-1) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  there is some property, such 
that that property is a disposition to act and that object instantiates that property; 
 
(ghost-2) our unique Scottish ghost does not exist; 
 
(ghost-3) Franz fears our unique Scottish ghost; 
 
(ghost-4) if  Franz fears our unique Scottish ghost, then our unique Scottish ghost instantiates the 
disposition to produce fear (i.e., a disposition to act), 
 
and it concludes that 
 
(ghost-5) our unique Scottish ghosts both exists and does not exist. 
 
 It is possible to reply to this argument in different ways. Actualists could argue that 
(ghost-2) is false, since the ghost exists or it is not an object, so that it does not instantiate any 
property. However, we have already seen that there are valid reasons for assuming that our unique 
Scottish ghost is an object: it is different from any other object and, when people believe that it 
has some properties, they believe that exactly that ghost has those properties. On the other hand, 
it might be suggested against (ghost-3) that Franz does not fear that unique ghost, but something 
else (perhaps, an existing thing): a strange and unexpected noise, for example, or the thought that 
that ghost is really evil. Yet, Franz might answer: no, Sir, everything is calm here, and I do not 
fear that thought, I fear the ghost! Furthermore, it might be argued that the disposition to 
produce fear is not a disposition to act and that, perhaps, it is not a disposition at all, so that 
                                                 
311 This case seems to be nothing more than a case of the so-called "paradox of fiction". For an introductory survey 
of this paradox, see, for example, Schneider (2009). 
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(ghost-4) is false. Yet, it truly seems to be a disposition to act. If  there were an evil person in the 
castle and if  Franz knew that that person is evil, that person would have the disposition to 
produce fear. Thus, it might seem legitimate to conclude that (ghost-1), i.e., our thesis (ex.causal 
powers-2), is false, and that (ex.causal powers-1) is false too, since it is possible that there is an 
object (i.e., Franz) such that the ghost acts on that object, even if  the ghost does not exist: in fact, 
Franz is our unlucky object.  
 Yet, why do we have to admit such conclusion? In fact, there is another solution for our 
case. We might admit that some existent object produces Franz's fear. For example, the thought 
of  that ghost's existence and of  that ghost's being evil, provided that those thoughts exist. In 
such a case, it might be legitimate to argue that, even if  Franz believes that the ghost produces his 
fear, he has a false belief, since the (existing) thought of  that ghost's existing and of  that ghost's 
being evil produces that fear. However, Franz truly has the false belief  that our Scottish ghost 
produces his fear and that that ghost (i.e., a mental object that is thought of  by Franz) exists. 
Thus, if  the ghost is a mental object, why cannot we claim that that object produces that fear, 
instead of  Franz's thought? In other terms, it seems that both the ghost (with all the properties 
that are ascribed to it by Franz and other people) and Franz's thought of  that ghost's existing and 
being evil are sufficient to produce Franz's fear.  
 This remark introduces our second problem. In fact, there might be objects that share 
one and the same disposition to act. For example, let me consider Conan Doyle’s thinking of  
Sherlock Holmes. In order for Sherlock Holmes to be constituted as an object, it might be 
sufficient that there is a complex fact, such as the fact that Conan Doyle takes some properties 
(e.g., the properties of  being a detective, of  living in London, etc.) and that he thinks that those 
properties are instantiated by one and only one object (within some fictional context, I add, even 
if  I shall justify this addition in the next chapter). Thus, if  that complex fact is sufficient to 
constitute Sherlock Holmes as an object, so that it has the disposition to constitute Sherlock 
Holmes as an object (i.e., a disposition to act), then that fact exists. Now, if  every disposition to 
act possessed by Conan Doyle is possessed by some complex fact too, both Conan Doyle and all 
the complex facts involving Conan Doyle exist. Yet, it seems that too many objects (facts are 
objects too, following my terminology) turn out to exist. Thus, this account is too ontologically 
rich. On the other hand, many philosophers think that facts or events (and only facts or events) 
have causal powers, since only facts (or events) might be causal relata. Thus, this account, if  not 
too ontologically rich, might turn out to be too ontologically poor, since it would exclude the 
existence of  objects such as Franz, Conan Doyle, and so on.  
 It is possible to deal with such problems following three suggestions. First, it is worth 
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noting that many objects share many dispositions to act. For example, both Conan Doyle and I 
have the disposition to constitute a fictional character as an object. Thus, considering a certain 
existing object, one might try to individuate some unique disposition to act that that object (and 
only that object) has: 
 
(ex.causal powers-1a) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  it is possible that 
there is some other object (regardless of  its being identical with or different from the first 
object), such that the first object acts in some unique way on it and there is no other object 
different from the first object, such that it possibly acts in that same way on the second object; 
 
(ex.causal powers-2a) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  there is some 
property, such that that property is a disposition to act and that object instantiates that property 
and there is no other object different from that first object, such that it instantiates that property. 
 
 Yet, (ex.causal powers-1a) seems to be too complicated for the aims of  this exposition, 
even if  I accept it. Thus, I shall concentrate by now on the examination of  (ex.causal powers-2). 
However, both solutions have to meet another difficulty: given the possible world that is 
occupied only by two perfectly similar balls, if  those balls exist, they have the same dispositions 
to act or it is possible that they act in the same ways. Thus, following these solutions, they would 
turn out to be non-existents. 
 I here introduce the second and third suggestions. One could claim that there is no other 
object of  any different kind that has that unique disposition to act and that, even if  there is some 
other object of  some different kind that has that unique disposition to act, this latter object 
depends on the first one for its identity conditions. This identity-dependence cannot be expressed 
in purely modal terms, since it is necessary that, for example, Sherlock Holmes has his own 
identity conditions iff  there exists some thought of  Sherlock Holmes' author's that is about 
Sherlock Holmes (provided that Sherlock Holmes is a mental object), but it is also necessary that 
that existing thought of  Sherlock Holmes' author's that is about Sherlock Holmes has its own 
identity conditions iff  there is an object such as Sherlock Holmes. However, it seems that, 
provided that Sherlock Holmes is a mental object, Sherlock Holmes depends for his identity 
conditions on his author's thoughts about him, while those thoughts do not depend for their 
identity conditions on Sherlock Holmes. In fact, such thoughts constitute Sherlock Holmes as an 
object, i.e., they provide identity conditions for Sherlock Holmes.  
 We can now formulate our thesis in order to deal with the aforementioned problems: 
 
(ex.causal powers-2b) it is necessary that, for every object, that object exists iff  there are some 
property and some kind, such that that object belongs to that kind and that property is a 
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disposition to act and that object instantiates that property and there is no other object such that 
it does not belong to the same kind of  the first object and it does not depend on the first object 
for its identity conditions and it instantiates that disposition to act. 
 
 Put formally (using the variable "K" as ranging over kinds, the property constant "D" as 
expressing the second-order property of  being a disposition to act and the property constant "I" 
as expressing the relation of  depending for its identity conditions): 
 
(ex.causal powers-2b) ⎕ x(Ex ↔  P K(Kx & DP & Px & ~ y(~Ky & ~Iyx & Py)) 
 
 Since x and y belong to different kinds, they obviously are different objects. Kinds are 
properties that are different from dispositions to act: no disposition to act is a kind and no kind is 
a disposition to act.  
 Following (ex.causal powers-2b), it is easy to show that our problems disappear. Let me 
consider Franz himself, the thought that the Scottish ghost exists and is evil and Franz's thought 
that the Scottish ghost exists and is evil. These two latter thoughts depend on minded subjects: 
the thought that the Scottish ghost exists and is evil depends on some minded subject in order 
for its being a thought and for its being a thought about a Scottish ghost (i.e., about a non-
existent, mental object that is constituted as an object by some minded subject); Franz's thought 
that the Scottish ghost exists and is evil depends, for its identity conditions, on Franz. Thus, if  
Franz himself  has the disposition to cause his own fear, then neither the general thought, nor 
Franz's thought have that disposition. Yet, Franz has the disposition to cause his own fear by 
thinking that there is a unique Scottish ghost which exists and is evil, that entails his possession 
of  the disposition to cause his own fear. Thus, Franz himself  has such a disposition and, 
following (ex.causal powers-2b), there is no disposition to cause fear that some object different 
from Franz in its kind and independent of  him for its identity conditions has. Thus, Franz's 
thought that the Scottish ghost exists and is evil does not have the disposition to cause Franz's 
fear. It seems reasonable to claim that such a thought does not exist. Furthermore, by analogy, 
the thought that the Scottish ghosts exists and is evil does not have any disposition to cause 
anyone's fear: as in Franz's case, there exists some minded subject that has the disposition to 
cause its own fear. Thus, in our argument, the premise (ghost-4) is false: Franz himself  (an 
existing object) has the disposition to produce his own fear. With regard to complex facts, it 
seems that such facts depend for their identity conditions on objects such as Conan Doyle (and 
properties). Thus, they do not properly have Conan Doyle's dispositions to act. One could reply 
that, following this thesis, no fact turns out to exist. I am inclined to concede this point: I think 
that facts have some properties and that they are objects, but I think that it is not necessary to 
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admit that they exist. However, if  they had dispositions to act as the ones introduced in (ex.causal 
powers-2b), they would turn out to exist. 
 It is worth remarking that my strategy is strongly anti-reductive and anti-eliminativist with 
regard to existing objects. For example, I exist since I have dispositions to act that are not borne 
by any constituent of  mine (e.g., my atoms or the sum of  my atoms)312. 
 Existence makes a great difference: its possession is a necessary condition for the 
possession of  any disposition to act by existing objects. Furthermore, it is legitimate to argue that 
there are kinds that confer dispositions to act and kinds that do not confer any disposition to act, 
i.e., existence-entailing kinds and non-existence entailing ones, and that this happens in virtue of  
identity-dependence.  
 Let me consider one final worry about kinds' existence. One could claim that, contrary to 
what I have concluded in the previous sections, kinds have the dispositions to confer dispositions 
to act to objects that instantiate them. For example, the kind-property of  being human has the 
disposition to confer to all humans the disposition to think (provided that only human beings are 
able to think). Since there are such higher-order dispositions that do not depend for their identity 
conditions on other entities and are uniquely instantiated by kinds, it might be legitimate to claim 
that kinds exist too. However, such dispositions are not properly dispositions to act, at least given 
the following:  
 
(dispositions to act) it is necessary that, for every object, that object instantiates some disposition 
to act iff  it is possible that there is some other object (regardless of  its being identical with or 
different from the first object), such that the first object acts on it. 
 
 Nevertheless, quantifying more generally over items (i.e., in my two-category ontology, 
over objects and properties), one could obtain that 
 
(dispositions to act-1) it is necessary that, for every item, that item instantiates some disposition 
to act iff  it is possible that there is some other item (regardless of  its being identical with or 
different from the first object), such that the first item acts on it. 
 
 According to (dispositions to act-1), even kinds turn out to have dispositions to act, such 
as the disposition to confer the disposition to think (in the case of  the property-kind of  being 
human). In order to admit that there are properties that exist, we should change (ex.causal 
powers-2b) too, by quantifying over items. How can we restrict (dispositions to act-1), in order to 
imply that kinds do not exist? Let me notice, at first, that dispositions to act such as the 
                                                 
312 This line of thought can be adopted in response to T. Merrick's eliminativist account of non-minded ordinary 
objects. See Merricks (2001). 
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disposition to confer the disposition to think are complex dispositions: they contain within 
themselves further dispositions. We could introduce one restricted kind of  dispositions to act, i.e., 
dispositions to act that do not contain other dispositions within themselves, namely dispositions 
to act that are not dispositions to confer dispositions to act. Let me call them dispositions to actA. 
Thus, it is possible to amend (dispositions to act-1) as follows: 
 
(dispositions to act-2) it is necessary that, for every item, that item instantiates some disposition 
to actA iff  it is possible that there is some other item (regardless of  its being identical with or 
different from the first entity), such that the first item acts on it and such that this action does not 
consist in conferring dispositions to act. 
 
 Finally, quantifying over items, we could amend (ex.causal powers-2b) as follows: 
 
(ex.causal powers-2c) it is necessary that, for every item, that item exists iff  there are some 
property and some kind, such that that item belongs to that kind and that property is a 
disposition to actA and that item instantiates that property and there is no other item, such that it 
does not belong to the same kind of  the first item and it does not depend on the first item for its 
identity conditions and it instantiates that disposition to actA. 
 
 Thus, kinds do not exist, since they do not have any disposition to actA.  
 
II.2.4. What Kind and Degree of Existence do you have? 
Our quantifiers are not ontologically committing: they range over whatever (objects and 
properties) has identity conditions. There is only one kind of  quantifiers and existence is only a 
first-order, informative property that some objects (and not all the objects) have.  
 It is now worth asking whether there are several ways or kinds of  being. K. McDaniel and 
J. Turner have defended a thesis named "ontological pluralism", according to which there are 
many ways or kinds of  being, that are expressed by different restricted quantifiers313. For 
example, if  we quantify over objects, we have to use a restricted quantifier that expresses the way 
of  being an object, while, if  we quantify over properties, we have to use a restricted quantifier 
that expresses the way of  being a property, and so on. Every fundamental ontological category 
has its own restricted quantifier. On the other hand, unrestricted quantifiers are nothing more 
than mere disjunctions of  restricted quantifiers: by using an unrestricted existential quantifier, we 
only claim that there is something that has the way of  being a property, or an object, and so on, 
i.e., that there is an object or a property (or whatever else) that is such-and-such. Ways of  beings 
are not properties of  entities that fall under unrestricted quantifiers: they are simply and 
                                                 
313 See McDaniel (2009), (2010a), (2010b), and Turner (2010). 
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primitively what is expressed by restricted quantifiers. Furthermore, according to McDaniel, ways 
of  being are more natural than that "being in general" that is expressed by the unrestricted 
quantifier. 
 So far, so good. Yet, I think that items falling under unrestricted quantifiers have 
something in common: they have identity conditions. Thus, such quantifiers are not merely 
disjunctive: they express a real commonality among items. On the other hand, I do not see the 
advantages given by the postulation of  many ways of  being (or of  existing, perhaps). First, why 
cannot we introduce properties that are instantiated by all the items over whom restricted 
quantifiers range? For example, we can introduce the properties of  having the way of  being an 
object, or a property (or the way of  "being in" something, that is postulated by McDaniel in 
order to define the ontological status of  accidents). Such properties are non-informative 
properties, at least with regard to certain domains of  items (i.e., with regard to the different 
domains of  restricted quantifiers). Secondly, if  it is legitimate to introduce such properties, then 
their instantiation turns out to be equivalent to the instantiation of  the properties of  being an 
object, of  being a property (or of  being an accident). If  they express something more than the 
instantiation of  such properties, then one might had one further property, i.e., the property of  
having the way of  being an object. Yet, this does define anything new in the world: why is it 
necessary to add that there is a way of  being an object, in addition to the property of  being an 
object? What commonality does this way of  being express, in addition to the commonality that is 
already expressed by the property of  being an object? I do not know. Thirdly, ontological 
pluralists have some problems when they try to determine (and to logically express) how many 
ways of  being there are314. 
 Thus, it seems to me that ways of  being (or of  existing) and restricted quantifiers are 
redundant. My account of  unrestricted quantifiers and of  existence only as a first-order, 
informative property seems to be clearer and better grounded. However, I would perhaps agree 
with those who claim that there is a way of  temporally existing, that is different from the way of  
atemporally existing, as I shall argue in the fourth chapter of  this part. 
 What about degrees of  existence? Following my account, even provided that existence is 
a yes/no property, it is possible to make sense of  such degrees. In fact, one might use 
dispositions to act in order to claim that some object has a higher degree of  existence than some 
other object. Let me call such objects object1 and object2. The following rule seems to be 
acceptable in order to justify that object1 has a higher degree of  existence than object2: 
 
(degrees) it is necessary that, for any two different objects object1 and object2, object1 has a higher 
                                                 
314 See Paolini Paoletti (manuscript). 
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degree of  existence than object2 iff  object1 has more dispositions to act than object2. 
 
 Let me notice that, since the possession of  some dispositions to act is sometimes entailed 
by the possession of  other dispositions to act (e.g., if  I have the disposition to freely act with my 
body, I have the disposition to freely move my arm, since my arm is part of  my body), it is 
possible to claim that, for example, a minded object has a higher degree of  existence than a non-
minded one and that a free object (such as a human person) has a higher degree of  existence 
than a non-free one. Degrees of  existence are somehow connected with moral value, but it is not 
necessary to claim that there is such a connection. One could claim that God has every 
disposition to act, since He is omnipotent. Thus, if  God exists, He has the highest degree of  
existence.  
 I cannot explore such topics to a larger extent. I have only tried to demonstrate that my 
account of  existence can set kinds of  existence apart and that it can make sense of  the idea of  
there being degrees of  existence. 
 
II.2.5. "Living" on the Edge: Mathematical Objects, Propositions and Facts. 
I have claimed and tried to demonstrate that some non-existent objects (at least, fictional ones) 
are mental objects. Yet, are all non-existent objects mental objects? Let me consider numbers and 
geometrical figures. On the one hand, it seems that numbers and geometrical figures have, for 
example, the disposition to produce our knowledge that they are such-and-such (e.g., that the 
number 1 is a prime number). Thus, they exist. On the other hand, such a disposition can be 
thought of  as being borne by minded subjects too: I have the disposition to know that the 
number 1 is a prime number. What other dispositions do numbers have? I think that they only 
have epistemic dispositions, that also minded subjects have: they cannot cause things to happen, 
they do not introduce any real possibility of  change that is not already introduced by anything 
else. Thus, it seems reasonable to me to conclude that numbers do not exist.  
 However, even if  numbers (and geometrical figures) do not exist, are they mental objects? 
Do minded subjects define their identity conditions? If  they are mental objects, then minded 
subjects should be able to define such conditions. If  they are not mental objects, then minded 
subjects somehow discover them and their features. My theory would be more elegant, if  it 
would be able to provide a mentalistic account for mathematical objects. Yet, I have at least two 
doubts: amica theoria, sed magis amicus Plato!  
 The first doubt is that, when we claim that a triangle is such-and-such, its features do not 
depend on our minds. This seems to happen because we do not abstract from something in the 
nature the property of  being triangular (nothing is perfectly triangular in nature!). However, in 
order to defend a mentalistic account of  triangles, one could reply that the property of  being 
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triangular is the product of  some higher-level abstraction: we find out objects that seem to be 
triangular (that are not perfectly triangular, but are different from other objects that have other 
shapes) and we imagine a property such as the property of  being (perfectly) triangular, with the 
aid of  some "intensive" abstraction (an abstraction by degrees). Yet, do such properties (the 
properties of  being perfectly or imperfectly triangular) depend for their identity conditions on 
there being triangles or not? If  they depend on there being triangles, then triangles must be 
objects prior to any mental abstraction, even if  they do not exist. If  they do not depend on 
triangles, then there should be some way to reduce such properties of  being (perfectly or 
imperfectly) triangular to other properties, with the aid of  which we could construct triangles.  
 One could perhaps immediately think of  numbers and of  their properties. Yet, this would 
simply postpone the problem, since numbers seem to be non-existent and non-mental objects 
too. In fact (here is my second doubt), how can we construct the number 1 with all its features in 
our minds? One of  the most interesting accounts could be given in terms of  identity and 
difference. I cannot explore such an account here. Yet, I have some doubts about the possibility 
of  constructing numbers in such a way without already presupposing that there are such 
numbers. Thus, it seems to me that we have no reason for thinking that numbers depend on our 
minds for their being objects. Perhaps, we might think that they depend on God's mind, so that 
they are divine mental objects. I cannot follow here such a suggestion. I can only conclude that 
numbers are non-existent objects that do not depend on human minded subjects. This does not 
exclude that they have properties and that they can be thought of  by us as having properties, and 
the same seems to happen with regard to geometrical objects.  
 What about propositions? It seems that propositions are true or false regardless of  there 
being minded subjects thinking of  them and constituting them as propositions. For example, let 
me consider a possible world in which there is no minded subject, but in which there are stones. 
In that world, there is a proposition, such as the proposition [stones exist], and that proposition 
has the property of  being true, independently of  the existence of  any minded subject. On the 
other hand, given my mentalistic account of  propositions, we think of  that proposition and we 
constitute it in our world (where minded subjects exist) and we attribute to it the property of  
being true in that possible world. Thus, such a proposition is true in that possible world iff  there 
is some minded subject that constitutes it as a proposition and that attributes to it the property 
of  being true in that possible world. Furthermore, such a minded subject constitutes it as a 
proposition iff  it ascribes to each part of  that proposition the relation of  referring to something 
and to the whole proposition the property of  having some truth-value (i.e., of  being true or 
false). Which one is the correct account? The argument for the mind-independence of  the 
217 
 
proposition [stones exist] runs as follows (assuming that "w1" is a constant standing for one 
possible world in which stones exist and no minded subject exists): 
 
(prop.I) [stones exist] has the property of  being true in w1; 
 
(prop.II) [no minded subject exists] has the property of  being true in w1; 
 
(prop.III) if  [stones exist] has the property of  being true in w1, then [stones exist] is an item in w1; 
 
(prop.IV) for every possible world and for every item, if  that item has some property in that 
possible world and no minded subject exists in that possible world, then that item is mind-
independent; 
 
(prop.V) [stones exist] is mind-independent. 
 
 However, one could perfectly accept premises (prop.I)-(prop.III) and deny the truth of  
(prop.IV). Let me recall the distinction between different senses of  being the actual world 
introduced in chapter I.4 by provisionally accepting that possible worlds are sets of  propositions: 
the actual1 world is the sum of  everything there is; the actual2 world can be considered a maximal 
and consistent proposition (or a set of  propositions, or a conjunction of  propositions) that has 
all non-modal true propositions as constituents; the actual3 world can be considered a maximal 
and consistent proposition (or a set of  propositions, or a conjunction of  propositions) that has 
all the true propositions (included modal ones) as constituents. In this perspective, [stones exist]’s 
being part of  a possible world – i.e., of  a set of  propositions – does not imply that there is an 
item such as [stones exist]. Furthermore, what is requested in order for [stones exist] to be a 
mind-independent item is that the proposition [[stones exist] is a mind-independent item] is part 
of  the actual2 world, so that [stones exist] is a mind-independent item according to the actual2 
world. Yet, premises (prop.I)-(prop.III) only make it legitimate to conclude that [stones exist] is 
true in w1, i.e., that the proposition [[stones exist] is true in w1] is part of  the actual3 world. 
Furthermore, by weakening (prop.IV) as follows: 
 
(prop.IV') for every possible world and for every item, if  that item has some property in that 
possible world and no minded subject exists in that possible world, then that item is mind-
independent in that possible world, 
 
we can only conclude that the proposition [[stones exist] is a mind-independent item in w1] is part 
of  the actual3 world, but we cannot conclude that [[stones exist] is a mind-independent item] is 
part of  the actual2 world – i.e., the desired conclusion. It is necessary to replace (prop.IV) with 
two new premises that, if  they are jointly accepted, imply (prop.V): 
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(prop.VI) for every item, if  there is some possible world in which that item does not depend on 
any minded subject, then that item does not (actually2) depend on any minded subject, i.e., it is 
(actually2) mind-independent; 
 
(prop.VII) for every item, if  there is some possible world in which there is that item and there is 
no minded-subject, then that item does not depend on any minded subject in that possible world. 
 
Furthermore, it can be claimed that the consequent of  (prop.III) – whose truth is implied 
by the truth of  (prop.I) and (prop.III) – and (prop.II) jointly make it true the antecedent of  
(prop.VII). Namely, it can be claimed that: that [stones exist] is an item in w1 and that no minded 
subject exists in w1 jointly imply that there is some possible world in which there is a proposition 
such as [stones exist] and no minded subject exists in that world. Yet, it should be still 
demonstrated that it is true that (prop.VI): given (prop.VI), mind-dependence is necessary, i.e., if  
an object is mind-dependent in the actual2 world, then it is necessary that it is mind-dependent. 
In fact, by transposition, we obtain  
 
(prop.VI-trans.) for every item, if  that item (actually2) depends on some minded subject, i.e., it is 
(actually2) mind-dependent, then it is necessary that it is mind-dependent. 
 
This line of  reasoning assumes that merely possible objects are non-mental objects. 
Otherwise, if  mere possibilia were considered mental objects, it would be obviously false that 
(prop.VI-trans.): merely possible objects qua mental objects would be mind-dependent in the 
actual2 world, even if  that mind-dependence would not be a necessary one (e.g., if  Noman is a 
actually2 merely possible object and a mental one, he is a mental object, but it is not necessary 
that he is a mental object, provided that he can exist and that, in those possible worlds in which 
he exists, he is not a mental object). I shall question this assumption about the necessity of  
(actually2) mental objects’ (and, in particular, of  fictional objects’) being mental in chapter II.4.  
Furthermore, the necessity of  mind-dependence amounts to the claim that, for every 
mental object (i.e., for every object that is mental in the actual2 world), it is true in every possible 
world that that object is a mental one. Yet, what about possible worlds in which there are no 
minded subjects? In those worlds, there would be no mental objects at all, so that it would not be 
true in every possible world that objects that are mental in the actual2 world are mental in that 
world too. This is a strong reason for doubting about the truth of  (prop.VI). In order to defend 
the non-mentalistic approach, one could invoke distinctions such as the one between truth in 
worlds and truth at worlds315 – in order to claim that it is not true that actually2 mental objects are 
                                                 
315 For this distinction, see §I.4.2. However, King (2007) uses this distinction in order to defend the opposite thesis 
that – at least from a modal actualist perspective – propositions should be thought of as mind-dependent items. 
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mental in possible worlds in which no minded subject exists, but that it is true at those worlds – 
or s/he could invoke two different kinds of  necessity, by claiming that the necessary mind-
dependence of  actually2 mental objects is a conditional necessity – it is true that actually2 mental 
objects are mental in every possible world in which there are minded subjects – and it is not an 
absolute one (i.e., it is not true in every possible world). Yet, if  it is legitimate from a non-
mentalistic perspective to use such strategies and to reformulate (prop.VI) and (prop.VII) in 
order to fit them, we should take the necessary mind-dependence of  mental objects as follows: 
 
(nec.ment.1) for every item, if  that item is actually2 mind-dependent, then it is true in every 
possible world in which minded subjects exist that it is mind-dependent and it is true at every 
possible world in which no minded subject exists that it is mind-dependent; 
 
(nec.ment.2) for every item, if  that item is actually2 mind-dependent, then it is true in every 
possible world in which minded subjects exist that it is mind-dependent and there is no such an 
item in every possible world in which no minded subject exists. 
 
Both (nec.ment.1) and (nec.ment.2) are revised versions of  (prop.VI-trans.). There should 
be new formulations of  (prop.VI), i.e., 
 
(prop.VI'-1) for every item, if  it is not the case that: (it is true in every possible world in which 
minded subjects exist that that item is mind-dependent and it is true at every possible world in 
which no minded subject exists that it is mind-dependent), then that item is actually2 mind-
independent; 
 
(prop.VI'-2) for every item, if  it is not the case that: (it is true in every possible world in which 
minded subjects exist that that item is mind-dependent and there is no such an item in every 
possible world in which no minded subject exists), then that item is actually2 mind-independent. 
 
 How does (prop.VII) make the antecedent(s) of  (prop-VI'-1) and/or of  (prop-VI'-2) 
true? The possible world w1 is a possible world in which no minded subject exists. In the former 
case, (prop.VII) claims that the truth at w1 of  [stones exist] does not depend on any minded 
subject if  there is in w1 a proposition such as [stones exist] and there is no minded subject in w1. 
In the latter case, it claims that, if  there is in w1 a proposition such as [stones exist] and there is no 
minded subject in w1, the proposition [stones exist] does not depend on any minded subject in w1. 
This seems to work.  
Yet, why do we have to use such a complicate machinery? According to this account, 
three elements need to be maintained. It seems that one has to maintain that there is a 
proposition such as [stones exist] in w1 only in order to maintain that it is true that stones exist in 
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w1 – even if  there is no minded subject in that world. Furthermore, it is required that there is 
something that makes that proposition true in w1, i.e., the fact that stones exist in w1 – whatever 
this fact amounts to. Finally, there is a proposition such as the proposition [it is true in w1 that 
stones exist], that is part of  the actual3 world. Yet, why cannot we claim that the only items that 
we should admit in order to maintain that stones exist in w1 are the proposition [it is true in w1 
that stones exist] and the fact that stones exist in w1 – whatever this fact amounts to? No further 
item, such as the proposition [stones exist], would be required. Let me explain this point by using 
a parallel case. At a time at which no minded subject existed (e.g., 67 million years ago), dinosaurs 
existed. The proposition [dinosaurs existed 67 million years ago] is now true and this proposition 
seems to be made true by the fact that dinosaurs existed 67 million years ago. Furthermore, we 
can claim that the logical constituents of  that proposition refer to certain items – dinosaurs, for 
example. Finally, we can admit that it would have been the case that dinosaurs existed 67 million 
years ago (i.e., there would have been the fact that dinosaurs existed 67 million years ago), even if  
no one had acknowledged the truth of  [dinosaurs existed 67 million years ago] and even if  no 
one had thought of  that proposition. No proposition such as [dinosaurs existt] – that was an item 
67 million years ago – is requested in order to ground these theses.  
In a similar vein, there is a possible world in which stones exist, even if  no minded 
subject exists in that world and there is no proposition such as [stones exist] in that world, even 
though that proposition is part of  that world, at least if  possible worlds are sets of  propositions. 
This is the end of  the story about the truth of  there being dinosaurs 67 million years ago and of  
there being stones in other possible worlds without minded subjects. Why should we admit that 
there was 67 million years ago or that there is in w1 some third item – and defend this admission 
in a rather complicate way -, such as the proposition [dinosaurs existt] or the proposition [stones 
exist]? One could reply that the propositions [dinosaurs existed 67 million years ago] and [it is 
true in w1 that stones exist] identity-depend on propositions such as [dinosaurs existt] and [stones 
exist], but this is not sufficient in order to admit that there are such propositions 67 million years 
ago or in w1: such propositions could now (or actually2) be mind-dependent, even if  [dinosaurs 
existt] is now false – and even if  the proposition [stones exist] would be actually2 false, if  stones 
did not actually2 exist.  
In sum, it does not seem to me necessary to admit that propositions are non-existent and 
non-mental objects. Yet, on the other hand, is it legitimate to claim that they are non-existent? 
Yes, they do not have any peculiar disposition to act, or so it seems to me. 
 Finally, what about facts? Facts do not exist, on the basis of  my discussion, but they 
nevertheless seem not to be mental objects. It is a fact that Obama instantiates the property of  
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being human, regardless of  there being any minded subject thinking of  that fact. Facts are not 
constituted by minded subjects: they do not depend on them for their identity conditions. Thus, 
facts do not exist, even if  they are not mental. 
 It seems reasonable to conclude, after this examination, that there are objects (such as 
mathematical objects and facts) that do not exist and that are nevertheless non-mental objects. In 
sum, not all the non-existent objects are mental objects. Should we introduce any further kind of  
being for such objects? For the reasons that I have already tried to explain, I do not think that we 
should: they simply do not exist. 
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II.3. Non-Existence: an Ascriptivistic Perspective 
I shall present in this chapter an ascriptivistic theory of  fictional objects, that is partly inspired by 
P. van Inwagen's notion of  ascription and by Fine (1982), but that accepts that there are objects 
that do not exist (e.g., fictional objects). According to my theory, such objects have properties in 
two different ways: on the one hand, they instantiate properties as existent objects do (e.g., 
fictional objects instantiate the property of  being fictional); on the other hand, some properties 
are ascribed to them by minded subjects thinking of  them. However, this theory is not simply a 
version of  instantiation-centered Meinongianism. It does not assume that there is a primitive 
distinction between two ways of  having properties (e.g., Zalta's exemplification and encoding), 
but it claims that there are some relations (ascription relations) that hold (at least) between 
minded subjects, fictional objects and properties. Secondly, it does not introduce existing objects' 
blueprints in order to make it true, for example, that Lord Gladstone had a tea with Sherlock 
Holmes. Thirdly, it provides us with a unified account of  thinking of  objects’ having properties, 
since such ascription relations may involve existent objects too. Fourthly, it deals with fictional 
contexts defined by stories, by thinking of  them as fictional worlds that are involved within 
ascription relations. 
 After having presented the basis of  the theory (II.3.1) and after having introduced some 
elements of  a theory of  fiction (II.3.2), I shall define the identity conditions of  fictional objects 
(II.3.3), thus trying to reply (at least in part) to Quine's objection about the lack of  identity 
conditions for non-existents. Finally, I shall deal with some kinds of  seemingly true statements 
concerning fictional objects (the ones presented in chapters I.2 and I.3), in order to ground their 
truth-conditions from an ascriptivistic perspective (II.3.4). 
 
II.3.1. How to Ascribe Whatever You Want to Whatever You Like. 
Let me recall my aforementioned example of  a true statement involving a fictional object: 
 
(12) Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
 
 It has already been remarked that there is no detective named "Sherlock Holmes", since 
the property of  being a detective seems to be an existence-entailing one: for every object, that 
object is a detective only if  it exists. However, many Meinongians have argued that there are 
detectives who do not exist (e.g., Sherlock Holmes), that the instantiation of  the property of  
being a detective does not imply anything about the ontological status of  objects that instantiate 
it. In other terms, the Sosein of  an object (that comprehends, in Sherlock Holmes' case, his being 
a detective) is independent of  its Sein. However, things are not so easy. In fact, our commonsense 
might reply that, if  there were a murder in our town, Sherlock Holmes would not be able to 
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investigate on it and that, since every detective is able to investigate on a murder (at least, since 
every detective has the disposition to investigate on a murder), Sherlock Holmes is not a 
detective. Meinongians might then distinguish between real and fictional murders and they might 
claim that, even if  Sherlock Holmes is not able to investigate on any real murder, since he is only 
a fictional detective, he is able to investigate on some fictional murder. Thus, he is a detective, 
since he is able to investigate on a murder (at least, on a fictional one). There are real murders and 
fictional ones, real detectives and fictional ones but, in order for something to be a murder, it 
does not have to be real and in order for someone to be a detective, s/he does not have to be 
real. However, there are features of  real murders that are not features of  fictional ones; there are 
features of  real detectives that are not features of  fictional ones. For example, it seems that real 
detectives are complete, while fictional ones are somehow incomplete: it seems to be neither true, 
nor false that Sherlock Holmes had a grandfather named Daniel, while, for every real detective, it 
is true or false that s/he had a grandfather named Daniel. Furthermore, as we have already 
remarked, some fictional objects are inconsistent: round squares or, better, round and non-round 
circles, for example. 
 In order to avoid complications introduced by the inconsistency and incompleteness of  
fictional objects and in order to maintain that they are objects, one might choose different 
solutions. For example, as it is claimed by ascriptivism, s/he might accept that there are some 
relations (some ascription relations) between those objects and those properties that they have 
according to stories. Since, as I have already argued, fictional objects are mental objects, such 
relations should include minded subjects too. The basis of  an ascriptivistic theory of  fictional 
objects is thus represented by the introduction of  a family of  ascription relations, that hold at 
least between some object, some property and some minded subject (even if  I shall introduce an 
ascription relation that will not hold for objects). Furthermore, since fictional objects do not have 
within the actual world (but within some other fictional world) some properties that are ascribed 
to them, there are ascription relations that involve fictional contexts too (i.e., fictional worlds 
defined by stories, as we shall see in the next section). Here are some examples of  ascription 
relations: A1 (a 3-place relation that holds between some object, some property and some minded 
subject); A2 (a 4-place relation that holds between some object, some property, some minded 
subject and some fictional context); A3 (a 4-place relation that holds between two objects, some 
two-place relation and some minded subject); A4 (a 5-place relation that hold between two 
objects, some two-place relation, some minded subject and some fictional context); and so on. It 
is worth remarking that: ascription relations do not only involve fictional objects, but existing 
objects too, as we will see; not every property had by a fictional object is an ascribed property, but 
224 
 
there are properties that they simply instantiate (e.g., the property of  being fictional). Finally, it is 
a corollary of  my theory of  existence that minded subjects have to exist in order to ascribe 
properties to fictional objects, since they have the unique active disposition to ascribe properties 
to fictional objects (and nothing else has that unique disposition).  
 Let me consider Sherlock Holmes' example. Even if  it is not true that Sherlock Holmes 
instantiates the property of  being a detective, i.e., it is not true that 
 
(12ins.) ~DEh 
 
(where "h" stands for Sherlock Holmes and "DE" for the property of  being a detective), it is 
nevertheless true that there is some minded subject that ascribes to him the fictional property of  
being a detective within some fictional context, i.e., it is true that 
 
(12ascr.)  m cA2DEhmc 
 
 If  it is true that (12), it seems that (12ascr.) expresses its proper logical reading and the 
logical form of  its truth-conditions: if  there is some minded subject that ascribes to Sherlock 
Holmes the property of  being a detective within some fictional context, then it is true that (12). 
It is not necessary that Sherlock Holmes' author (Conan Doyle) ascribes to him that property 
within some fictional context (some fictional context defined by Conan Doyle's stories) in order 
for (12) to be true: one and the same Sherlock Holmes might have that property within some 
other fictional context defined by some other author's stories or by the interpretation of  some 
story about Sherlock Holmes that has not been written by Conan Doyle. For example, if  I 
watched the movie directed by Guy Ritchie about Sherlock Holmes and if  I did not know that 
Sherlock Holmes was constituted as a fictional object by Conan Doyle, I could nevertheless 
ascribe to Sherlock Holmes (to Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes) the property of  being a 
detective within the fictional context defined by that movie. When I shall deal with the identity 
conditions of  fictional objects, this point will become clearer.  
 Let me now see how ascription relations work when some minded subject ascribes to 
some (fictional or existent) object some property. In fact, ascription relations can involve both 
existent and non-existent objects. For example, when I think that Francesco Orilia is a Professor 
at the University of  Macerata, I ascribe (by A1) to Francesco Orilia (the existing Francesco Orilia) 
the property of  being a professor at the University of  Macerata. My ascription is veridical iff  
Francesco Orilia instantiates the property of  being a Professor at the University of  Macerata; 
otherwise, it is not veridical. A1 does not involve any fictional context: it only involves me (a 
minded subject), the property of  being a Professor at the University of  Macerata and Francesco 
Orilia. The same happens with fictional objects: I ascribe (by A1) to Sherlock Holmes the 
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property of  being a fictional object, and my ascription is veridical, since Sherlock Holmes 
instantiates the property of  being a fictional object.    
 Fictional objects are always incomplete and sometimes inconsistent, even if  we do not 
have to deny that the laws of  the excluded middle and of  non-contradiction hold for them. In 
fact, it is legitimate to distinguish between two kinds of  negation: property-negation (where the 
property-negation of  some property P is the negative property non-P, or P̅) and ascription-
negation (where the ascription negation of  some ascription relation A corresponds to its not 
holding between its relata). Fictional objects are always incomplete as a matter of  fact: 
 
(incompleteness) for every fictional object, that object is incomplete iff, for at least one n-adic 
property P, for every minded subject and for every fictional context, neither P is ascribed to that 
object by that minded subject within that fictional context (i.e., it is not true, by ascription-
negation, that P is ascribed to that object by that minded subject within that fictional context), 
nor its negation P̅ (i.e., it is not true, by ascription-negation, that P̅, i.e., the property-negation of  
P, is ascribed to that object by that minded subject within that fictional context). 
 
 The axiom (incompleteness) neither implies the denial of  the law of  excluded middle, nor 
of  the law of  bivalence. In fact, for every n-adic property (ascription-relations included) and for 
every fictional object, it is always either true or false that that property is instantiated by that 
object. Every fictional object is incomplete as a matter of  fact, since there is no (finite) minded 
subject that can think of  it as being thus determined with regard to every (ascribed) property – 
even if, as we shall see in the next chapter, God can somehow complete fictional contexts and 
fictional objects too.  
 With regard to inconsistency, it seems to me legitimate to claim that there are different 
kinds (and different degrees) of  it. For example: 
 
(inconsistency-1) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-1 iff, for every minded 
subject, for every fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded 
subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject 
ascribes to that object P̅ within that context; 
 
(inconsistency-2) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-2 iff, for some (but not every) 
minded subject, for every fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that 
minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject 
ascribes to that object P̅ within that context; 
 
(inconsistency-3) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-3 iff, for every minded 
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subject, for some (but not every) fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that 
that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded 
subject ascribes to that object P̅ within that context; 
 
(inconsistency-4) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-4 iff, for some (but not every) 
minded subject, for some (but not every) fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is 
true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that 
minded subject ascribes to that object P̅ within that context. 
 
 The round non-round circle is inconsistent-1, since both the properties of  being round 
and of  non-being round are ascribed to it within every fictional context by every minded subject. 
On the other hand, the round square can be inconsistent-2, inconsistent-3 or inconsistent-4, since 
there can be minded subjects that do not know the rules of  geometry and that do not ascribe to 
it the property of  non-being round in virtue of  its being a square (inconsistency-2), or there can 
be fictional contexts where such rules do not hold, so that it is not legitimate to ascribe to it the 
property of  non-being round in virtue of  its being a square (inconsistency-3), or both 
(inconsistency-4). Inconsistent fictional objects do not "explode", since no kind of  inconsistency 
implies  
 
(inconsistency-0) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-0 iff, for every minded 
subject, for every fictional context, for every property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes 
to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object 
P̅ within that context. 
 
 Furthermore, it is not necessary to deny the law of  non-contradiction in order to admit 
inconsistent-0 objects, since it is not the case that, with regard to one and the same n-adic 
property, that property is both instantiated and not instantiated by an object. Thus, even 
inconsistent-0 fictional objects are not contradictory: it is neither necessary to admit impossible 
worlds, nor true contradictions within the actual world in order to deal with them316. 
 
II.3.2. Stories and Authors. 
It has already been argued that fictional objects are mental objects and that they are constituted as 
objects by minded subjects' thinking about them. Thus, it seems to me fair to accept  
 
(constitution)  x(Fx →  mCONSTmx) 
                                                 
316 Thus, Everett (2005)’s complaints about the indeterminacy of every fictum and the inconsistency of some ficta are 
not justified within my theory: ascriptivism neither introduces true contradictions, nor indeterminacy (for every 
object – and for every fictum too – and for every n-adic property, that object instantiates or (aut) does not instantiate 
that property). 
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(where "F" stands for the property of  being a fictional object and "CONST" stands for the relation 
of  constituting, that holds between some minded subject and that object)317. The axiom 
(constitution) does not exclude that there are objects that are constituted by minded subjects and 
that are not fictional objects. Intuitively, something is a fictional object iff  it is a non-existent 
character of  a story. Yet, in order to grasp what is for an object to be a fictional object and what 
is for it to be constituted by some minded subject, it is necessary to introduce further notions. 
First, I shall take stories as sets of  propositions that have logical relationships with one another 
(e.g., logical implication, conjunction, and so on). Secondly, I shall assume that, for every object 
and every minded subject, that minded subject thinks of  that object iff  it ascribes to that object 
by A1 some property, i.e., 
 
(thinks of)  x m(THmx ↔  PA1Pxm) 
 
(where "TH" stands for the relation of  thinking of). If  Conan Doyle thinks of  Sherlock Holmes, 
then he ascribes by A1 to him, for example, the property of  being a detective according to some 
story. If  I think of  Francesco Orilia, then I ascribe by A1 to him, for example, the property of  
being a professor at the University of  Macerata, and so on. 
Thirdly, for every proposition and every story, that proposition is true within that story iff  
it is part of  that story, i.e., 
 
(true in story)  p(TSps ↔ PAps) 
 
(where "p" is a variable ranging over propositions, "TS" and "PA" respectively stand for the 
relations of  being true within a story and of  being part of). 
 The identity of  stories depends on propositions that are part of  them, i.e., two stories are 
identical iff  all and only the same propositions are part of  them: 
 
(story-id.)  s1 s2((s1 = s2) ↔  p(PAps1 ↔ PAps2)) 
 
(where "s1" and "s2" are variables ranging over stories).  
 The original author of  a story is the minded subject that grounds, by its activities, the 
identity of  that story.  
 Let me now introduce the notion of  context and the relation that holds between stories 
and fictional contexts: 
 
(def.story-context)  s c(Dsc ↔  p(TSps → TCpc)) 
 
(where "c", "s" and "p" are variables respectively ranging over fictional contexts, stories and 
                                                 
317 For a list of symbols, see the Appendix (pp. 281-284). 
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propositions, "D" stands for the relation of  defining, that holds between stories and fictional 
contexts, "TC" stands for the relation of  being true within a context). Intuitively, the idea behind 
(def.story-context) is that fictional contexts are fictional worlds that are different from stories: 
minded subjects, in fact, tend to distinguish between stories and contexts in which what is 
asserted by those stories is true. It is not necessary that, for any proposition that is true or false in 
the actual2 world, it is true or false within stories too: there are (true or false) propositions in the 
actual2 world that are not part of  any story and, for every story, it is not necessary that it 
comprehends any proposition of  the actual2 world and that it claims that it is true or false within 
the fictional context defined by that story. On the other hand, there are propositions that are true 
within fictional contexts defined by stories and that are not part of  those stories: a good 
interpreter of  the story A Study in Scarlet, for example, might claim that it is true in the fictional 
context defined by A Study in Scarlet that London is in England, even if  the proposition [London 
is in England] is not part of  A Study in Scarlet.  
 For every object, that object is a character of  a story iff  the original author of  the story 
ascribes to it some property within the fictional context defined by that story: 
 
(character)  x s(CHxs ↔  P m c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc)) 
 
(where "CH" stands for the relation of  being a character within a story and "AUOS" stands for the 
relation of  being the original author of  a story). Thus, a fictum is a non-existent object that is a 
character of  some story: 
 
(fictum)  x(Fx ↔ (~Ex &  sCHxs)) 
 
 Furthermore, I shall define the context of  origin of  a fictum as follows: 
 
(cont.or.)  x c(COcx ↔ (Fx &  s1(CHxs1 & Ds1c & ~ s2(~(s1 = s2) & CHxs2 & PRs2s1)))) 
 
(where "CO" and "PR" respectively stand for the relations of  being the context of  origin and of  
preceding). The relation of  preceding holds between two stories s1 and s2 iff  s1 is constituted as a 
story at a time t1 that precedes the time t2 at which s2 is constituted as a story.  
 The original author of  a fictum is the original author of  the story that defines the context 
of  origin of  that fictum, i.e.,  
 
(or.author obj.)  x m(AUOOxm ↔  s(AUOSms &  c(Dsc & COcx))) 
 
(where "AUOO" stands for the relation of  being the original author of  a fictional object). The 
original author of  a fictum is the minded subject that constitutes that fictum as an object. 
Furthermore, by using the relation of  being the original author of  a story, it is legitimate 
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to introduce the relation of  being the original author of  a fictional context: 
 
(or.author con.)  x m(AUOCxm ↔  s(AUOSms & Dsc)) 
 
(where "AUOC" stands for the relation of  being the original author of  a fictional context). The 
author simpliciter of  a fictional object is some minded subject that is the author of  a story that 
defines a fictional context within which some property is ascribed to that fictional object, i.e., 
 
(sim.author ob.)  x m(AUOmx ↔ (Fx &  P s c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc))) 
 
(where "AUO" stands for the relation of  being the author simpliciter of  an object). 
 After having defined contexts of  origins, it is possible to introduce original story-
boundedness and story-boundedness simpliciter. Some fictional object is originally story-bound to 
some story iff  that story defines its context of  origin: 
 
(or.story-bound.)  x s(BOxs ↔ (Fx &  c(COcx & Dsc))) 
 
(where "BO" stands for the relation of  being originally story-bound to), while it is story-bound 
simpliciter to some story iff  there is some property that is ascribed to it by the original author of  
that story within the fictional context defined by that story: 
 
(sim.story-bound.)  x s(Bxs ↔ (Fx &  P m c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc))) 
 
(where "B" stands for the relation of  being story-bound simpliciter to). 
 Finally, it is acceptable that someone is a good interpreter of  some story iff, for every 
proposition and every fictional context, that story defines that fictional context and that 
proposition is true within the story and is part of  that story and s/he ascribes to that proposition 
the relation of  being part of  that story iff  s/he ascribes to that proposition the relation of  being 
true within the fictional context defined by that story, i.e., 
 
(good inter.)  m s(ISms ↔  p c((Dsc & TSps & PAps & A3PApsm & A3TSpsm) ↔ A3TCpcm) 
 
(where "IS" stands for the relation of  being a good interpreter of  some story). All these notions 
will turn out to be useful for outlining the truth-conditions of  our initial data318. 
 
II.3.3. It Has Always Been the Same, the Same Fat Man: Identity Conditions for Ficta. 
In this section, I shall outline four different criteria of  identity for fictional objects: given any two 
                                                 
318 Thus, ascriptivism can reply to some objections addressed against abstract artifactualism and, more generally, 
realism about ficta. Ficta are not abstract objects that necessarily exist and that cannot be caused to exist – as it seems 
to be claimed by abstract artifactualists (see Deutsch (1991)). Furthermore, they are not properly caused to exist: they 
are simply constituted as objects by their original authors at the time at which they are thought of by them, who 
somehow govern their identity with other objects (see below) (see Brock (2010)). There is no ambiguity concerning 
ficta’s non-existence: they simply do not exist, since they do not instantiate the property of existing (see Deutsch 
(1991) and Yagisawa (2001)).  
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fictional objects thought of  by someone, it seems to me that they are identical iff  at least one of  
such criteria hold for them. I do not think that I will be exhaustive about this topic (further 
criteria of  identity for ficta might be found out) and I acknowledge that such criteria cannot be 
established a priori. I have only looked for the truth-conditions of  our statements about the 
identity of  fictional objects and I have restricted my investigation to those cases in which it seems 
certain (or almost certain) that two fictional objects are identical.  
 Given two mental-fictional objects that are thought of  by someone, they are identical if  
they have the same original author that establishes their identity (ficta-identity-1). It follows that 
anyone who acknowledges that original author's authority over those fictional objects should 
recognize their identity. 
 Yet, some fictional objects' identities are not only established by their original authors. Let 
me suppose that we both think of  some fictional object (i.e., that the mental-fictional object I am 
thinking of  should be identical with the mental and fictional object you are thinking of): how can 
we establish that it is one and the same fictional object, even if  we ascribe to that object different 
properties? It seems to me legitimate to introduce one further situation in which those fictional 
objects can be identified. According to the criterion (ficta-identity-2), two fictional objects can be 
identified if, for any two minded subjects, both subjects think of  them and they ascribe to one 
another the relation of  thinking of  those objects and they both ascribe to the fictional object they 
think of  the relation of  being identical with the fictional object thought of  by the other subject. I 
have to remark that (ficta-identity-2) works from an intrasubjective perspective too. In fact, I can 
ascribe to some fictional object I am thinking of  the relation of  being identical with some other 
fictional object I am thinking of.  
 Thirdly, there are some identities of  ficta that are grounded on univocally identifying 
fictional properties. Let me assume that the variable "x" ranges here only over fictional objects 
thought of  by someone (so that I shall assume a version of  (character) that is implicitly restricted 
to fictional objects).  
 For every fictum x and for every property, I shall define as follows the property of  being a 
univocally identifying fictional property of  that fictum: 
 
(un.fic.property-1)  x P(PUFPx ↔  m c s((CHxs & ISms & Dsc) → (A2Pxmc →  y(THmy → 
((A3Ixym V A3Ix̅ym) & ~(A3Ixym & A3Ix̅ym)))))) 
 
(where "PUF" stands for the relation of  being a univocally identifying fictional property and the 
variable "x" ranges only over fictional objects, while "y" ranges over every object).  
 Thus, two ficta can be identified if  they have the same univocally identifying fictional 
property (ficta-identity-3). 
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 In this situation, there should be sufficiently elastic properties in order to deal with 
difficult cases of  identity between ficta. Yet, one caveat is: do not introduce disjunctive properties. 
In fact, if  minded subjects introduced disjunctive properties, by the rule of  introduction of  
disjunction applied to ascribed properties, every fictional object would turn out to be identical 
with any other. Thus, I shall reform (un.fic.property-1) as follows:  
 
(un.fic.property-2)  x P(PUFPx ↔ (~DIP &  m c s((CHxs & ISms & Dsc) → (A2Pxmc → 
 y(THmy → ((A3Ixym V A3Ix̅ym) & ~(A3Ixym & A3Ix̅ym))))))) 
 
(where "DI" stands for the property of  being a disjunctive property). The criterion (ficta-identity-
3) holds in virtue of  (un.fic.property-2), i.e., in virtue of  the possession of  the same univocally 
identifying fictional property.  
 We can deal with other cases of  identity by introducing one further situation that is 
grounded on story-boundedness. In this situation, the identity between two fictional objects 
thought of  by some minded subject(s) holds if  one of  those objects is story-bound to some story 
and some minded subject, thinking of  the other object, ascribes to it some property within some 
fictional context that has that subject as its original author and that is different from the fictional 
context defined by that story and that subject ascribes to those objects the relation of  being 
identical with one another (ficta-identity-4). For example, writing a story, I might define a 
fictional context (i.e., I might be its original author) where the same Sherlock Holmes who is a 
character in Conan Doyle's stories does something. Thus, my Sherlock Holmes would be identical 
with Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes. 
 Put together, these four criteria can establish the identity between two fictional objects iff  
at least one of  such criteria holds for those objects, namely (by taking the variables "x" and "y" as 
ranging over every object) 
 
(ficta-identity)  x y((Fx & Fy & x = y) ↔  m(AUOOmx & AUOOmy & A3Ixym) V  m1 m2(THm1x & 
THm2y & A3THm2ym1 & A3THm1xm2 & A3Ixym1 & A3Iyxm2) V  P(PUFPx & PUFPy) V  s(Bxs & 
 P m c(A3Bxsm & ~Dsc & AUOCmc & A2Pymc & A3Iyxm))) 
 
 There is no degree of  identity between fictional objects (perhaps, there is only some 
degree of  similarity without identity between them). Yet, if  one wished to preserve the intuition 
according to which there seemingly is some degree of  identity between them, s/he could claim that 
there seemingly is some increasing degree of  identity whenever more than one criterion holds.  
 One could object against such an account that many minded subjects are not conscious 
of  ascribing properties and identity in such ways. Sure! Yet, I have not claimed that they have to 
ascribe to themselves the ascription-relations of  ascribing properties in such ways, i.e., I have not 
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introduced self-consciousness about ascription. I have only claimed that, as a matter of  fact, such 
criteria of  identity ground identity between fictional objects from an ontological viewpoint.
 Furthermore, one should ask whether some character in some fiction is identical with or 
different from some existing object. I shall first introduce the criterion (ex.fic.identity-1), 
according to which, roughly, some character within a story is identical with some existing object 
if  the original author of  that story ascribes to that character the property of  being identical with 
that existing object (ex.fic.identity-1). 
 Secondly, one could introduce univocally identifying properties, i.e., properties that are 
instantiated only by one definite existing object (and that are not disjunctive): 
 
(un.property)  x P(PUPx ↔ (Px & ~DIP & ~ y(~(x = y) & Py))) 
 
(where "PU" stands for the relation of  being a univocally identifying property). It is worth 
remarking that such properties are univocally identifying as a matter of  fact, not necessarily, since 
there might be possible worlds in which an object's univocally identifying properties are different. 
Thus, the second criterion I shall introduce (ex.fic.identity-2) asserts that some character within a 
story that has some minded subject as its original author is identical with some existing object if  
that existing object has some univocally identifying property that is ascribed by the original 
author of  that story to that character within the fictional context defined by that story. 
 Finally, the third criterion is based on good interpreters: some character within a story is 
identical within some existing object if  every good interpreter of  that story ascribes to that 
character the property of  being identical with that existing object (ex.fic.identity-3). 
 Such an identity is not simply grounded on some (but not all) or most (but not all) good 
interpreters' ascriptions, since there would remain in such a case a shadow of  doubt about the 
truth of  some identity statements. On the other hand, different degrees of  similarity without 
identity can be grounded in these latter situations. 
 Put together (and assuming that our variables "x" and "y" range over every object), the 
criterion of  identity between some existing object and some character within a story asserts that: 
 
(ex.fic.identity)  x y s(Ex & CHys & x = y) ↔  m(AUOSms & A3Ixym) V  P m c(AUOSms & PUPx 
& Dsc & A2Pxmc) V  m(ISms ↔ A3Ixym)) 
 
Yet, accepting (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity), some problems arise concerning the 
transitivity of  identity. In fact, let me consider a case in which, by (ficta-identity-4), Conan Doyle’s 
Sherlock Holmes turns out to be identical with some character of  some fictional context that has 
me as its original author. Furthermore, that character, by (ficta-identity-4) and still in virtue of  my 
power of  identifying fictional objects, is identical with Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. It turns out, by 
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the transitivity of  identity, that Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes is identical with Flaubert’s Emma 
Bovary. A different case: by (ficta-identity-4), Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes turns out to be 
identical with some character of  some fictional context that has me as its original author. 
Furthermore, that character, by (ficta-identity-4), is identical with Conan Doyle’s Watson. It turns 
out, by the transitivity of  identity, that Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes is identical with Conan 
Doyle’s Watson. Still another case: besides my character that is identical with Conan Doyle’s 
Sherlock Holmes, let me assume that another minded subject identifies, by (ficta-identity-4), some 
character of  some fictional context that has that subject as its original author with Flaubert’s 
Emma Bovary. Furthermore, by (ficta-identity-2), we establish that my character and that 
subject’s character are identical. It turns out, by the transitivity of  identity, that Conan Doyle’s 
Sherlock Holmes and Flaubert’s Emma Bovary are identical. Finally, considering a case involving 
(ex.fic.identity-1), I identify, by (ex.fic.identity-1), some character of  some story that has me as its 
original author with the existing Lord Gladstone. Later on, I identify that character, by 
(ex.fic.identity-1), with the existing Obama. It turns out, by the transitivity of  identity, that Lord 
Gladstone is identical with Obama. Thus, one should amend (ficta-identity-2), (ficta-identity-4), 
(ex.fic.identity-1), (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity) in order to avoid such problems.  
I shall introduce the notion of  a legitimate identifier as follows: for any minded subject, 
for any two objects, that subject is a legitimate identifier of  those objects (I shall use "IL" as 
standing for the relation of  being a legitimate identifier) iff  it is legitimate that, if  that subject 
ascribes to those objects the relation of  being identical, then those objects are identical. 
Furthermore, it seems to me that, for any minded subject and for any two objects x and y, 
that minded subject is a legitimate identifier of  x and y iff  at least one of  the following 
conditions holds: 
- that minded subject is the original author of  both x and y, or (vel) 
- there is no other object z, such that there is a criterion of  identity not for ficta (e.g., a criterion of  
identity between existing things), such that x is identical with z iff  that criterion holds between 
them and, as a matter of  fact, that criterion does not hold between them and that minded subject 
nevertheless ascribes the identity between x and z (or the same for y), or (vel)  
- intuitively, there is no other object z, that is originally authored by another minded subject or 
that has a fictional context not originally authored by the former minded subject as its context of  
origin, such that the former minded subject ascribes the identity between z and x, even though 
the original author of  z does not ascribe the identity (or s/he ascribes the non-identity) between y 
and z, or even though the contexts of  origin of  y and z – not originally authored by the former 
minded subject – are different (or the same for y).  
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Put formally: 
 
(leg.)  m1 x y(ILmxy ↔ ((AUOOm1x & AUOOm1y) V ~ z w(CINFw & (~HOwxz & ((z = x) ↔ 
(HOwxz)) & A3Iyzm1) V (~HOwyz & ((z = y) ↔ (HOwyz)) & A3Ixzm1))) V ~ z((A3Ixzm1 & 
 m2(AUOOm2z & ~(m2 = m1) & (A3Iy̅zm2 V ~A3Iyzm2))) V (A3Iyzm1 &  m2(AUOOm2z & ~(m2 = m1) 
& (A3Ix̅zm2 V ~A3Ixzm2))) V (~AUOOm1z & A3Ixzm1 &  c1 c2(COc1z & COc2y & ~(c1 = c2) & 
~AUOCm1c1 & ~AUOCm1c2)) V (~AUOOm1z & A3Iyzm1 &  c1 c2(COc1z & COc2x & ~(c1 = c2) & 
~AUOCm1c1 & ~AUOCm1c2))))) 
 
(where "CINF" stands for the property of  being a criterion of  identity that is not for fictional 
objects and "HO" stands for the relation of  holding, that holds between a criterion of  identity 
and two objects. I have put the major disjunctions in bold font). 
 Thus, (ficta-identity-2), (ficta-identity-4) and (ex.fic.identity-1) should be amended, by 
adding that the two minded subjects are legitimate identifiers of  those objects (ficta-identity-2a), 
that the minded subject that establishes the identities is a legitimate identifier of  the objects 
involved in those identities, so that we obtain (ficta-identity-4a) and (ex.fic.identity-1a). 
Accordingly, (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity) should be amended as follows: 
 
(ficta-identity-a)  x y((Fx & Fy & x = y) ↔  m(AUOOmx & AUOOmy & A3Ixym) V  m1 m2(THm1x 
& THm2y & A3THm2ym1 & A3THm1xm2 & ILm1xy & ILm2xy & A3Ixym1 & A3Iyxm2) V  P(PUFPx & 
PUFPy) V  s(Bxs &  P m c(ILmxy & A3Bxsm & ~Dsc & AUOCmc & A2Pymc & A3Iyxm))) 
 
(ex.fic.identity-a)  x y s(Ex & CHys & x = y) ↔  m(ILmxy & AUOSms & A3Ixym) V 
 P m c(AUOSms & PUPx & Dsc & A2Pxmc) V  m(ISms ↔ A3Ixym)) 
 
The fact that the third major disjunct of  (leg.) is negated and no other disjunct is true excludes 
the first, the second and the third case (e.g., I cannot identify my strange Sherlock Holmes-
Watson (x) with Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes (y), since there is an object z (Conan Doyle’s 
Watson) that I identify with x, such that both y and z are not originally authored by me and their 
author ascribes to them the property of  non-being identical). The fourth case is excluded by the 
fact that (leg.)’s second major disjunct is negated, since it is established by a criterion of  identity 
that is not for fictional objects that Obama is distinct from Lord Gladstone, and no other 
disjunct is true. The criterion (leg.) is not an ad hoc criterion: it preserves the idea that one cannot 
identify in every case two objects by simply establishing that they are identical.  
What about Quine's merely possible fat man in that doorway? Following (at least in part) 
Routley, I shall distinguish between different questions concerning his being countable and his 
identity with or distinctness from the merely possible bald man in that doorway: 
235 
 
(I) is the fictional fat man in that doorway identical with the fictional bald man in that doorway? 
(II) How many fictional fat men are there in that doorway? 
(III) Is the merely possible fat man in that doorway identical with the merely possible bald man in 
that doorway? 
(IV) How many merely possible fat men are there in that doorway? 
(V) How many fat men is it possible that are placed in that doorway? 
 In this chapter, I shall give an answer to questions (I) and (II). This does not exclude that, 
after having dealt with modal problems, I shall reply to questions (III)-(V) in a similar way, since 
it might be legitimate to think of  merely possible objects as (peculiar) fictional objects. My answer 
to question (I) is: it depends. First, one might have to introduce properties such as the property 
of  being in the doorway in front of  him/her (i.e., in front of  the minded subject that is thinking 
of  the fictional fat man) or such as the property of  being in the doorway of  room 401 at the 
fourth floor of  the building of  the Department of  Philosophy of  the University of  Macerata. 
Such properties are ascribed to those objects within fictional contexts defined by stories (for 
example, by Quine's story or by my story about the fictional object). Secondly, we should provide 
some contextual information: am I the author of  some really short story about the fictional fat 
man (and the fictional bald man) in the doorway, that are originally authored by me (first case)? 
Am I talking with my friend and colleague Ernesto about those objects (provided that I am their 
original author or Ernesto is their original author) (second case)? Is Ernesto thinking of  an object 
that I have introduced within some story as its original author (third case)? Are we both talking 
of  Quine's story's bald and fat characters in Quine's doorway (fourth case)? Am I thinking of  a 
story that contains Quine's bald and fat characters (fifth case)? In the first case, we should claim 
that I can establish the identity of  these two fictional objects by (ficta-identity-1): if  I think of  
both objects as identical and I am the author of  those objects, then they are identical. In the 
second case, Ernesto and I can assert their identity by following (ficta-identity-2a). In the third 
case, Ernesto can assert their identity with one another by thinking of  my assertions as being 
made by their original author (following (ficta-identity-1)) or, if  he is a legitimate identifier of  his 
fictional character and my fictional character, by thinking of  a new story where the same fictional 
object has other properties (e.g., he might claim that Michele's fat man in that doorway has the 
property of  being bald within some different fictional context that has Ernesto as its original 
author) (following ficta-identity-4a).  
 It seems to me that, in the fourth case and in the fifth one, it is legitimate to claim that 
those objects are distinct. In the fourth case, Ernesto and I could use (ficta-identity-2a) or (ficta-
identity-4a) to establish Quine’s fictional objects’ identity, at least if  we were legitimate identifiers 
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of  those fictional objects. Yet, I am not a legitimate identifier of  Quine’s merely possible fat man 
in the doorway and Quine’s merely possible bald man in the doorway. In fact, in order to 
establish their identity, I would have to claim that there are two fictional objects thought of  by me 
(my merely possible fat man in the doorway and my merely possible bald man in the doorway) 
that are respectively identical with Quine’s merely possible fat man in the doorway and Quine’s 
merely possible bald man in the doorway and that those fictional objects of  mine are identical 
(e.g., according to some story that has me as its original author or by stipulation when I talk with 
Ernesto and Ernesto agrees). Yet, if  I claim that those objects of  mine are identical, they turn out 
to be non-identical with Quine’s corresponding fictional objects. Let me consider the third major 
disjunct of  (leg.) and its first subdisjunct: my merely possible fat man in the doorway (x) should 
be identical with Quine’s merely possible fat man (y). Yet, there is another object (z) (i.e., Quine’s 
merely possible bald man) that I identify with x and that is such that it has Quine as its original 
author and Quine does not ascribe to it the relation of  being identical with y, i.e., with Quine’s 
merely possible fat man in the doorway. The same happens when we start with my merely 
possible bald man in the doorway. In these cases, the first major disjunct of  (leg.) is negated and 
all the other major disjuncts of  (leg.) are negated. It turns out that, if  I identify my merely 
possible fat man in the doorway with my merely possible bald man in the doorway, I am not a 
legitimate identifier of  those objects with Quine’s objects, so that I cannot establish Quine’s 
objects’ identity by simply asserting that my objects are identical with one another. The same 
seems to happen with Ernesto. Thus, Quine’s merely possible fat man and Quine’s merely 
possible bald man in the doorway are distinct fictional objects. For similar reasons, we should give 
to the fifth case the same answer. 
 The answers to question (II) depend on the answers to question (I). In fact, by 
distinguishing the aforementioned cases, we could obtain different answers to the same question. 
 There are other problematic cases of  identities between fictional objects that I have 
already introduced or that I shall introduce now. Two problematic cases have been presented in 
chapter I.3. According to the first case, the original author of  some story is competently 
acquainted with some fictional object that is constituted within some other story, but s/he 
attributes to that fictional object properties that are completely different from the ones that are 
ascribed to it according to the latter story: there might be a literary work where a fictional 
character named "Sherlock Holmes" is a rapper who lives in New York. Following our criteria of  
identity, the first fictional object is identical with the second one not in virtue of  (ficta-identity-3) 
but (if  the original author of  the first story ascribes such an identity) in virtue of  (ficta-identity-1) 
(if  both stories have the same original author) or in virtue of  (ficta-identity-4a) (if  they have 
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different authors and if  one of  such authors – the rapper’s author – is a legitimate identifier of  
those objects). According to the second case, two different authors (without respectively knowing 
their works) constitute two fictional objects that are qualitatively really similar. Are they the same 
fictional object? Yes, if  (ficta-identity-3) holds for them, given some unique fictional property. If  
they are qualitatively identical (a really implausible, yet not impossible case), (ficta-identity-3) 
certainly holds. On the other hand, if  some author thought of  a story about some fictional object 
qualitatively identical with (or very similar to) some other fictional object already constituted by 
another author and if  the former author thought of  both objects as identical with one another, 
then their identity could hold in virtue of  (ficta-identity-3) and (ficta-identity-4a). It follows from 
these solutions that it is not necessary that, for every fictional object, that object has one and only 
one original author: there might be cases (implausible, I should repeat, but not impossible ones) 
in which one and the same fictional object has two or more different original authors. If  two 
different authors ground the identity of  one and the same story, that story has two different 
original authors. Furthermore, (ficta-identity-3) makes it possible to think that some fictum could 
have had a different author. If  there is a possible world in which Conan Doyle does not exist and 
there is some fictional object that is qualitatively identical with (or at least very similar to) 
Sherlock Holmes, but that is authored by some other minded subject (let me call such an object 
Sherlock Holmes-2), Sherlock Holmes-2 is identical with our Sherlock Holmes in virtue of  (ficta-
identity-3), so that one and the same object has – in some other possible world – some other 
author. 
 A further case is the one introduced about three (fictional) characters: within different 
fictional contexts or within the same context, their original author(s) ascribe(s) to the first one the 
properties of  being a detective and of  living in Baker Street 221B, London, and of  not having a 
friend named Watson; to the second one the properties of  being a detective and of  having a 
friend named Watson and of  not living in Baker Street 221B, London; to the third one the 
properties of  having a friend named Watson and of  living in Baker Street 221B, London, and of  
not being a detective. Are such objects identical with one another? Are they all identical with 
Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes? Concerning the first question, the answer depends on further 
contextual information (e.g., about their authors), which provides different answers following our 
criteria. Concerning the second question, it seems difficult to establish whether they are identical 
with Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes, at least according to (ficta-identity-3), since we cannot use 
disjunctive properties. However, one might use other criteria to establish their identity or 
difference, provided further contextual information. It is worth remarking once again that the 
identifiers should be legitimate identifiers. 
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 Finally, let me analyze a case inspired by one of  K. Fine's objections against 
Meinongianism319. Let me assume that there are two qualitatively identical, yet numerically distinct 
fictional objects within the same story. How can we ground their being different from one 
another? First, one should think that this story is incomplete: if  we do not give a name to such 
objects, if  we do not have any property in virtue of  whose ascription we can understand that the 
author talks of  the former and not of  the latter object, then it is hard to distinguish them. Yet, let 
me assume that the original author does not give any name to such objects and that s/he does 
not ascribe any individualizing property to them.. Do they turn out to be identical? It seems to 
me that they do not. In fact, following (un.fic.property-2), it is legitimate that a good interpreter 
of  the story, in order to preserve their distinction, introduces some unique fictional property that 
is ascribed to one of  them and whose negation is ascribed to the other, so that, considering that 
the negation of  (ficta-identity-3) is true and that no other criterion holds (since the original 
author does not identify them and since no one could identify them without turning out to be an 
illegitimate identifier), they turn out to be different fictional objects.  
 
II.3.4. Saving the Data. 
It is now possible to provide the truth-conditions for our data, i.e. for the plausibly true 
statements that I have mentioned in chapter I.3. It is worth remarking that my interpretation is a 
reformative one: it aims at showing what propositions are expressed by those statements and at 
defining their truth-conditions.  
 Ascriptivism can preserve both the intuition that it is not necessary to refer to some 
author or to some definite story in order to claim that  
 
(12) Sherlock Holmes is a detective 
 
is true (since I could think of  Sherlock Holmes as a detective, even if  I did not know anything 
about Conan Doyle or about Conan Doyle's stories) and the intuition that there is some reading 
of  such statements, according to which the propositions that are expressed by them are made 
true by something involving Conan Doyle and his stories. 
 Let me call the truth-conditions that follow the first intuition "minimal" truth-conditions 
and the truth-conditions that follow the second one "qualified" truth-conditions. In order for 
(12) to express a true proposition, it is sufficient that there are minimal truth-conditions, so that 
(12) expresses (as we have already seen) a proposition that has such a logical form (that implies its 
having such-and-such truth-conditions): 
 
(12ascr.)  m cA2DEhmc 
                                                 
319 See Fine (1984): 103-104. 
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 However, one might be dissatisfied with such a result: s/he might claim that, for example, 
by stating that it is true that (12), s/he aims at showing that, according to Conan Doyle or 
according to his stories or according to some story about Sherlock Holmes, Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective. Thus, there should be some qualified readings of  (12) that express such interpretations. 
I propose the following readings: 
 
(12ascr.qual.-1)  m c(AUOOmh & A2DEhmc) 
 
(12ascr.qual.-2)  c(AUOOdh & A2DEhdc) 
 
(12ascr.qual.-3)  c s(CHhs & Dsc &  m(ISms → A2DEhmc)) 
 
(12ascr.qual.-4)  c s(AUOSds & CHhs & Dsc &  m2(ISm2s → A2DEhm2c)) 
 
(where the constant "d" stands for Conan Doyle). By (12ascr.qual.-1), it is claimed that there is 
some original author of  Sherlock Holmes that ascribes to him the property of  being a detective 
within some fictional context, while, by (12ascr.qual.-2), it is added that such an author is Conan 
Doyle. By (12ascr.qual.-3), it is explained that Sherlock Holmes is a character in some story and 
that every good interpreter of  that story ascribes to him the property of  being a detective within 
the fictional context defined by that story, while, by (12ascr.qual.-4), it is added that Conan Doyle 
is the original author of  that story (or of  those stories), according to which Sherlock Holmes is 
such-and-such. What reading should we choose? It depends on the contextual information. 
However, every qualified reading simply seems to specify, to add further information (e.g., to 
select some fictional context and/or some minded subject) to the minimal reading. 
 I shall simply recall the reading of 
 
(8) Sherlock Holmes does not exist 
 
as 
 
(8ascr.) ~Eh 
 
and of   
 
(13) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character 
 
as 
 
(13ascr.-1) Fh 
 
 With regard to 
 
(33) Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' creator, 
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it is legitimate to claim that it simply asserts that Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes' original 
author, i.e., that 
 
(33ascr.) AUOOdh 
 
 Statements  
 
(34) Conan Doyle killed Sherlock Holmes 
 
and 
 
(35) Conan Doyle resurrected Sherlock Holmes 
 
are a little bit more difficult to deal with. However, the idea behind them is that, according to 
some story written by Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes dies, while, according to some other story 
written by Conan Doyle after the first one, Sherlock Holmes lives. Yet, by (35), it is also possible 
to express the fact that, within the fictional context(s) defined by two stories, Conan Doyle first 
ascribes the property of  dying to Sherlock Holmes and, then, he ascribes the property of  living 
to him. 
 Thus, the reading of  (34) turns out to be 
 
(34ascr.)  c s(AUOSds & Dsc & A2DYhdc) 
 
(where "DY" stands for the property of  dying). The reading of  (35) is 
 
(35ascr.)  c1 c2 s1 s2 t1 t2(AUOSds1 & AUOSds2 & ~(s1 = s2) & Wds1t1 & Wds2t2 & PRt1t2 & Ds1c1 & 
Ds2c2 & A2DYhdc1 & A2Lhdc2) 
 
(where "c1" and "c2" are variables ranging over fictional contexts, "L" stands for the property of  
living and "W" stands for the relation of  writing some story at some time, even if  one might use 
different relations for unwritten stories). While it is claimed by (35ascr.) that these two stories are 
different, it is not claimed that the fictional contexts defined by them are different. They might 
define the same fictional context, in which Sherlock Holmes dies (at first) and then he lives.  
 The statement 
 
(36) Conan Doyle is the author of  Sherlock Holmes' stories 
 
expresses the idea that Conan Doyle is the only original author of  Holmes' native stories (i.e., 
those stories that define Sherlock Holmes' context of  origin) and it seems to imply that he is the 
original author of  Holmes too. Thus, it might be rendered as 
 
(22ascr.) AUOOdh &  s c((CHhs & Dsc & COch) → (AUOSds & ~ m(~(m = d) & AUOSms)))) 
 
 It is worth remarking that, according to this reading, every story about Holmes defines 
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some context that is Holmes' original context, but this context can be common (and should be 
common) for all those stories. Otherwise, it could not be the common fictional context of  origin 
of  Holmes.  
 There can be both minimal and qualified readings of 
 
(37) Sherlock Holmes exists, 
 
(38) Sherlock Holmes lives in London, 
  
(39) Sherlock Holmes had a tea with Gladstone, 
 
(40) in The Hound of  the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
 
 Restricting our interpretation to minimal readings, we will have: 
 
(37ascr.)  m cA2Ehmc (even if  he does not instantiate existence) 
 
(38ascr.)  m cA4LIhlmc 
 
(39ascr.)  m cA4HThgLmc & EgL 
 
(40ascr.)  m c(DsHc & A2DEhmc) 
 
(where the constants "gL", "l" and "sH" respectively stand for Lord Gladstone, London and the 
story The Hound of  the Baskervilles, while "LI" and "HT" respectively stand for the relations of  
living in and of  having a tea with). Concerning (39), we do not have to introduce any fictional 
duplicate of  Gladstone and we do not have to block the inference from (39) to 
 
(25') Gladstone had a tea with Sherlock Holmes, 
 
since it is true that the relation of  having a tea with is ascribed by some minded subject both to 
Sherlock Holmes and to Gladstone within some fictional context, even if  it is not true that they 
instantiate such a relation. Furthermore, the theory does not have to introduce any distinction 
between fictional objects and their Meinongian existing correlates (e.g., between the fictional 
Gladstone and the real one).  
 The interpretation of 
 
(41) in The Hound of  the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is English, 
 
even if  such a statement is not present in Conan Doyle's story, can go as follows. First, I shall 
assume that there is a relation R, i.e., the relation of  being reasonable that some minded subject 
ascribes some property to some object within some fictional context. The instantiation of  this 
relation is governed by this equivalence: 
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(reasonable)  x P1 m1 c(RA2P1xm1c ↔  m2(AUOCm2c & ~AP1xm2c & ~ P2(~(P2 = P1) & 
AP2xm2c & (AP2xm2c → AP1xm2c)) &  P3(~(P3 = P1) & AP3xm2c & (AP3xm2c → AP1xm2c)))) 
 
(where "P1", "P2" and "P3" are variables ranging over properties). This equivalence is grounded on 
three ideas: a property that it is reasonable for some minded subject to ascribe to some object 
within some fictional context is a property (a) whose negation is not ascribed to that object 
within that context by its original author, (b) whose negation is not implied by the ascription of  
any other property, (c) whose ascription is implied by the ascription of  some other property. It is 
difficult to interpret stories and their authors' intentions, so that it turns out to be difficult to 
interpret their ascriptions too. Yet, it is difficult from our viewpoint, i.e., from interpreters' viewpoint, 
not from authors' viewpoint, and this latter viewpoint is what grounds the truth of  (41). Thus, 
(41) can be minimally read as 
 
(41ascr.)  m c(DsHc & RA2ENhmc) 
 
(where "EN" stands for the property of  being English).  
 Furthermore, it is easy to deal with  
 
(42) although Sherlock Holmes is a detective, he is a fictional character, 
 
as 
 
(42ascr.) Fh &  sCHhs &  m cA2DEhmc 
 
 Among our data, there are also statements that involve intentional properties, such as the 
properties of  being more beloved than, of  being more famous than, and so on: 
 
(44) Sherlock Holmes is more beloved than Darth Vader, 
 
(45) John admires Sherlock Holmes. 
 
 Since such properties are not existence-entailing (in order for something or for someone 
to be loved or admired, it or s/he does not have to exist), one might simply introduce relations 
such as the relation of  being more beloved than and of  admiring: 
 
(44) BEhdV 
 
(45) ADjh 
 
(where "BE" and "AD" respectively stand for the relations of  being more beloved than and of  
admiring, while the constants "dV" and "j" respectively stand for Darth Vader and John). I shall 
leave to the reader the task of  determining the equivalences that rule the instantiation of  such 
relations (e.g., someone is more beloved than someone else iff  it is the case that...).  
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 Things become quite different with 
 
(43) Sherlock Holmes is more intelligent than Emma Bovary, 
 
since the n-adic properties of  being intelligent and of  being more intelligent than someone else 
seem to be existence-entailing: in order for every object to instantiate those n-adic properties, it 
has to exist. Yet, one might think of  degrees of  intelligence too and minimally read (43) as 
follows: 
 
(43ascr.)  m( c1(A2INT
1hmc1) &  c2(A2INT
2bmc2) & GRINT
1INT
2 & A7GRINT
1INT
2m) 
 
(where "INT
1" and "INT
2" respectively stand for Sherlock Holmes' and Emma Bovary's degrees of  
intelligence, "GR" stands for the relation of  being greater than, A7 is some special ascription 
relation that holds for relations between properties outside fictional contexts, even without 
involving objects, and the constant "b" stands for Emma Bovary). It is not necessary that 
Sherlock Holmes and Emma Bovary "live" in the same fictional context in order to compare their 
intelligence: it is only sufficient that some minded subject ascribes to them some degrees of  
intelligence, that s/he compares such degrees and that such a comparison actually holds.  
 The statement  
 
(47) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective 
 
can be interpreted with regard to degrees of  fame. Thus, we shall have 
 
(47ascr.)  m c s(CHhs & Dsc & A2DEhmc) & FAM
1h & ~ x(Dx & FAM
2x & (GRFAM
2FAM
1 V (FAM
2 = 
FAM
1))) 
 
(where "FAM
1" and "FAM
2" respectively stand for different degrees of  fame).  
 On the other hand 
 
(46) Conan Doyle died some years after Sherlock Holmes 
 
seems to metaphorically express the fact that Conan Doyle stopped writing about Sherlock 
Holmes some years before dying or that Conan Doyle died in some year and that he ascribed to 
Sherlock Holmes the property of  dying in some other year, that precedes Doyle’s year of  death. 
 In the former case, we will have 
 
(46'ascr.) AUOOdh &  ty1 ty2(SWdhty1 & DYTdty2 & PRty1ty2) 
 
(where "ty1" and "ty2" are variables that range over years, while "SW" and "DYT" respectively stand 
for the relations of  stopping writing at some year and of  dying at some year).  
 In the latter case, we will have 
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(46''ascr.) AUOOdh &  c ty1 ty2(A4hty1dc & DYTdty2 & PRty1ty2) 
 
 With regard to 
 
(48) Sherlock Holmes is still the paradigmatic detective character, 
 
I shall set "still" apart for now (since I have not dealt with the relationship between ascriptions 
and times) and I shall rewrite it as 
 
(48') Sherlock Holmes is the paradigmatic detective character. 
 
How can we deal with the property of  being a paradigmatic character with regard to some 
property (e.g., with regard to the property of  being a detective)? First, I shall recall univocally 
identifying fictional properties, in order to claim that they can be conjunctive. Secondly, I shall 
introduce the relation of  inspiring as follows: 
 
(inspiring)  x m(INSxm ↔ (Fx &  P1 P2 P3... PN(PUFP1x & CONP1 & PRCP2P1 & PRCP3P1 & … 
& PRCPNP1 &  y c(AUOCmc & (A2P2ymc V A2P3ymc V … V A2PNymc)))))  
 
(where "INS" stands for the relation of  inspiring some minded subject, "CON" stands for the 
property of  being a conjunctive property and "PRC" stands for the relation of  being a conjunct of, 
that holds between properties). An original author of  a fictional context is maximally inspired by 
some fictional object when s/he "copies" it, i.e. when s/he puts the same fictional object within 
his/her originally authored context. Furthermore, it follows from (inspiring) that there are 
degrees of  inspiration, connected with the number of  properties that are conjuncts of  the 
univocally identifying fictional property320. 
 In order for something to be the most paradigmatic detective character, one has to think 
that it is a fictional character and that the majority of  those that are the original authors of  
fictional contexts that involve detective characters are inspired by Sherlock Holmes or that the 
number of  such authors that are inspired by Sherlock Holmes is greater than the number of  
those that are inspired by any other detective character. Yet, the same point can be made with 
regard to readers or interpreters or (more generally) minded subjects thinking of  fictional 
characters: whenever they think of  fictional detectives (i.e., whenever they ascribe to some object 
the property of  being a detective within some fictional context and that object is a fictional 
character), the absolute majority of  them think of  Sherlock Holmes or the number of  those who 
think of  Sherlock Holmes is greater than the number of  those who think of  any other fictional 
                                                 
320 Yet, literally, it is not true that fictional objects inspire minded subject, so that they would have the disposition to 
inspire some minded subject. In fact, it seems to me that authors of fictional objects primarily have such a 
disposition. Thus, it is preferable to read this relation as the relation of x's being a fictional object such that its author 
has the disposition to inspire some m.   
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detective. I shall not formalize here (48'), since I would have to introduce some further technical 
devices such as plural quantification, but I think that the ascriptivistic interpretation of  this 
statement is now clear.   
 On the other hand, one might simply formalize 
 
(49) Ulysses inspired both Dante and Joyce 
 
as follows: 
 
(49ascr.) INSudA & INSujJ 
 
(where the constants "u", "dA" and "jJ" respectively stand for Ulysse, Dante and Joyce). 
Furthermore, it seems to be acceptable that Ulysses inspired Dante more than Joyce, since 
Dante's Ulysses (i.e., Ulysses within the context defined by Dante's Divina Commedia) has more 
properties that are part of  the conjunctive univocally identifying fictional property of  Ulysses (I 
would rather say that they are identical, following (ficta-identity-3) and/or (ficta-identity-4a)), 
while Joyce's Ulysses is not identical with Ulysses (I do not see how he might be identical with 
him).   
 With regard to 
 
(50) the Faust of  Goethe's Faust is an aspect of  Faust itself, 
 
one does not have to introduce any general Faust-character (that has no ascribed properties 
within any fictional context, since it is a fictional character in no context) in order to deal with 
this statement. It seems to me plausible to state that 
 
(50ascr.) FfA & CHfAsF & AUOSgOsF &  P1 P2... PN PN+1 s m c1 c2(DsFc1 & A2P1fAgOc1 & A2P2fAgOc1 
& … & A2PNfAgOc1 & ~A2PN+1fAgOc1 & ~(m = gO) & ~(s = sF) & ~(c2 = c1) & AUOSms & 
A2PN+1fAmc2)  
 
(where the constants "fA", "gO" and "sF" respectively stand for Faust, Goethe and Goethe's Faust). 
In sum, the truth of  (50ascr.) implies that there are some properties that are ascribed by Goethe 
to Faust within the fictional context defined by his Faust but that there are other properties (at 
least one) that are not ascribed by Goethe to Faust within that fictional context (properties that 
are thus different from the former ones, if  the L.N.C. is true) and that are ascribed to Faust 
within some other fictional context defined by some other story, authored by some other author.  
 On the other hand, if  there were some general Faust-character, one would have to 
introduce some arbitrary fictional context (not defined by any story) where that Faust would have 
his properties, and s/he would have to define some relation between that general Faust-character 
and Goethe's (and other authors') Faust-characters. 
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 The statements  
 
(51) Sherlock Holmes in The Hound of  the Baskervilles is the same as Sherlock Holmes in A Study in 
Scarlet 
 
and 
 
(52)  Sherlock Holmes of  Conan Doyle's stories is the same as Sherlock Holmes of  a recent 
movie directed by Guy Ritchie 
 
are two different identity-statements. From an ascriptivistic perspective, the former can be 
minimally interpreted as follows: 
 
(51ascr.)  x y c1 c2(DsHc1 & DsSc2 & CHxsH & CHysS &  m(A2NHxmc1 & A2NHymc2) & x = y) 
 
(where the constants "sS" and "NH" respectively stand for the story A Study in Scarlet and for some 
property such as the property of  being named "Sherlock Holmes"). The identity between the first 
Sherlock Holmes and the second one is made true by (ficta-identity-1).  
 On the other hand, (52) might be minimally interpreted as 
 
(52ascr.)  x y z c1 c2 s1 s2(MOx & DRxgR & MAxs1 & CHys1 & AUOSds2 & CHzs2 & Ds1c1 & Ds2c2 
&  m(A2NHxmc1 & A2NHymc2) & y = z)  
 
(where "MO", "DR" and "MA" respectively stand for the property of  being a movie, for the 
relation of  being directed by and for the relation of  being the material support of  some story, 
while the constant "gR" stands for Guy Ritchie). 
 Our last datum concerns fiction within fiction, namely the statement 
 
(53) in Hamlet, Gonzago is a fictional character, 
 
which can be minimally interpreted as 
 
(53ascr.)  m c(DsHAc & A2FgONmc) 
 
(where the constant "sHA" and "gON" respectively stand for the story Hamlet and for Gonzago).   
 Yet, with regard to (53), one might object: there are minded subjects that ascribe to 
Gonzago the property of  non-being fictional within the fictional context defined by Hamlet. 
Perhaps, they have misunderstood the story, but if  it is minimally sufficient that there is a minded 
subject that ascribes such a property to Gonzago in order for (53) to be true, it might be 
nevertheless sufficient to claim that there is some minded subject that ascribes its negation to him 
in order for (53) to be false, so that it is not the case that it is true that (53). Yet, this objection is a 
non-sequitur. In fact, if  we consider minded subjects that ascribe to Gonzago the property of  non-
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being fictional within the fictional context defined by Hamlet, this situation seems to be expressed 
by 
 
(53ascr.neg.1)  m c(DsHAc & A2F̅gONmc) 
 
which does not contradict (53ascr.), and not by 
 
(53ascr.neg.2)  m c(DsHAc & ~A2FgONmc) 
 
nor by 
 
(53ascr.neg.3) ~ m c(DsHAc & A2FgONmc) 
 
which would contradict (53ascr.), while (53ascr.neg.1) and (53ascr.neg.2) do not/would not 
contradict it. It is not true that (53ascr.neg.3), since there is, at least under some qualified reading, 
some minded subject (e.g., Shakespeare) that ascribes that property to Gonzago within the 
fictional context defined by Hamlet. Furthermore, given that that qualified reading is true of  (53), 
(53ascr.neg.1) expresses a bad interpretation of  Hamlet (i.e., the minded subject that makes it true 
that (53ascr.neg.1) is a bad interpreter of  Hamlet) and (53ascr.neg.2) expresses an incomplete one.  
 One problem remains if  we accept both the ascriptivistic theory and (ex.causal powers-
2c). Let me consider the following statements: 
 
(71) London exists; 
 
(72) Hobbiville does not exist. 
 
 Intuitively, they both seem to be true. Yet, if, following (ex.causal powers-2c), London 
turns out not to exist (since it does not possess the relevant dispositions to act requested by that 
criterion), it is false that (71). Thus, it turns out that every minded subject that ascribes by A1 to 
London the property of  existing makes a non-veridical ascription. Both London and Hobbiville 
do not exist. Yet, how can we express the ontological difference between them – i.e., that London 
is a town in the world and Hobbiville is a fictional or imaginary one? 
  First, one might accept that (71) and (72) can be paraphrased by 
 
(71') London is a real town; 
 
(72') Hobbiville is not a real town. 
 
 Such paraphrases are not arbitrary: they are guided by the conception of  existence that is 
expressed by (ex.causal powers-2c) and that I have already tried to defend. Yet, what is for 
something to be a real town? If  we accept that towns do not exist provided that they do not have 
dispositions to act, given (ex.causal powers-2c), it is not for that thing to instantiate the properties 
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of  being a town and of  existing. However, one might introduce some property of  being a real 
town (that is different from the property of  existing) in order to deal with such cases. In order 
for a town to be real, it simply has to instantiate the property of  being a town. Thus, London is a 
town and Hobbiville is not a town. For any minded subject, that subject makes a veridical A1-
ascription of  the property of  being a real town with regard to some object iff  that object is a 
town. Furthermore, that object is a town iff  there is some property that is relevant for the 
instantiation of  the property of  being a town (e.g., the property of  having some geographical 
coordinates). Thus, it is true that (71'), while it is false that (71), and it is true both that (72) and 
(72').  
 Finally, given the ascriptivistic theory, it is possible to redefine existence in terms of  
completeness. Let me imagine that there is a story sA that is constituted by all and only the 
propositions that are true in the actual world. Such a story defines a context cA that is not a 
fictional context that is identity-dependent on our minds. Yet, this context is a fictional one iff  
there is some minded subject mA that is its original author. That minded subject (e.g., God) 
knows, for every property or relation and for any object(s), if  that/those object(s) has/have that 
property or relation or not, i.e., that minded subject veridically ascribes to every object (or to all 
objects) that property (or that relation) or its negation. This context is a fictional one before 
creation, so that it does not exist before creation (and, as we will see in the next chapter, it does 
not exist after creation too, at least according to my perspective).  
 Thus, by A2 ascriptions (or by reductions to them), it turns out that 
 
(ex.completeness-ascr.)  x(Ex ↔  m c(COx & AUOCmc &  P(A2Pxmc V A2P̅xmc))) 
 
 On the other hand, no author of  any fictional object ascribes, for every property, that 
property or its negation to that object within no context. Yet, (ex.completeness-ascr.) has two 
problems: it works only for beings that are different from God (so that, if  God exists, there 
should be some other property of  existing that is instantiated by Him) and it implies (together 
with the assumption that minded subjects exist in order to define the identity conditions of  
objects and fictional contexts) that God exists, so that many philosophers could not accept it. 
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II.4. I Might Have Not Existed, I Shall Not Exist (Maybe) 
In this chapter, I shall deal with some problems that I have already discussed in the first part of  
this work and that concern the relationship between existence, modality and time. In particular, I 
shall propose an approach to possible worlds that is inspired by the ascriptivistic theory 
developed in the chapter II.3 and I shall introduce the qualifying theses of  my Meinongian 
presentism. It seems to me that such solutions can preserve the truth of  our initial data and that 
they can deal with more difficult data too. Roughly, my idea is that possible worlds are nothing 
more than peculiar fictional contexts and that they can be considered mental objects, while a non-
actualistic form of  presentism can accept that there are now non-existing objects and that objects 
can instantiate present-/past-/future-tensed properties with respect to times.   
 
II.4.1. A Mentalistic Approach to Possible Worlds. 
A mentalistic approach to possible worlds that is grounded on ascriptivism first aims at defending 
two theses: 
 
(a) every fictional context is a mental object; 
 
(b) since every possible world is a fictional context, it is a mental object. 
 
I shall try to argue for (a) as follows: 
 
(arg.I.1) every fictional context depends for its identity conditions on some story/stories; 
 
(arg.I.2) every story depends for its identity conditions on propositions that constitute it; 
 
(arg. I.3) identity dependence is transitive; 
 
(arg.I.4) thus: every fictional context depends for its identity conditions on some propositions 
(i.e., on those propositions that are true in it). 
 
 Given  
 
(def.story-context)  s c(Dsc ↔  p(TSps → TCpc)) 
 
it seems true that (arg.I.1). Intuitively, two different stories define two different fictional contexts, 
even if  I do not exclude the case that two stories define the same fictional context. However, in 
this latter case, it seems to happen that those stories are unified in order to constitute only one 
story and that that story defines that unified context (e.g., if  we unify the stories A Study in Scarlet 
and The Hound of  the Baskervilles, we obtain one fictional context that is defined by them and if  we 
unify all the stories about Sherlock Holmes we obtain one fictional context that can be 
considered Sherlock Holmes' fictional context). With regard to (arg.I.2), if  stories are sets of  
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propositions that have logical relationships with one another (e.g., logical implication, 
conjunction, and so on), then they seem to depend on their constituting propositions for their 
identity conditions, so that two stories are different iff  they are constituted by different 
propositions (in fact, even different relations between propositions, such as entailment, can 
define further constituting propositions that make stories different or identical). Finally, it seems 
true that (arg.I.3): for any three objects (e.g., a body, a molecule and an atom), if  the first object 
(the body) identity-depends on the second one (the molecule) and the second object identity-
depends on the third one (the atom), then the first object identity-depends on the third one too 
(i.e., the body identity-depends on the atom). One could reject this example, by claiming that the 
body has some kind of  unity that makes it identity-dependent not only on its constituting 
molecules, but also on something else (e.g., its structure). However, this would ground a case of  
partial identity-dependence, while, in the case of  fictional contexts, stories and propositions, there 
seems to be nothing more than stories or propositions (and, in turn, as we will notice, minded 
subjects) that ground the identity of  fictional contexts.  
 The second part of  the argument for (a) works as follows: 
 
(arg.II.1) for every proposition, that proposition depends for its identity conditions on some 
minded subject(s); 
 
(arg.II.2) every fictional context depends for its identity conditions on some proposition(s) (i.e., 
those propositions that are true in it); 
 
(arg.II.3) for every object, that object depends for its identity conditions on some minded 
subject(s) iff  it is a mental object; 
 
(arg.II.4) identity dependence is transitive; 
 
(arg.II.5) thus: every fictional context is a mental object. 
 
 While I have already tried to defend (arg.II.4) and (arg.II.2) and while (arg.II.3) only 
represents the equivalence that governs the instantiation of  the property of  being a mental 
object, it is not intuitively true that (arg.II.1). In fact, as I have already claimed in the chapter II.2, 
one could think that some possible world in which no minded subjects exist would still contain 
some truth-bearers, i.e., propositions. Thus, propositions seem to exist (or, better, to be 
identified) independently of  minded subjects. Yet, I do not accept this argument. In fact, those 
propositions that seem to be true in possible worlds without any minded subject are true from 
our viewpoint, i.e., from the viewpoint of  the actual world. For example, one could claim [in 
some possible world without any minded subject, dinosaurs exist] is a true proposition (provided 
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that there is such a possible world) in virtue of  the fact that that possible world, roughly, is 
constituted by a state of  affairs such as the state of  affairs that dinosaurs exist. In order to make 
[in some possible world without any minded subject, dinosaurs exist] true, we only need two 
items: that proposition (that is part of  the actual1 and of  the actual3 world and that is thought of  
by minded subject(s) that live in the actual1 world) and the state of  affairs that dinosaurs exist. 
Why do we have to introduce one further entity in that possible world, such as the proposition 
[dinosaurs exist]? Thus, it seems to me that propositions could be only considered mental objects. 
It thus turns out that (a) is true.  
 Before dealing with the argument for (b), I shall introduce some theses of  my mentalistic-
ascriptivistic theory of  modality, under the hypothesis that possible worlds are nothing more than 
peculiar fictional contexts. 
 First, after having reduced all fictional ascriptions (i.e., all ascriptions that involve at least 
one fictional context) to fictional ascriptions of  monadic properties (a reduction that is legitimate 
within an abundant conception of  properties), we can define the relation of  being part of  a 
fictional context: 
 
(part-fc)  x c(PACxc ↔  P mA2Pxmc) 
 
(where "PAC" stands for the relation of  being part of  a fictional context)
321. Secondly, one could 
claim that a possible world is a fictional context that is consistent and complete, i.e. a fictional 
context in which, for every object and every property, if  that object is part of  that context, then 
that property or (aut) its complementary property is ascribed to it. Thus, we shall obtain: 
 
(p.w.)  c(PWc ↔  x P m(PACxc → (A2Pxmc V A2P̅xmc))) 
 
(where "PW" stands for the property of  being a possible world).  
 Reducing all ascribed properties to monadic properties instantiated by them, two possible 
worlds are identical iff  they are qualitatively identical, i.e.,  iff  they have the same properties (and, 
in particular, the same monadic ascribed properties, such as the property of  being such that some 
property P is ascribed by A2 to some object x by some minded subject m within it). Thus, we shall 
have: 
 
(id.p.w.)  c1 c2((PWc1 & PWc2) → ((c1 = c2) ↔  P(Pc1 ↔ Pc2))) 
 
 It seems to me that there are no qualitatively identical and numerically distinct possible 
worlds: I do not know how to make sense of  such an idea.  Among possible worlds, there is one 
world that is actual2, i.e., (by reducing both ascribed and instantiated properties to monadic ones) 
                                                 
321 For a list of symbols, see the Appendix (pp. 281-284). 
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(actual2 p.w.)  c(ACc ↔ (PWc &  x P m((A2Pxmc ↔ Px) & (A2P̅xmc ↔ ~Px)))) 
 
(where "AC" stands for the property of  being actual2). 
 It is easy to show that there is only one actual2 possible world. In fact, if  there were two 
different actual2 possible worlds, then they would be different for at least one property and, in 
particular, for a monadic ascribed property. They would be such that the first world would have 
that property and the second world would not have it. Yet, given (actual2 p.w.), it would turn out 
that one and the same object would both instantiate and not instantiate that property. Yet, given 
the validity of  the law of  non-contradiction, it is not the case that one and the same object both 
instantiates and does not instantiate the same property. Thus, it is not the case that there is more 
than one actual2 possible world. Furthermore, the actual2 possible world can be now considered 
identical with the actual3 possible world, since every other possible world is an object that has 
properties in the actual2 possible world, so that there is no need to distinguish between the actual2 
and the actual3 world. 
 In addition, one could ask: what minded subjects are requested in order to think of  
possible worlds? It seems that there should be some omniscient minded subject, i.e., some 
minded subject that ascribes to every object (even comprehending possible worlds) all and only 
the properties (both positive and negative) that it has. Thus, an omniscient minded subject is such 
that 
 
(om.mind)  m(OMm ↔  P x((A1Pxm ↔ Px) & (A1P̅xm ↔ ~Px)))  
 
(where "OM" stands for the property of  being an omniscient minded subject). It is worth noticing 
that modal properties (such as the property of  being thus-and-thus in some definite possible 
world) are monadic properties instantiated by an object x too. An omniscient minded subject is 
simply invoked for one reason: if  possible worlds are fictional contexts (i.e., mental objects) and 
if  they must be distinguished from one another, then non-omniscient minded subjects (such as 
human beings) cannot ground their identity, since they cannot know all the properties that are 
instantiated (and not instantiated) by every object. Thus, non-omniscient minded subjects could 
not grasp individual possible worlds and they could not ground their identity conditions: they 
could (at best) be able to distinguish sets of  possible worlds for which some condition holds.   
 Given (id.p.w.), it is easy to introduce possible worlds' individuating properties, i.e., 
properties that ground the identity and distinction between possible worlds. The instantiation of  
a possible world's individuating property is governed by the following equivalence: 
 
(p.w.ind.properties)  P c1(PINDPWP ↔ (PWc1 &  c2(~(c2 = c1) ↔ (Pc1 & ~Pc2)))) 
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(where "PINDPW" stands for the property of  being an individuating possible world's property). 
Among possible worlds' individuating properties, there are properties that are propositional,  
such as the property of  being such that the proposition [p] (even a complex conjunctive one) is 
true in it. Furthermore, many (but not all) possible world's individuating properties seem to be 
propositional. However, if  there were two possible worlds qualitatively identical with regard to all 
and only their propositional properties, what other properties would ground their distinctness? 
For example, the property of  being thought of  by some omniscient minded subject as distinct 
from some other qualitatively identical possible world w or of  not being possibly coactualized 
with some other qualitatively identical possible world w. Yet, such properties would not be 
possible worlds' individuating properties: given two qualitatively identical yet numerically distinct 
possible worlds, they would both have them. If  we maintain that possible worlds are mental 
objects and that there is an omniscient minded subject that thinks of  them, then it seems to me 
that such an omniscient minded subject would ground their numerical distinction by primitively 
and arbitrarily thinking that there are two qualitatively identical possible worlds. That subject 
would arbitrarily think of  those worlds as distinct, since there would be no reason for maintaining 
that they are identical or distinct, so that the former world (world-1) would have a relational 
property such as the property of  being distinct from the latter world (world-2) and the latter 
world (world-2) would have a relational property such as the property of  being distinct from the 
former world (world-1) and (id.p.w.) would still hold for them. However, it seems to me that 
every non-arbitrary identity or distinction between possible worlds is grounded on possible 
worlds' propositional individuating properties and that every non-arbitrary possible world's 
individuating property (i.e., every property distinct from the aforementioned relational property) 
is a propositional one. 
 In order for a proposition to be true in a possible world, it is the case that 
 
(true-in)  c p(TPWpc ↔ (PWc &  m(OMm & A2Tpmc))) 
 
(where "TPW" stands for the relation of  being true within a possible world), i.e., a proposition 
bears the relation of  being true in a possible world within a fictional context iff  that fictional 
context is a possible world and there is an omniscient minded subject that ascribes to that 
proposition by A2 the property of  being true within that context. 
 The last two notions that I shall introduce in order to deal with our data are proximity to 
the actual2 world except for some proposition and conventional essence. A fictional context that 
is a possible world is proximate to the actual2 world except for some proposition in this case: 
 
(proximity)  c p1(PROXccAp1 ↔ (PWc & PWcA & TPWp1cA & ~TPWp1c &  p2(TPWp2c ↔ (TPWp2cA & ~(p2 
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= p1) & ~(TPWp1cA → TPWp2cA))))) 
 
(where "PROX" stands for the relation of  being proximate to the actual2 world except for some 
proposition and "cA" is a constant that stands for the actual2 world). For example, let me take the 
proposition [Michele exists], that is true in the actual2 world and that is not true in some other 
fictional context that is a possible world. By (proximity), that fictional context is proximate to the 
actual2 world except for that proposition iff  both that context and the actual2 world are possible 
worlds and [Michele exists] is true in the actual2 world and it is not true in the other possible 
world and, for every proposition, that proposition is true in the other possible world iff  it is true 
in the actual2 world and it is obviously different from [Michele exists] and it is not the case that its 
truth in the actual2 world is implied by the truth in the actual2 world of  [Michele exists].  
 Finally, I shall introduce conventional essences of  objects as follows: 
 
(mod.ess.)  x P(ECMPx ↔ (Px &  m(OMm → ~ c(PWc & A2P̅xmc)))) 
 
(where "ECM" stands for the relation of  being a conventional essence of  something).  
 If  we now turn to the ontological status of  possible worlds, it seems to be possible to 
demonstrate that they are mental objects: 
 
(arg.III.1) every possible world depends for its identity conditions (whenever such identity 
conditions are non-arbitrarily defined) on possible worlds’ individuating properties; 
 
(arg.III.2) every non-arbitrary possible worlds' individuating property depends for its identity 
conditions on some proposition; 
 
(arg.III.3) identity dependence is transitive; 
 
(arg.III.4) thus, every possible world depends for its identity conditions (whenever such identity 
conditions are non-arbitrarily defined) on some proposition. 
 
In turn,  
 
(arg.IV.1) for every proposition, that proposition depends for its identity condition on some 
minded subject(s); 
 
(arg.IV.2) for every object, that object depends for its identity conditions on some minded subject 
iff  it is a mental object; 
 
(arg.IV.3) every possible world depends for its identity conditions (whenever such identity 
conditions are non-arbitrarily defined) on some proposition; 
 
(arg.IV.4) identity dependence is transitive; 
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(arg.IV.5) thus, every possible world depends, for its identity condition (whenever such identity 
conditions are non-arbitrarily defined) on some minded subject(s); 
 
(arg.IV.6) thus, every non-arbitrarily defined in its identity conditions possible world is a mental 
object. 
 
 I have already defended all the premises. One important point of  these arguments 
concerns the ontological economy of  their assumptions. Provided that it is possible to consider 
possible worlds mental objects, it is neither necessary to admit that they somehow are or exist, 
nor that they have some more ontologically committing ontological status (e.g., the status of  
being complex states of  affairs), so that they would be identifiable independently of  minded 
subjects. On the other hand, it seems that my account commits to the existence of  at least one 
omniscient minded subject, provided that minded subjects must exist in order to constitute the 
identity conditions of  mental objects. Yet, this theory can have a fictionalist reading too: given a 
fictional context defined by the ascriptivistic-mentalistic theory of  possible worlds, finite minded 
subjects ascribe such-and-such properties to objects, possible worlds and omniscient minded 
subject(s), even if  they do not believe that (those) that minded subject(s) exist(s).  
 It is now time to introduce some properties concerning the possible existence or non-
existence of  objects: 
 
(cont.ex.)  x(ECONTx ↔ (Ex &  m c(OMm & PWc & ~(c = cA) & A2E̅xmc))) 
 
(cont.non-ex.)  x(ECONT-NONx ↔ (~Ex &  m c(OMm & PWc & ~(c = cA) & A2Exmc))) 
 
(nec.ex.)  x(ENECx ↔  m c((OMm & PWc) → A2Exmc))  
 
(non-nec.poss.ex.)  x(ENON-NEC-POSSx ↔  m(OMm &  c1 c2(PWc1 & PWc2 & ~(c1 = c2) & A2Exmc1 & 
A2E̅xmc2))) 
 
(imp.ex.)  x(EIMPx ↔  m c((OMm & PWc) → A2E̅xmc)) 
 
(where "ECONT", "ECONT-NON", "ENEC", "ENON-NEC-POSS" and "EIMP" respectively stand for the 
properties of  contingently existing, contingently non-existing, necessarily existing, non-
necessarily yet possibly existing and non-possibly existing).  
 Yet, as I have already noticed, it is not sufficient, in order to grasp the truth-conditions of  
our data about my merely possible non-existence and Noman's (and Sherlock Holmes') merely 
possible existence, that there is some possible world in which I do not exist or Noman (or 
Sherlock Holmes) exists. In fact, what seems to be asserted by statements such as 
 
(54) Noman might have existed, 
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(55) I might have not existed, 
 
(56) Sherlock Holmes might have existed, 
 
is at least ambiguous between what seems to happen in some possible world or another and what 
might happen in the actual2 world (provided that the actual2 world is identical with the actual3 
world), so that each statement has at least two different interpretations: 
 
(54a) Noman exists in some possible world or another, 
 
(54b) Noman might have existed in the actual2 world, 
 
(55a) I do not exist in some possible world or another, 
 
(55b) I might have not existed in the actual2 world, 
 
(56a) Sherlock Holmes exists in some possible world or another, 
 
(56b) Sherlock Holmes might have existed in the actual2 world. 
 
 I shall start with Noman. It is possible to read the truth-conditions of  (54a) as follows: 
 
(54a-ascr.) ECONT-NONn 
 
(where "n" is a constant standing for Noman). On the other hand, what is requested for the truth 
of  (54b) is that there is a possible world that is proximate to the actual2 world except for the 
proposition [Noman does not exist]: 
 
(54b-ascr.) ECONT-NONn &  m c(OMm & PROXccApN & A2Enmc) 
 
(where "pN" is a constant standing for the proposition [Noman does not exist]). Since there are 
possible worlds in which Noman exists that differ from the actual2 world with respect to many 
other propositions, not every possible world is proximate to the actual2 world except for [Noman 
does not exist]. 
 From an impersonal perspective, (55a) and (55b) can be interpreted as follows: 
 
(55a-ascr.) ECONTmM 
 
(55b-ascr.) ECONTmM &  m c(OMm & PROXccApM & A2EmMmc) 
 
(where the constants "mM" and "pM" respectively stand for me, i.e., Michele, and the proposition 
[Michele exists]).  
 Yet, since a first-person perspective is introduced in (55), it is worth considering the 
veridicity of  the self-ascription (by A1) of  properties such as the ones of  contingently existing 
and of  contingently existing with regard to the actual2 world. This latter property seems to be 
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governed by the following equivalence: 
 
(cont.ex.act.)  x(ECONT-ACTx ↔ (Ex &  m c(OMm & PWc & ~(c = cA) & PROXccApX & A2Exmc))) 
 
(where "ECONT-ACT" stands for the property of  being contingently existent with regard to the 
actual2 world and the constant "pX" stands for the proposition [x exists]), so that (55b-ascr.) is 
equivalent to 
 
(55b-ascr.') ECONT-ACTmM 
 
 Thus, from the first-person perspective, (55a) and (55b) should be read as 
 
(55a-first.pers.-ascr.) A1ECONTmMmM 
 
(55b-first.pers.ascr.) A1ECONT-ACTmMmM 
 
and their truth-conditions (i.e., those conditions in virtue of  which they are veridical A1-
ascriptions) are respectively expressed by (55a-ascr.) and (55b-ascr.) and (55b-ascr.'). 
 I remain agnostic about the truth of  (56a) and (56b). On the one hand, if  the property of  
being fictional is a conventional essence of  Sherlock Holmes, then Sherlock Holmes is a non-
possibly existent object, so that (56a) and (56b) are false. Nevertheless, provided that there seems 
to be no inconsistency between Sherlock Holmes' ascribed properties and that no inconsistency 
is implied by the truth of  all the propositions that constitute Conan Doyle's stories (if  we assume 
that in such stories Sherlock Holmes did not really die), why cannot we claim that some 
omniscient minded subject thinks of  a possible world in which Sherlock Holmes exists? It is true 
that Conan Doyle's and finite minded subjects' fictional contexts are not possible worlds, since 
they are at least incomplete. Yet, they can be somehow completed by some omniscient minded 
subject and they can be completed in different ways, so that there could be many Sherlock 
Holmes' possible worlds following Conan Doyle's stories, i.e., many possible worlds obtained by 
completing that/those fictional context(s) defined by Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes' stories. 
 Following this latter solution, let me imagine that there is a possible world in which there 
is an existent Sherlock Holmes and that this possibly existent Sherlock Holmes does not actually 
exist (i.e., he does not exist in the actual2 world). This Sherlock Holmes would be a contingently 
non-existent object. Since he is constituted by some minded subject in his identity conditions, he 
actually is a mental object. Furthermore, he is a fictional object too. Is he identical with or 
different from the fictum Sherlock Holmes that we all know? Provided my criteria of  identity for 
ficta, he seems to be identical with him. In fact, by (ficta-identity-4a), by completing that story, 
that omniscient minded subject thinks of  a story in which that Sherlock Holmes defined in his 
identity conditions by Conan Doyle exists. Thus, it seems to be true that (56a). What about (56b)? 
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Well, perhaps there is a possible world that is proximate to the actual world except for the 
proposition [Sherlock Holmes does not exist]. Yet, this possible world is not one of  those worlds 
obtained by completing Conan Doyle's stories. In fact, such possible worlds would contain many 
propositions that are not true in the actual2 world and that are not connected in their truth-values 
with the truth-values of  [Sherlock Holmes does not exist] or [Sherlock Holmes exists]. Thus, 
(56b) might be true, but it might not be made true simply by completing Conan Doyle's stories in 
order to obtain some possible world(s) in which Sherlock Holmes exists.  
 The difficulties in accepting the truth of  (56a) and (56b) lie in at least three points. First, 
one might think that seemingly inconsistent objects (such as the man that is not a man) would 
turn out to be only contingently non-existent. Yet, the man that is not a man has both the 
properties of  being a man and of  non-being a man, so that he does not exist in any possible 
world. Secondly, it might seem arbitrary to ground the identity of  those two Sherlock Holmes 
(Conan Doyle's one and the one obtained by completing Conan Doyle's fictional context) on 
(ficta-identity-4a). True. Yet, if  that omniscient minded subject is truly omniscient, why cannot he 
constitute a possible world in which Sherlock Holmes (our Sherlock Holmes) exists? Nothing 
seems to rule out such a possibility. Thirdly, many philosophers argue that it is part of  the 
essence of  Sherlock Holmes that he is a fictional object. However, as long as we do not accept 
any peculiar theory of  essences (i.e., as long as we remain agnostic about essences) and essences 
can be defined in non-modal terms too, it is not demonstrated that Sherlock Holmes essentially is 
fictional, i.e., that he necessarily is fictional. Perhaps, it is true that Sherlock Holmes essentially is 
a fictional object, so that he is a necessarily non-existent object too. Yet, I do not now see any 
strong reason for the falsity of  (56a) and (56b), at least from the viewpoint of  a mentalistic 
theory of  possible worlds. Thus, even if  I maintain that there might be such a reason, it seems to 
me that (56a) and (56b) might be true. More precisely, I am only an agnostic quasi-believer about 
Sherlock Holmes' possible existence. 
 Three questions remain concerning Quine’s merely possible fat man in the doorway, if  we 
accept that he is a merely possible object: 
(III) Is the merely possible fat man in that doorway identical with the merely possible bald man in 
that doorway? 
(IV) How many merely possible fat men are there in that doorway? 
(V) How many fat men is it possible that are placed in that doorway? 
 Concerning question (III), the answer is: it depends. There are possible worlds in which 
there is a fat man in that doorway who is bald too and possible worlds in which he is not bald. 
Furthermore, considering possibilities about the actual2 world, there are possible worlds 
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proximate to it in which they are identical and possible worlds proximate to it in which they are 
distinct, i.e., in which there is a fat man in that doorway who is not bald. Further contextual 
information is required in order to give a definite answer to the question. Yet, it is possible to give 
a definite answer to the question, so that Quine’s complaint is not justified. 
 Concerning question (V), the answer is: it depends on the size of  the fat man and on the 
size of  that doorway – if  we consider the actual2 doorway, i.e., if  we investigate the possibility of  
there being n fat men in that doorway in a possible world that is proximate to the actual2 one. On 
the other hand, if  that doorway were larger or narrower (i.e., if  there are possible worlds in which 
it is larger or narrower than it actually2 is), the answer would obviously vary.  
 Finally, concerning question (IV), the answer is: zero. Since the property of  being in that 
doorway is an existence-entailing one and since merely possible fat men do not exist, no merely 
possible fat man instantiates the former property. 
 
II.4.2. A Sketch of Meinongian Presentism. 
In this section, I shall give a brief  sketch of  a Meinongian Presentism, i.e., a non-actualistic 
version of  Presentism, which seems to have some advantages over its presentist rivals and over 
many forms of  non-presentism. 
 I cannot defend here all the assumptions incorporated in the version of  Meinongian 
Presentism that I wish to defend. In particular, I cannot defend a substantialist view of  times 
(according to which, roughly, there are times that are different from one another independently 
of  the things that occupy those times) and a peculiar view of  tenses (according to which tenses 
should be primarily considered property-modifiers, i.e., they primarily introduce new properties 
by modifying untensed properties). 
 My version of  Meinongian Presentism uses some strategies that are typically accepted by 
non-presentists and that are rejected by many (actualist) presentists. In particular, it mixes times 
and tenses qua property-modifiers in order to provide the truth-conditions for tensed 
propositions. First, I shall spend some words about times and tenses and give a preliminary view 
of  tensed properties. Secondly, I shall make my approach more formal and introduce some basic 
notions, in order to contrast eternalism and non-eternalism and in order to define, among non-
eternalist positions, presentism and, among presentist positions, Meinongian Presentism. Thirdly, 
I shall try to demonstrate the superiority of  Meinongian Presentism over other positions in 
dealing with the problems of  substantial change and of  the truth-conditions of  propositions 
seemingly about merely past objects. Fourthly, I shall deal with the nature of  propositions and the 
difference between truth at times and truth simpliciter. Finally, I shall analyze the data presented in 
chapter I.4. 
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 From my perspective, times are non-existent and non-mental objects that are identified 
along the B-series in virtue of  the relation of  simultaneity. Given two times, they are identical iff  
they are simultaneous with one another. On the other hand, they are different iff  they are not 
simultaneous with one another, i.e., iff  one of  them precedes or (aut) follows the other. As I have 
already said, this conception of  times is committed to a substantialist view of  times. 
Nevertheless, there might be fundamental physical facts that determine the difference between 
times. It is worth noticing that, if  there are such facts, they are not in time, they do not obtain at 
any time, since they ground the identity of  times and such an identity cannot be presupposed by 
claiming that such facts presently obtain with regard to some time or another.  
 Tenses are primarily considered property-modifiers. A tensed property is a property 
obtained by modifying non-tensed properties (using temporal adverbs, such as "presently", 
"pastly" and "futurely") and by adding a temporal index. In fact, tensed properties are always 
instantiated with regard to times322: there is no object that instantiates the property of  presently 
being a man simpliciter, since every object that presently is a man has that feature with regard to 
some time. It is not the case that Socrate presently is a man with regard to this time (the present 
time), while it is the case that he pastly is a man (i.e., that he was a man) with regard to this time. 
On the other hand, there is a time that precedes the present time and with regard to which 
Socrates presently is a man. The property of  presently being such-and-such with regard to some t 
may add nothing new to objects already instantiating tensed properties: for example, Socrates 
presently is pastly a man with regard to t iff  he pastly is a man with regard to t. By now, I shall name 
facts such as the fact that Socrates presently is pastly a man with regard to t "redundant facts"323. 
Thus, given the property of  being a man, it can be modified in order to obtain the tensed 
properties of  presently being a man with regard to some time, of  pastly being a man with regard to 
some time, of  futurely being a man with regard to some time.   
 Past-tensed, present-tensed and future-tensed properties with regard to times are different 
from one another. For example, provided that t1 is the present time, the extension of  the 
property of  pastly being a man with regard to t1 differs from the extension of  the property of  
presently being a man with regard to t1: if  we accept that Socrates still is an object at t1, even if  he 
does not exist at t1 (i.e., he does not presently exist with regard to t1), then Socrates pastly is a man 
                                                 
322 For a presentist (though non-Meinongian) approach similarly based on a substantialist view of times and on 
irreducibly tensed properties involving times, see Orilia (2012a), (2012b) and (forthcoming). See also Hinchliff (1988) 
and (1996). 
323 Given the view of facts presented in chapter II.2, I do not consider facts true propositions. Furthermore, I 
distinguish between facts and states of affairs, since it seems to me that facts are occurring states of affairs. Thus, the 
expression "redundant facts" is not synonymous with the expression "redundant propositions". Facts such as the fact 
that Socrates presently is pastly a man with regard to t are redundant as long as there is another fact (i.e., the fact that 
Socrates pastly is man with regard to t) that does the same ontological work and that is somehow more fundamental 
than the former fact.   
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with regard to t1 and it is not the case that he presently is a man with regard to t1. Yet, how can we 
define the present and the present time?  
 Let me first introduce the notion of  temporal fact. A temporal fact is a fact that consists 
of  the instantiation of  some n-adic tensed property (e.g., the property of  presently being a man) 
with regard to some time by some object(s), i.e., a temporal fact is an event (given J. Kim's 
definitions of  events, according to which events consist of  the instantiation of  some n-adic 
property by some object(s) at some time). I assume that not every fact is a temporal fact. For 
example, as we have already seen, if  there are fundamental physical facts that determine the 
identity of  times, then they are not temporal facts. Furthermore, times' instantiating relations 
such as the ones of  being simultaneous, preceding, and so on, are not temporal facts. The present 
with regard to some time t is the sum of  all the temporal facts that involve t: that Michele presently 
is a man with regard to t, that Socrates pastly is a man with regard to t, and so on. The strict present 
with regard to t is the sum of  all the non-redundant temporal facts that involve t and that are 
constituted by present-tensed properties. For example, the strict present with regard to t 
comprehends Michele's presently being a man with regard to t, but it does not comprehend 
Socrates' pastly being a man with regard to t. The present time is, roughly, the time involved in facts 
that occur now, i.e., in present events (I shall give an analysis of  "now" in a few pages). There are 
(i.e., given my reading of  quantifiers, are identified) times across times: we can now identify the 
time of  the Battle of  Hastings and we can claim that it is different from the present time. 
Furthermore, there are different (strict and non-strict) presents with regard to different times, 
even if  there is now only one present.   
 In order to define some basic notions of  Meinongian presentism, I shall use tensed 
properties, i.e., properties such as the property of  presently being a philosopher (with regard to 
some t): given a property P, it is possible to characterize a present-tensed property PPRES (and a 
past-tensed PPAST and a future-tensed PFUT). A property is temporal iff, for every object, it is 
instantiated by that object only if  it is presently or pastly or futurely instantiated with regard to some 
time, namely 
 
(temp.prop.)  P(PTEMPP ↔  x(Px →  t(PPASTxt V PPRESxt V PFUTxt))) 
 
(where "PTEMP" stands for the property of  being a temporal property). There are properties that 
are not temporal: for example, if  we accept that there are non-temporally existing objects, the 
property of  existing is not temporal.  
 On the other hand, an object is a temporal existent iff  there is a time with regard to 
which it presently exists: 
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(temp.ex.)  x(ETEMPx ↔  tEPRESxt) 
 
(where "ETEMP" stands for the property of  being a temporal existent). An object is a sempiternal 
existent iff  it presently exists with regard to every time: 
 
(semp.ex.)  x(ESEMPx ↔  tEPRESxt) 
 
(where "ESEMP" stands for the property of  being a temporal existent). It follows that, if  there are 
sempiternally existing objects, they are temporally existing objects too, while it is not intuitively 
clear whether every temporally existing object is a sempiternally existent too: if  there is 
something like substantial change, then it seems that not every temporally existing object 
sempiternally exists.  
 Finally, I shall use "EENT" as standing for the property of  being an existence-entailing 
property, i.e., a property for which it is necessarily true that, for every object, that object 
instantiates that property only if  it exists. 
 According to this perspective, eternalism should be better named "sempiternalism", since 
it seems to imply that every temporal object is a sempiternal object too, namely 
 
(sempiternalism)  x(ETEMPx → ESEMPx) 
 
 It is true that many eternalists might not intuitively accept (sempiternalism), but this 
thesis simply expresses the fact that there exists no object that does not exist anymore or that 
does not yet exist, i.e., that every (past, present and future) object presently exists. On the other 
hand, the denial of  (sempiternalism) is 
 
(non-sempiternalism) ~ x(ETEMPx → ESEMPx) 
 
 There are many versions of  non-sempiternalism. Pastists, for example, argue that objects 
start to exist, but they do not cease to exist. Presentism is a version of  non-sempiternalism 
according to which 
 
(presentism) ~ x(ETEMPx → ESEMPx) &  P y t((EENTP & PPRESyt) → EPRESyt) 
 
This formulation of  presentism is neutral with regard to actualism and non-actualism: it 
only claims that, for every existence-entailing property presently instantiated by an object with 
regard to some time, that object presently exists with regard to that time. For actualists, every 
property is an existence-entailing one, i.e., there are no objects at no time that do not presently 
exist at that time, while, for non-actualists, there is at least one time at which there is at least one 
object that does not presently exist at that time and that nevertheless presently instantiates some 
property at that time: 
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(presentism-actualist) ~ x(ETEMPx → ESEMPx) &  P y t(PPRESyt → EPRESyt) 
 
(presentism-non-actualist) ~ x(ETEMPx → ESEMPx) &  P1 y t1((EENTP1 & P1PRESyt1) → EPRESyt1) 
&  z P2 t2((P2PRESzt2 V P2PASTzt2 V P2FUTzt2) & ~EPRESzt2) 
 
 My version of  Meinongian Presentism accepts (presentism-non-actualist). It is worth 
noticing that merely past objects (such as Socrates) do not only presently (with regard to some 
time) instantiate properties (i.e., intentional ones), but also past-tensed and future-tensed ones: if  
we consider t2 the present time, we might say that Socrates pastly is a philosopher with regard to t2 
and that he futurely is dead with regard to t2 (since he is now dead and there is no reason for 
supposing that he will resurrect) or that he futurely is a philosopher or a non-philosopher with 
regard to t2 (i.e., a disjunctive property). Accepting an abundant conception of  properties, I do 
not see any reason for which a Meinongian presentism should deny that objects instantiate now 
future-tensed properties (even if  one might put a constraint on them, depending on other views, 
such as the acceptance or denial of  determinism). 
 Both the actualist and the non-actualist versions of  presentism can deal with the first 
horn of  the triviality dilemma introduced in section I.4.4 (i.e., the horn according to which 
presentism is trivially true) in a satisfying way. In fact, they exclude that there are temporal 
existents that sempiternally exist and this assertion is not trivially true. On the other hand, 
concerning the second horn of  the objection (the obvious falsity of  presentism, given that there 
are no objects that do not presently exist), non-actualist presentism could seem more convincing 
than the actualist one: the former admits that there are objects that do not presently exist, but it 
denies that they presently have existence-entailing properties, even if  they could have had them, 
and it affirms that non-presently existing objects have properties. 
 Furthermore, non-actualist presentism might admit that there are now causal relations 
between merely past objects and present ones (or between temporal facts involving them), even 
if  such relations do not entail the present existence of  the former objects and their presently 
having causal powers.  
 With regard to absolute change (i.e., things' starting and stopping existing, things' having 
an absolute beginning and an absolute end), both actualist and non-actualist presentism can give 
an exhaustive interpretation of  it, while sempiternalism obviously denies that there is such a 
phenomenon. An object has an absolute beginning at some time t in the following case: 
 
(ab.ben.)  x t1(ABBxt1 ↔ (EPRESxt1 &  t2(PRt2t1 → ~EPRESxt2))) 
 
(where "ABB" stands for the relation of  absolutely beginning at some time and "PR" stands for the 
relation of  preceding, that obtains among times). On the other hand, an object has an absolute 
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end at some time t in the following case: 
 
(ab.end)  x t1(ABExt1 ↔ (EPRESxt1 &  t2(FOLLt2t1 → ~EPRESxt2))) 
 
(where "ABE" stands for the relation of  having an absolute end at some time and "FOLL" stands 
for the relation of  following, that obtains among times). 
 Before dealing with the nature of  propositions, it is worth examining the relationship 
between tensed instantiation at times and instantiation simpliciter of  properties. In other terms, 
why is it justified to assert that Socrates is a man simpliciter and that Sherlock Holmes is not  a 
man simpliciter, given that the property of  being a man is always presently/pastly/futurely instantiated 
with regard to times (i.e., it is a temporal property)? Given a temporal property, it could be argued 
that that property is instantiated simpliciter by an object iff  there is some time with regard to which 
it is presently instantiated by that object. On the other hand, that property is not instantiated 
simpliciter by an object iff  there is no time with regard to which it is presently instantiated by that 
object. In fact, if  there is no time with regard to which it is presently instantiated by that object, 
there is no preceding time with regard to which it is futurely instantiated by that object and no 
following time with regard to which it is pastly instantiated by that object. Yet, this implies that, if  
an object presently has two incompatible temporal properties with regard to two different times, 
then that object instantiates simpliciter two incompatible properties. Thus, I think that there are 
temporal properties that cannot be instantiated simpliciter, but that can only be 
presently/pastly/futurely instantiated with regard to times (e.g., I cannot instantiate simpliciter the 
properties of  staying at home and the negative property of  not staying at home – or the 
incompatible property of  staying outside – for the fact that I presently instantiate the property of  
staying at home with regard to some time t1 and I presently instantiate the negative property of  not 
staying at home with regard to some different time t2, but I can only presently/pastly/futurely 
instantiate those properties with regard to times). On the other hand, there are temporal 
properties that I presently instantiate at every time at which I exist: for example, the kind-property 
of  being human. There are also non-temporal properties – such as the property of  existing – that 
I presently instantiate at every time at which I exist. In this respect, I can claim that those 
properties are instantiated simpliciter. Yet, it is necessary to introduce a clause. In fact, given that I 
instantiate simpliciter the properties of  being human and of  existing, at a time at which I do not 
exist, I presently instantiate the negative properties of  non-being human and of  non-existing with 
regard to those times. Thus, in order to avoid contradictions, it is worth adding that such negative 
properties are not instantiated simpliciter by me. 
 What about propositions? Propositions are mental objects that do not exist, as I have 
already claimed. Thus, they cannot be temporal existents. However, many mental objects seem to 
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have identity conditions (i.e., they seem to be constituted as objects) only after some time: 
Sherlock Holmes is not identified (i.e., he is not an object) before his author's thinking of  him as 
having such-and-such properties. It is only in virtue of  the fact that Sherlock Holmes (with 
regard to the present time) presently has identity conditions, that we can claim that he does not 
presently have any identity condition with regard to any time preceding Conan Doyle's birth and 
that he does not pastly have any identity condition with regard to the time at which he has been 
constituted as an object by Conan Doyle. 
 Nevertheless, if  there is some omniscient minded subject that lives outside the time and 
that thinks of  propositions' being true or false, propositions do not strictly have temporal identity 
conditions. This does not imply that they cannot have tensed properties relative to times, 
provided that, by analogy, even non-temporal properties can be (presently, pastly, futurely) 
instantiated with regard to times. Thus, we have to distinguish between truth at times and truth 
simpliciter. I shall only examine tensed propositions that aret true at times, i.e., that presently are true 
with regard to those times, even if  they could also be pastly or futurely true with regard to other 
times.  
 For example, if  we claim that the proposition [Socrates ist a philosopher] ist true at t1, we 
claim that that proposition presently is true with regard to t1 and what makes it true is the fact that 
Socrates presently is a philosopher with regard to t1. On the other hand, [Socrates was a 
philosopher] ist true at t1, i.e., that proposition presently is true with regard to t1, iff  Socrates pastly 
is a philosopher with regard to t1 (and, if  Socrates ist no more a philosopher, he is not presently a 
philosopher with regard to t1), namely (since Socrates is defined in his identity conditions before 
t1) there is some t with regard to which Socrates presently is a philosopher and t precedes t1. 
 [Socrates will be a philosopher] ist true at t1, i.e., that proposition presently is true with 
regard to t1, iff  Socrates futurely is a philosopher with regard to t1, i.e., there is some t with regard 
to which Socrates presently is a philosopher and such that t1 precedes t. However, I am not inclined 
to think that such truth-conditions obtain, since I am not inclined to accept that determinism is 
true. Finally, in order to deal with difficult cases such as [Socrates ist a philosopher] is now true, it 
is worth introducing further ascription relations that involve properties, propositions, minded 
subjects and times. Thus, that proposition is now true iff  there are some minded subject and some 
time, such that that subject presently thinks of  that proposition with regard to that time and s/he 
ascribes to it at that time the property of  presently being true and Socrates presently is a philosopher 
with regard to that time (I shall clarify this analysis in few pages). This does not imply that the 
minded subject should ascribe to that proposition the property of  presently being true with regard 
to that time: the subject might not know the time and s/he might nevertheless claim that that 
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proposition presently is true. 
 A temporal proposition is a proposition that involves within its truth-conditions 
temporally existing objects and (more generally) objects that are temporally defined in their 
identity-conditions. Furthermore, temporal propositions attribute to those objects tensed 
properties with regard to times. Such propositions are true simpliciter iff  there is some time with 
regard to which they are presently true, while they are not true simpliciter iff  there is no time with 
regard to which they are presently true. On the other hand, this account does not exclude that 
there are non-temporal propositions that are not presently true at any time, even though they are 
true simpliciter. Such propositions could involve within their truth-conditions objects that do not 
temporally exist (e.g., God) or, more generally, that are defined in their identity conditions 
independently of  time. I do not wish to dwell on the problem of  propositions' identity 
conditions here (in particular, on their being dependent on objects involved in their truth-
conditions), since this section only presents a sketch of  a Meinongian presentist theory. 
 What about propositions claiming that an object instantiates simpliciter a property? Aret 
they only true with regard to times or are they true simpliciter too? I think that there is a sense in 
which they can be considered true simpliciter too, at least if  we introduce the aforementioned 
restrictive clause on properties that can be instantiated simpliciter and on negative properties. 
 Finally, let me consider the truth-conditions of  our initial data at some definite time t1. 
First, I shall analyze 
 
(57) Socrates existed 
 
and 
 
(58) Socrates does not exist anymore, 
  
that are respectively true at t1 iff 
 
(57mein-pres.) EPASTsOt1 
 
and 
 
(58mein-pres.) EPASTsOt1 & ~EPRESsOt1 
 
(where "sO" is a constant standing for Socrates).  
 With regard to  
 
(59) Socrates has ceased to exist, 
 
(60) Michele exists now, 
 
(61) Michele did not exist, 
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(62) Michele has started to exist, 
 
it is possible to give the following truth-conditions at t1: 
 
(59mein-pres.) ~EPRESsOt1 &  t0(PRt0t1 & EPRESsOt0) 
 
(60mein-pres.)  m(A9PRESTPRESpImt1 & EPRESmMt1) 
 
(61mein-pres.)  t0(PRt0t1 & ~EPRESmMt0) 
 
(62mein-pres.)  tABBmMt 
 
(where A9PRES is an ascription relation presently (with regard to t1) holding between properties, 
objects, minded subjects and times, "mM" is a constant standing for Michele, "TPRES" stands for 
the property of  presently being true, "pI" is a constant standing for the proposition [Michele 
presently exists]). It is worth noticing that (60) can be reinterpreted in order to make [I exist now] 
true by simply claiming that Michele is that minded subject that ascribes to that proposition the 
property of  presently being true at t1. The reference of  "now" to times turns out to be relative to 
ascription relations involving the present truth of  propositions, times, minded subjects and 
propositions themselves. It is true that my account concedes to non-presentists that there is more 
than one strict present (since strict presents are relative to times), so that it offers a relativized 
analysis of  "now". Yet, it safeguards presentism as long as it admits substantial change and it 
affirms the primacy of  present existence over non-present existence. 
 With regard to 
 
(63) Nothan will exist (and he does not exist now), 
 
whose truth-conditions at t1 can be interpreted as 
 
(63mein-pres.) ~EPRESnOTt1 & EFUTnOTt1 
 
(where "nOT" is a constant standing for Nothan), I cannot but notice two problems. First, we have 
to provide now identity conditions for that future individual. Secondly, nothing seems to guarantee 
now that that individual will exist (i.e., that he presently exist with regard to some future time). 
Thus, it seems to me that, even if  the first task can be performed (by claiming, for example, that 
Nothan is the first kid who will be born in 2014 in Macerata's Central Hospital), the second 
difficulty is insurmountable. It is perhaps false with regard to t1 that (63).  
 Finally, what about non-existent objects that have identity conditions? Let me briefly 
consider the truth at t1 of 
 
(71) there was no Sherlock Holmes (i.e., Sherlock Holmes was not an object). 
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 From my perspective, the truth-conditions of  the proposition expressed by (71) are the 
following ones: 
 
(71mein-pres.) OPRESht1 &  t0(PRt0t1 & ~OPRESht0) 
 
 Since Sherlock Holmes presently is not (with regard to t0) an object, then he futurely is not 
an object (with regard to t0) too. There is no Sherlock Holmes at all at t0 and this is the end of  the 
story. Yet, we can claim that it is true that (71ascr.) only because Sherlock Holmes presently is an 
object with regard to t1
324.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
324 My Meinongian presentism can deal with other problems that typically affect presentist theories and, more 
specifically, those presentist theories that are grounded on tensed properties. For example, Sanson, Caplan (2010) 
argue that the fact that Socrates once had the property of being a philosopher is more fundamental than the fact that 
Socrates now has the property of having been a philosopher, so that one could not primarily invoke this latter past-
tensed property in order to ground the truth of [Socrates was a philosopher] without recognizing that there are now 
objects that are not present. I could simply reply that it is precisely in virtue of the fact that Socrates – the same 
Socrates who does not now exist – presently is a philosopher with regard to some time t that precedes the present time 
that Socrates pastly is a philosopher with regard to the present time, so that their intuition is respected without 
abandoning presentism. Furthermore, Baron (2013) roughly claims that presentism does not respect an intuition 
according to which true past propositions such as [Socrates was a philosopher] are about the past. Yet, in my theory, 
they are precisely about Socrates!  
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II.5. Epilogue in Heaven: the Existence of God 
In this final chapter, I shall briefly defend two arguments for the existence of  God. According to 
the first argument (a reading of  Anselm's ontological argument based on my theory of  existence 
as possessing dispositions to act and on some elements of  the ascriptivistic theory), it is 
contradictory to assert that God is the greatest conceivable being and that He does not exist. 
Following the second argument, it is contradictory to imagine that there are possible worlds and 
that there exists no omniscient minded subject that can individuate them.  
 
II.5.1. The Greatest Conceivable Being. 
My reading of  Anselm's ontological argument goes as follows: 
 
(oa1)     GREATESTg A 
(oa2)      x(GREATESTx ↔ ~ yGREATERyg) A 
(oa3)      x(~Ex → ~ P(DMP & Px)) A 
(oa4)      x(~ P(DMP & Px) →  yGREATERyx) A 
(oa5)     GREATESTg ↔ ~ yGREATERyg                                                                                      (oa2) E 
(oa6)     GREATESTg → ~ yGREATERyg (oa5) ↔E 
(oa7)     ~ yGREATERyg (oa1),(oa6) →E 
(oa8)     ~ P(DMP & Pg) →  yGREATERyg (oa4) E 
(oa9)     ~~ P(DMP & Pg) (oa7),(oa8) MT 
(oa10)    P(DMP & Pg) (oa9) ~E 
(oa11)   ~Eg → ~ P(DMP & Pg) (oa3) E 
(oa12)   ~~Eg (oa10),(oa11) MT 
(oa13)   Eg (oa12) ~E 
 
"GREATEST", "GREATER" and "DM" respectively stand for the n-adic properties of  being the greatest 
conceivable being, of  being conceivable as greater than, of  being a moral disposition; "g" is a 
constant standing for God325.             
The premises assert that: God is the greatest conceivable being (oa1); for everything, that 
thing is the greatest conceivable being iff  there is nothing that is conceivable as greater than it 
(oa2); for every object, if  it does not exist, then there is no property, such that that property is a 
moral disposition and it is instantiated by that object (oa3); for every object, if  there is no moral 
disposition that is instantiated by that object, then there is some other object, such that it is 
conceivable as greater than the first one (oa4). 
 The first premise (oa1) can be accepted by definition: regardless of  His existence, God is 
the greatest conceivable being. The third premise (oa3) simply asserts something that is justified 
                                                 
325 For a list of symbols, see the Appendix (pp. 281-284). 
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by the theory of  existence developed in the chapter II.2: non-existent objects do not have any 
disposition to act and, since moral dispositions (i.e., dispositions to make some good action) are 
dispositions to act, they do not have any moral disposition.  
However, Anselm's fool might not accept (oa2) and/or (oa4). With regard to (oa2), he 
might reply that conceivability is ambiguous. Something can be conceived of  as the greatest 
being, even if  this does not imply anything about the actual world: I can conceive of  God as the 
greatest being within the fictional context defined by some story (e.g., the Bible), even if  this does 
not imply that God is the greatest possible being within the actual world and/or within some 
possible world accessible or not accessible from the actual world. I accept this objection. Yet, I 
think that someone who takes (oa2) as true might in turn reply that this notion of  conceivability 
is too weak: in order for something to be conceivable as being such-and-such, it is not simply 
requested that it can be thought of  by some minded subject as having some properties, but that it 
is legitimate to conceive of  that being as being such-and-such, i.e., for example, that there is some 
logically possible world in which that being is such-and-such. Furthermore, it is also requested 
that, by asserting that God is the greatest conceivable being, we imply that there is no logically 
possible world in which there is some being that is greater than God. In sum, God is the greatest 
conceivable being iff  He has the (negative) modal property of  non-possibly being such that there 
is some being different from Him that is greater than Him (not simply the property of  possibly 
being such that there is no being different from Him that is greater than Him). 
 These remarks imply that, if  God does not exist, then it is conceivable that there is some 
being within the actual world that is possibly greater than God, i.e., that there is some being (e.g., 
my friend Sam) that has the modal property of  possibly being greater than God. Yet, this implies 
a contradiction.  
 It is true that the fool might reply that God, according to him, is only a fictional object 
that can have properties only within fictional contexts that are not possible worlds and/or that 
He does not have the property of  being the greatest possible being (a de re possibility) or, 
equivalently, of  non-possibly being such that there is some being different from Him that is 
greater than Him (a de re impossibility) in worlds in which He does not exist. Yet, with regard to 
the first objection, nothing seems to forbid that there is at least one logically possible world in 
which God exists: God is not a logically impossible object and, as we have already seen with 
regard to Sherlock Holmes, the fictional contexts defined by some stories about God can be 
completed in order to obtain logically possible worlds. In sum, there seems to be nothing 
contradictory in the idea of  God: God seems not to be an inconsistent object.  
 Concerning the second objection, the non-actualist believer might reply that God 
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instantiates the property of  being the greatest possible being (a de re possibility) even in possible 
worlds in which it seems that He does not exist: in principle, at least for non-actualists, in order 
for something to have some property, it is not requested that that thing exists. Thus, my argument 
seems not to beg the question, since I might imagine that there is some possible world in which 
God instantiates some de re possibility, even without asserting that He exists in that world simply in 
virtue of the fact that He has some property in that world.   
 What about (oa4)? If  God does not exist, my friend Sam can be conceived of  as greater 
than God for two reasons. First, he can do some good action, while God, if  He does not exist, 
cannot do any good action. Yet, this seems not to be sufficient in order for something to be 
greater than some other thing: even if  an evil person exists and has moral dispositions, if  that 
person only makes evil actions, then that person does not seem to be greater than a non-existent 
object that can make neither good, nor bad actions. However, it is not requested that Sam does in 
fact more good than bad actions in order for him to be conceivable as greater than God: it is only 
requested that he is possibly greater than God, since God does not exist, while Sam exists and 
can do good actions – since he has moral dispositions. 
 Finally, there is no distinction, within my theory, between mental existence and real 
existence: if  God does not exist, He does not exist at all, even if  He can be considered an object 
and He instantiates some properties. 
 
II.5.2. The Omniscient Minded Subject. 
My second proof  for the existence of  God aims at demonstrating that there exists an omniscient 
minded subject that constitutes possible worlds qua mental objects. The proof  goes as follows: 
 
(om1)        Tp1 & MODp1                                                  A 
(om2)         p((Tp & MODp) →  x(SETPWx & TSETpx)) A 
(om3)         x(SETPWx →  y(PWy & IDENTy & PARTyx))                                A 
(om4)         x(PWx → MENTx)                                                                  A 
(om5)         x(MENTx ↔  mIDDEPxm)                                                       A 
(om6)         x m((IDENTx & IDDEPxm) → Em)                                           A 
(om7)         x(PWx → ~ m(~OMm & IDDEPxm))                                       A 
(om8)        (Tp1 & MODp1) →  x(SETPWx & TSETp1x)                                 (om2)  E 
 (om9)         x(SETPWx & TSETp1x)                                                             (om1),(om8) →E 
(om10)      SETPWs1 & TSETp1s1                                                                                   H( E) 
(om11)      SETPWs1 (om10) &E 
(om12)      SETPWs1 →  y(PWy & IDENTy & PARTys1)                                      (om3)  E 
(om13)       y(PWy & IDENTy & PARTys1)                                                      (om10),(om11) →E 
(om14)      PWw1 & IDENTw1 & PARTw1s1                                                      H( E) 
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(om15)      PWw1                                                                                      (om14) &E 
(om16)      PWw1 → MENTw1                                                                     (om4)  E 
(om17)      MENTw1                                                                                   (om15),(om16) →E 
(om18)      MENTw1 ↔  mIDDEPw1m                                                           (om5)  E 
(om19)      MENTw1 →  mIDDEPw1m (om18) ↔E 
(om20)       mIDDEPw1m                                                                            (om17),(om19) ↔E 
(om21)      IDDEPw1m1                                                                                H( E) 
(om22)      IDENTw1                                                                                   (om14) &E 
(om23)      IDENTw1 & IDDEPw1m1                                                               (om21),(om22) &I 
(om24)       m((IDENTw1 & IDDEPw1m) → Em)                                            (om6)  E 
(om25)      (IDENTw1 & IDDEPw1m1) → Em1                                                 (om24)  E 
(om26)      Em1                                                                                        (om23),(om25) →E 
(om27)      PWw1 → ~ m(~OMm & IDDEPw1m)                                           (om7)  E 
(om28)      ~ m(~OMm & IDDEPw1m)                                                        (om15),(om27) →E 
(om29)       m~(~OMm & IDDEPw1m)                                                        (om28) QE 
(om30)      ~(~OMm1 & IDDEPw1m1)                                                          (om29)  E 
(om31)      ~~OMm1 V ~IDDEPw1m1                                                          (om30) DM 
(om32)      ~~OMm1                                                                                (om21),(om31) DS 
(om33)      OMm1                                                                                     (om32) ~E 
(om34)      Em1 & OMm1                                                                          (om26),(om33) &I 
(om35)       m(Em & OMm)                                                                     (om34)  I 
(om36)       m(Em & OMm)                                                                     (om20), (om21)-(om35)( E) 
(om37)       m(Em & OMm)                                                                     (om13), (om14)-(om36)( E) 
(om38)       m(Em & OMm)                                                                     (om9), (om10)-(om37)( E) 
 
"T", "MOD", "SETPW", "TSET", "PW", "IDENT", "PART", "MENT", "IDDEP", "OM" stand for the n-adic 
properties of: being true, being a modal proposition, being a set of  possible worlds, being true 
within a set of  possible worlds, being a possible world, being identified, being part of, being a 
mental object, identity-depending on, being an omniscient minded subject. The constants "p1", 
"w1", "s1", "m1" respectively stand for: some definite true modal proposition (e.g., the proposition 
[Michele might have not existed]), some definite possible worlds, some definite set of  possible 
worlds and some definite minded subject. 
 The premises assert that: the proposition [Michele might have not existed] is a true modal 
proposition (om1); for every proposition, if  that proposition is a true modal one, then there is a 
set of  possible worlds in which it is true (om2); for every object, if  that object is a set of  possible 
worlds, then there is some object that is an identified possible world and that is part of  it (om3); 
for every object, if  that object is a possible world, then it is a mental object (om4); for every 
object, that object is mental iff  there is some minded subject on which it identity-depends (om5); 
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for every object and every minded subject, if  that object is identified and if  it identity-depends 
on that minded subject, then that minded subject exists (om6); for every object, if  that object is a 
possible world, then there is no minded subject, such that that subject is not an omniscient 
minded subject and that object identity-depends on it (om7). 
 I have already defended some of  these premises in other parts of  this work. In particular, 
(om1) and (om2) concern my position about modal propositions and my interpretation of  their 
truth-conditions. With regard to (om3), it simply asserts that, if  it is true that there is a set of  
possible worlds in which some proposition (e.g., the proposition [Michele does not exist]) is true, 
then each possible world that is part of  that set is identified. It is worth noticing that, according 
to my perspective, [Michele does not exist] is a proposition that contributes to the identity of  
possible worlds in which Michele does not exist too. In fact, I do not think that some proposition 
is true in a world iff  the referent of  the logical subject of  that proposition exists in that world. 
Otherwise, [Sherlock Holmes is a fictional object] would not be true in the actual world. Within 
my theory, [Sherlock Holmes] actually2 refers to Sherlock Holmes, that is a fictional object that is 
part of  the actual2 world, even if  he does not exist.  
 Possible worlds are mental objects (om4), as I have already tried to argue. In fact, they 
identity-depend on propositions, that are in turn mental objects. On the other hand, it seems to 
me false that propositions depend for their identity and for their truth-values on possible worlds 
in which they are true or false. Possible worlds are constructed out of  propositions. By weakening 
the ontological status of  possible worlds (that are neither unactualized states of  affairs, nor 
properties, nor worlds just like the actual world), it seems that we can deal with many data and 
problems. Thus, why do we have to admit that possible worlds are something more than mental 
objects? 
 The premises (om5) and (om6) assert something that is part of  my theory of  existence 
and non-existence. Mental objects are defined in their identity-conditions by minded subjects that 
think of  them and these minded subjects need to exist in order to think of  such objects. If  they 
did not exist, there would be no such mental objects. However, no non-omniscient minded 
subject can constitute possible worlds qua mental objects (om7). Non-omniscient minded 
subjects cannot establish, for every property (even included modal properties) and every object, 
whether that property is instantiated or is not instantiated by that object. Thus, if  there are 
possible worlds and if  such worlds are mental objects, then there exists some omniscient minded 
subject (that can be identified with God, even if  we should demonstrate that that subject has 
other properties typically attributed to God and that He can create the actual world) that thinks 
of  them. 
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Conclusive Remarks 
In this work, I have tried to argue for several theses. I shall now summarize the results of  my 
inquiry into the notions of  existence and non-existence. I have criticized the thesis (actualism), 
according to which everything whatsoever exists (and the cognate thesis (actualism-a), according 
to which existence is not a first-order and informative property), by noticing that there are 
internal and (at least from my viewpoint) insurmountable difficulties within each actualist strategy 
for dealing with true existential statements (and propositions) and with seemingly true statements 
(and propositions) concerning non-existent items. Furthermore, I do not see any reason either 
for accepting (actualism) and (actualism-a) as first principles or, if  we do not aim at accepting 
them as first principles, as well-grounded theses. 
 Further problems for actualists have emerged from my investigation on the ontology of  
fiction and the ontology of  modality and time. In particular, such problems concern the truth-
makers for true (internal and external) statements (or propositions) about ficta, the ontological 
status of  mere possibilia, the ontological grounds of  contingent existence, the justification of  
substantial change and the conjunction of  (actualism) (and (actualism-a)) and presentism.  
 After these first, critical remarks, it is worth summarizing the positive theses defended in 
the second part of  this work. First, after having accepted a two-category ontology according to 
which there are both objects (in a wide sense) and properties and after having justified the 
irreducibility of  negative properties to positive ones and an abundant conception of  properties, I 
have tried to defend a conception of  existence only as a first-order and informative property. It 
seems to me legitimate to quantify over both existing and non-existing items, provided that such 
items have definite identity conditions, so that what is requested in order to quantify over 
something simply is the fact that that thing is something, i.e., that it is identical with itself  and it has 
definite identity conditions.   
 My justification of  the thesis that existence is only a first-order and informative property 
has been (at least in part) dialectical: I have tried to reject alternative possibilities. In particular, I 
have explicitly argued against the view that existence is a multi-level, non-informative property, 
i.e., the view according to which everything whatsoever instantiates existence. Even if  there were 
a property such as a non-informative and multi-level property of  existing, that property would 
not be involved within the truth-conditions of  our true ordinary existential claims. Thus, it is 
either legitimate to claim that there are (at least) two different meanings of  the predicate "exist" 
and that "exist" is used with its informative meaning in our true ordinary existential claims or that 
the only acceptable meaning of  "exist" is the one that is involved within our true ordinary 
existential claim, i.e. the informative meaning. So far, so good.  
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 If  existence is only a first-order and informative property, what about true general 
existential statements? I accept that, for everything, that thing is a lion, only if  it exists, so that 
there is no object that is a non-existent lion, i.e., I accept that there are existence-entailing 
properties. On the other hand, there are non-existence entailing properties too, e.g., the property 
of  being fictional, so that there is no existing fictional object. Finally, there are properties that are 
neither existence-, nor non-existence-entailing, e.g., the property of  being an object. What about 
the idea that it is true that unicorns do not exist (i.e., that there is no object that exists and that is 
unicorn)? Is the property of  being a unicorn a non-existence-entailing one? Yes, it is, even if  it is 
also possible that there is a world in which something exists and is a unicorn. If  you prefer, we 
can claim that there are weakly non-existence-entailing properties, such as the property of  being a 
unicorn, that are not instantiated within the actual world by objects (they are only ascribed to 
them) but that are instantiated by merely possible objects within other possible worlds, and 
strongly non-existence-entailing properties, such as the property of  being fictional, that are not 
instantiated by existing objects within any possible world (i.e., by objects existing in that world). 
However, given my ontology of  possible worlds, weakly non-existence-entailing properties are 
not instantiated by any (possible) object at all: they are only ascribed to them within possible 
worlds, that are thought of  as peculiar fictional contexts.  
 I have defended a modal, non-foundational and non-relational account of  existence, 
according to which it is necessary that, for everything, that thing exists iff  it has at least one 
causal power. However, in order to solve some problems deriving from the fact that the same 
causal powers are often attributed to different objects (or to different kinds of  objects) and from 
the examination of  the paradox of  fiction, I have elaborated a more refined formulation of  that 
account of  existence.  
 Furthermore, within my perspective, many non-existent objects (e.g., ficta and 
propositions) are mental objects – i.e. objects whose identity-conditions depend on the activity of  
some minded subject(s) -, even though not every non-existent object is a mental one: facts, 
towns, and so on, are non-existent and non-mental objects. Thus, it seems to me legitimate to 
claim that there are existent objects, non-existent mental objects and non-existent and non-
mental ones.  
 I have presented an account of  ficta according to which ficta both instantiate properties 
and have properties ascribed to them. My ascriptivistic theory of  ficta is grounded on the 
introduction of  some peculiar relations (ascription relations) that hold at least between some 
monadic property, some object (or, in some cases, some other property) and some minded 
subject. Furthermore, some ascription relations that hold for ficta involve fictional contexts too. 
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This account has some advantages over concurrent accounts. For example, it is part of  a unified 
theory of  mental activities; it clearly defines some relations between stories, propositions, 
fictional contexts, ficta, and so on; it does not imply that there are true contradictions (neither in 
the actual world, nor in any world); it does not introduce ad hoc surrogates of  ficta, e.g., the 
fictional London in Sherlock Holmes’ stories; it is a creationist account of  ficta, even if  it is 
different from artifactualism (since ficta do not exist). 
 Furthermore, I have extended this account to problems concerning modality, by 
distinguishing a peculiar kind of  fictional contexts (possible worlds) and by introducing the idea 
of  an omniscient minded subject, so that I have sketched a mentalistic approach to possibilia. I 
have presented a Half-Meinongian version of  Presentism, that is grounded on the acceptance of  
non-presently-existing objects and of  tensed properties instantiated with regard to times. Finally, 
I have defended two arguments for the existence of  the greatest conceivable being (in this 
respect, I have reformulated the first version of  Anselm’s ontological argument) and of  an 
omniscient minded subject.  
 The account that I have presented is only a Half-Meinongian one. It is Meinongian, as 
long as it rejects (actualism) and (actualism-a), by accepting that there are items that do not exist 
and that the relevant property of  existing that is involved within the truth-conditions of  true 
existential propositions is only a first-order and informative property. Furthermore, the catalogue 
of  items that do not exist comprehend: mental objects (e.g., ficta and propositions), non-mental, 
yet non-existing objects (e.g., facts, objects that are merely possible and, as regards present 
existence, merely past and merely future objects), properties. This is only a sketch of  an 
ontological system. In addition, quantification is something different from existence: as I have 
already claimed, even if  there were a property of  existence instantiated by every item (i.e., 
everything over which it is legitimate to quantify, everything that has identity conditions), that 
existence would nevertheless be something different from the existence involved in our true 
existential propositions.  
 However, even if  my account is partly Meinongian, it is only Half-Meinongian. First, I do 
not think that every non-existent item is non-mental too. On the other hand, Meinongians usually 
accept that Sherlock Holmes would be a non-existent item, even if  there were no minded subject 
defining its identity conditions. Furthermore, according to them, it is true that Sherlock Holmes 
is an item and that he does not exist even before his creation (i.e., in my own terms, his having 
been defined as an item by some minded subject, that provides his identity conditions). Here is 
an argument against such theses: if  w is a possible world where no minded subject exists, the 
proposition [Sherlock Holmes does not exist] is true in that world. Thus, according to 
277 
 
Meinongians, it is true in that world that there is an item such as Sherlock Holmes. However, the 
proposition [Sherlock Holmes does not exist] is true in that world iff  the proposition [in w, the 
proposition [Sherlock Holmes does not exist] is true] is a true proposition, i.e., provided that it is 
legitimate within a non-actualist perspective to transform every de dicto modal assertion into a 
corresponding de re one, [Sherlock Holmes is such that he does not exist in w] is a true 
proposition. Such latter propositions are part of  whatever there is – i.e., of  our actual1 world. If  
we do not wish to accept that propositions are abstract, necessarily existing (or necessarily 
identified) entities – and I have tried to demonstrate that there is no reason for accepting this 
thesis –, then those propositions’ identity conditions are defined within the actual1 world, where, 
as a matter of  fact, they identity-depend on Sherlock Holmes, who identity-depends, in turn, on 
the activity of  some minded subject (and such propositions are part of  the actual3 world). A 
similar argument could be used against the second Meinongian remark, in order to demonstrate 
that it is legitimate to claim that Sherlock Holmes does not exist before the time of  his creation 
only after the time of  his creation. Provided that t1 is the time of  Sherlock Holmes’ creation, it is 
legitimate to claim only after t1 that Sherlock Holmes does not presently exist before t1.  
 Meinongians could present two objections. First, they could remark that, within my 
perspective, it is never and in no possible world legitimate to claim that it is true that Sherlock Holmes 
has no identity conditions. True! In order to assert that Sherlock Holmes has no identity 
conditions, we would have to assume that Sherlock Holmes is an object, i.e., that he has identity 
conditions, so that a contradiction would follow. Second, I have claimed that it is not 
unreasonable to think that Sherlock Holmes could have existed, i.e. that there is a possible world 
in which Sherlock Holmes exists. Thus, in that world, Sherlock Holmes does not exist and is not 
a mental object even before the time of  his birth, so that Sherlock Holmes is not a mental object. 
Yet, I reply, this does not prove that Sherlock Holmes is not a non-mental object, but that there 
are mental objects (such as Sherlock Holmes) that are not necessarily mental. Furthermore, 
provided that possible worlds (qua peculiar fictional contexts) are mental objects defined in their 
identity conditions by the activity of  some omniscient minded subject, Sherlock Holmes, as a 
matter of  fact, remains a mental object. In sum, the solution goes as follows: Sherlock Holmes is 
a fictional and mental object; an omniscient minded subject can think (and, in fact, it actually 
thinks) of  some possible world where that object exists, so that that object is neither necessarily 
non-existing, nor necessarily mental. Yet, even though that minded subject thinks of  Sherlock 
Holmes as existing within some possible world, it nevertheless thinks that Sherlock Holmes is a 
mental object, so that it is true that Sherlock Holmes is a mental object.  
Yet, here is another Meinongian objection: if  that omniscient minded subject thinks of  
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Sherlock Holmes as being such-and-such and if  that subject exists before the existence of  
Sherlock Holmes’ original author, then that omniscient minded subject is the original author of  
Sherlock Holmes’326. Thus, Sherlock Holmes’ original author (Conan Doyle) simply finds out 
what that omniscient minded subject has already identity-defined, so that Conan Doyle is not 
Sherlock Holmes’ original author. Yet, first, it is not so obvious that that omniscient minded 
subject exists before Conan Doyle: it could be a non-temporally existing object, so that it would 
not be legitimate to make temporal comparisons between that subject and Conan Doyle. Second, 
that non-temporally existing omniscient minded subject still believes that Conan Doyle is 
Sherlock Holmes’ original author: is it wrong about this? Yet, as it has already been established, it 
cannot be wrong about this fact: it is omniscient. Third, this problem is part of  the general 
problem of  secondary causes: if  God – a non-temporally existing object - creates the world, does 
He cause every event that happens in the world? Or is it legitimate to claim that there are 
secondary causes (agents and/or other events) that are able to cause events and that actually 
cause them? One could reply that God is the primary cause of  those events, while other agents 
and/or events, that are caused by God himself  or by other agents and/or events caused by God, 
are their secondary causes. Without such secondary causes, those events simply do not happen, 
i.e. they simply do not have any cause. A similar solution could be adopted with regard to 
Sherlock Holmes: Sherlock Holmes identity-depends on Conan Doyle only if  Conan Doyle 
himself  identity-depends (and depends for his existence, if  the omniscient minded subject creates 
him) on the omniscient minded subject or on other agents and/or events identity-depending (and, 
in the case of  agents, provided that they are created by the omniscient minded subject, 
existentially-depending) on the omniscient minded subject itself. Thus, if  the antecedent is true, 
Sherlock Holmes identity-depends on Conan Doyle. This reply seems to be in favor of  a theistic 
interpretation of  the ontological status of  the omniscient minded subject. Fourth, even if  it were 
true that Conan Doyle is not Sherlock Holmes’ original author, accepting the Meinongian-theistic 
suggestion, how does he find out that character that is already identity-dependent on the 
omniscient minded subject? Does he establish some special connection with that subject, when 
he thinks of  Sherlock Holmes’ stories? It seems to be difficult to defend such an interpretation 
of  the authorial process on purely rational grounds. 
 The second difference between my account and typical Meinongian accounts lies in the 
fact that I think that there are existence-entailing properties and that such properties are neither 
instantiated by non-existent items, nor encoded by them. Furthermore, I do not think that they 
have such properties provided that they have them in other possible (or impossible) worlds. It is 
                                                 
326 I am grateful to Francesco Orilia for this objection. 
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neither true that Sherlock Holmes instantiates the property of  being a detective, nor that he 
encodes it, nor that he is a detective provided that there is a possible (or impossible) world in 
which he instantiates that property. The relation between Sherlock Holmes and the property of  
being a detective is a relation of  ascription, that involves Sherlock Holmes, that property, one 
minded subject and one fictional context. Finally, I have rejected the thesis that there are truly 
impossible objects.  
 Let me now briefly consider some issues in metaontology. I have assumed in the 
introduction that there are substantive existential questions in ontology. However, I can now 
justify this assumption. I have introduced in chapter II.2 an argument against existence as a 
property of  everything whatsoever. Following that argument, if  existence is a multi-level, non-
informative property (since it is a property instantiated by every property too), then there is still a 
sense in which it is legitimate to ask whether things exist or do not exist. Considering objects, it is 
legitimate to ask whether Sherlock Holmes exists or does not exist, even if  many philosophers 
could not agree that existence is only a first-order, informative property. In fact, a Russell-
inspired metaphysician could reply: Sherlock Holmes does not exist, since the properties that are 
used to define Sherlock Holmes are not jointly instantiated. A Quine-inspired metaphysician 
could reply: Sherlock Holmes does not exist, since he is not part of  the ontological commitment 
of  our best theory of  the world. Thomasson could reply: it is true that Sherlock Holmes exists 
qua fictum, even though, when we ask whether Sherlock Holmes exists or does not exist, we can 
give an answer to such question by pointing out that Sherlock Holmes is not a man. I have 
already criticized such replies. Yet, all these replies would not be legitimate and they would be 
useless, if  there were no substantive existential question, at least concerning objects. 
 What about properties? I have claimed that no property exists, even if  every property has 
definite identity conditions, so that it is legitimate to quantify over properties. Thus, on the one 
hand, it is trivially true that there are strange properties such as Goodman’s property of  being 
glue (green or blue). Yet, an ontologist could investigate whether such properties are fundamental 
or not – whether they are instantiated by fundamental objects or not, whether other properties 
are part of  their identity conditions or not. Furthermore, ontologists could investigate whether 
there is a category such as the category of  properties or whether properties are nothing more 
than mental objects (e.g., concepts or predicates, provided that linguistic objects could be 
considered mental ones) or sets. In this latter respect, they could ask, for example, if  the identity 
conditions for properties are identical with the identity conditions for other categories or kinds 
of  items, if  they play the same explanatory role, if  they depend on such items for their identity 
conditions, and so on. In order to develop such investigations, it is neither necessary to ask 
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whether properties exist or do not exist, nor to assume that they trivially exist, as Thomasson 
(2008) and Schaffer (2009) do. 
 These are only intuitions about the methodology of  ontology. Yet, it seems to me that 
one could do ontology, even without presupposing the existence of  the items investigated – at 
least given my peculiar notion of  existence. 
 At the end of  this investigation, there are still some points that are left open. For 
example, one could investigate some further applications of  the ascriptivistic theory of  fictional 
objects. In particular, provided that it aims at being a general account of  intentionality, it is worth 
examining whether (and how) it can be applied to some typical problems concerning perception 
(e.g., whether we directly perceive objects or we perceive them through sense-data). Furthermore, 
one could better justify and defend (or criticize) my argument against the mind-independent 
existence of  propositions by investigating the ontological status of  propositions themselves. 
Finally, my Half-Meinongian Presentism and my mentalistic account of  modality are only 
presented in a provisional form. Thus, it is worth investigating their plausibility with regard to the 
problem of  the nature of  time itself, the other problems that are typically related to Presentism 
and that I could not deal with here (e.g., the problem of  causation), the grounding of  the truth-
value of  counterfactuals, and so on. These are only examples of  further investigations.  
 I only wish to conclude that an inquiry into the notions of  existence and non-existence is 
one of  the most difficult tasks in metaphysics and that it can only be dealt with by aiming at 
presenting (at least) some general and plausible solutions for many metaphysical problems. On 
the one hand, one has to consider a wide variety of  data, questions, arguments and positions, 
adopting rigorous analytical methods. Yet, on the other hand, one has to pay attention to the 
overall structure of  her/his own ontological system – at least in order not to be contradicted by 
herself/himself! I think that this latter task has been often neglected in analytic tradition, even 
though it is at least as important as the former one. Putting it in E. J. Lowe’s terms:  
I have always thought that metaphysics needs to be tackled systematically, rather than piecemeal. I liken the 
task to that of  putting together the pieces of  a gigantic jigsaw puzzle: it’s no use just trying to perfect many 
small but disconnected parts of  the puzzle in the hope that these will eventually fit together, since it’s likely 
there are several different ways in which any small number of  pieces will fit together, no more than one of  
which will be correct. Rather, you need to work simultaneously on the ‘big picture’ and on its many parts327. 
 I hope that my contribution will be useful in the construction of  the "big picture" of  
other metaphysicians too.  
 
 
                                                 
327 See Lowe (2013c).  
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Appendix. What do the Symbols stand for? 
Object Constants Variables ranging over … 
[p1], [p2], … (proposition constants outside 
formulas) 
c, c1, c2, … fictional contexts 
a the actual world (in some 
contexts) 
m, m1, m2, … minded subjects 
b Emma Bovary P, P1, P2, … n-adic properties 
cA the actual world (in some contexts) P̅ negative property non-P  
d Conan Doyle p, p1, p2, … propositions 
dA Dante R, R1, R2, … relations 
dV Darth Vader s, s1, s2, … stories 
f Anselm’s fool t, t0, t1, t2, … times 
fA Faust tY1, tY2, … years 
g God x, y, z, … objects 
gL Lord Gladstone w, w1, w2, … worlds (possible, impossible, 
fictional) 
gO Goethe φ, ψ, … first-order properties 
gON Gonzago   
h Sherlock Holmes   
i I Other Symbols 
j  John [ … ] (isolate a proposition) 
jJ Joyce c( … ) in the context c, … (operator) 
l London C* Castañeda’s consubstantiation 
m1, m2, … (in some contexts, used as 
minded subject constants) 
C**i Castañeda’s consociation (at 
context i) 
mM Michele F it will be the case that … (Prior’s 
operator) 
n Noman ist, aret is (tensed), are (tensed) 
nOT Nothan P it was the case that … (Prior’s 
operator) 
o Obama Pn at some n-degree in the past, it was 
the case that … (Prior’s operator) 
p, p1, p2, … (in some contexts, used as 
proposition constants) 
PPAST, PPRES, 
PFUT … 
is pastly/presently/futurely P 
(with regard to some time) 
pI the proposition [Michele 
presently exists]  
  
pM the proposition [Michele exists]   
pN the proposition [Noman does not 
exist] 
  
pX the proposition [x exists]   
s1, s2, … (in some contexts, used as story 
constants) 
  
sF Goethe’s Faust   
sH the story The Hound of the 
Baskervilles  
  
sHA the story Hamlet    
sO Socrates   
sS the story A Study in Scarlet    
t1, t2, … (in some contexts, used as time 
constants) 
  
u Ulysses   
w1, w2, … (in some contexts, used as 
possible world constants) 
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Property and Relation Constants (and items that instantiate them) 
A1 … is ascribed to … by … (property, object, minded subject) 
A2 … is ascribed to … by … within … (property, object, minded subject, 
fictional context) 
A3 … is ascribed to … and … by … (2-place relation, object, object, minded 
subject) 
A4 … is ascribed to … and … by … within … (2-place relation, object, 
object, minded subject, fictional context) 
A7 … is ascribed to … and … by … (2-place relation, property, property, 
minded subject) 
A9PRES … is presently ascribed to … by … with regard to … (property, object, 
minded subject, time) 
ABB … has an absolute beginning at … (object, time) 
ABE … has an absolute end at … (object, time) 
AC is an actual2 world (fictional context – if the theory presented in chapter 
II.4 is true) 
AD … admires … (object, object) 
AUO … is the author simpliciter of … (minded subject, object – fictional) 
AUOC … is the original author of … (minded subject, fictional context) 
AUOO … is the original author of … (minded subject, object – fictional) 
AUOS … is the original author of … (minded subject, story) 
B … is story-bound simpliciter to … (object – fictional, story) 
BE … is more beloved than … (object, object) 
BO … is originally story-bound to … (object – fictional, story) 
C it is distinctly conceivable that … has … (object, property) 
C1 it is conceivable that … has … (object, property) 
C2 it is conceivable that … is more … than (object, property, object) 
C3 … conceives … as … (object, object, property) 
CINF … is a criterion of identity that is not for fictional objects (object) 
CO … is the context of origin of … (fictional context, object – fictional) 
CON … is a conjunctive property (property) 
CONST … constitutes … as an object (minded subject, object) 
D … defines … (story, fictional context) 
DE … is a detective (object) 
DEM it is demonstrable that … has … (object, property) 
DI … is a disjunctive property (property) 
DM … is a moral disposition (property) 
DR … is directed by … (object – movie, object) 
DY … dies (object) 
DYT … died in … (object, year) 
E … exists (object – if the theory presented in II.2 is true) 
ECM … is a conventional essence of (property, object) 
ECONT … contingently exists (object) 
ECONT-ACT … contingently exists with regard to the actual2 world (object) 
ECONT-NON … contingently does not exist (object) 
EENT … is an existence-entailing property (property) 
EFUT … futurely exists (with regard to some time) (object, time) 
EIMP … does not possibly exist (object) 
EM … has mental existence (object) 
EN … is English (object) 
ENEC … necessarily exists (object) 
ENON-NEC-POSS … does not necessarily exist, yet possibly exists (object) 
EPAST … pastly exists (with regard to some time) (object, time) 
EPRES … presently exists (with regard to some time) (object, time) 
ER        … has real existence (object) 
E̅R      … does not have real existence (object) 
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ESEMP … sempiternally exists (object) 
ESSENCE … is an essence of … (property, object) 
ETEMP … temporally exists (object) 
E* … is a referring definite denoting concept (Orilia’s definite denoting 
concept) 
F … is a fictional object (object) 
FAM1, FAM2 (different degrees of fame) 
FOLL … follows … (time, time) 
G … is the greatest being (object) 
GOD … is God-like (object) 
GR … is greater than … (object, object) (different properties as degrees) 
GREATER … is conceivable as greater than … (object, object) 
GREATEST … is the greatest conceivable being (object) 
HO … holds between … and … (object – criterion of identity, object, object) 
HT … has a tea with … (object, object) 
IDDEP … identity-depends on … (object, object) (object, minded subject) 
IDENT … is identified (object) 
IL    … is a legitimate identifier of … and … (minded subject, object, object) 
IMPERF … is imperfect (object) 
INS … inspires … (object, minded subject) 
INT1, INT2   (different degrees of intelligence) 
IS … is a good interpreter of … (minded subject, story) 
L … lives (object) 
LI … lives in … (object, object) 
M … is identical with Michele (object) 
MA … is the material support of … (object, story) 
MARK (some property that is a mark of existence) (object) 
MENT  … is a mental object (object) 
MO … is a movie (object) 
MOD … is a modal proposition (proposition) 
N it is necessary that … has … (object, property) 
NH … is named "Sherlock Holmes" (object) 
NOTHAN … is identical with Nothan (object) 
OBAM … is identical with Obama (object) 
OM … is an omniscient minded subject (minded subject) 
OPRES … presently is an object (with regard to some time) (object, time) 
PA … is part of … (proposition, story) 
PAC … is part of … (object, fictional context) 
PART … is part of … (object, story) 
PE … is a perfection (property) 
PINDPW  … is an individuating possible world’s property (property) 
POL … is a politician (object) 
POS … is positive (first-order property) 
PR … precedes … (story, story) (year, year) (time, time) 
PRC … is a conjunct of … (property, property – conjunctive) 
PROX … is proximate to … except for … (fictional context – possible world, 
fictional context – possible world, proposition) 
PS … is the most perfect being (object) 
PTEMP … is a temporal property (property) 
PU … is a univocally identifying property of … (property, object) 
PUF … is a univocally identifying fictional property of … (property, object – 
fictional) 
PW … is a possible world (possible world) (fictional context – if the theory 
presented in II.4 is true) 
S … is identical with Socrates (object) 
SETPW … is a set of possible worlds (object) 
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SW … stopped writing in … (object, year) 
T … is true (proposition) 
TC … is true in … (proposition, fictional context) 
TH … thinks of … (minded subject, object) 
TPRES … is presently true (with regard to some time) (proposition, time) 
TPW … is true in … (proposition, fictional context – possible world) 
TS … is true in … (proposition, story) 
TSET … is true within … (proposition, object – set of possible worlds) 
U … is understood (object) 
W … writes … at … (minded subject, story, time) 
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